{ "id": 4265822, "name": "In re TERRELL L., a Minor (Terrell L., Appellant, v. The Department of Children and Family Services, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Terrell L. v. Department of Children & Family Services", "decision_date": "2006-11-17", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20141356", "first_page": "1041", "last_page": "1052", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1041" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 121", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186552 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "132" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0121-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477031 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 482", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736057 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "494" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0482-01" ] }, { "cite": "210 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2535026 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "533" }, { "page": "533" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/210/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "183 Ill. 2d 470", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 209990 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "475" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/183/0470-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55979 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "378" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 Ill. 2d 405", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 351263 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "419" }, { "page": "419" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/196/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 428", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736074 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "433" }, { "page": "433" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0428-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 453249 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/192/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58928 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 157", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704419 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "162" }, { "page": "162" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0157-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 493", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229719 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0493-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780263 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" }, { "page": "83" }, { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "332 Ill. App. 3d 996", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1034212 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1004" }, { "page": "1004" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/332/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 591", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209188 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "597" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/0591-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79467 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "finding that \"where child custody proceedings are brought under the Act, the juvenile court's primary concern is the best interests of the child, and to that end, the court is vested with wide discretion\"" }, { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "finding that a child's best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit" }, { "page": "77" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2599999 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "879" }, { "page": "879" }, { "page": "879" }, { "page": "879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 31", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450528 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "49" }, { "page": "43-44" }, { "page": "43" }, { "page": "43-44" }, { "page": "46" }, { "page": "46" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0031-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609712 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" }, { "page": "123" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0120-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1033, "char_count": 29660, "ocr_confidence": 0.733, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.0209177732320319e-07, "percentile": 0.5452090063938091 }, "sha256": "79a1f723580393ef65952e336953b2370cb4137d65f48ad7cd5951e98c4cd444", "simhash": "1:ebbd5d3fdcc94b96", "word_count": 5047 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:06:43.500571+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re TERRELL L., a Minor (Terrell L., Appellant, v. The Department of Children and Family Services, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Terrell L., a minor, and his guardian sought to vacate his guardianship with his paternal grandmother and have the Guardianship Administrator (the Administrator) of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) appointed as his guardian. The circuit court denied the motions based on a finding that the guardian was not unfit, unable or unwilling, for reasons other than financial circumstances alone. Respondent appeals the judgment of the circuit court contending that it improperly interpreted section 2 \u2014 27 of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (the Act) (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27 (West 2004)) and should have conducted a best interest analysis to guide its decision. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court and remand this matter for further proceedings.\nBACKGROUND\nTerrell and his twin sister Theresa were born on May 16, 1988, to Monica L. and Anthony S. Terrell and Theresa were two of Monica L.\u2019s six children. In April 1998, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that Terrell and his siblings were abused and neglected by their biological parents. The circuit court granted temporary custody of Terrell and Theresa to the DCFS Administrator. On May 10, 1999, the circuit court issued an adjudication order pursuant to section 2 \u2014 21 of the Act finding that the minors were abused and neglected in accordance with sections 2 \u2014 3(1) (a) and (l)(b) of the Act and placed them under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. On August 20, 1999, the circuit court entered a disposition order pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act, adjudicating Terrell and his siblings wards of the court based on findings that Monica and Anthony were both unable and unfit to care for their children for reasons other than financial circumstances alone. The specific findings were predicated on various indications of abuse and neglect. The court held that it was in the best interests of the children to remove them from their parents\u2019 custody. The circuit court appointed the DCFS Administrator to be the guardian for Terrell and his siblings.\nOn September 13, 2000, the DCFS Administrator filed motions to vacate guardianship of Terrell and Theresa, transfer guardianship to James S. and Theresa S., the minors\u2019 paternal grandparents, and close the case. The minors had resided with James and Theresa S. since the age of five. On October 4, 2000, the circuit court entered an order vacating the Administrator\u2019s guardianship and establishing private guardianship with James and Theresa S. The circuit court explicitly retained jurisdiction over the parties and the case to modify or enforce the order.\nDuring their adolescent years, both Terrell and Theresa encountered problems with school. Theresa, however, became increasingly difficult to discipline and would run away from home for weeks at a time, use illegal drugs and was found delinquent for aggravated assault. Terrell, on the other hand, after failing in high school, joined the Lincoln\u2019s Challenge program and received his GED. Terrell subsequently enrolled in a diesel mechanics repair program at Kishwaukee Community College in DeKalb, Illinois, through Lincoln\u2019s Challenge and resided in a private residence hall near the campus of Northern Illinois University.\nPrior to January 6, 2006, James S. passed away. Theresa S., at the age of 75, also suffered from illnesses such as high blood pressure, heart disease and gout. Theresa S. began to express concerns about her ability to care for the minors. On January 6, 2006, Theresa S. filed a pro se petition to vacate her guardianship of Terrell and Theresa. The circuit court partially granted the motion, making both Theresa and Terrell wards of the court. The court appointed a private attorney to represent Theresa S. and the office of the public guardian as attorney and guardian ad litem (GAL) to represent the minors. On April 17, 2006, following several appearances by the attorneys representing Theresa S., the minors and the State, Terrell\u2019s GAL filed a motion to vacate Terrell\u2019s guardianship and appoint the DCFS Administrator as guardian. The attorney for Theresa S. and the State\u2019s attorney were in agreement with the GAL\u2019s motion.\nOn April 18, 2006, the circuit court conducted a hearing to determine placement of the minors who had been made wards of the court pursuant to section 2 \u2014 33 of the Act. Over the DCFS\u2019s objection, the court granted Theresa S.\u2019s petition to vacate her guardianship of Theresa L. and appointed the DCFS Administrator as Theresa L.\u2019s guardian. The court continued the hearing as it related to the placement of Terrell. On May 5, 2006, at his continued hearing, Terrell\u2019s GAL, the State\u2019s Attorney and Theresa S. argued that it was in Terrell\u2019s best interest to appoint the DCFS Administrator as his guardian for, among other reasons, continued educational support. The Department of Children and Family Services responded that the consideration of Terrell\u2019s best interest was not the proper \u201cstandard of review\u201d under section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act without first entering a finding that Theresa S. was unfit, unable or unwilling to care for Terrell. The Department of Children and Family Services also argued that Theresa S., Terrell and the State were seeking appointment of the DCFS Administrator solely for financial reasons. The circuit court took the case under advisement over the weekend to further examine section 2 \u2014 27 and other relevant provisions of the Act. It expressed its uncertainty regarding the parties\u2019 and the court\u2019s interpretation of section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act.\nOn May 12, 2006, the circuit court denied Theresa S. and Terrell\u2019s motion to appoint the DCFS Administrator as guardian. The court indicated that it interpreted section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act to preclude the court from vacating private guardianship unless it first found Theresa S. to be unfit, unable or unwilling for reasons other than financial ability alone. The circuit court expressed its doubts about the outcome of the instant case in its ruling, specifically with regard to its interpretation of section 2 \u2014 27.\nThe circuit court denied Terrell\u2019s emergency motion to reconsider on May 15, 2006, but granted his motion to stay the circuit court\u2019s ruling pending the outcome of this appeal over the DCFS\u2019s objection. Terrell filed this timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nI. STANDARD OF REVIEW\nTerrell contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to vacate private guardianship and appoint the DCFS Administrator as guardian based on two theories. The first theory is that the circuit court misinterpreted section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act to require a finding that Theresa S. was unfit, unable or unwilling, for reasons other than financial ability, before considering Terrell\u2019s best interests. Second, if we were to agree with the circuit court that such a finding was necessary prior to analyzing Terrell\u2019s best interest, then the circuit court\u2019s conclusion that Theresa S. was not unable to care for Terrell was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because we agree that the circuit court misinterpreted section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act, we need only address Terrell\u2019s first argument. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d 120, 124 (2003).\nII. PROCEDURAL HISTORY\nDue to the relative complexity of the procedural history of this case, we find it necessary to recount the actions and identify the authority under which the circuit court issued its rulings on the relevant motions. First, in response to Theresa S.\u2019s motion, the circuit court had to determine whether to open Terrell and Theresa\u2019s case and reinstate wardship pursuant to section 2 \u2014 33 of the Act. Section 2 \u2014 33 states:\n\u201c(1) Any time prior to a minor\u2019s 18th birthday, pursuant to a supplemental petition filed under this Section, the court may reinstate wardship and open a previously closed case when:\n(a) wardship and guardianship under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 was vacated in conjunction with the appointment of a private guardian under the Probate Act of 1975;\n(b) the minor is not presently a ward of the court under Article II of this Act nor is there a petition for adjudication of wardship pending on behalf of the minor; and\n(c) it is in the minor\u2019s best interest that wardship be reinstated. (2) The supplemental petition must be filed in the same proceeding in which the original adjudication order was entered.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 33 (West 2004).\nThe circuit court found that the minors met the standards set forth in section 2 \u2014 33 and ruled that both Terrell and Theresa were to be made wards of the court. The court then looked to section 2 \u2014 23 of the Act, which provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(1) The following kinds of orders of disposition may be made in respect of wards of the court:\n(a) A minor under 18 years of age found to be neglected or abused under Section 2 \u2014 3 or dependent under Section 2 \u2014 4 may be (1) continued in the custody of his or her parents, guardian or legal custodian; (2) placed in accordance with Section 2 \u2014 27; (3) restored to the custody of the parent, parents, guardian, or legal custodian, provided the court shall order the parent, parents, guardian, or legal custodian to cooperate with the Department of Children and Family Services and comply with the terms of an after-care plan or risk the loss of custody of the child and the possible termination of their parental rights; or (4) ordered partially or completely emancipated in accordance with the provisions of the Emancipation of Mature Minors Act.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 2004).\nBased on section 2 \u2014 23(l)(a)(2) of the Act, the circuit court looked to section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act for direction in terms of Terrell\u2019s placement. Section 2 \u2014 27 states:\n\u201c(1) If the court determines and puts in writing the factual basis supporting the determination of whether the parents, guardian, or legal custodian of a minor adjudged a ward of the court are unfit or are unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline the minor or are unwilling to do so, and that the health, safety, and best interest of the minor will be jeopardized if the minor remains in the custody of his or her parents, guardian or custodian, the court may at this hearing and at any later point:\n(a) place the minor in the custody of a suitable relative or other person as legal custodian or guardian;\n(a \u2014 5) with the approval of the Department of Children and Family Services, place the minor in the subsidized guardianship of a suitable relative or other person as legal guardian; \u2018subsidized guardianship\u2019 means a private guardianship arrangement for children for whom the permanency goals of return home and adoption have been ruled out and who meet the qualifications for subsidized guardianship as defined by the Department of Children and Family Services in administrative rules;\n(b) place the minor under the guardianship of a probation officer;\n(c) commit the minor to an agency for care or placement, except an institution under the authority of the Department of Corrections or of the Department of Children and Family Services;\n(d) commit the minor to the Department of Children and Family Services for care and service ***.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27 (West 2004).\nIII. CONSTRUCTION OF\nTHE JUVENILE COURT ACT OF 1987\nThe Department of Children and Family Services argues that the circuit court may not modify guardianship under section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act without first finding the guardian unfit, unable or unwilling. We disagree. In all guardianship and custody cases, \u201c \u2018the issue that singly must be decided is the best interest of the child.\u2019 \u201d In re Austin K., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 49 (2005), quoting In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 879 (1991). \u201cA child\u2019s best interest is not part of an equation. It is not to be balanced against any other interest. In custody cases, a child\u2019s best interest is and must remain inviolate and impregnable from all other factors ***.\u201d In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 879. In our view, once the initial finding of abuse and neglect has been entered by the circuit court, it is proper and consistent with the purpose of the Act that the circuit court have broad authority to modify orders in a manner that serves the best interests of the minor. In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77 (2001) (finding that \u201cwhere child custody proceedings are brought under the Act, the juvenile court\u2019s primary concern is the best interests of the child, and to that end, the court is vested with wide discretion\u201d).\n\u201cThe Juvenile Court Act is a statutory scheme, created by the legislature, the purpose of which is to secure for each minor subject thereto the care and guidance which will best serve the minor\u2019s safety and moral, emotional, mental and physical welfare, and the best interests of the community.\u201d In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 43-44 (2005); 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 2 (West 2004). Our supreme court has clearly indicated that once a child has been adjudicated abused, neglected or dependent pursuant to section 2 \u2014 21 of the Act, the court must determine whether it is in the best interests of the child to be made a ward of the court and the \u201cproper disposition best serving the health, safety and interests of the minor and the public.\u201d In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 43; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 22(1) (West 2004).\nAlthough dispositional orders are generally considered \u201cfinal\u201d for the purposes of appeal (see In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 43-44), they are subject to modification in a manner consistent with the provisions of the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 23 (West 2004). The purpose of the dispositional hearing is for the court to determine whether it was in the best interests of the children to be made wards of the court. In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77 (2001) (finding that a child\u2019s best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit). When conducting a dispositional hearing, the question is not necessarily one of unfitness of the parent but rather what is in the best interest of the child. In re Edward T, 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 800 (2003); In re Chyna B., 331 Ill. App. 3d 591, 597 (2002). Relative to the circuit court\u2019s responsibility in a dispositional hearing, we find In re J.J. to be instructive. In that case we stated:\n\u201cPursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act), in order to deprive a parent of custodial rights to children who have been adjudged wards of the court, a court must find that the parent is unfit or unable to care for, protect, train or discipline the children or is unwilling to do so. [Citation.] Where child custody proceedings are brought under the Act, the juvenile court\u2019s primary concern is the best interests of the child, and to that end, the court is vested with wide discretion. [Citations.] In such custody proceedings, a child\u2019s best interest is superior to all other factors, including the interests of the biological parents. [Citation.] \u2018If the \u201cbest interests\u201d standard can be attained only by placing the child in the custody of someone other than the natural parent, it is unnecessary for the court to find the natural parent unfit to care for the child.\u2019 [Citations.]\u201d In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 77.\nThe DCFS contends, nonetheless, that a minor\u2019s best interests are not to be considered in a section 2 \u2014 27 fitness determination and that the legislature intended that a finding of unfitness be determined before any guardianship modification occurs. In support of its first contention, the DCFS cites to In re M.B., 332 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1004 (2002). In re M.B. is distinguishable from the instant case. In that case we held that \u201c[i]n gauging one\u2019s fitness to act as a parent, the child\u2019s best interests are not to be considered.\u201d In re M.B., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. However, the court was not modifying a previous guardianship order and the question before the court in that case was whether sufficient evidence existed to support the circuit court\u2019s finding that the biological parent was unfit. In re M.B., 332 Ill. App. 3d at 1004. In this case, the court is being asked to modify a previous guardianship order and the facts do not implicate the rights of biological parents. We therefore agree with Terrell that the court was not required to find his guardian unfit to care for him before modifying a previously entered guardianship order.\nIV INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 2 \u2014 27\nTerrell next argues that the circuit court misinterpreted and misapplied section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act to the instant case. The cardinal principle of statutory interpretation is that the court must effectuate legislative intent. In re Justin M.B., 204 Ill. 2d at 123, citing Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (1994). The best indicator of legislative intent is statutory language. Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504 (2000). Courts should consider the statute in its entirety, keeping in mind the subject it addresses and the legislature\u2019s apparent objective in enacting it. People v. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d 157, 162 (2006), citing People v. Davis, 199 Ill. 2d 130, 135 (2002). However, a reviewing court\u2019s inquiry must always begin with the language of the statute itself, which is the surest and most reliable indicator of the legislature\u2019s intent. Taylor, 221 Ill. 2d at 162; People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). When the language of a statute is clear, it must be applied as written without resort to further aids or tools of interpretation. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d 428, 433 (2006). If statutory language is plain, the court cannot read exceptions, limitations or conditions into a statute that the legislature did not express. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d 405, 419 (2001); Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996), quoting Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 83. Only when the meaning of the enactment cannot be ascertained from the language may a court look beyond the language and resort to aids for construction. In re D.D., 196 Ill. 2d at 419; Gem Electronics of Monmouth, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 183 Ill. 2d 470, 475 (1998); Solich, 158 Ill. 2d at 81.\nIn the instant case, the Department cites to the language of section 2 \u2014 27 which refers to a guardian and legal custodian in addition to parents. This inclusion of a guardian and legal custodian, according to the DCFS, is proof that \u201cthe General Assembly intended that a bifurcated hearing take place under section 2 \u2014 27 [of the Act], with the court first considering fitness of the minor\u2019s current guardian before turning to the child\u2019s interest.\u201d In other words, \u201cif the legislature had intended that the fitness inquiry in section 2 \u2014 27 apply only to the initial decision to remove a minor from his natural parents, there would be no fitness inquiry for the subsequent guardians and/or legal custodians.\u201d\nTerrell asserts that the language of the statute allowing the circuit court to make a placement during the section 2 \u2014 27 \u201chearing and at any later point\u201d clearly and unambiguously gives the circuit court authority to place a minor once there is a determination that the parents, guardian or legal custodian was unfit, unable or unwilling to properly care for the minor. We agree.\nTerrell points out that the circuit court entered specific findings on August 20, 1999, that his biological parents were unfit, unable and unwilling to care for him and his siblings and found that it was in their best interests to remove them from their parents\u2019 custody and appoint the DCFS Administrator as guardian. Following the circuit court\u2019s appointment of the DCFS Administrator as guardian to Terrell and his siblings, it subsequently appointed James and Theresa S. private guardians on the DCFS Administrator\u2019s motion. This placement of the minors with James and Theresa S. was accomplished pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act without a finding that the DCFS or the Administrator was unfit, unable or unwilling to care for the minors.\nWe are aware that the language of section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act calls for a written factual finding supporting the circuit court\u2019s determination and refers to guardians and legal custodians. It does not, however, indicate whether a finding of unfitness is required once parental rights are terminated and a modification of guardianship is sought. Based on the plain language of section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act, we find two compelling reasons to conclude that a subsequent finding that a guardian or legal custodian is unfit, unable or unwilling is not required before the circuit court may modify placement of a minor.\nFirst, the language, \u201cat this hearing and at any later point,\u201d is quite broad in its scope and does not contain any limiting language. In our view, if the legislature intended that the circuit court must find a guardian unfit, unable or unwilling before a modification under section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act, it could have so indicated in the text of this section. It did not. The legislature expressly gave the circuit court authority to exercise the options contained in section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act at the hearing and at any later point. The DCFS\u2019s interpretation of section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act would require that it find any guardian or legal custodian, including the DCFS, unfit, unable or unwilling before modifying placement of a minor previously adjudicated abused and neglected. We find such an interpretation to be inconsistent with the purpose of the Act and well-established Illinois case law and, potentially, contrary to the best interests of the minor. 705 ILCS 405/ 1\u2014 2 et seq. (West 2004); see also In re Austin W, 214 Ill. 2d at 46; In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 879; In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App. 3d 521, 533 (1991).\nSecond, were we to agree with the DCFS\u2019s construction of section 2\u2014 27, the phrase \u201cat any later point\u201d would be rendered meaningless. A statute should be construed in a manner such that no term is rendered meaningless or superfluous. Harshman v. DePhillips, 218 Ill. 2d 482, 494 (2006), citing Stroger v. Regional Transportation Authority, 201 Ill. 2d 508, 524 (2002). We cannot conclude, based on the language of the statute, that the legislature did not intend the words \u201cat any later point\u201d to actually mean \u201cat any later point.\u201d It is neither this court\u2019s place nor its function to limit or expand the operative phrase in this statute. In re R.L.S., 218 Ill. 2d at 433. Moreover, if it so desired, the legislature could have simply identified an event or a point in time beyond which the circuit court would be required to hold an additional hearing and make such a finding of a guardian or legal custodian before ordering a modification. It did not. We therefore conclude that the legislature\u2019s intent, as evidenced by the plain language, was to authorize the circuit court to place a minor at any time following an initial finding of unfit, unable or unwilling under section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act when it serves the minor\u2019s best interests.\nV BEST INTEREST ANALYSIS\nWe recognize that the DCFS also contends that the circuit court considered the best interests of Terrell and ruled that guardianship with the Administrator was not in his best interests. After reviewing the record, it is not clear whether the circuit court believed that placement pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 was prohibited without a renewed finding that Theresa S. was unfit, unable or unwilling. The circuit court made the following statements during arguments on the motions and in its ruling:\n\u201cBut when you look at the actual issue, is it in his best interest for [the court] to take wardship? Yes, the best interest factors apply. Am I able to find that [Theresa S.] is unable so that I can look at the best interest? I don\u2019t think so.\u201d\nRelative to modifying a previous guardianship order under section 2 \u2014 27, the court stated:\n\u201c[W]hat do I make of this language? The Court may at this hearing and at any later point. You\u2019re arguing to me on behalf of the minor that that means that once I\u2019ve done it once, at any later point I can do whatever of these options, A through D I feel is appropriate without any further finding other than just best interest. I appreciate that argument. It could be right which is why I am going to stay the enforcement of this order.\u201d\nLastly, before ruling in favor of the DCFS the court explained:\n\u201c[T]he question is in order for me to do a 2 \u2014 27 dispositional order, do I have to find some deficit in order for me to intervene and to name the State then as this youngster\u2019s guardian? I think I essentially do. *** I have struggled with this. I think that the statute wants me to do that. And then the questions is factually I\u2019ve made findings that she is neither unable nor unwilling nor unfit. And to the extent that she is under any inability, it is strictly financial. ***\n[I] do find that some deficiency on the part of the legal guardian has to be identified before I start down the road [that] somebody else can do it better. I find that specifically because I feel that 2 \u2014 23 drives me to 2 \u2014 27 and 2 \u2014 27 requires that. Now, if I\u2019m wrong and it is strictly a best interest issue, then, again, I want to reiterate what I said the first time through. I think this is all about finances.\u201d\nDespite the DCFS\u2019s contention that the circuit court decided this matter based on Terrell\u2019s best interests, we find it appropriate to remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. \u201cIn all cases, it is the health, safety and interests of the minor which remains the guiding principle when issuing an order of disposition regarding the custody and guardianship of a minor ward.\u201d In re Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d at 46; see also In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 879, quoting In re Violetta B., 210 Ill. App. 3d at 533. Based on the record of the proceedings below, it is clear that the framework for the proceedings here was predicated on an erroneous construction of the applicable statute and primarily focused on Theresa S.\u2019s fitness. We find it more appropriate for the circuit court to decide what action, if any, should be taken regarding Terrell\u2019s motion with the benefit of a full hearing that is not dominated by uncertainty in applying the statute. We, however, express no opinion with regard to the outcome on remand and defer to the circuit court to determine whether Terrell requires any further action provided under the Act.\nAs an aside, we are not suggesting that, in the absence of a previous order entered pursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act, a finding of unfit, unable or unwilling is not required. That is a different issue which is not before this court for consideration. We are also mindful that biological parents have a superior right of custody to their children and that both parents must be adjudged unfit, unable or unwilling to care for the minor before placement with the DCFS is authorized. In re Edward T, 343 Ill. App. 3d 778 (2003). A fit parent has a superior right to custody of his child that can be superceded only by a showing of good cause to place custody of the child in a third party. In re S.S., 313 Ill. App. 3d 121, 132 (2000). Nonetheless, the rights of Terrell\u2019s biological parents were previously terminated and are not now at issue. Consequently, we hold that the circuit court was not required to find Theresa S. unfit, unable or unwilling prior to considering Terrell\u2019s best interests relative to his motion.\nVI. CONCLUSION\nIt appears to be obvious that once a minor has been adjudicated abused, neglected or dependent under the Act and thrust into the care of this state\u2019s juvenile system, the circuit court\u2019s main and perhaps only function is to address the minor\u2019s needs consistent with his best interests. We need not recount the unspeakable circumstances established in the record under which Terrell and his siblings initially came to be wards of the court. Suffice it to say that the only contact with the semblance of a caring adult that similarly situated children will ever experience may only occur through the efforts of the circuit court and agency intervention. We suggest that adhering to a rigid construction of the Act which limits the court\u2019s ability to exercise its discretion and act in the best interests of a child frustrates the purpose of the Act and pointlessly elevates form over substance.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the circuit court misinterpreted and misapplied section 2 \u2014 27 of the Act as it relates to a modification of a previous guardianship order. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nReversed and remanded.\nJOSEPH GORDON and McNULTY, JJ., concur.\nThe record reflects that Theresa S.\u2019s counsel initially believed that Theresa S. only sought to vacate guardianship of Theresa L. After clarifying his client\u2019s position, however, counsel confirmed that she was seeking to vacate guardianship of both minors and subsequently joined the GAL\u2019s motion.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard Cozzola, Diana White, Adela Carlin, Steven Pick, and Maureen Schmidt, all of Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re TERRELL L., a Minor (Terrell L., Appellant, v. The Department of Children and Family Services, Appellee).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20141356\nOpinion filed November 17, 2006.\nRichard Cozzola, Diana White, Adela Carlin, Steven Pick, and Maureen Schmidt, all of Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1041-01", "first_page_order": 1059, "last_page_order": 1070 }