{ "id": 4265768, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF THOMAS E. DAVID, Petitioner and Counter-respondent-Appellant, and MARY A. DAVID, Respondent and Counter-petitioner-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of David", "decision_date": "2006-10-02", "docket_number": "Nos. 2\u201404\u20141191, 2\u201405\u20140088 cons.", "first_page": "908", "last_page": "919", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 908" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "99 Ill. 2d 389", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3164374 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "391-92" }, { "page": "392" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/99/0389-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780265 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 169", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821398 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "175" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0169-01" ] }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 743", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469299 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "751", "parenthetical": "rejecting argument that trial court's failure to adhere to provisions of the Act governing educational expenses and modification of child support deprived the trial court of jurisdiction" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0743-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5454603 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1161" }, { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1155-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 C.F.R. \u00a72510.3", "category": "laws:admin_compilation", "reporter": "C.F.R.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 41", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336070 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0041-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 410", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718601 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0410-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71056", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(l)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529-30" }, { "page": "547-49", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "370-71", "parenthetical": "Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 1155", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5454603 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/352/1155-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 957, "char_count": 25626, "ocr_confidence": 0.752, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.99351890452814e-08, "percentile": 0.37249507596774944 }, "sha256": "cc7ced37a582195e95d5672fbfa2a1571a6afe57294ed3d489cb005d70ed2561", "simhash": "1:8dfe4d2efd0ec4ed", "word_count": 4134 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF THOMAS E. DAVID, Petitioner and Counter-respondent-Appellant, and MARY A. DAVID, Respondent and Counter-petitioner-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn these consolidated appeals, petitioner, Thomas E. David, seeks review of two amended qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs) entered by the circuit court of Du Page County. The QDROs awarded a share of Thomas\u2019s pension benefits to respondent, Mary A. David. We dismiss case No. 2 \u2014 04\u20141191 for lack of jurisdiction. In case No. 2 \u2014 05\u20140088, we conclude that the amended QDROs were properly entered and we therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn February 18, 2003, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage. Among the marital property divided under the judgment were various retirement funds, including Thomas\u2019s pensions with Commonwealth Edison Company (ComEd) and Exelon Corporation (Exelon). According to the judgment, the pensions were in \u201cpayout status.\u201d Thomas was evidently a victim of downsizing and was not employed when the judgment was entered. Nonetheless, the trial court assigned 60% of the retirement funds to Mary, reasoning that, although Thomas had lost his job with ComEd/Exelon, he was likely to return to gainful employment, whereas Mary\u2019s earning potential was limited. Of relevance here, the judgment specifically provided, \u201cThe pension received by [Thomas] from Exelon (formerly Commonwealth Edison) shall be divided 60% to Mary *** and 40% to Thomas *** by a Qualified Domestic Relations Order.\u201d Prior to entry of the judgment, the trial court had issued a memorandum opinion in which it indicated that Mary\u2019s share of the pensions should amount to $17,816 per year.\nOn February 27, 2003, the trial court entered two separate QDROs: one pertaining to the ComEd pension (ComEd QDRO) and the other pertaining to the Exelon pension (Exelon QDRO). On September 18, 2003, however, Mary moved to modify the Exelon QDRO. She indicated that the administrator of the Exelon Corporation Employee Savings Plan (Exelon Plan) had determined that the Exelon QDRO did not' conform to the applicable legal requirements. The trial court granted the motion. As amended on September 23, 2003, the Exelon QDRO provided in pertinent part:\n\u201c[Mary] is awarded sixty percent (60%) of the vested portion of [Thomas\u2019s] account balance under the [Exelon] Plan determined as of February 18, 2003, as well as gains and losses subsequent to February 18, 2003 on that portion of [Thomas\u2019s] account balance awarded to [Mary]. The segregation of funds shall be on a pro rata basis by money type and by investment fund. The [Exelon] Plan shall pay [Mary\u2019s] benefit in the form of a lump sum as soon as administratively practicable following the later of the date [szc] on which this order is determined by the Plan Administrator to constitute a QDRO under the Internal Revenue Code and ERISA (Employee Retirement Income Security Act).\u201d\nSubsequently, on September 24, 2004, Mary also moved to amend the ComEd QDRO. She claimed that the administrator of the Commonwealth Edison Company Service Annuity System had determined that the original ComEd QDRO did not assign Mary any right to Thomas\u2019s early retirement benefits, supplemental benefits, and cost-of-living adjustments. Mary sought amendment of the QDRO to provide her with a share of these payments. Thomas objected to Mary\u2019s motion and also filed a motion to \u201camend and superceed [sic]\u201d the original and amended Exelon QDROs. Thomas objected that neither QDRO conformed to the judgment of dissolution. With respect to the amended Exelon QDRO, Thomas complained that Mary was improperly awarded gains and losses accruing on her portion of the pension account after the dissolution of the marriage. Thomas insisted that Mary was entitled to the value of her portion of the pension only as of the date of dissolution.\nOn October 25, 2004, the trial court granted Mary\u2019s motion to amend the ComEd QDRO. As amended, the ComEd QDRO provided, in pertinent part:\n\u201cBenefits will be paid *** directly to [Mary], as follows:\na. [Mary] is hereby assigned the sum of Sixty Percent (60%) of [Thomas\u2019s] monthly benefit in the Pension Plan, including supplemental benefit and early retirement subsidy, said benefit to be determined on February 18, 2003. [Mary] is entitled to a pro-rata share of any cost-of-living adjustments made to [Thomas\u2019s] pension benefits.\u201d\nOn November 16, 2004, Thomas moved, pro se, to \u201cconform\u201d the amended ComEd QDRO to the judgment of dissolution. He argued that the amended ComEd QDRO improperly expanded Mary\u2019s rights under the original judgment. Prior to the disposition of this motion, Thomas\u2019s attorney filed a notice of appeal on November 24, 2004. That same day, Thomas filed a motion to reconsider the order amending the ComEd QDRO. On December 22, 2004, the trial court denied Thomas\u2019s motion to amend and supercede the original and amended Exelon QDROs and also denied his motion to conform the amended ComEd QDRO to the judgment of dissolution. (Although the trial court\u2019s written order did not specifically mention Thomas\u2019s November 24, 2004, motion to reconsider, the trial court\u2019s remarks from the bench indicate that the court\u2019s ruling disposed of that motion.) On January 21, 2005, Thomas filed a second notice of appeal. This court consolidated the appeals.\nANALYSIS\nInitially, a question of appellate jurisdiction arises. Thomas filed separate notices of appeal on November 24, 2004, and January 21, 2005. When the former notice of appeal was filed, Thomas\u2019s motion to \u201cconform\u201d the October 25, 2004, amended ComEd QDRO to the judgment of dissolution was pending. Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(2) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(2)) provides, in pertinent part: \u201cWhen a timely post-judgment motion has been filed by any party, *** a notice of appeal filed before the entry of the last pending post-judgment motion shall have no effect and shall be withdrawn by the party who filed it.\u201d Here, Thomas\u2019s motion was in the nature of a postjudgment motion, and it was not decided until December 22, 2004. As such, the November 24, 2004, notice of appeal was of no effect and should have been withdrawn. Consequently, the appeal arising from that notice of appeal (case No. 2 \u2014 04\u20141191) must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The second notice of appeal was timely, however. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction in case No. 2 \u2014 05\u20140088, and we will proceed to consider the merits of Thomas\u2019s appeal.\nThe Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) generally restricts the alienation of certain retirement benefits. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a71056(d)(l) (2000). However, under an important exception to this principle, in a divorce or dissolution of marriage proceeding, ERISA permits a state court to enter a QDRO assigning one spouse an interest (as marital property) in the other spouse\u2019s retirement benefits. The QDRO must comply with specific requirements set forth in ERISA. See 29 U.S.C. \u00a71056(d)(3) (2000). Thomas argues that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the amended QDROs here, because they improperly deviated from the terms of the judgment of dissolution pertaining to the distribution of his pensions. In support of the basic premise of his argument \u2014 that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter a QDRO that did not conform to the judgment of dissolution \u2014 Thomas cites In re Marriage of Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d 410 (2003). In Allen, the trial court entered a QDRO giving the wife a smaller fraction of the husband\u2019s pension than provided in the original dissolution judgment. The QDRO corrected a mathematical error in the original judgment, which had the effect of giving her credit for pension benefits that were not earned during the marriage. Nonetheless, the wife complained that the QDRO did not conform to the dissolution judgment, and she sought to amend the QDRO to distribute the pension in accordance with the formula in the judgment of dissolution. The Allen court affirmed the trial court\u2019s decision to amend the QDRO, rejecting the husband\u2019s argument that the trial court had acted outside its jurisdiction:\n\u201c[W]e believe the court has jurisdiction to amend a QDRO to conform it to the judgment. Although the trial court loses jurisdiction to amend a judgment after 30 days from entry, it retains indefinite jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. [Citation.] The judgment in this case specified a formula for use in determining the [wife\u2019s] share of the [husband\u2019s] pension. The original QDRO contained a different formula. The amendment to the QDRO changed the formula to conform to the judgment. This change did not impose new or different obligations on the parties. The rights and obligations of the parties vested when the judgment became final. [Citation.] The amendment to the QDRO was necessary to enforce the [wife\u2019s] rights and obligations with respect to the pension. Since the amended order only enforced the provisions of the judgment, the court had jurisdiction to make the modifications.\u201d Allen, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 412-13.\nThus, consistent with Thomas\u2019s argument, the salient inquiry, in light of Allen, is whether the amended QDROs conform to the dissolution judgment or whether they impose new or different obligations. Thomas contends that the amended QDROs improperly deviated from the judgment of dissolution. He emphasizes that the judgment of dissolution awarded Mary \u201c60 percent of Thomasfs] pension earned *** during [the] marriage,\u201d and \u201cdid not describe, discuss, or otherwise order that [Mary] be entitled to subsequent \u2018supplemental benefits,\u2019 or any \u2018early retirement subsidy,\u2019 or that she share in any \u2018cost-of-living adjustments made\u2019 to Thomas\u2019 [sic] pension benefits.\u201d Obviously, the argument presupposes that these items are not already subsumed within the definition of \u201cpension\u201d itself, in which case the trial court\u2019s failure to enumerate them in the judgment of dissolution would signify nothing. The question starkly presented, therefore, is, what does \u201cpension\u201d mean, as used in the judgment? In answering this question, it is helpful to consider the amended ComEd QDRO and the amended Exelon QDRO separately. We consider the amended ComEd QDRO first.\nGenerally speaking, \u201cjudgments may be construed like other written instruments.\u201d In re Marriage of Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d 41, 57 (1999). \u201cFor instance, although an unambiguous judgment must be enforced as drafted, an ambiguous judgment may be read in conjunction with the entire record and construed in accordance therewith.\u201d Breslow, 306 Ill. App. 3d at 57. The term \u201cpension\u201d means \u201c[Retirement benefit paid regularly (normally, monthly), with the amount of such based generally on length of employment and amount of wages or salary of pensioner.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1134 (6th ed. 1990). As far as the record shows, the various items specified in the amended ComEd QDRO \u2014 early retirement benefits, supplemental benefits, and cost-of-living adjustments \u2014 are simply part of the package of benefits that collectively make up Thomas\u2019s pension. We are aware that, within the labyrinthine provisions of ERISA and its associated regulations, more specialized definitions of \u201cpension\u201d do exist. Notably, in certain circumstances and for certain purposes, Department of Labor regulations treat cost-of-living adjustments as welfare plans rather than pension plans. See 29 C.F.R. \u00a72510.3 \u2014 2(g) (2006). There is no reason to believe, however, that the trial court used the word other than according to its ordinary meaning.\nIn Coterel v. Coterel, 2005 \u2014 Ohio\u20145577, at 112, it was held that a divorce decree awarding the wife \u201cone-half (V2) of all benefits accumulated in [the husband\u2019s] pension\u201d with General Motors Corporation entitled the wife to share in the husband\u2019s supplemental benefit for early retirement. The court rejected the husband\u2019s argument that the decree pertained only to his basic retirement benefit, not the supplemental benefit:\n\u201cThe decree orders \u2018all benefits\u2019 which [the husband] receives from the General Motors Pension Plan upon his retirement divided equally with [the wife]. No evidence was offered showing that the source of both benefits is anything other than the \u2018General Motors Pension Plan\u2019 to which the decree refers, or that the basis for the payments each involves is other than [the husband\u2019s] service as a General Motors employee.\u201d Coterel, 2005 \u2014 Ohio\u20145577, at 119.\nDespite the broader language in the divorce decree in Coterel, we believe the same reasoning applies here. All the benefits at issue in this case were earned through Thomas\u2019s service to ComEd prior to the dissolution of the marriage, and they are all provided for Thomas\u2019s financial support during his retirement. We thus believe the word \u201cpension\u201d in the judgment of dissolution here carries the same broad meaning as the phrase \u201call benefits\u201d in Coterel.\nEven to the extent that the meaning of \u201cpension\u201d in the judgment is in any way ambiguous, examination of the record as a whole tends to bolster our interpretation. Beyond the pensions, the judgment of dissolution awarded Mary a 60% share of five other retirement accounts (two in her name and three in Thomas\u2019s). Given the identical treatment of both pension and nonpension retirement assets, it is difficult to conceive of any reason not to treat the items at issue here in the same fashion.\nThomas points to the trial court\u2019s statement in its memorandum opinion that Mary\u2019s share of the pensions would amount to $17,816 annually. According to Thomas, Mary will receive substantially more if the amended ComEd QDRO stands. The argument fails because, although Thomas argued in the trial court that Mary would receive about $10,000 more per year under the amended QDRO, he presented no evidence to substantiate the claim.\nWe next consider the amended Exelon QDRO. Thomas complains that this order improperly grants Mary benefits that accrued after the dissolution of marriage by awarding her postdissolution gains and losses on her portion of the balance of the pension account. We disagree. The amended Exelon QDRO did not award Mary the dollar value of her assigned share of the pension on the date of dissolution. Rather, the amended Exelon QDRO essentially divvied up the investments in Thomas\u2019s pension account on a pro rata basis pending the liquidation and lump-sum distribution of Mary\u2019s share. This method of dividing the pension is consistent with the judgment of dissolution, which contains no requirement that the assets be liquidated on the date of the judgment. The postdissolution gains and losses are simply a by-product of dividing marital assets with a fluctuating value.\nSUPPLEMENTAL ISSUES ON REHEARING\nThomas filed a petition for rehearing claiming that we overlooked certain points in reaching our decision. Thomas initially contends that we failed to consider that the original judgment granted Mary 60% of all of Thomas\u2019s ComEd pension, even though he had been working for ComEd for over five years before the parties were married. Thus, Thomas maintains that the trial court improperly awarded Mary a portion of his nonmarital property.\nIn his original brief, Thomas noted that the original judgment awarded Mary a nonmarital portion of his pension; Thomas observed that the amended ComEd QDRO \u201cin addition to granting Mary more money than the trial court ordered, does not take this into consideration.\u201d However, Thomas did not specifically ask this court to correct this alleged error. Rather, Thomas requested entry of an order \u201cconforming to the unequivocal terms of the judgment of dissolution.\u201d The judgment of dissolution did not differentiate pension benefits earned during the marriage from those earned before the marriage. Therefore, under Thomas\u2019s own reasoning, the amended QDRO could not deviate from the judgment by exempting part of Thomas\u2019s pension. Indeed, the principal case cited by Thomas \u2014 Allen\u2014held that the parties could not use a QDRO to correct a mistake in the original judgment regarding the portion of a pension that was marital property.\nThomas argues in his petition for rehearing that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to award Mary any part of the pension that constitutes nonmarital property. Thus, according to Thomas, the judgment is void in this respect. Thomas cites, inter alia, this court\u2019s decision in In re Marriage of Roe, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1155, 1161 (2004), which stated that because dissolution of marriage is entirely statutory in origin, \u201c[cjourts in dissolution cases may exercise their powers within the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the statute, and this jurisdiction depends on the grant of the statute.\u201d Roe, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1161. We are bound, however, by our supreme court\u2019s decision in Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), which unequivocally held that \u201c[w]ith the exception of the circuit court\u2019s power to review administrative action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution.\u201d Belleville Toyota, Inc., 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Under Belleville Toyota, Inc., a court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding does not exceed its jurisdiction merely because it overlooks or misapplies the provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2004)). Accord In re Marriage of Waller, 339 Ill. App. 3d 743, 751 (2003) (rejecting argument that trial court\u2019s failure to adhere to provisions of the Act governing educational expenses and modification of child support deprived the trial court of jurisdiction).\nIn re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169 (1998), a case decided before Belleville Toyota, Inc., bolsters our conclusion. When Mitchell was decided, the Act required an order setting child support to state the support level in a dollar amount. The Mitchell court held that an order setting the level of support as a percentage of income, rather than as a fixed dollar amount, was erroneous but not void. The Mitchell court reasoned that where the trial court had jurisdiction over the parties, over the dissolution matter in general, and over the award of child support, an error in the trial court\u2019s judgment did not divest the trial court of jurisdiction. Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d at 175. The Mitchell court based its conclusion, in part, on the traditional rule stated in In re Estate of Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d 1 (1994), that \u201c \u2018[a] void order or judgment is one entered by a court without jurisdiction of the subject matter or the parties, or by a court that lacks the inherent power to make or enter the order involved.\u2019 \u201d Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d at 177, quoting Steinfeld, 158 Ill. 2d at 12.\nRoe cited Mitchell for the proposition that \u201c[wjhen a trial court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding enters an order that it lacks the inherent power to make under the Marriage Act, its order is void.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Roe, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1161. In doing so, Roe embellished Mitchell by adding the words \u201cunder the Marriage Act,\u201d which do not appear in the pertinent quotation from Mitchell. This embellishment is inconsistent with Belleville Toyota, Inc. and with our supreme court\u2019s decision in Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001), which explained that the \u201cinherent power\u201d requirement applies to administrative agencies and courts of limited jurisdiction, not courts of general jurisdiction (i.e., the circuit court). Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-30. Consonant with the reasoning of Mitchell, Steinbrecher, and Belleville Toyota, Inc., we hold that any error in awarding Mary part of the nonmarital portion of Thomas\u2019s pension was not jurisdictional. To the extent that Roe holds that the circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction in a dissolution of marriage proceeding is conferred by statute, Roe is overruled.\nThomas next reprises his argument that the amended ComEd QDRO deviated from the original judgment by awarding supplemental benefits to Mary. Thomas points to a pay stub among the trial exhibits included within the record on appeal. The pay stub indicates a pension payment of $2,474.55 designated \u201cmarital\u201d and a payment of $1,235.01 designated \u201csupplem.\u201d Thomas notes that the monthly amount of $2,474.55 multiplied by 12 equals $29,694.60 annually, and that 60% of this amount equals $17,816.76. Because the trial court found that 60% of Thomas\u2019s pension would amount to $17,816 per year, the implication is that the trial court did not intend to award a portion of the supplemental benefits.\nIn his original appellate brief, Thomas made no mention of this particular exhibit. He cited a pro se motion in which he had argued that the inclusion of supplemental benefits resulted in an award much larger than $17,816. However, he submitted no evidence in support of that pro se motion. In her appellee\u2019s brief, Mary specifically pointed out this shortcoming in Thomas\u2019s argument, so it should have come as no surprise to Thomas when we rejected it. The trial exhibit that Thomas presently cites in his petition for rehearing certainly could have been cited in his reply brief to rebut Mary\u2019s argument. Instead, responding to an observation in Mary\u2019s brief that the record on appeal did not include transcripts of the original trial testimony, Thomas took the position that the evidence presented at trial was not germane to the issue on appeal:\n\u201c[T]he issue on appeal does not have anything to do with what happened at trial. Indeed, the judgment itself is not being and in fact cannot be directly assailed now; what happened at trial leading to the judgment is of little practical import. The issue here is instead more precise: did the amended qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) entered match the terms of the judgment of dissolution? Respectfully, trial transcripts or bystander\u2019s reports are unnecessary to review this issue, under the de novo standard. [Citations.] It is a matter of viewing the judgment itself and the amended QDROs complained of.\u201d\nIf trial transcripts and bystander\u2019s reports are not necessary for review of the issue on appeal, it is difficult to understand how a trial exhibit could be. Now, however, Thomas would have us rely on a single trial exhibit, in a vacuum, to deduce how the trial court calculated the value of Mary\u2019s 60% share of the pension and what the trial court meant by \u201cpension\u201d as used in the judgment. But this shift in position breathes new life into Mary\u2019s concerns about the lack of a complete record. It is a basic principle of appellate review that \u201can appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error.\u201d Foutch v. O\u2019Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). \u201cAny doubts which may arise from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.\u201d Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 392. While, viewed in isolation, the trial exhibit may appear to shed light on the trial court\u2019s reasoning and its understanding of the word \u201cpension,\u201d a full record of the trial testimony might very well place these matters in an altogether different light. Accordingly, we are unwilling to give controlling weight to this single exhibit.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the appeal in case No. 2 \u2014 04\u20141191 and affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County in case No. 2 \u2014 05\u20140088.\nNo. 2 \u2014 04\u20141191, Appeal dismissed.\nNo. 2 \u2014 05\u20140088, Affirmed.\nCALLUM, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER,\nspecially concurring:\nI was on the panel that decided In re Marriage of Roe, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1155 (2004), and I sided with the majority in that decision. Despite my position in Roe, I concur today in the majority\u2019s supplemental decision to adhere to our original judgment in this case.\nI write separately to note that the Roe decision did not include a discussion of either Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), or Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514 (2001). As the majority points out, Belleville Toyota held that \u201c[w]ith the exception of the circuit court\u2019s power to review administrative action, which is conferred by statute, a circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Steinbrecher held that the \u201cinherent power\u201d requirement applies to administrative agencies and courts of limited jurisdiction, not courts of general jurisdiction. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 529-30. Thus, our statement in Roe that a trial court order is void when the court in a dissolution proceeding enters an order that it lacks the inherent power to make under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2002)) is at odds with controlling supreme court precedent. Nevertheless, in closing, I point out that the members of our supreme court are seemingly divided about some of the issues we address today. See Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 370-71 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow, J.) (classifying the majority\u2019s discussion of jurisdiction as \u201cwrong\u201d); Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d at 547-49 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by McMorrow and Kilbride, JJ.) (arguing that a void order is one entered by a court that lacks the inherent power to do so).", "type": "concurrence", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Robert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, for appellant.", "Michael J. Dudek, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF THOMAS E. DAVID, Petitioner and Counter-respondent-Appellant, and MARY A. DAVID, Respondent and Counter-petitioner-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNos. 2\u201404\u20141191, 2\u201405\u20140088 cons.\nOpinion filed October 2, 2006.\nRobert G. Black, of Law Offices of Robert G. Black, of Naperville, for appellant.\nMichael J. Dudek, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0908-01", "first_page_order": 926, "last_page_order": 937 }