{ "id": 4265889, "name": "HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GOMIEN AND HARROP Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Highway Traffic Safety Associates, LLC v. Gomien & Harrop", "decision_date": "2006-10-17", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201405\u20140786", "first_page": "989", "last_page": "997", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 989" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "471 U.S. 462", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6205101 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "477" }, { "page": "544" }, { "page": "2185" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 694", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "700" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 113", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349596 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "120" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0113-01" ] }, { "cite": "839 F. Supp. 364", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 3850840 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/839/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 590", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366751 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "196" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "357 U.S. 235", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6162253 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1958, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/357/0235-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 F. Supp. 2d 1018", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9282761 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/304/1018-01" ] }, { "cite": "629 N.E.2d 733", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "739" }, { "page": "739" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "258 Ill. App. 3d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2878994 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "55" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/258/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "824 N.E.2d 1175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1179" }, { "page": "1181" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 1107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600210 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1112" }, { "page": "1115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/1107-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 Md. App. 425", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 2343781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/94/0425-01" ] }, { "cite": "76 Md. App. 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 4447952 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/76/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. \u00a76", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "Md. Code Ann.", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "391 Md. 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md.", "case_ids": [ 2830761 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "721" }, { "page": "999" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md/391/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "166 Md. App. 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Md. App.", "case_ids": [ 973210 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "832" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/md-app/166/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 702", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" }, { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 997", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2527788 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1001" }, { "page": "1001" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0997-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 902", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570864 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0049-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 823, "char_count": 16766, "ocr_confidence": 0.769, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.666970501906556e-08, "percentile": 0.2928946822768432 }, "sha256": "8baa8544bbe8c96fa2afca38755f5b0fdb6514d56adfcfd2b727d0ba17749fb4", "simhash": "1:229471e8666c5c54", "word_count": 2677 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GOMIEN AND HARROP Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Highway Traffic Safety Associates, LLC, is a consulting firm located in Bethesda, Maryland. The defendant, Gomien & Harrop, was formerly an Illinois law firm. The plaintiff was granted a default judgment in Maryland against the defendant. The plaintiff then filed a motion to enforce judgment here in Illinois under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 650 et seq. (West 2004). The defendant moved to vacate, claiming Maryland lacked personal jurisdiction over it. The circuit court denied the defendant\u2019s motion, finding jurisdiction in Maryland was proper. The defendant appeals, contending the circuit court erred in denying its motion to vacate for lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendant also claims that the trial court erred by allowing the plaintiff to proceed in a civil action in Illinois under section 45 \u2014 45 of the Limited Liability Company Act. 805 ILCS 180/45 \u2014 45(a) (West 2004). We affirm.\nThe parties stipulated the following facts. The defendant law firm, which dissolved on July 31, 2003, was located in Morris, Illinois, at all times relevant to this case. Neither partner of the firm has ever lived or practiced law in Maryland. The defendant did not have any contact with any Maryland resident or entity other than the plaintiff.\nRoger Gomien, a partner in the defendant law firm, represented a plaintiff in a lawsuit against Ford Motor Company (Ford). In May 2003, a motion for summary judgment filed by Ford was pending. To respond to that motion, Gomien deemed it necessary to obtain an affidavit from an expert in the relevant field. Another attorney recommended Allan Kam, the sole owner of the plaintiff consulting firm, to Gomien.\nOn May 20, 2003, Gomien telephoned Kam at the plaintiffs office in Maryland, and they discussed Kam\u2019s qualifications, his hourly fee and his retainer. On May 28, 2003, Gomien again telephoned Kam and engaged his services to review the pending motion and other documents and provide an affidavit supporting the client\u2019s position. Also on that date, Gomien sent Kam a letter of engagement, a $3,000 retainer, and other relevant documents. Kam e-mailed Gomien on May 28 confirming their agreement and attached a copy of his curriculum vitae.\nAt Gomien\u2019s request, Kam contacted another attorney, Robert Palmer, who is an authority on preemption law. On June 2, 2003, Palmer sent Kam a copy of a CD-ROM containing material relevant to the preemption issue in the underlying lawsuit against Ford. Also on June 2, 2003, Gomien faxed Kam 23 additional pages of material to review and mailed him two memoranda of law from other cases. On June 4, 2003, Gomien telephoned Kam and sent him a CD-ROM containing other documents for Kam\u2019s review.\nOn June 7, 2003, Kam sent a draft affidavit to Gomien at Go-mien\u2019s vacation home in Texas. On June 18, 2003, Gomien telephoned Kam at his Maryland office to request revisions to the draft affidavit. Kam made the requested revisions and e-mailed the new draft to Go-mien. On June 19, 2003, Gomien and Kam spoke on the telephone. Kam made further revisions to the affidavit and e-mailed those revisions to Gomien. On June 20, 2003, Kam\u2019s final, notarized affidavit was sent to Gomien\u2019s law office in Illinois' accompanied by an invoice for Kam\u2019s services. The amount due exceeded the $3,000 retainer, and the defendant refused to pay the remainder due.\nThe plaintiff ultimately filed suit against the defendant in the district court of Maryland for Montgomery County. The defendant failed to appear in that suit. On April 14, 2004, the Maryland court granted a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $9,843.75.\nOn June 9, 2004, the plaintiff filed a petition to register a foreign judgment in the circuit court of Grundy County, Illinois. On June 22, 2004, the defendant entered a special appearance and filed a motion to vacate the registration of a foreign judgment, arguing that the Maryland judgment is void because Maryland lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The parties submitted stipulated facts to the court via affidavit by Gomien and Kam, and the court heard legal argument on May 27, 2005. The court issued a written order on October 5, 2005, finding that Maryland properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendant and, thus, denying the defendant\u2019s motion.\nOn appeal, the defendant renews its argument that the Maryland judgment is void because the Maryland court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Specifically, the defendant maintains it did not transact business in Maryland and did not have sufficient contacts with the state. The plaintiff, however, contends that the defendant\u2019s contacts with the State of Maryland constituted a transaction of business and that these contacts were constitutionally sufficient for Maryland to assert personal jurisdiction over it. Our review is de novo. Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 49, 756 N.E.2d 902 (2001).\nInitially, the plaintiff argues that the defendant may not litigate in Illinois the question of Maryland\u2019s personal jurisdiction over the defendant under its long-arm statute. The plaintiff claims the defendant forfeited the right to contest Maryland\u2019s jurisdiction by failing to do so in Maryland. We disagree. \u201c \u2018Under the doctrine of full faith and credit, the forum court will not rehear a case on its merits because the judgment is res judicata. [Citations.]\u2019 \u201d Sackett Enterprises, Inc. v. Staren, 211 Ill. App. 3d 997, 1001, 570 N.E.2d 702, 704 (1991). However, the trial court may inquire into whether a sister state had subject matter and personal jurisdiction in the matter. Sackett Enterprises, 211 Ill. App. 3d 997, 570 N.E.2d 702.\n\u201cIf this inquiry reveals a jurisdictional defect which would either render the foreign judgment void according to the law of the foreign State, or deprive the foreign court of jurisdiction over the nonresident under the general constitutional standards of due process, the foreign judgment has no constitutional claim to full faith and credit.\u201d Sackett Enterprises, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 1001, 570 N.E.2d at 704.\nWhether Maryland courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant starts with a two-part inquiry. MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 166 Md. App. 481, 890 A.2d 818 (2006). First, we must determine whether jurisdiction is authorized under Maryland\u2019s long-arm statute. MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. 481, 890 A.2d 818. Second, we consider whether exercising jurisdiction in this case comports with federal constitutional due process requirements. MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. 481, 890 A.2d 818. Maryland courts have consistently construed their long-arm statute \u201cto authorize the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full extent allowable under the Due Process Clause.\u201d Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 721, 895 A.2d 990, 999 (2006). \u201cThus, \u2018our statutory inquiry merges with our constitutional examination.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. at 498, 890 A.2d at 828.\nMaryland\u2019s long-arm statute provides, in pertinent part, \u201cA court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who directly or by an agent *** [transacts any business or performs any character of work or service in the State.\u201d Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. \u00a76\u2014 103(b)(1) (2006). \u201cA nonresident who has never entered the State, either personally or through an agent, may be deemed to have \u2018transacted business\u2019 in the State within the meaning of subsection (b)(1) as long as his or her actions culminate in \u2018purposeful activity\u2019 within the State.\u201d Sleph v. Radtke, 76 Md. App. 418, 427, 545 A.2d 111, 115 (1988). In this case, the defendant initiated contact with the plaintiff in Maryland, contracted for its services, and sent a retainer and numerous documents to Maryland for Kam to review. Thus, the defendant transacted business in Maryland within the meaning of the statute. See Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co., 94 Md. App. 425, 617 A.2d 1125 (1993).\nFederal due process requires that a \u201cdefendant ha[ve] sufficient \u2018minimum contacts\u2019 with the forum state, such that maintaining an action there comports with \u2018traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Bombliss v. Cornelsen, 355 Ill. App. 3d 1107, 1112, 824 N.E.2d 1175, 1179 (2005). To determine whether a court\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant satisfies due process, we must consider: \u201c(1) whether the nonresident defendant has minimum contacts within the forum state such that he has fair warning that he may be required to defend himself there; (2) whether the action arises out of the defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum State; and (3) whether it is reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum State. [Citations.]\u201d Pilipauskas v. Yakel, 258 Ill. App. 3d 47, 55, 629 N.E.2d 733, 739 (1994).\nFirst, we consider whether the plaintiffs claim arises out of the defendant\u2019s contacts with Maryland. \u201c \u2018If a defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum state are related to the operative facts of the controversy, then an action will be deemed to have arisen from those contacts.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d MaryCLE, 166 Md. App. at 504, 890 A.2d at 832. In a contract case, only the dealings between the parties regarding the disputed contract are relevant to the question of whether a plaintiffs claim arises out of a defendant\u2019s contacts with the forum state. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co. v. Interclaim (Bermuda) Ltd., 304 F. Supp. 2d 1018 (N.D. Ill. 2004). Here, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in Maryland for payment owed under the parties\u2019 agreement for the plaintiff to provide an expert witness affidavit for the defendant\u2019s use in another lawsuit. This claim directly relates to the defendant\u2019s contacts with Maryland. Therefore, this requirement for personal jurisdiction is met.\nSecond, we address whether the defendant had fair warning that it may be required to defend itself in Maryland. The fair warning requirement may be met by showing that the defendant \u201cpurposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws.\u201d Pilipauskas, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 56, 629 N.E.2d at 739. The quality and nature of the defendant\u2019s contacts with Maryland are critical to the question of purposeful availment. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1283, 78 S. Ct. 1228 (1958).\nWhen a contract is at issue, courts have considered the following factors to determine the question of purposeful availment: \u201c(1) who initiated the transaction, (2) where the contract was entered into, and (3) where the performance of the contract was to take place. [Citation.]\u201d Dilling v. Sergio, 263 Ill. App. 3d 191, 196, 635 N.E.2d 590, 594 (1994). \u201c \u2018The strongest factor that seems to have emerged, however, is a determination of whether the defendant initiated the business relationship in some way.\u2019 \u201d Potomac Design, Inc. v. Eurocal Trading, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 364, 370 (D. Md. 1993), quoting Nueva Engineering, Inc. v. Accurate Electronics, Inc., 628 E Supp. 953, 955 (D. Md. 1986).\nIn the instant case, the defendant \u201creached out\u201d into Maryland by initiating contact with the plaintiff by telephone to secure its services. Additionally, the defendant repeatedly telephoned the plaintiff in Maryland and sent numerous documents to Maryland for Kam to review so he could prepare the requested affidavit. The defendant also sent the plaintiff\u2019s initial retainer to Maryland. Indeed, the defendant anticipated that the plaintiff would perform all of its work in Maryland. The defendant deliberately established contact and obligations with a Maryland resident. \u201c \u2018[T]he Due Process Clause may not readily be wielded as a territorial shield to avoid interstate obligations that have been voluntarily assumed.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Ruprecht Co. v. Sysco Food Services of Seattle, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 113, 120, 722 N.E.2d 694, 700 (1999). Thus, we determine that the defendant purposely availed itself of the privileges of conducting business in Maryland. See Ruprecht, 309 Ill. App. 3d 113, 722 N.E.2d 694 (finding that nonresident corporation purposefully directed activities at Illinois where nonresident placed two orders with Illinois resident via fax and obtained information from resident via telephone); see also Sleph, 76 Md. App. 418, 545 A.2d 111.\nThird, we must determine whether Maryland\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the defendant was constitutionally reasonable. To determine what is reasonable, courts consider several factors: \u201c(1) the burden on the defendant of defending the action in the forum state; (2) the forum state\u2019s interest in adjudicating the dispute; (3) the plaintiff\u2019s interest in obtaining effective relief; (4) the interstate judicial system\u2019s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of the action; and (5) the shared interests of the several states in advancing fundamental social policies. [Citation.]\u201d Bombliss, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 1115, 824 N.E.2d at 1181. The Supreme Court has asserted that, once purposeful availment has been established, a defendant must make a \u201ccompelling case\u201d that it is unreasonable or unfair to require it to defend a suit out of state. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477, 85 L. Ed. 2d 528, 544, 105 S. Ct. 2174, 2185 (1985).\nThe defendant has failed to meet its burden. The defendant has not provided us with any compelling reasons to find that Maryland\u2019s exercise of jurisdiction over it was constitutionally unreasonable or unfair. In addition, the applicable factors weigh in favor of the plaintiff\u2019s position. Maryland has an interest in affording its citizens a forum for relief in breach of contract situations, as the plaintiff has an interest in obtaining convenient relief. Furthermore, public policy supports Maryland\u2019s assertion of jurisdiction in this factual scenario. It is fairly routine in litigation to engage expert witnesses who live in states other than the forum state of the litigation. Entering into an agreement in which the expert does most, if not all, of his work at his place of business reduces the costs of litigation for all parties. It would be unreasonable to deny such an expert a forum in his home state to adjudicate disputes over payment. Defendant could have provided by contract that any disputes would be resolved by Illinois courts. Of course, such a contract provision would likely dissuade out-of-state parties from contracting with defendant. As a practical matter, why would a Maryland resident, who was retained by an Illinois resident to perform services in Maryland, agree to a contract provision requiring him to come to Illinois to seek redress if the Illinois resident stiffed him on his bill? Thus, we find that Maryland properly asserted personal jurisdiction over the defendant in this case.\nThe defendant also claims the trial court erred by allowing the nonresident plaintiff to proceed in a civil action in Illinois. The defendant relies upon section 45 \u2014 45(a) of the Limited Liability Company Act to argue the plaintiff may not pursue a civil action in Illinois because it is not registered to do business in Illinois. 805 ILCS 180/45 \u2014 45(a) (West 2004). That statute reads, \u201cA foreign limited liability company transacting business in this State may not maintain a civil action in any court of this State until the limited liability company is admitted to transact business in this State.\u201d 805 ILCS 180/45\u2014 45(a) (West 2004). The defendant does not cite any authority interpreting this statute to apply in the case of a petition to register a foreign judgment. We decline to apply the statute here, where the plaintiff seeks to enforce a foreign judgment under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution, rather than initiate a new cause of action in Illinois. U.S. Const., art. 1 \u00a71; 735 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 650 et seq. (West 2004).\nBased upon the above analysis, we conclude that Maryland properly exercised personal jurisdiction over the defendant. In addition, we reject the defendant\u2019s claim that section 45 \u2014 45 of the Limited Liability Company Act applies here. Accordingly, the judgment of the Grundy County circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHOLDRIDGE and McDADE, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE SCHMIDT" } ], "attorneys": [ "T. Donald Henson, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Regan, EC., of LaSalle, and Joan N. Harrop, of Gomien & Harrop, of Morris, for appellant.", "Keith L. Davidson, of Keith L. Davidson & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ASSOCIATES, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GOMIEN AND HARROP Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201405\u20140786\nOpinion filed October 17, 2006. \u2014\nRehearing denied November 27, 2006.\nT. Donald Henson, of Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Regan, EC., of LaSalle, and Joan N. Harrop, of Gomien & Harrop, of Morris, for appellant.\nKeith L. Davidson, of Keith L. Davidson & Associates, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0989-01", "first_page_order": 1007, "last_page_order": 1015 }