{ "id": 4265495, "name": "A. JEFFREY HICKS, d/b/a Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AIRBORNE EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Hicks v. Airborne Express, Inc.", "decision_date": "2006-07-25", "docket_number": "No. 5\u201404\u20140793", "first_page": "1005", "last_page": "1012", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 1005" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "108 Stat. 745", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Stat.", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "411 F.2d 622", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2191422 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26", "parenthetical": "the contract language allowing the purchaser to cancel the order and get a refund of the deposit if the delivery did not occur within 30 days created the exclusive remedy even though the contract did not use the word \"exclusive\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/411/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "40 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2970051 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "4", "parenthetical": "the contract language revealed that the parties intended the settlement formula to be the exclusive remedy" }, { "page": "4" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/40/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 889", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3314150 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893", "parenthetical": "the contract language was sufficient to limit the plaintiffs remedy to the repair or replacement of defective parts and to rebut a presumption that contract remedies were cumulative to those in the Uniform Commercial Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0889-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 248", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980727 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256", "parenthetical": "the exclusive remedy provisions of the contract limited the plaintiff to the price of replacement pipe" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0248-01" ] }, { "cite": "107 F.3d 493", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7639085 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "498" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/107/-1091-01" ] }, { "cite": "95 Ill. 2d 68", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3112739 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "72-73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/95/0068-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 507", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5239798 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" }, { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0507-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 338", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App.", "case_ids": [ 5030877 ], "year": 1948, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "349", "parenthetical": "each contract must be interpreted, for unquestionably a contract may provide for a sole remedy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app/333/0338-01" ] }, { "cite": "266 Ill. App. 3d 905", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 887289 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "910" }, { "page": "910", "parenthetical": "the contract created the exclusive remedy of allowing a recovery for only the losses suffered in reliance on the commitment" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/266/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "190 Ill. App. 3d 787", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2520781 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "797" }, { "page": "797-98", "parenthetical": "the contract limited the measure of damages that would have otherwise been available under the Uniform Commercial Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/190/0787-01" ] }, { "cite": "256 Ill. App. 3d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5383260 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34" }, { "page": "34-35", "parenthetical": "the merger agreement created the exclusive remedy of indemnification" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/256/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2766109 ], "year": 1958, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0272-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. App. 3d 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2869983 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "31" }, { "page": "31" }, { "page": "32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/27/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637144 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "839" }, { "page": "840", "parenthetical": "the plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for specific performance because the contract created the exclusive remedy of terminating the contract" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 362", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848905 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0362-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "102" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 517", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2463089 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0517-01" ] }, { "cite": "14 Ill. 156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2586542 ], "year": 1852, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158", "parenthetical": "the measure of damages for failing to deliver hogs within the contract time was the difference between the value of the hogs at the time they arrived and their value at the time they should have arrived" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/14/0156-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336122 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1059", "parenthetical": "the written undertaking of the air carrier was not preempted even though it related to rates or service" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "73 F.3d 1423", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7414866 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1432", "parenthetical": "the plaintiff's claim that the defendant breached its agreement to honor confirmed reservations involved privately ordered obligations and was not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/73/1423-01" ] }, { "cite": "116 S.W.3d 745", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 9095161 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "753" }, { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/116/0745-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 F.3d 254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11586014 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258", "parenthetical": "the contract action could only be adjudicated by reference to federal law and policies external to the parties' bargain and, therefore, was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/134/0254-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 U.S. 219", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1333903 ], "weight": 27, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "228" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "824" }, { "page": "228-29" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "824" }, { "page": "230" }, { "page": "726" }, { "page": "824" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "232-33" }, { "page": "728" }, { "page": "826" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/513/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "463 U.S. 85", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6191473 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/463/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "504 U.S. 374", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11729384 ], "weight": 12, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" }, { "page": "164" }, { "page": "2034" }, { "page": "384" }, { "page": "167-68" }, { "page": "2037" }, { "page": "390" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "2040" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/504/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 F.3d 605", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11195710 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "607" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/219/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 627", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949709 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "633" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0627-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 141", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636558 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "152" }, { "page": "674-75" }, { "page": "3022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "518" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "49 U.S.C. \u00a741713", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(b)(l)" }, { "page": "(b)(l)" }, { "page": "(b)(l)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 990, "char_count": 18990, "ocr_confidence": 0.785, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.115575937052327e-08, "percentile": 0.3810544552983591 }, "sha256": "e247a801478bebb3cc544da513af1b7d82aaf1a04abc69c24e76ef11bbcd28f4", "simhash": "1:7aff3a004f0118b5", "word_count": 3072 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:55:49.400377+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "A. JEFFREY HICKS, d/b/a Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AIRBORNE EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOPKINS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, A. Jeffrey Hicks (Hicks), doing business as Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, appeals the circuit court\u2019s order granting a summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Airborne Express, Inc. (Airborne). On appeal, Hicks argues that the circuit court erred in holding that the parties\u2019 contract limited Hicks\u2019s remedy. We affirm.\nFACTS\nHicks filed a class-action complaint against Airborne, a courier service that provides package transportation and delivery services. In his complaint, Hicks alleged that Airborne breached its shipping contract by charging customers higher rates for express delivery and failing to deliver the packages by the agreed delivery time. Hicks sought compensation for the difference in value between the service customers requested and the service they received.\nHicks shipped packages using Airborne\u2019s Flight-Ready prepaid shipping service. Pursuant to this service, Hicks purchased the Flight-Ready shipment envelope used to package his shipment. Airborne guaranteed that Hicks\u2019s Flight-Ready shipment envelope would be delivered by noon the next day. When Hicks\u2019s delivery was delayed, Airborne provided Hicks with a free Flight-Ready envelope pursuant to the Flight-Ready guarantee.\nAirborne\u2019s Flight-Ready order form, used to order Flight-Ready envelopes, stated:\n\u201cTHE FLIGHT-READY GUARANTEE: Airborne Express guarantees that your pre[ jpurchased domestic Flight-Ready shipment will arrive on time (as stated in the current Service Guide) \u2014 or Airborne will give you another Flight-Ready domestic express envelope free of charge.\u201d\nAirborne\u2019s Flight-Ready envelope stated, in pertinent part:\n\u201cService Conditions\n*** Use of Flight-Ready constitutes your agreement to the service conditions stated here [and] in our published tariffs and current\nService Guide (available on request). No one is authorized to alter or modify those terms.\nLimitations of Liability\n*** We shall not be liable in any event for special, incidental[,] or consequential damages, including but not limited to loss of profits or income.\nClaims\nFiling claims for delayed, lost[,] or damaged shipments is subject to time limits. Consult the Service Guide for full details.\u201d\nOn March 22, 2004, Airborne filed a motion for a summary judgment, arguing that Airborne provided Hicks with the only contractual remedy to which he was entitled, a prepaid Flight-Ready envelope. On November 23, 2004, after hearing arguments, the circuit court entered a summary judgment in favor of Airborne, finding that the parties had agreed to an exclusive remedy, i.e., another Flight-Ready envelope, for Airborne\u2019s breach of the contract to deliver Hicks\u2019s package by noon the next day. On December 15, 2004, Hicks filed a notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\nAirline Deregulation Act Preemption\nInitially, we address whether Hicks\u2019s breach-of-contract action is preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (Airline Deregulation Act) (49 U.S.C. \u00a741713(b)(l) (2000)), an argument raised in Airborne\u2019s brief on appeal. Hicks argues that Airborne waived this argument by failing to raise it as an affirmative defense in the circuit court. However, the waiver rule is a limitation on the parties and not the jurisdiction of this court. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 518 (2000). We choose to address the issue.\nPursuant to the preemption doctrine, which arises from the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2), we examine whether Congress intended for federal law to preempt state law in a given case. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664, 674-75, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982); Cohen v. McDonald\u2019s Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 627, 633 (2004).\nSection 41713(b)(1) of the Airline Deregulation Act expressly preempts the states from \u201cenact[ing] or enforc[ing] a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier that may provide air transportation.\u201d 49 U.S.C. \u00a741713(b)(l) (2000). State common law is considered an \u201cother provision having the force and effect of law\u201d for purposes of this statute. United Airlines, Inc. v. Mesa Airlines, Inc., 219 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2000). Congress enacted the express-preemption provision in the Airline Deregulation Act \u201c[t]o ensure that the States would not undo federal deregulation with regulation of their own.\u201d Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 378, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157, 164, 112 S. Ct. 2031, 2034 (1992).\nThe Supreme Court first considered the scope of preemption under the Airline Deregulation Act in Morales, 504 U.S. 374, 119 L. Ed. 2d 157, 112 S. Ct. 2031. In holding that the Airline Deregulation Act preempted the application of state consumer protection statutes to airline advertisements, the Court stated that the statutory phrase \u201crelating to\u201d expressed a broad preemptive purpose so that any claim that has \u201ca connection with[ ] or reference to\u201d an airline\u2019s prices, routes, or services is preempted under the statute. Morales, 504 U.S. at 384, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 167-68, 112 S. Ct. at 2037. However, the Court noted that state actions affecting airline prices, routes, or services \u201c \u2018in too tenuous, remote, or peripheral a manner\u2019 \u201d would not be preempted. Morales, 504 U.S. at 390, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 172, 112 S. Ct. at 2040, quoting Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 100 n.21, 77 L. Ed. 2d 490, 503 n.21, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2901 n.21 (1983).\nThe Court next considered the Airline Deregulation Act\u2019s preemption clause in American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 130 L. Ed. 2d 715, 115 S. Ct. 817 (1995). The Court in Wolens held that contract claims against airlines, such as those involving frequent-flyer programs, even when related to prices, routes, or services, are not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act when they merely seek to enforce the parties\u2019 \u201cown, self-imposed undertakings.\u201d Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 115 S. Ct. at 824. The Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act\u2019s preemption prescription bars state-imposed regulation of air carriers but allows room for court enforcement of contract terms set by the parties themselves. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228-29, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 115 S. Ct. at 824.\nThe Court in Wolens noted that the word series \u201claw, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision\u201d connotes official, government-imposed policies, not the terms of a private contract. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 726 n.5, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.5. The Court also noted that the phrase \u201chaving the force and effect of law\u201d is most naturally read to reference binding standards of conduct that operate irrespective of private agreements. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n.5, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 726 n.5, 115 S. Ct. at 824 n.5. The Court held that the Airline Deregulation Act was designed to promote \u201cmaximum reliance on competitive market forces\u201d (49 U.S.C. app. \u00a71302(a)(4) (1988)) and that market efficiency requires an effective means to enforce private agreements. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 230, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 115 S. Ct. at 824. The Court limited its breach-of-contract exception to actions confined to the terms of the parties\u2019 bargain \u201cwith no enlargement or enhancement based on state laws or policies external to the agreement.\u201d Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 115 S. Ct. at 826; see also Smith v. Comair, Inc., 134 F.3d 254, 258 (4th Cir. 1998) (the contract action could only be adjudicated by reference to federal law and policies external to the parties\u2019 bargain and, therefore, was preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act).\nAccordingly, in deciding whether contract claims are preempted, we distinguish between obligations dictated by the state and those voluntarily undertaken by the airline. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 115 S. Ct. at 826. When parties privately negotiate a contract\u2019s terms and an action is later filed in state court for a breach of those terms, there is generally no specter of state-imposed regulation. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Black, 116 S.W.3d 745, 753 (Tex. 2003). \u201c[T]he enforcement of a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken does not amount to state enactment or enforcement of a law that the [Airline Deregulation Act\u2019s] preemption provision forbids.\u201d Delta Air Lines, Inc., 116 S.W.3d at 754.\nIn the present case, Hicks\u2019s breach-of-contract action against Airborne is not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act because the court\u2019s concern is restricted to the parties\u2019 bargain. Hicks\u2019s action is based on Airborne\u2019s self-imposed obligation to deliver packages by a specified time and does not involve external state policy. Accordingly, Hicks\u2019s breach-of-contract claim is based upon Airborne\u2019s written and self-imposed undertaking, can be adjudicated without reference to law and policies external to the parties\u2019 bargain, and is not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act. See Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-33, 130 L. Ed. 2d at 728, 115 S. Ct. at 826; see also Travel All Over the World, Inc. v. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 73 F.3d 1423, 1432 (7th Cir. 1996) (the plaintiff\u2019s claim that the defendant breached its agreement to honor confirmed reservations involved privately ordered obligations and was not preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act); Shubert v. Federal Express Corp., 306 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1059 (1999) (the written undertaking of the air carrier was not preempted even though it related to rates or service).\nBreach of Contract\nHicks argues that the contract language guaranteeing delivery by a specified time or a free Flight-Ready shipment envelope did not create the exclusive remedy for a breach of Airborne\u2019s promise to deliver by the specified time. Airborne counters that the contract between it and Hicks was clear and unambiguous and provided the exclusive remedy for a delayed delivery \u2014 a free Flight-Ready shipment.\nCargo Airline Association (Cargo) submitted an amicus curiae brief in support of Airborne. Cargo argues that Hicks is not entitled to common law damages because there was no difference between the value of the shipped items at the time they arrived and the value of the shipped items at the time they should have arrived. See Sangamon & Morgan R.R. Co. v. Henry, 14 Ill. 156, 158 (1852) (the measure of damages for failing to deliver hogs within the contract time was the difference between the value of the hogs at the time they arrived and their value at the time they should have arrived). Cargo argues that because Hicks is not entitled to a common law remedy, he is only entitled to seek the remedy explicitly provided in his contract with Airborne, i.e., a free Flight-Ready shipment.\nA summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with any affidavits, show that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2004); Shannon v. Boise Cascade Corp., 208 Ill. 2d 517, 523-24 (2004). The circuit court\u2019s decision to grant a summary judgment presents a question of law and is subject to de novo review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992).\nThe primary objective in construing a contract is to give effect to the intention of the parties involved. Schek v. Chicago Transit Authority, 42 Ill. 2d 362, 364 (1969). The parties\u2019 intention must be ascertained from the plain and ordinary meaning of the language of the contract. O\u2019Shield v. Lakeside Bank, 335 Ill. App. 3d 834, 839 (2002); Board of Regents v. Wilson, 27 Ill. App. 3d 26, 31 (1975). A contract is to be construed as a whole, giving meaning and effect to every provision thereof, if possible, since we presume that every clause in the contract was inserted deliberately and for a purpose. Martindell v. Lake Shore National Bank, 15 Ill. 2d 272, 283 (1958); Board of Regents, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 31.\n\u201c[T]he parties\u2019 rights under the contract are limited by the terms expressed therein.\u201d O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 839. \u201c[PJarties by an express agreement may contract for an exclusive remedy that limits their rights, duties[,] and obligations.\u201d Board of Regents, 27 Ill. App. 3d at 32; see also O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 839. Illinois courts have recognized and enforced exclusive remedy provisions, even when the contract omits the word \u201cexclusive,\u201d when the contract as a whole warrants that construction. O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 839; Omnitrus Merging Corp. v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 256 Ill. App. 3d 31, 34 (1993); Veath v. Specialty Grains, Inc., 190 Ill. App. 3d 787, 797 (1989). \u201cAn exclusive remedy clause will be enforced unless it violates public policy or something in the social relationship of the parties works against upholding the clause.\u201d W.E. Erickson Construction, Inc. v. Chicago Title Insurance Co., 266 Ill. App. 3d 905, 910 (1994).\nA slight difference in contract language may justify the interpretation that the contract provides the buyer an exclusive remedy, as opposed to a privilege in addition to other remedies that he might have. Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. Daniel Burkhartsmeier Cooperage Co., 333 Ill. App. 338, 349 (1948) (each contract must be interpreted, for unquestionably a contract may provide for a sole remedy). While clauses limiting damages are not favored and must be strictly construed against a benefiting party, the basis for their enforcement is the strong public policy favoring the freedom of contract. Rayner Covering Systems, Inc. v. Danvers Farmers Elevator Co., 226 Ill. App. 3d 507, 512 (1992). Public policy permits competent parties to contractually allocate business risks as they see fit. McClure Engineering Associates, Inc. v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 Ill. 2d 68, 72-73 (1983).\nPursuant to the parties\u2019 contract regarding the Flight-Ready shipment envelope, Airborne guaranteed that it would deliver the shipment on time or provide Hicks with another Flight-Ready domestic express envelope free of charge. The contract precluded a broad range of potential damages and provided that no one could alter or modify its terms. See CogniTest Corp. v. Riverside Publishing Co., 107 F.3d 493, 498 (7th Cir. 1997) (considering the contract language allowing the retention of outstanding advances if the agreement terminated prior to publication, in addition to a provision precluding a broad range of potential damages and the contract\u2019s integration clause, the court concluded that the retention remedy was intended to be exclusive). The contract\u2019s express language clearly provides that the replacement Flight-Ready envelope was Hicks\u2019s exclusive remedy if Airborne breached the contract by failing to deliver the package by noon the next day. See O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 840 (the plaintiffs could not maintain a claim for specific performance because the contract created the exclusive remedy of terminating the contract); Intrastate Piping & Controls, Inc. v. Robert-James Sales, Inc., 315 Ill. App. 3d 248, 256 (2000) (the exclusive remedy provisions of the contract limited the plaintiff to the price of replacement pipe); W.E. Erickson Construction, Inc., 266 Ill. App. 3d at 910 (the contract created the exclusive remedy of allowing a recovery for only the losses suffered in reliance on the commitment); Omnitrus Merging Corp., 256 Ill. App. 3d at 34-35 (the merger agreement created the exclusive remedy of indemnification); Veath, 190 Ill. App. 3d at 797-98 (the contract limited the measure of damages that would have otherwise been available under the Uniform Commercial Code); Schultz v. Jackson, 67 Ill. App. 3d 889, 893 (1979) (the contract language was sufficient to limit the plaintiffs remedy to the repair or replacement of defective parts and to rebut a presumption that contract remedies were cumulative to those in the Uniform Commercial Code); J.D. Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 4 (1976) (the contract language revealed that the parties intended the settlement formula to be the exclusive remedy); see also Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 625-26 (7th Cir. 1969) (the contract language allowing the purchaser to cancel the order and get a refund of the deposit if the delivery did not occur within 30 days created the exclusive remedy even though the contract did not use the word \u201cexclusive\u201d).\nHicks and Airborne voluntarily chose to distribute the risks in a manner represented by the contract language. We find no public policy to bar the contract\u2019s exclusive remedy provision (see Rayner Covering Systems, Inc., 226 Ill. App. 3d at 512), and nothing in the record justifies altering the contractual allocation adopted by the parties (see J.D. Pavlak, Ltd., 40 Ill. App. 3d at 4). The language of the parties\u2019 contract limited Hicks to the exclusive remedy of a free Flight-Ready envelope if Airborne breached the contract by failing to deliver his shipment on time. Accordingly, the circuit court properly entered a summary judgment in favor of Airborne.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Madison County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nGOLDENHERSH and McGLYNN, JJ., concur.\nIn reenacting Title 49 of the United States Code, Congress revised this clause in 1994 to read: \u201c[A] State *** may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of an air carrier ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 49 U.S.C. \u00a741713(b)(l) (1994). Congress intended that the revision make no substantive change. Pub. L. 103 \u2014 272, \u00a71(a), 108 Stat. 745 (1994).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOPKINS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Gail G. Renshaw, Gary E. Peel, and Gerald Walters, of Lakin Law Firm, PC., of Wood River, Timothy Campbell, of Campbell Law Offices, of Godfrey, and Paul M. Weiss and Tod A. Lewis, both of Freed & Weiss, LLC, and Malik R. Diab and Phillip A. Bock, both of Diab & Bock, both of Chicago, for appellant.", "Karen L. Kendall and Craig L. Unrath, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, Robert H. Shultz, Jr., Joseph P Whyte, and Deborah A.", "Hawkins, all of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Edwardsville, and Edwin V Woodsome, Jr., D. Barclay Edmundson, William W Oxley, and T. Jason White, all of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, of Los Angeles, California, for appellee.", "Stephen A. Alterman, of Cargo Airline Association, of Washington, D.C., and Robert K. Spotswood, Kenneth D. Sansom, Michael T. Sansbury, and John R. Parker, Jr., all of Spotswood, LLC, of Birmingham, Alabama, for amicus curiae." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "A. JEFFREY HICKS, d/b/a Financial Planning Advisors, Inc., Indiv. and on Behalf of All Others Similarly Situated, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. AIRBORNE EXPRESS, INC., Defendant-Appellee.\nFifth District\nNo. 5\u201404\u20140793\nOpinion filed July 25, 2006.\nGail G. Renshaw, Gary E. Peel, and Gerald Walters, of Lakin Law Firm, PC., of Wood River, Timothy Campbell, of Campbell Law Offices, of Godfrey, and Paul M. Weiss and Tod A. Lewis, both of Freed & Weiss, LLC, and Malik R. Diab and Phillip A. Bock, both of Diab & Bock, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nKaren L. Kendall and Craig L. Unrath, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria, Robert H. Shultz, Jr., Joseph P Whyte, and Deborah A.\nHawkins, all of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Edwardsville, and Edwin V Woodsome, Jr., D. Barclay Edmundson, William W Oxley, and T. Jason White, all of Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, of Los Angeles, California, for appellee.\nStephen A. Alterman, of Cargo Airline Association, of Washington, D.C., and Robert K. Spotswood, Kenneth D. Sansom, Michael T. Sansbury, and John R. Parker, Jr., all of Spotswood, LLC, of Birmingham, Alabama, for amicus curiae." }, "file_name": "1005-01", "first_page_order": 1023, "last_page_order": 1030 }