{ "id": 4267013, "name": "FRANCESCA DETRANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY SUCH et al., Defendants-Appellees (Berton N. Ring, Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "Detrana v. Such", "decision_date": "2006-11-20", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20141263", "first_page": "861", "last_page": "873", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 861" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "729 N.E.2d 75", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186551 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "14" }, { "page": "14" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "749 N.E.2d 958", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record\" and, \"absent a record, 'it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.' [Citation.]\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725351 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432", "parenthetical": "\"the appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record\" and, \"absent a record, 'it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.' [Citation.]\"" }, { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "632 N.E.2d 22", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171657 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "577" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "138 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5576867 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/138/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "260 Ill. App. 3d 351", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2863307 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356" }, { "page": "356-58", "parenthetical": "on appeal, the defendant's interpretation of the meaning of the term \"dwelling unit\" under the RLTO was rejected" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/260/0351-01" ] }, { "cite": "826 N.E.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748728 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "411" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "601 N.E.2d 869", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "235 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5785547 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "126" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/235/0121-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 989, "char_count": 29492, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.40576461183852e-08, "percentile": 0.44302621504188083 }, "sha256": "630f8d50410cd85b9aec891b239dedb78aa15c82e40219d9629d72f037d5f5fe", "simhash": "1:a37e694b3f4e8cfc", "word_count": 4809 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:06:43.500571+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FRANCESCA DETRANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY SUCH et al., Defendants-Appellees (Berton N. Ring, Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this landlord-tenant dispute, plaintiff Francesca Detrana appeals from an order of the circuit court entering partial summary judgment in defendants\u2019 favor on the issue of \u201cownership,\u201d and an order (following a bench trial) imposing Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against plaintiffs attorney. At trial, the trial court ruled that, pursuant to section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020(a) of the City of Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO) (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014020(a) (2004)), the subject building co-owned by defendants Jerry and Serifa Such and Serifa\u2019s father, Nasrulla Murtus, was exempted from the operation of the RLTO because it was \u201cowner-occupied.\u2019 \u2019 The court further denied plaintiffs request for sanctions against defendants and their counsel. There was no report of proceedings or bystanders report filed in this matter. However, in reading the record in this case together with the briefs of both parties, this court concludes that it can determine the issues in this appeal. We find that the record is sufficiently complete to allow us to consider the merits of the arguments raised. Robles v. Chicago Transit Authority, 235 Ill. App. 3d 121, 601 N.E.2d 869 (1992).\nOn appeal, plaintiff contends: (1) the term \u201cowner-occupied,\u201d as used in the RLTO, should apply only to titleholders who maintain a measure of control over the premises; (2) even if this court finds that bare legal title constitutes ownership within the meaning of the RLTO, summary judgment in favor of defendants was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether defendants waived the RLTO exemption and whether Murtus\u2019 occupancy was designed to avoid application of the RLTO; and (3) plaintiff presented an objectively reasonable argument regarding the definition of \u201cownership\u201d as incorporating an element of control, thereby precluding imposition of Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) against his attorney, Berton Ring. We affirm in part and reverse in part.\nSTATEMENT OF FACTS\nPlaintiff entered into a lease on June 5, 1999, \u201cfor apartment unit #3\u201d located at 1246 West Altgeld in Chicago. The monthly rent was $1,525 and the security deposit was $2,287.50. Serifa Such was listed as the lessor. The expiration date of the lease was June 30, 2000. Plaintiff renewed the lease on June 30, 2000, with the rent listed as $1,600 and the security deposit $2,362.50. Plaintiff moved out of the premises prior to June 27, 2001, having \u201cpaid all the rents to Serifa through June 30, 2001.\u201d On August 15, 2001, Serifa sent plaintiff a list of deductions against plaintiffs security deposit plus the balance of the deposit ($1,077.54), \u201ctogether with the receipts,\u201d explaining the deduction of $116.25 for two late charges, and giving credit for two years of interest on the deposit.\nOn October 22, 2001, plaintiff filed a four-count complaint against defendants. Counts I, II and IV were based on claims under the RLTO. Count III was based on breach of contract for mishandling her security deposit. Plaintiff further alleged in her complaint that the \u201csubject *** building contains two units, is not owner occupied and is subject to the [RLTO].\u201d\nOn January 8, 2003, defendants filed a motion for partial summary judgment on counts I, II and IV of plaintiffs complaint, arguing that the RLTO was inapplicable to the property because Murtus, one of the titleholders, resided in the basement apartment, thereby excluding the building from operation of the RLTO pursuant to section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020 of the RLTO. Defendants attached, in support of their motion, the quitclaim deed by which Murtus conveyed title to the building to himself, Serifa, and Jerry; Serifa\u2019s supplemental and second supplemental affidavits; and a portion of Serifa\u2019s deposition. In her affidavits, Serifa averred that: Murtus had resided in and occupied the premises for approximately 37 years; during plaintiffs tenancy, the basement apartment was occupied by Murtus and, at times, by his grandson, Adam; and Murtus was 78 years old in 1999 and was absent from his basement apartment approximately two or three weeks out of the entire year due to medical treatments. In her deposition, Serifa testified that: at times from 1999 to 2001, when Murtus was ill, he would stay with defendants for short periods of time, but then would return to his home at the 1246 West Altgeld building; and Murtus\u2019 furniture, furnishings and clothing were at the Altgeld building. Defendants further argued that plaintiffs affidavit, which they attached, \u201cdoes not state that Nasrulla Murtus did not occupy the subject property *** from 1999-2001,\u201d and that plaintiff admitted in the affidavit that Murtus received his mail at the property. Defendants further argued that plaintiffs affidavit simply stated that plaintiff never saw, communicated with or met Murtus. Defendants explained this fact throughout Serifa\u2019s deposition, in which Serifa testified that Murtus was very ill and a private person. Defendants further explained, pursuant to Serifa\u2019s supplemental and second supplemental affidavits, that the reason plaintiff never saw Murtus, but did see Adam, was that Adam went to work every day, while Murtus was retired and stayed at home. Lastly, defendants maintained that because plaintiff was working nights and sleeping during the day, she could not have personal knowledge of Murtus\u2019 whereabouts and activities.\nPlaintiff filed a memorandum of law in opposition to defendants\u2019 motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff argued that a question of fact existed as to whether Murtus occupied the basement apartment. Plaintiff maintained that Serifa was lying about Murtus\u2019 occupancy, based on the fact that the basement apartment did not have electric service or direct heat, and Murtus lived there without a telephone. Plaintiff further argued that a \u201cletter\u201d from defendants to plaintiff, showing a deduction for interest on plaintiffs security deposit for her two-year tenancy pursuant to the RLTO, was evidence that Serifa \u201ctreated the RLTO as applying\u201d to the property, and \u201cthe purported applicability of the \u2018owner-occupied\u2019 exemption [was] a convenient fabrication concocted after suit was commenced.\u201d (Emphases in original.)\nPlaintiff also argued that, although Murtus was a titleholder, he could not be deemed an owner for purposes of the owner-occupied exemption because he did nothing concerning the management of the building and kept his \u201cownership\u201d secret. Plaintiff maintained that the thrust of the RLTO is to ensure the proper treatment of tenants by landlords and that this purpose is not applicable where the party has no control over the status of the tenants\u2019 rights.\nIn opposition, plaintiff presented her affidavit, which included her averment that she never saw Murtus in the building and that the basement apartment was unoccupied (except by Adam for two or three months) during her tenancy. Plaintiff also relied on Serifa\u2019s deposition testimony regarding the facts that the basement unit did not have its own direct heating, electricity or telephone service to the apartment.\nThe trial court granted partial summary judgment on the issue of ownership, finding that Murtus was a titleholder, but denied the motion on the issue of occupancy, finding that competing deposition testimony sufficiently created a factual dispute.\nA trial was conducted on plaintiff\u2019s complaint and, on November 3, 2002, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants and against plaintiff on the RLTO counts, finding that the RLTO did not apply because the building was \u201cowner-occupied\u201d by Murtus. The trial court also entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on her breach of contract claim regarding her security deposit. Defendants tendered payment of the judgment against them to plaintiff, but plaintiff\u2019s counsel refused to accept it.\nDefendants then filed a petition for Supreme Court Rule 137 sanctions against Berton N. Ring, plaintiff\u2019s attorney, alleging nine sanctionable filings and/or statements made by him. Plaintiff later filed a petition for attorney fees against defendants and their counsel, James Glass, seeking sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 and Rule 219(b) (155 Ill. 2d R. 137; 166 Ill. 2d R. 219 (b)). On September 22, 2004, the trial court filed a written opinion granting defendants\u2019 petition for Rule 137 sanctions based on two of the nine allegations made by defendants. Those allegations were:\n\u201c8. Taking a legal position that a titleholder is not an \u2018owner\u2019 of property; and\n9. Bringing causes of action under certain sections of the RLTO in absence of a causal basis to support the allegations in the complaint that the subject property was not owner-occupied.\u201d\nPursuant to number 8, the trial court sanctioned Ring for arguing, in a section of plaintiffs memorandum of law in opposition to defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment, that a titleholder was not an owner. With regard to allegation number 9, the trial court imposed sanctions apparently because Ring had told the court he would be filing a trial memorandum in support of plaintiffs argument on \u201cownership\u201d but, in fact, plaintiffs \u201cTrial Memorandum of Law on Owner Occupancy,\u201d in the court\u2019s view, contained lengthy \u201cdisjointed\u201d arguments on the issue of \u201coccupancy,\u201d not \u201cownership.\u201d The trial court further ruled, however, that plaintiff had a right to otherwise make arguments on the issue of \u201coccupancy\u201d and did not impose sanctions for that.\nThe court also denied plaintiffs petition for attorney fees and imposed sanctions, on its own initiative, against Ring for filing a Supreme Court Rule 137 petition against defendants. The court found that the petition was not well grounded in supportive facts, it was not warranted by existing law, and it was filed for an improper purpose: harassment and to increase the cost of litigation. The court also granted defendants leave to file a petition for reasonable expenses and attorney fees incurred because of the filing of the improper pleading. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nI. RLTO Section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020 Exclusion\nPlaintiff argues that in order for the owner-occupied exclusion under section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020 to apply to a building containing six units or less, the \u201cowner\u201d must exercise control over the property that is to be excluded. Plaintiff bases her contention on her interpretation of the RLTO definition of \u201cowner\u201d as a person \u201cin whom is vested all or part of the legal title to property, or all or part of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014030(c) (2004). Plaintiff claims that the words \u201cright to present use and enjoyment of the premises\u201d mean \u201ccontrol of the subject *** property and enjoying the benefits of ownership, such as the right to receive income.\u201d To find otherwise, plaintiff argues, would result in every six-flat landlord in Chicago simply deeding a nominal title interest to a tenant without any real ownership rights, thus circumventing the RLTO\u2019s requirements. Plaintiff further maintains that her construction of the term \u201cowner\u201d to include an element of control is consistent with the purpose and policy of the RLTO to protect tenants and serve the goal of better housing. Plaintiff concludes that Murtus could not be deemed an owner based on his status as a titleholder because his daughter and her husband maintained exclusive control in managing the property and receiving the income and benefits of the refinancing of the property.\nDefendants contend that the definition of \u201cowner\u201d in the RLTO is clear and unambiguous. Defendants argue that plaintiff seeks to add a term not intended by the city council.\nStatutory construction raises questions of law and, therefore, our review is de novo. Allen v. Lin, 356 Ill. App. 3d 405, 411, 826 N.E.2d 1064 (2005). In interpreting a statute, \u201c \u2018the primary rule, to which all other rules are subordinate, is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature.\u2019 \u201d Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 356 (1993), quoting Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill. 2d 178, 189 (1990).\n\u201cOur inquiry begins with the language of the statute, but it also entails consideration of \u2018the reason and the necessity for the law, the evils to be remedied, and the objects and purposes to be obtained.\u2019 [Citation.] The intent of the legislature is best evidenced by the language of the statute, and where the enactment is clear and unambiguous, we are not at liberty to depart from its plain meaning. [Citation.] However, statutes are also to be construed in a manner which avoids absurd or unjust results ***.\u201d Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 356.\nThe language of a statute must be given its plain and ordinary meaning and \u201c[t]he dictionary can be used to ascertain the ordinary and popular meaning of words.\u201d Stein v. Chicago Park District, 323 Ill. App. 3d 574, 577 (2001).\nThe stated purpose of the RLTO is \u201cto establish the rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental of dwelling units, and to encourage the landlord and the tenant to maintain and improve the quality of housing\u201d in the City of Chicago. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014010 (2004). Section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020 of the RLTO provides: \u201cDwelling units in owner-occupied buildings containing six units or less\u201d shall be excepted from application of the RLTO. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014020(2004). Section 5 \u2014 12\u2014030(c) defines \u201cowner\u201d as a person\n\u201cin whom is vested all or part of the legal title to property, or all or part of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014 030(c) (2004).\nBlack\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201cowner\u201d as \u201c[o]ne who has the right to possess, use, and convey something.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1130 (7th ed. 1999). \u201cOwnership\u201d is defined as \u201c[t]he collection of rights allowing one to use and enjoy property, including the right to convey it to others. Ownership implies the right to possess a thing, regardless of any actual or constructive control.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1131 (7th ed. 1999).\nPlaintiff here essentially interprets \u201cowner-occupied\u201d as \u201cowner-occupier-controlled.\u201d Plaintiff claims that Murtus, at best, was only a \u201cfractional \u2018titleholder\u2019 \u201d of the property, since he did not manage or collect any income from it. However, the RLTO\u2019s definition allows for such an owner\u2019s \u201cfractional\u201d interest by providing that an owner is a person with \u201call or part of the legal title to property, or all or part of the beneficial ownership and a right to present use and enjoyment of the premises.\u201d (Emphases added.) Chicago Municipal Code \u00a75 \u2014 12\u2014 030(c) (2004). Even with a \u201cfractional interest,\u201d as plaintiff argues, Murtus clearly had a right to possession of the property: he was a titleholder and, as the trial court determined, therefore an owner. He had use of the property: he rented out two units and occupied the third. He had the right to convey the property and, in accordance with this right, he quitclaimed the property to himself and his daughter and her husband. That Murtus chose to exercise all these rights in a manner apparently inconsistent with other owners is of no consequence. The fact is that Murtus, as a titleholder/owner, possessed all the rights of an owner and had the legal right to exercise his rights as he saw fit, whether through his personal control or through delegation of that control, as here, by instructions to defendants pursuant to a power of attorney.\nWe also find, with respect to plaintiffs claim that present use and enjoyment implies requiring, and exercising, control over the property, that this was not the intention of the city council. In Meyer v. Cohen, 260 Ill. App. 3d 351, 632 N.E.2d 22 (1993), a case analogous to the case at bar, the defendant owned an eight-unit building at the time the plaintiff signed a lease for one of the units. Three other units (including the apartment where the defendant lived) were occupied. Upon later terminating her lease, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendant, claiming that the defendant failed to comply with the RLTO in returning her security deposit. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed.\nOn appeal, the defendant in Meyer argued that the RLTO was inapplicable to her building because it was owner-occupied and contained six or less units. The defendant further argued that in order for the RLTO to apply, a \u201cdwelling unit\u201d must \u201cactually, not possibly\u201d be occupied at the time a lease is signed, and only four of the seven available units were occupied at the time the plaintiff signed her lease. In rejecting the defendant\u2019s argument, the Meyer court stated that her\n\u201c \u2018actual occupancy\u2019 interpretation clearly contradicts one of the city council\u2019s express purposes for enacting the ordinance: \u2018to establish the rights and obligations of the landlord and the tenant in the rental of dwelling units.\u2019 *** [Citation.] Were we to adopt [the defendant\u2019s] construction of the ordinance, landlords would be unsure whether they are subject to the provisions of the ordinance, as its applicability would depend on how many units were being occupied or how many leases were in effect at the time a lease was signed, thus controverting the express purpose of the statute, i.e., to fix more clearly the rights and obligations which landlords and tenants have vis-a-vis each other.\u201d Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 356.\nThe Meyer court further stated that the defendant\u2019s construction would lead to the result that a landlord would be subject to the RLTO regarding some tenants, but not others, depending upon the number of units occupied when a lease was signed. Similarly, tenants in the same building would be afforded different rights and responsibilities under the law based on the time they signed their leases, which the city council could not have intended. The Meyer court therefore held that the defendant was subject to the RLTO, and it was of no import that four of the seven inhabitable units were occupied when the plaintiff signed her lease.\nIn the case at bar, a construction of the definition of \u201cowner\u201d to include the element of control could lead to a result that was not intended by the city council. For example, landlords\u2019 and tenants\u2019 rights and obligations could be subject to continual changes, contrary to the purpose of the RLTO to make them more clearly fixed. Specifically, those rights and obligations would be subject to a determination of what constitutes a sufficient degree of control, the time during which the control must be exercised or not exercised, and whether partial or continuous exercise of the control was required during a lease. Further, all of these considerations would depend upon whether the owner remained the same or, if the property were sold to another, whether the new property owner exercised control of the property in the same manner as the previous owner during his tenants\u2019 leases. Clearly, the obligations and rights of landlords and tenants could never be clearly fixed, since a particular owner\u2019s control would be at issue each time a tenant signed a lease, a fact of which an ultimate tenant may not have notice.\nMoreover, the fact that Murtus, pursuant to a power of attorney to defendants, allowed defendants to manage and receive income from the property does not conflict with the purpose of the RLTO, which allows for the owner-occupied exclusion from application of the RLTO. The fact that Murtus did not claim the income from the property, and defendants did, has no relevance to the issue of whether Murtus was an owner, since, like the term \u201ccontrol,\u201d which is not a term in the RLTO definition of \u201cowner,\u201d there simply is no requirement in the definition that an owner exercise his right to receive all or part or any of the income from the property.\nWe find that the RLTO definition of \u201cowner\u201d is clear and unambiguous. Thus, there is no need to consider how that term has been interpreted in the cases relied upon by plaintiff. We note only that those cases, both from Illinois and other jurisdictions, are distinguishable or did not involve the RLTO but, rather, the Animal Control Act, the Liquor Control Act, the Structural Work Act, and the Property Tax Code where the term \u201cowner\u201d had no fixed meaning.\nII. Partial Summary Judgment Order\nPlaintiff argues that even if this court finds that bare legal title constitutes ownership within the meaning of the RLTO, summary judgment in favor of defendants was improper because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether defendant waived the RLTO exemption and whether Murtus\u2019 claimed occupancy of the premises was designed to avoid application of the RLTO. Plaintiffs arguments are misplaced. The trial court granted partial summary judgment by ruling on ownership only. The issues of waiver and whether the property was owner-occupied as intended by the ordinance were questions of fact that should have been part of the evidence at trial. The trial court did not grant summary judgment on those issues. As previously indicated, no report of proceedings or bystanders report at trial was part of the record in this case. The burden is on the appellant to present a record of sufficient completeness in order to question the evidence on issues raised at trial (Robles, 235 Ill. App. 3d at 126), and appellants in the case at bar failed to do so on the issues of waiver and whether Murtus\u2019 claimed occupancy of the premises was designed to avoid application of the RLTO.\nWe also note that, in addition to failing to provide a report of proceedings at trial, plaintiff did not include the transcript of proceedings on defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment.\nSince we do not know what occurred at trial, we cannot make any determination as to any of the court\u2019s findings at trial. We therefore must presume that the court properly decided the issues. See Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432, 749 N.E.2d 958 (2001) (\u201cthe appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record\u201d and, \u201cabsent a record, \u2018it [is] presumed that the order entered by the trial court [is] in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d). Webster, 195 Ill. 2d at 432. In addition, appellant does not claim any trial errors in this appeal concerning waiver or the avoidance of application of the RTLO.\nIII. Sanctions\nA. Defendants\u2019 Motion for Rule 137 Sanctions\nRing contends that he presented an objectively reasonable argument as to why the definition of ownership incorporates an element of control and, therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning him pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137. (155 Ill. 2d R. 137).\nSupreme Court Rule 137 provides in relevant part:\n\u201cThe signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\n\u201cA determination of whether to grant a party\u2019s motion for sanctions is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Peterson v. Randhava, 313 Ill. App. 3d 1, 14, 729 N.E.2d 75 (2000). We consider the following factors on review: \u201c(1) whether the trial court made an informed ruling; (2) whether the court based its ruling on valid reasons that fit the case; and (3) whether the trial court\u2019s ruling followed logically from the application of the reasons stated to the particular circumstances of the case.\u201d Peterson, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 14.\nWhile the trial court determined that a titleholder was an owner for purposes of the RLTO, the court further stated that Ring had the right to pursue the occupancy issue. However, the trial court nonetheless found sanctionable Ring\u2019s repeated allegations that Murtus, although a titleholder, was not an \u201cowner\u201d for purposes of the RLTO. We disagree with the court\u2019s finding. The issue of ownership, according to Ring, included a determination of whether Murtus occupied the premises, along with being a titleholder. Ring\u2019s argument, therefore, was a legal one, even if the trial court was disposed to reject it because of the court\u2019s prior ruling that Murtus was a titleholder and therefore an owner of the property. In light of the trial court\u2019s holding, Ring\u2019s repeated arguments to the contrary were merely his disagreement with the court\u2019s decision throughout the proceedings, which went to the ultimate decision to be made by the trial court, which itself was subject to a determination by reviewing courts.\nWe further observe that plaintiff did not dispute that Murtus was a titleholder or owner but, rather, whether Murtus was an \u201cowner\u201d for purposes of the RLTO\u2019s \u201cowner-occupied\u201d provision. Additionally, no case law existed regarding the interpretation of \u201cowner-occupied\u201d under the RLTO, which plaintiff maintained included an element of control. We do not find plaintiffs argument without merit, particularly in light of the fact that, prior to the trial court\u2019s ruling, another term of the RLTO had been challenged, requiring a reviewing court to interpret that term. Meyer, 260 Ill. App. 3d at 356-58 (on appeal, the defendant\u2019s interpretation of the meaning of the term \u201cdwelling unit\u201d under the RLTO was rejected).\nHere, the trial court found that Ring\u2019s repeated arguments, challenging Murtus\u2019 ownership based on the fact that he was a titleholder, were sanctionable. The trial court chose not to accept plaintiffs argument that Murtus could be an owner within the meaning of \u201cowner-occupied\u201d in the RLTO only if he also exercised control over the property. Nevertheless, as stated above, Ring\u2019s contentions on this issue were proper legal arguments, in light of the fact that no case law existed on this issue. Accordingly, we find that the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Ring on this issue.\nIn light of our disposition above, we also find that the trial court abused its discretion in sanctioning Ring, pursuant to defendants\u2019 allegations 8 and 9, for pursuing this argument in plaintiffs memorandum in opposition to defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs trial memorandum on owner occupancy.\nB. Sanctions Against Ring\nWe also find that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing, on its own initiative, Rule 137 sanctions against Ring for filing his petition for attorney fees, which included allegations pertaining to the security deposit with respect to the RLTO provisions. The focus for the trial court\u2019s imposition of sanctions was plaintiffs allegation that defendants falsely answered (in the negative) the question of whether they commingled the security deposit in violation of the RLTO. The court reasoned that there was no need for defendants to admit that they commingled the security deposit when they believed the RLTO did not apply. Ring, in his brief before this court, contends that instead of denying this allegation, defendants could have properly admitted to commingling and to not paying interest on a timely basis and still could have raised the owner-occupied exemption as a defense. In any event, the court stated that the allegations as a whole were not well grounded in supportive facts and were not warranted by existing law, and the petition was filed for an improper purpose: harassment and to increase the cost of litigation. We observe, however, that, again, Ring\u2019s allegations turned on his understanding of the RLTO and what constituted an \u201cowner-occupied\u201d exemption. We therefore find that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to impose sanctions for the filing of plaintiffs petition for attorney fees.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s judgment in part, finding that the RLTO did not apply to defendants\u2019 property because the owner-occupied exemption in section 5 \u2014 12\u2014020 was applicable, and we reverse the judgment of sanctions against plaintiffs attorney, Berton Ring.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part.\nCAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.\nMurtus, who died prior to trial, was not named as a defendant in this case.\nPlaintiff argues that this court can determine all issues on appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders, deposition testimony and affidavits. However, there is no indication in any of these regarding the issue of waiver of the RLTO, except for defendants\u2019 mention of it in their reply to plaintiffs memorandum of law in opposition to defendant\u2019s motion for summary judgment, which pertained to the issue of occupancy and the credit given plaintiff for interest on her security deposit.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Berton N. Ring, EC., of Chicago (Berton N. Ring and Eatrick D. Boyle, of counsel), for appellants.", "Law Office of James L. Glass, of Chicago (James L. Glass, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FRANCESCA DETRANA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY SUCH et al., Defendants-Appellees (Berton N. Ring, Appellant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20141263\nOpinion filed November 20, 2006.\nBerton N. Ring, EC., of Chicago (Berton N. Ring and Eatrick D. Boyle, of counsel), for appellants.\nLaw Office of James L. Glass, of Chicago (James L. Glass, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0861-01", "first_page_order": 879, "last_page_order": 891 }