{ "id": 4267131, "name": "JACK E. DUSTHIMER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Dusthimer v. Board of Trustees", "decision_date": "2006-10-27", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201405\u20141034", "first_page": "159", "last_page": "172", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 159" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 N.E. 69", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "76" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "317 Ill. 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5148566 ], "year": 1925, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/317/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "242 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "271" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851370 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "312-13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "776 N.E.2d 218", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477020 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319-20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "784 N.E.2d 431", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. 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DUSTHIMER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs are Jack and Kathy Dusthimer and their son Brandt. The defendant is the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Jack and Kathy are helping pay Brandt\u2019s tuition at the university. (For clarity and ease of reference, we will use first names when referring to the plaintiffs individually.) Tuition would be cheaper if Brandt were a resident of Illinois. The university, however, has refused to classify him as a resident. Plaintiffs challenged the university\u2019s decision by filing a complaint for administrative review, which, with leave of the circuit court, they repleaded as an amended complaint for a writ of certiorari. After oral arguments, the court entered judgment in the board\u2019s favor. Plaintiffs appeal, arguing the university is violating its own regulation defining who is a \u201cresident.\u201d\nWe find no ambiguity in the regulation. In plain language, it defines a \u201cresident\u201d to include the dependent of someone employed at least a quarter of the time as a faculty member of a \u201cstate-supported institution[ ] of higher education in Illinois.\u201d University of Illinois Residency-Status Regulations, par. K, at 3 (eff. Fall 1997). Given the undisputed facts in the record, we find that Brandt meets that definition: he is the dependent son of Kathy, who is on the faculty of Black Hawk College in Moline, an institution of higher education which the State supports financially. Therefore we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment and remand this case for issuance of the requested writ of certiorari.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn their amended complaint, which they filed in June 2005, plaintiffs allege they are residents of Iowa and that Kathy is employed at least a quarter of the time as a faculty member of Black Hawk College, \u201ca state-supported institution of higher education.\u201d Brandt is her and Jack\u2019s dependent son. He has just finished his sophomore year at the University of Illinois in Urbana-Champaign, and they are contributing toward his tuition. The university has a regulation on the residency status of its students. Paragraph K of the regulation provides as follows:\n\u201cStaff members of the [u]niversity and of allied agencies, and faculties of state-supported institutions of higher education in Illinois, holding an appointment of at least one-quarter time, and their spouses and dependent children, shall be treated as residents.\u201d University of Illinois Residency-Status Regulations, par. K, at 3 (eff. Fall 1997).\nThe university denied Brandt\u2019s application for residency status under paragraph K and denied his administrative appeal. As a result, plaintiffs must pay the higher nonresident tuition.\nIn its answer, the board denies that Black Hawk College is a \u201cstate-supported institution of higher education\u201d and, therefore, denies that Brandt is eligible for resident tuition under paragraph K of the regulation. The board filed a certified record of the administrative proceedings. In the remaining paragraphs of this \u201cBackground,\u201d we will summarize the material documentation from the administrative record.\nOn December 9, 2003, Darice Yonker of the Illinois Board of Higher Education sent Jack an e-mail quoting section 1(a) of the Board of Higher Education Act (110 ILCS 205/1(a) (West 2004)), which defined \u201c \u2018[p]ublic institutions of higher education\u2019 \u201d to include \u201c \u2018the public community colleges of the State.\u2019 \u201d\nOn December 10, 2003, Bruce Bennett, assistant director for system finances at the Illinois Community College Board, sent Jack an e-mail stating: \u201cBlack Hawk College is a state[-]funded public institution of [bjigher [ejducation in the State of Illinois.\u201d\nOn December 16, 2003, Brandt signed a fill-in-the-blank application for residency status. In this form, he certifies he is the dependent child of Kathy, a faculty member of Black Hawk College, a state-supported institution of higher learning in Illinois. The third page of the form is a \u201cCertificate of Appointment,\u201d signed by Gary A. Bibby, data and systems specialist of Black Hawk College, confirming that Kathy is on the faculty of the college.\nA \u201c2003 Benefit Summary Statement\u201d shows that Kathy is a participant in the State Universities Retirement System.\nThe administrative record also includes a printout from a web page maintained by the marketing department of Black Hawk College showing that in 2003, the college received 35.4% of its revenue from State funds. Its annual budget was $30.6 million.\nOn January 7, 2004, Gayle Laman, assistant director of university-wide student programs at the university, sent an e-mail to two other staff members of the university, Ira Langston and Marilyn Marshall. In this e-mail, she made the following inquiry:\n\u201cI have a question that exceeds my history over here. I have a request from a father to grant resident tuition to his son based on the fact that the mother/wife is an employee of Black Hawk Community College in Moline. The family lives in Iowa. I know that the practice has been to limit resident tuition based on parental employment to four-year institutions \u2014 not community colleges. I believe we used the rationale that this was the same group of institutions covered in the [child-of-employee tuition waiver] (half-price tuition). And I think we also used the rationale that [a four-year] institution received state funding while community [-] college funding was regional.\nThe father has sent me documentation that the state support of Black Hawk [College] is 35% \u2014 larger than our state[-]support percentage. And he has sent me a definition of \u2018public institutions of higher education\u2019 from the Illinois code that includes four-year [ ] and community colleges. I called Lisa Huson[,] who is doing some checking!,] but it looks [as if] we need to change our definition. Do either of you have any history to shed on this?\nIs there anything in writing on this topic that you recall?\u201d\nOn January 8, 2004, Marshall, of the university\u2019s office for planning and budgeting, replied to Layman with the following e-mail:\n\u201c \u2018State supported\u2019 was a key phrase Peter used when he and I coordinated the major revision of residency in the late [1980s] (?). I think we moved from [\u2018]state[-]assisted[\u2019] to [\u2018]state[-]supported[\u2019] in order not to capture the community colleges and private! ] [institutions] that get state money. *** [C]ommunity colleges are considered [ ]local units of government! ] ***. ***\nBecause community colleges do not receive most of their funding from the state, I don\u2019t think it was meant that their employees are to be treated as residents. The problem is that state support for public universities has fallen so much that I wonder whether the *** employees [of the University of Illinois] would qualify; I don\u2019t know what the percentage is now.\nH* *2*\nI would suggest trying to get the definition of \u2018state[-]supported.\u2019 It is around somewhere. I don\u2019t think it was a random phrase that was put together for the residency policy. Nonetheless, just because someone says a third of the funding (an unknown numerator over an unknown denominator) for Black Hawk [College] is state support, that doesn\u2019t make them \u2018state supported.\u2019 Their basis of funding is local, not state.\u201d (Emphasis in original.)\nIn a letter dated March 18, 2004, Layman informed Jack that after \u201creviewing the policies and state law,\u201d the university concluded that Brandt was not a \u201cresident\u201d of Illinois within the meaning of paragraph K of the regulation and, therefore, he did not qualify for instate tuition. According to her, \u201cstate-supported institutions of higher education\u201d meant only state universities. She reasoned as follows:\n\u201c[T]o compare the levels of funding between a community college and a campus of the University of Illinois, one should only compare the funding for instruction costs[,] since a community college\u2019s primary mission is instruction and it engages in comparatively little research, public service[,] or outreach. The instruction costs at our Urbana campus are entirely supported by state funds (50%) and tuition (50%). So, for comparison purposes, the state support for the instruction at [the university] is 50%.\nThere is no definition in state statutes for the term \u2018state-supported[,]\u2019 as used in the [regulations,] and the [regulations] themselves provide no definition. Therefore, we must look to other statutory language and to the commonly understood use of the term \u2018state-supported\u2019 institution.\nBlack Hawk [College] is a community college which is created generally under [the Public Community College Act (110 ILCS 805/ 1 \u2014 1 through 8 \u2014 2 (West 2004))]. There are a number of important differences between community colleges and State universities. State universities, such as the University of Illinois, are individually established by the Illinois legislature and draw their funding primarily from State appropriations. Community colleges are not individually created by the Illinois legislature, [but,] rather[J are created by petition and referendum[ ] and are primarily funded through local[-]district tax funds. Consequently, community colleges are sustained on a local and not statewide basis, although they may get some state money in the form of grants.\nIn fact, community[-]college boards are authorized to actually levy taxes for educational purposes and for the operation and maintenance of facilities. State institutions have no such authority and are dependent on the State legislature for their appropriations. Community[-]college boards set their own fiscal year and budget[ ] [and] select their own basis of financing and their own systems of accounting. [Citation.]\nOther statutes contemplate what tuition benefits employees of state-supported institutions receive. [Section 7f of the University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/7f(b) (West 2004))] provides for a 50% tuition waiver to the children of employees of \u2018an Illinois college or university who have been employed by any one or by more than one Illinois college or university for an aggregate period of at least [seven] years.\u2019 Subsection (a) of section 7f defines \u2018Illinois college or university\u2019 as \u2018the University of Illinois, Southern Illinois University, Chicago State University, Eastern Illinois University, Northeastern Illinois University, Northern Illinois University, and Western Illinois University.\u2019 [110 ILCS 305/7f(a) (West 2004).]\nIn conclusion, although it\u2019s true that Black Hawk [College] does receive some State money, it is not a \u2018 state-supported\u2019 institution as contemplated in the [regulations].\u201d\nPlaintiffs appealed to the director of admissions and the director of the office for academic policy analysis. They pointed out that while the University of Illinois received 31% of its total revenue from the State, Black Hawk College received 34% of its revenue from the State \u2014 showing that Black Hawk College was, in fact, more \u201cstate-supported\u201d than the university. They argued that just because Black Hawk College received revenue from other sources, such as the local community, that fact did not negate its status as a state-supported institution, any more than the university\u2019s receipt of $500 million in federal funds negated its status as a state-supported institution. These arguments failed to carry the day, either in the university or circuit court.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Standard of Review\nSection 3 \u2014 102 of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3\u2014 102 (West 2004)) empowers a court to review the final decision of an administrative agency if the statute \u201ccreating or conferring power on such agency, by express reference, adopts the provisions of [a]rticle III of [the Code of Civil Procedure, i.e., the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 through 3 \u2014 113 (West 2004)),] or its predecessor, the Administrative Review Act.\u201d Otherwise \u2014 unless the statute creating or empowering the agency prescribes some other form of review\u2014 the plaintiff must seek a writ of certiorari under the common law. Applegate v. Department of Transportation, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1061, 783 N.E.2d 96, 102 (2002), appeal denied, 204 Ill. 2d 656, 792 N.E.2d 305 (2003). The University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/0.01 through 30 (West 2004)), which, in section 1 (110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2004)), creates the board of trustees, nowhere adopts the Administrative Review Law or prescribes any other form of review. In denying Brandt\u2019s application for classification as a resident, the university exercised quasijudicial power, adjudicating facts and individual rights. See Applegate, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 783 N.E.2d at 102. Therefore, the university\u2019s decision is reviewable in an action for a writ of certiorari.\nOur standard of review is the same as in actions under the Administrative Review Law. Applegate, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1061, 783 N.E.2d at 102. Given the certified record of the administrative agency, we ask whether the factual findings and conclusions of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. O\u2019Boyle v. Personnel Board, 119 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653, 456 N.E.2d 998, 1002 (1983).\nIn the present case, the material facts are undisputed, and we have no occasion to ask whether the factual findings of the university are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Only the meaning of the regulation is in dispute. The board argues \u201cit is of tantamount importance that deference be given an administrative agency\u2019s own interpretation of the regulations which it has set forth.\u201d Rend Lake College Federation of Teachers, Local 3708 v. Board of Community College, District No. 521, 84 Ill. App. 3d 308, 311, 405 N.E.2d 364, 368 (1980). In its explication of our standard of review, however, the board overlooks the indispensable precondition of deference: ambiguity. We will defer to an agency\u2019s interpretation of its regulation only if the regulation is ambiguous (Hetzer v. State Police Merit Board, 49 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1047-48, 365 N.E.2d 261, 263-64 (1977))\u2014that is, only if reasonably well-informed persons could understand the regulation in more than one sense (Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 652, 657, 840 N.E.2d 704, 709 (2005)). The board is correct that a reviewing court should overturn an agency\u2019s interpretation of its own regulation only if the interpretation is \u201c \u2018clearly erroneous.\u2019 \u201d Cotter & Co. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 277 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542-43, 660 N.E.2d 1283, 1285 (1995), quoting LaBelle v. State Employees Retirement System, 265 Ill. App. 3d 733, 735-36, 638 N.E.2d 412, 415 (1994). But \u201cplainly erroneous\u201d means \u201ccontrary to the clear language of the provision.\u201d Ress v. Office of the State Comptroller, 329 Ill. App. 3d 136, 142, 768 N.E.2d 255, 260 (2002). When we defer to an agency\u2019s interpretation, our justification for doing so is the agency\u2019s experience and expertise (LaBelle, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 638 N.E.2d at 415), but all the experience and expertise in the world cannot change what a regulation plainly says. If the regulation is unambiguous, \u201cthat is the end of the matter\u201d (Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842, 81 L. Ed. 2d 694, 703, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 2781 (1984)), and deference goes out the window. \u201c \u2018 \u201c[0]nly as the interpreter of a doubtful law\u201d \u2019 \u201d does an agency deserve deference. Hetzer, 49 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 365 N.E.2d at 263, quoting Whittemore v. People, 227 Ill. 453, 471, 81 N.E. 427, 433 (1907), quoting 2 Lewis\u2019 Sutherland on Statutory Construction \u00a7473 (2d ed. 1904)).\nB. \u201cState-Supported Institutions of Higher Education\u201d\nUnder section 1 of the University of Illinois Act, the board of trustees has statutory power to \u201cmake and establish [bylaws] *** for the management or government, in all its various departments and relations, of the University of Illinois.\u201d 110 ILCS 305/1 (West 2004). Obviously, to \u201cmanage[ ] or govern[ ]\u201d the university \u201cin all its various *** relations,\u201d the board must make a huge variety of decisions, including who will qualify as a \u201cresident\u201d of Illinois for purposes of assessing tuition. When the board makes a regulation on that question, the regulation has the same force as section 1 of the University of Illinois Act. See Rend Lake, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 310, 405 N.E.2d at 367. The briefs do not specifically discuss the enactment of the residency-status regulation, nor does the record appear to do so. But the regulation provides that it is amendable at the board\u2019s discretion, which seems to suggest that the board is the entity that promulgated the regulation in the first place. Because no one is above the law, including those who make law, the regulation binds the board. See Rend Lake, 84 Ill. App. 3d at 311, 405 N.E.2d at 367; Pace Realty Group, Inc. v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 306 Ill. App. 3d 718, 729-30, 713 N.E.2d 1249, 1257-58 (1999).\nWe interpret administrative regulations the same way we interpret statutes. Hetzer, 49 Ill. App. 3d at 1047, 365 N.E.2d at 263; Mora v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 266, 271, 726 N.E.2d 650, 653 (2000). Absent a special definition, we give the words of the text their ordinary meaning. Gerwin v. Livingston County Board, 345 Ill. App. 3d 352, 361, 802 N.E.2d 410, 417 (2003); Wahlman v. C. Becker Milling Co., 279 Ill. 612, 622, 117 N.E. 140, 144 (1917). If the meaning of a statute is evident from its plain language, we will decline any invitation to consider legislative history or other external aids of construction. Allstate Insurance Co. v. Menards, Inc., 202 Ill. 2d 586, 594, 782 N.E.2d 258, 263 (2002); Petersen v. Wallach, 198 Ill. 2d 439, 446, 764 N.E.2d 19, 23 (2002) (\u201cbecause the language of [the statute] is unambiguous, it was improvident for the appellate court to look beyond the language of the statute to the legislative history\u201d). Thus, if a regulation conveys its meaning in plain, unambiguous language, we will refrain from seeking the meaning outside the text. Only ambiguity expands the boundaries of the text.\nAgain, the regulation at issue in this case reads as follows:\n\u201cStaff members of the [ujniversity and of allied agencies, and faculties of state-supported institutions of higher education in Illinois, holding an appointment of at least one-quarter time, and their spouses and dependent children, shall be treated as residents.\u201d University of Illinois Residency-Status Regulations, par. K, at 3 (eff. Fall 1997).\nAs we explained, we have no occasion for deference unless those words, quoted above, are ambiguous \u2014 unless reasonably well-informed persons could understand them in more than one sense. \u201cHigher education\u201d is \u201ceducation beyond the secondary level,\u201d especially \u201ceducation provided by a college or university.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 546 (10th ed. 2000). Thus, a college is an \u201cinstitution[ ] of higher education.\u201d To \u201csupport\u201d an institution means to \u201cassist\u201d or \u201chelp\u201d the institution or \u201cpay [its] costs.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1180 (10th ed. 2000). When one says, for example, \u201cI support United Way,\u201d one normally is understood to mean that one helps United Way, probably in a financial sense \u2014 not necessarily by paying all or even most of United Way\u2019s expenses, but by making a contribution. New Oxford American Dictionary 1708 (2001) (defining \u201csupport\u201d as \u201cgive assistance to, especially] financially\u201d). Linguistically, the regulation in this case is clear and easy to understand \u2014 it is plain, unadorned English. A \u201cstate-supported institution[ ] of higher education in Illinois\u201d means, quite simply, a college or university in Illinois that receives financial assistance from the State. One could not interpret the regulation any other way without reading into it a special definition that does not appear in the text.\nBecause the residency-status regulation is unambiguous, we owe the board\u2019s interpretation no deference. Nevertheless, we will consider the reasons the board advances for its own interpretation and its objections against plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation.\n1. The Real Meaning Is To Be Found in Legislative History\nIn its brief, the board states: \u201cThe record reveals that when the residency regulations were revised in the late 1980s, the [b]oard of [t]rustees changed the wording of the regulation at issue from \u2018state-assisted\u2019 to \u2018state-supported\u2019 in order not to capture the [S]tate\u2019s community colleges and private institutions that receive state funding.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) The board is inviting us to consider an external aid of construction \u2014 legislative history \u2014 when the meaning of paragraph K of the regulation is clear on its face. We decline to do so. See Allstate Insurance Co., 202 Ill. 2d at 594, 782 N.E.2d at 263; Petersen, 198 Ill. 2d at 446, 764 N.E.2d at 23. When reading the residency-status regulation, parents and students should not have to ransack previous versions of the regulation in an effort to divine whether the board has some covert intention at odds with what the regulation plainly says.\nEven if we considered this legislative history, the distinction between a \u201cstate-assisted\u201d and \u201cstate-supported\u201d institution could strike one as exceedingly subtle, like the distinction between feathers and plumage. See Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1180 (10th ed. 2000) (\u201cassist\u201d is a synonym of \u201csupport\u201d). In her e-mail of January 8, 2004, Marshall puts her own gloss on this change in terminology, but presumably the board of trustees was the promulgator of the regulation, and the record contains no evidence that either Marshall or \u201cPeter\u201d was on the board in the 1980s.\n2. Blame the State\u2019s Budgetary Decisions\nThe board insists it has had a \u201clong[-] standing conceptual distinction between the [Sjtate\u2019s four-year public universities, the [Sjtate\u2019s community colleges, and the [Sjtate\u2019s private institutions,\u201d which one could formerly categorize as \u201cstate-supported,\u201d \u201clocally supported,\u201d and \u201cprivately supported,\u201d respectively. The board argues that just because the General Assembly, in its budgetary decisions, \u201chas muddled the conceptual distinction between\u201d these three types of institutions, we should keep the distinction intact by holding that only four-year state universities are \u201cstate-supported.\u201d\nThe problem with this argument is that by using the term \u201cstate-supported\u201d in its regulation, the board deliberately put the State\u2019s budgetary decisions \u2014 which everyone knows vary from year to year\u2014 front and center in the determination of who is a resident. Nowadays, a community college can be both state-supported and locally supported \u2014 as well as privately supported, if it maintains a foundation for which contributions are solicited for further support. If, in paragraph K, the board intended to classify, as residents, only the dependents of faculty members of four-year state universities in Illinois, the board could have easily said \u201cfour-year state universities in Illinois.\u201d Or the board could have easily listed the intended universities, as the General Assembly did in section 7f(a) of the University of Illinois Act (110 ILCS 305/7f(a) (West 2004)), the statute Layman quoted to Jack in her rejection letter. Layman\u2019s initial assessment was right on target: to exclude state-supported institutions such as Black Hawk College, the board will have to \u201cchange [the] definition.\u201d If changing realities make a regulation no longer desirable as written, one should change the regulation rather than try to rehabilitate it with a strained interpretation. See University of Illinois Residency-Status Regulations at 1 (eff. Fall 1997) (\u201cResidency[-]Status Regulations are subject to change from time to time at the discretion of the [b]oard of [t]rustees\u201d).\n3. Plaintiffs\u2019 Interpretation Is Not Exact Enough\nAccording to the board, plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation of paragraph K is untenable because it raises such questions as \u201cwhat \u2018financial support\u2019 means,\u201d \u201chow \u2018financial support\u2019 is measured,\u201d and \u201cwhat level of \u2018financial support\u2019 is sufficient to qualify as \u2018state-supported. \u2019 \u201d The board seems to suggest that one should not understand \u201cstate-supported\u201d to mean \u201csupported financially by the State\u201d unless the application and effect of the regulation, so interpreted, would be clear in every circumstance that could potentially arise. This standard would be unreasonable. In 2003, the State gave Black Hawk College a total of $10,832,400 (35.4% of the college\u2019s total revenue of $30.6 million). No one could seriously deny that the State thereby supported Black Hawk College in 2003.\n4. Plaintiffs\u2019 Interpretation Is Too Generous\nThe board complains that \u201cunder [plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation of the term \u2018state-supported,\u2019 many, if not all, Illinois private institutions of higher education could arguably be classified as \u2018 state-supported, \u2019 \u201d because many, if not all, such institutions receive state funds. Effectively, the term \u201cstate-supported\u201d would be superfluous, in the board\u2019s view. In the fiscal year 2000, 68 nonpublic institutions of higher education in Illinois received a total of $20,649,600 in state grants. Illinois Board of Higher Education, Illinois Financial Assistance Act: Fiscal Year 2000 Grant Allocation, available at http:// www.ibhe.state.il.us/Board/agendas/2000/February/2000-02-CA05.pdf.\nA latent ambiguity arises if the words of the legislation are clear in themselves but, because of external circumstances (in this case, the liberality of state grant programs), the literal application of those words would create an absurdity that the legislative body could not possibly have intended. Gibson v. Country Mutual Insurance Co., 193 Ill. App. 3d 87, 90, 549 N.E.2d 23, 25 (1990). To maintain the separation of the legislative and judicial branches and avoid compromising our fidelity to the text, we should be extremely reluctant to second-guess the clear language of legislation in the name of preventing a latent ambiguity. In re Estate of Snodgrass, 336 Ill. App. 3d 619, 623, 784 N.E.2d 431, 435 (2003). Whenever a court disregards the clear language of legislation in the name of \u201cavoiding absurdity,\u201d it runs the risk of implementing its own notions of optimal public policy and effectively becoming a legislature. Interpreting legislation to mean something other than what it clearly says is a measure of last resort, to avoid \u201cgreat injustice\u201d or an outcome that could be characterized, without exaggeration, as an absurdity and an utter frustration of the apparent purpose of the legislation. In re Detention of Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d 300, 319-20, 776 N.E.2d 218, 229-30 (2002), quoting People ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 312-13, 242 N.E.2d 267, 271 (1968), quoting Village of Glencoe v. Hurford, 317 Ill. 203, 220, 148 N.E. 69, 76 (1925).\nIn the present case, we are not even close to arriving at that impasse. Surely a college or university has to undergo some sort of vetting process before the State gives it thousands or millions of dollars in public funds. When the board of trustees of the University of Illinois promulgated the residency-status regulation, it could have decided that if the government of the State of Illinois deemed an institution of higher education to be worthy of financial support, that was good enough for the University of Illinois \u2014 as an arm of the State, the University of Illinois would likewise extend its support by classifying the dependents of a faculty member of that institution as a resident. We find no latent ambiguity.\n5. Residency Status Would Depend on the Changing State Budget\nThe board argues:\n\u201c[U]nder [plaintiffs\u2019 interpretation of the term \u2018state-supported,\u2019 whether an institution is classified as \u2018state-supported\u2019 depends on whether the General Assembly appropriates funding and whether that funding is allocated to the institution. Consequently, an institution\u2019s status might change year to year depending upon the budgetary decisions of the General Assembly and the decisions of those charged with allocating the grants.\u201d\nWe do not find this objection to be very compelling. Under the board\u2019s own interpretation of the regulation, a student\u2019s residency status could change from year to year \u2014 or even from semester to semester\u2014 depending on whether the parent is still employed a quarter of the time on the faculty of the qualifying institution.\nMoreover, this argument seems to undercut the board\u2019s argument that the term \u201cstate-supported\u201d is superfluous as plaintiffs interpret it. If, \u201cdepending upon the budgetary decisions of the General Assembly and the decisions of those charged with allocating the grants,\u201d an institution of higher education could be \u201cstate-supported\u201d one year but not the next year, the term would seem to have descriptive significance.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment and remand this case with instructions to issue the requested writ of certiorari.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nTURNER, EJ., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE APPLETON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE COOK,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent.\nThe majority pronounces that the words \u201cstate-supported institution\u201d are not ambiguous, and accordingly, it is not necessary to attempt to construe, interpret, or understand those words. I disagree. We interpret administrative regulations the same way we interpret statutes. Even if a statute is not particularly ambiguous, we should still examine it carefully and try to understand it, considering the entire statute in the factual context to which it applies and the various meanings that words may have. We should not seize upon one word or phrase in isolation and use that word as an excuse not to give the matter further consideration. Peck v. Froehlich, 367 Ill. App. 3d 225, 233 (2006).\nWhat does \u201cstate-supported\u201d mean? Does it mean \u201cstate\u201d as opposed to \u201cprivate\u201d? Does it mean \u201cstate\u201d as opposed to \u201clocal\u201d? Does it refer to an institution that receives most of its support from the state? A substantial amount of its support? Any amount of support? A statute is ambiguous when it is capable of being understood \u201cby reasonably well-informed persons\u201d in two or more different senses. In re B.L.S., 202 Ill. 2d 510, 517, 782 N.E.2d 217, 222 (2002); In re Timothy T, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1260, 1263, 799 N.E.2d 994, 997 (2003). The words \u201cstate-supported institution\u201d are ambiguous here.\nStatutory construction\u2019s fundamental rule requires courts to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. Thus, courts must consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature\u2019s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. King, 366 Ill. App. 3d 552, 555, 852 N.E.2d 559, 561 (2006). The words used are only a way to get to the legislature\u2019s intent. \u201cA word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.\u201d Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425, 62 L. Ed. 372, 376, 38 S. Ct. 158, 159 (1918) (opinion by Justice Holmes). Our goal is to give effect to the intent of the legislature, even if the language is not clear. It is not our goal to punish the legislature because its language is \u201cexceedingly subtle\u201d or could have been better written. See 368 Ill. App. 3d at 167. Under the majority\u2019s approach, if an absurd result is possible, we should go for it, to encourage the legislature to change the statute.\nWhen the language of the statute is open to two possible interpretations, the interpretation that is reasonable and that will not produce \u201cabsurd, unjust, unreasonable[,] or inconvenient results\u201d should prevail. Collins v.. Board of Trustees of the Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 110, 610 N.E.2d 1250, 1253 (1993); Albee v. City of Bloomington, 365 Ill. App. 3d 526, 528, 849 N.E.2d 1094, 1096 (2006). The majority\u2019s interpretation will produce an absurd result. The regulation was intended to distinguish between institutions that qualified and those that did not. Under the majority\u2019s interpretation, all institutions will qualify, even private religious institutions who receive some minimal form of state support. The majority\u2019s citation to Lieberman is inappropriate. Lieberman did not involve a statute that was open to two possible interpretations, but a situation where the court chose to honor the legislative intent despite the language of the statute. \u201cWe conclude that the legislature\u2019s omission of the now-repealed offense of rape from this definition was purely inadvertent and constituted a situation \u2018where a legislative intention, otherwise clear, was in part mistakenly or inaccurately stated.\u2019 \u201d Lieberman, 201 Ill. 2d at 320, 776 N.E.2d at 229-30, quoting Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 58, 445 N.E.2d 330, 333-34 (1983).\nThe majority argues that we should not consider the fact that the regulation was revised in the late 1980s to change the wording from \u201cstate-assisted\u201d to \u201cstate-supported.\u201d The majority complains that the board is inviting us to consider an external aid of construction\u2014 legislative history \u2014 when the meaning is clear on its face. 368 Ill. App. 3d at 166-67. This is not a situation where we are asked to consider something like the comments of a legislator on the floor, which may not have represented the thinking of other legislators who voted for the bill. This is the language of the regulation itself. An amendment indicates that the amendment was enacted to clarify the legislature\u2019s original intent. Collins, 155 Ill. 2d at 111, 610 N.E.2d at 1253. It is clear from the face of the amendment here that a minimal amount, mere \u201cassistance,\u201d does not constitute \u201csupport.\u201d\nThe majority says that we should not use external aids of construction but then refers to the dictionary. Why should we look to the dictionary, the meaning used by the public at large, but ignore the meaning actually used by \u201creasonably well-informed persons\u201d in the profession? Even the dictionary refutes the majority\u2019s assertion that one could not interpret the regulation any other way than it has chosen to read it. There are other meanings to the word \u201csupport\u201d than \u201cassist\u201d or \u201chelp.\u201d \u201cSupport\u201d can also mean \u201cto pay the costs of: MAINTAIN\u201d and \u201cto provide a basis for the existence or subsistence of.\u201d Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1184 (10th ed. 1998). Mere assistance does not amount to maintenance of or providing a basis for the existence of an activity.\nMore important, there is a distinction between state-supported and local-supported institutions. The board\u2019s interpretation of the regulation is a reasonable one. Black Hawk College, a community college, is primarily funded through local tax funds. State institutions have no such source of funds and are primarily funded from State appropriations. The regulation has consistently been interpreted not to apply to community colleges; our decision is the first to do otherwise. Black Hawk College is not a \u201cstate-supported institution\u201d as that term is used in the regulation. We should affirm the decision of the board and the decision of the circuit court.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE COOK," } ], "attorneys": [ "Jack E. Dusthimer (argued), of Davenport, Iowa, for appellants.", "Keith B. Hill (argued) and James C. Kearns, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "JACK E. DUSTHIMER et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellee.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201405\u20141034\nArgued August 15, 2006.\nOpinion filed October 27, 2006.\nCOOK, J., dissenting.\nJack E. Dusthimer (argued), of Davenport, Iowa, for appellants.\nKeith B. Hill (argued) and James C. Kearns, both of Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Urbana, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0159-01", "first_page_order": 177, "last_page_order": 190 }