{ "id": 4267164, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Stanley", "decision_date": "2006-10-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20141790", "first_page": "441", "last_page": "452", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 441" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 1222", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 418", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415351 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0418-01" ] }, { "cite": "665 N.E.2d 1330", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "171 Ill. 2d 475", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 57333 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/171/0475-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Haw. 285", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12260226 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298", "parenthetical": "holding the Hawaii statute requiring public notification including over the Internet of registered sex offenders without notice and a hearing violates procedural due process guarantees under the Hawaii Constitution" }, { "page": "1268", "parenthetical": "holding the Hawaii statute requiring public notification including over the Internet of registered sex offenders without notice and a hearing violates procedural due process guarantees under the Hawaii Constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/97/0285-01" ] }, { "cite": "105 Haw. 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Haw.", "case_ids": [ 12260473 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "235", "parenthetical": "holding the Hawaii statute requiring lifetime registration for all sex offenders violates procedural due process under the Hawaii Constitution" }, { "page": "255", "parenthetical": "holding the Hawaii statute requiring lifetime registration for all sex offenders violates procedural due process under the Hawaii Constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/haw/105/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "894 So. 2d 924", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "So. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9180511 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/so2d/894/0924-01" ] }, { "cite": "538 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9030296 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "1165" }, { "page": "7-8" }, { "page": "105" }, { "page": "1164-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/538/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "424 U.S. 319", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12026449 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "909" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/424/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "27 Ill. Reg. 16152", "category": "laws:admin_register", "reporter": "Ill. Reg.", "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "eff. September 30, 2003" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 550", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 434", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 356", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765225 ], "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0356-01" ] }, { "cite": "705 N.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 319", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352882 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0319-01" ] }, { "cite": "768 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 639", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472398 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0639-01" ] }, { "cite": "793 N.E.2d 687", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5574640 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "790" }, { "page": "795-800" }, { "page": "798" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "794 N.E.2d 888", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "342 Ill. App. 3d 512", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3473633 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516-17" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/342/0512-01" ] }, { "cite": "796 N.E.2d 153", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 664", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719555 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "667", "parenthetical": "both addressing the Internet provision of section 115(b)" }, { "page": "673" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0664-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 801", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 822", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262112 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831" }, { "page": "831-32" }, { "page": "831-32" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0822-01" ] }, { "cite": "851 N.E.2d 141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264536 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 433", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963706 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "787 N.E.2d 747", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 50", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609700 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "63-64" }, { "page": "64-65" }, { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0050-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 288", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448502 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "181" }, { "page": "183" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "203-05", "parenthetical": "holding the Notification Law does not violate the substantive due process guarantees of the Illinois Constitution" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 N.E.2d 312", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1951, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "410 Ill. 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5311584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1951, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/410/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 N.E. 316", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1927, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. 363", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2444575 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1927, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "364-65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/324/0363-01" ] }, { "cite": "837 N.E.2d 118", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259325 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "412" }, { "page": "412" }, { "page": "411" }, { "page": "411-12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "478 N.E.2d 267", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1985, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. 2d 237", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3138930 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "261" }, { "page": "261" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/106/0237-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1119, "char_count": 27506, "ocr_confidence": 0.775, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.2522635679873363e-08, "percentile": 0.33033219311241696 }, "sha256": "18a2a3ab21ed21cda9fbe60072c19f8bc7be41a0a8fc622f4c0597e9901b5b32", "simhash": "1:bab8ad0eed2e9512", "word_count": 4608 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:07.948493+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GARCIA\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollovying a bench trial, the defendant, Christopher Stanley, was convicted of three counts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated unlawful restraint. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of six years on the merged counts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and five years on aggravated unlawful restraint. Because he was convicted of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault, the defendant was required to register as a \u201csexual predator\u201d for the rest of his life. On appeal, the defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated unlawful restraint conviction. He also challenges the constitutionality of the Sex Offender Registration Act (Registration Act) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2004)) and the Sex Offender and Child Murderer Community Notification Law (Notification Law) (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2004)). Finally, he argues he is entitled to a $100 credit against his assessed fines.\nBACKGROUND\nAt trial, the State presented evidence to establish that E.H., the victim in this case, was jogging in Evanston at 5 p.m. on November 23, 2003, when she encountered the defendant running alongside her. It was raining outside and although the defendant was also jogging, he was not wearing running clothes. The victim engaged the defendant in conversation in order to make herself more comfortable with the situation. After conversing for a few minutes, the victim ran ahead of the defendant. The defendant then grabbed the victim from behind, dragged her to an alley or parking lot next to an auto body shop and, after she screamed, threatened to slit her throat. The victim, however, never saw a knife. He also told her she was \u201cgoing to die.\u201d The defendant pulled down her shorts and underwear so that her backside was exposed and unzipped his pants. The victim begged him to stop and struggled with him. The defendant punched the victim twice in the face and once in the stomach and eventually ran away. The victim received several nicks, cuts, and bruises to her face and body.\nEyewitness Matthew Beck was in his apartment overlooking the auto body shop and called the police after he heard someone screaming and saw a man lying on top of a person. Beck went outside after he saw the victim in the street trying to flag down a car. He called the police again. The police arrived shortly thereafter and took a description of the defendant from the victim. At the scene, the police recovered a cellular phone from a muddy puddle.\nA few hours later, Beck heard a vehicle outside his apartment. He looked out his window and saw a red and cream-colored pickup truck. He also saw the man he had previously seen attacking the victim. The man appeared to be looking for something. Beck called the police and gave them this information.\nPolice officers were able to trace the recovered cellular phone to Stellar Productions, an event equipment rental company where the defendant worked. On November 25, 2003, the police spoke to the defendant\u2019s supervisor, Michael Glabowicz, who informed them that the defendant had told him he lost his cellular phone on November 23 while at a jobsite in Winnetka. Glabowicz gave the officers a description of the defendant and of his vehicle. At trial, Glabowicz described the defendant\u2019s vehicle as a light-colored pickup truck with maroon or red side panels. He also acknowledged that the defendant had been working 50 to 60 hours a week in November 2003 and that some of the defendant\u2019s paychecks had bounced.\nAfter speaking to Glabowicz, the officers retrieved a photograph of the defendant. After the victim tentatively identified the defendant as the offender from an array, the officers went to the defendant\u2019s home in Zion. The defendant agreed to accompany the officers to the Evanston police station, where he was read his Miranda rights. The defendant initially told the officers that he lost his cellular phone at a Winnetka jobsite. However, when confronted with information that his phone had been recovered at the scene of an attack in Evanston and that a man fitting his description had been seen by an eyewitness driving a vehicle similar to his, the defendant put his head down and started to cry.\nThe defendant told the officers he had been experiencing troubles with his ex-wife; he believed she had begun working for an escort service. His ex-wife also had been harassing him over the phone, telling him she was moving with his two-year-old son to Florida. He left the Winnetka jobsite on November 23, 2003, and went for a drive, ending up in Evanston. He decided to go for a jog and was approached by the victim. The victim reminded him of his ex-wife, bothered him, and would not leave him alone. He \u201cjust snapped\u201d and grabbed her from behind, walked her toward a parking lot, and fell on top of her. He denied striking the victim, pulling down her shorts, or unzipping his pants. When he went back to the jobsite, he realized his cellular phone was missing. He returned to the scene of the attack to look for it, but could not find it.\nThe defendant was placed in a lineup in the early hours of November 26, 2003, where the victim identified him without hesitation. He then made a statement similar to the one above in the presence of Evanston police officer Joe Dugan and Assistant State\u2019s Attorney Beth Neslin. The defendant added that while he had been on top of the victim, he had a pocketknife with a small blade pressed against her cheek. He said he covered most of the blade with his thumb. The defendant either threw the knife away or lost it.\nThe defendant\u2019s trial testimony was similar to the statements he had previously made. H\u00e9 testified that on November 23, 2003, he had been working \u201ccrazy\u201d hours and several of his paychecks had bounced. He was also in an \u201cugly\u201d situation with his ex-wife. He decided to go for a jog to blow off steam when he encountered the victim. Although he initially wanted to talk to her, he became upset because \u201cshe was all in [his] business.\u201d He also felt rejected when she ran ahead of him. When he grabbed her, he \u201cjust lost [his] temper\u201d because he felt she had been rude to him and reminded him of his ex-wife. He threw her to the ground to scare her and struck her once in the mouth to quiet her. The defendant denied wanting to have sex with the victim. He also denied pulling down her shorts or unzipping his pants. He could not recall telling her that he was going to slit her throat. He eventually stopped because he looked into the victim\u2019s face and realized he was lashing out at the wrong person. He expressed his remorse for his actions and testified that he did not mean to hurt anyone.\nThe defendant also testified he told the victim he had a knife and would cut her if she moved. He admitted at trial that he did have a penknife or pocketknife, which he described as \u201c[j]ust a little \u2014 like Swiss army pocketknife\u201d or \u201cone of those Boy [Scout] knives *** [with] scissors in it *** [and] all that stuff in it.\u201d He acknowledged it was a pocketknife that came down into a casing. He testified that he held the knife to her cheek or jaw, but kept his thumb over most of the blade.\nThe trial court found the defendant guilty of three counts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault as well as one count of aggravated unlawful restraint based on his use of the pocketknife. He received a sentence of six years on the merged counts of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault and a concurrent sentence of five years on the aggravated unlawful restraint count. The trial court assessed numerous fees and fines, ordered him to submit a DNA sample, and explained that he would be required to register in the sex offender registry for the rest of his life.\nANALYSIS\nI\nThe defendant\u2019s first contention on appeal is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the pocketknife he used constituted a \u201cdeadly weapon.\u201d Accordingly, he argues that his conviction for aggravated unlawful restraint should be reduced to unlawful restraint.\nWhen a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the issue is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267 (1985); People v. Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d 400, 412, 837 N.E.2d 118 (2005). A criminal conviction will not be set aside unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant\u2019s guilt. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d at 261; Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 412.\nThe defendant in this case was charged with and convicted of aggravated unlawful restraint. The defendant contends that the evidence falls short of the required proof that he used a deadly weapon. The indictment specifically alleged that the defendant \u201ccommitted the offense of aggravated unlawful restraint in that he, knowingly without legal authority detained [the victim] while armed with a deadly weapon, to wit: a knife.\u201d See 720 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 3.1(a) (West 2004).\nA deadly weapon is one that is \u201cdangerous to life\u201d or \u201cone likely to produce death or great bodily injury,\u201d or one that \u201cmay be used for the purpose of offense or defense and capable of producing death.\u201d People v. Dwyer, 324 Ill. 363, 364, 155 N.E. 316 (1927). \u201c \u2018Some weapons are deadly per se; others, owing to the manner in which they are used, become deadly. A gun, pistol, or dirk-knife is itself deadly, while a small pocket knife, a cane, a riding whip, a club or baseball bat may be so used as to be a deadly weapon.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis added.) Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 411, quoting Dwyer, 324 Ill. at 364-65. It is for the trier of fact to determine whether the weapon used is a deadly weapon based on the manner of its use and the circumstances of the case. Blanks, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 411-12.\nIn People v. Carter, 410 Ill. 462, 102 N.E.2d 312 (1951), our supreme court addressed whether a small pocketknife, with a two-inch blade, constituted a dangerous and deadly weapon. The court held that although it was not a per se deadly or dangerous weapon, it was used as such where the defendant used the knife to cut the victim above her eye, a \u201cvital part of her body.\u201d Carter, 410 Ill. at 466.\nIn this case, we find the facts, when considered in the light most favorable to the State, sufficient to support the defendant\u2019s conviction. The defendant unlawfully restrained the victim while armed with a pocketknife. The pocketknife, while not deadly per se, was capable of being used as a deadly weapon. Carter, 410 Ill. at 465. The record indicates the defendant held the knife against the victim\u2019s jaw or cheek; clearly, a vital part of her body. Further, although the defendant covered most of the blade with his thumb, the victim testified that he threatened to slit her throat and told her she was going to die. The defendant acknowledged at trial that he threatened to cut her if she moved. On this record, the trial court was justified in finding that the pocketknife constituted a deadly weapon based on the manner in which it was used and in light of the circumstances of the case.\nII\nThe defendant next contends that certain provisions of the Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2004)) and Notification Law (730 ILCS 152/101 et seq. (West 2004)) violate his right to procedural due process under both the federal and state constitutions. He specifically challenges his designation as a \u201csexual predator\u201d under the Registration Act and its requirement that he register for the rest of his life. He also challenges the corresponding provisions of the Notification Law, which require that his personal information be publicly disseminated, including over the Internet. He argues he should have been provided an opportunity to be heard prior to being required to register as a sexual predator for life and prior to his personal information being posted online. The defendant argues the statutes are facially unconstitutional as well as unconstitutional as applied to him.\nAs noted by our supreme court in People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 181, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004), the Registration Act and Notification Law \u201coperate in tandem\u201d and provide a \u201ccomprehensive scheme for the registration of Illinois sex offenders and the dissemination of information about these offenders to the public.\u201d Numerous constitutional challenges to various provisions of the Registration Act and/or Notification Law in their various forms have been addressed and rejected by the courts of this state. See, e.g., Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d 178, 821 N.E.2d 288; In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d 50, 787 N.E.2d 747 (2003); People v. Malchow, 193 Ill. 2d 413, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000); People v. Beard, 366 Ill. App. 3d 197, 851 N.E.2d 141 (2006); In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d 822, 847 N.E.2d 801 (2006); People v. Grochocki, 343 Ill. App. 3d 664, 796 N.E.2d 153 (2003); In re D.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d 512, 794 N.E.2d 888 (2003); In re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d 784, 793 N.E.2d 687 (2003); People v. Marsh, 329 Ill. App. 3d 639, 768 N.E.2d 108 (2002); People v. Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d 319, 705 N.E.2d 152 (1998); but see People v. Johnson, 363 Ill. App. 3d 356, 843 N.E.2d 434 (2006), appeal allowed, 218 Ill. 2d 550 (2006).\nThe definition of \u201csex offender\u201d under the Registration Act includes those charged and convicted of any sex offense or attempted sex offense. 730 ILCS 150/2(A)(l)(a) (West 2004). \u201cSex offense\u201d under the Registration Act is defined as a violation of enumerated sections of the Criminal Code of 1961, including criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual assault. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1) (West 2004). Relevant to this case, a \u201csexual predator\u201d as defined by the Registration Act includes any person, who, after July 1, 1999, is convicted of an enumerated offense or the attempt of an enumerated offense, including aggravated criminal sexual assault. 730 ILCS 150/2(E)(1) (West 2004); see also In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 63-64. Sex offenders or sexual predators are required to register with municipal or county law enforcement officials within 10 days of establishing residency in that municipality or county. 730 ILCS 150/3 (West 2004). A sex offender must register for 10 years following his or her conviction while a sexual predator must register for the rest of his or her life. 730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2004); In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 64-65.\nThe Notification Law requires the Department of State Police to maintain the Statewide.Sex Offender Database for the purpose of identifying sex offenders and making information about them available to various aspects of the community. 730 ILCS 152/115(a) (West 2004). As of July 1, 2000, the Department of State Police is required to make the information contained in the Statewide Sex Offender Database available on the Internet through the Department\u2019s home page. 730 ILCS 152/115(b) (West 2004); see Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 183; Grochocki, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 667 (both addressing the Internet provision of section 115(b)); see also 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7 1282.30(g)(2) (2004), amended at 27 Ill. Reg. 16152 (eff. September 30, 2003) (setting forth requirements and procedures for providing sex offender information over the Internet).\nThe defendant in this case is included in the Statewide Sex Offender Database, and information about him, including his name, address, and photograph, is available on the Department of State Police website. Under his name, the words \u201cSexual Predator\u201d appear in red letters. The defendant does not dispute his inclusion in the Statewide Sex Offender Database or the general dissemination of that information over the Internet. Rather, the defendant disputes his designation as a sexual predator, the appearance of that term under his name and photograph on the Department website, and the requirement that he register for the rest of his life. The defendant argues that because the term \u201csexual predator\u201d brands him forever as a danger to the community, and connotes he has multiple convictions for sex offenses, or has recidivist tendencies, due process entitles him to a hearing to contest those connotations.\nOur statutes are presumed to be constitutional and the burden of establishing a statute\u2019s invalidity falls on the party challenging it. Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 189; In re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 790. The constitutionality of a statute is reviewed de novo. In re J.W., 204 Ill. 2d at 62.\n\u201cProcedural due process requires that a person in danger of serious loss of life, liberty or property be given notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.\u201d Beard, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 200, citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18, 41, 96 S. Ct. 893, 909 (1976). Challenges based on procedural due process focus on the procedures employed by a statute and whether the statute provides an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 831. The first step in a procedural due process challenge is to determine whether an individual has been deprived of life or a protected liberty or property interest. See In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 831. The second step is to determine what process is \u201cdue\u201d before such a deprivation may occur. See In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 831-32.\nUnder our federal constitution, \u201c[individuals] who assert a right to a hearing under the Due Process Clause must show that the facts they seek to establish in that hearing are relevant under the statutory scheme.\u201d Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8, 155 L. Ed. 2d 98, 105, 123 S. Ct. 1160, 1165 (2003). In Doe, the United States Supreme Court addressed whether the registration and notification requirements of the Connecticut sex offender statute violated procedural due process under the federal constitution. The Connecticut statute required persons convicted of certain sex offenses to register with the Department of Public Safety, which in turn compiled a sex offender registry available over the Internet. Some offenders were required to register for 10 years while others were required to register for life. The website included a disclaimer indicating that the Department had not determined whether any particular offender was currently dangerous. The respondent in that case argued that due process entitled him to notice and a hearing on whether he was currently dangerous before his information could be included in the online registry.\nThe Supreme Court, without reaching the question of whether the inclusion of the respondent in the sex offender registry and Internet posting constituted a \u201cdeprivation of liberty interest,\u201d rejected his contention that he was entitled to a predeprivation hearing because whether the respondent was currently dangerous was not material under the Connecticut statute, as his designation as a sex offender was grounded solely on his conviction of a certain sex offense. Doe, 538 U.S. at 7-8, 155 L. Ed. 2d at 105, 123 S. Ct. at 1164-65.\nFollowing the Court\u2019s decision in Doe, several courts in this state have rejected procedural due process challenges to the Registration Act and Notification Law because the duties of registrants under the Illinois statutes, like those under the Connecticut one, arise solely from one\u2019s conviction of certain enumerated sex offenses; whether the offender is currently dangerous is not relevant under the statutory scheme. See In re D.R., 342 Ill. App. 3d at 516-17; In re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 795-800. Under the Illinois statutes, the only material fact is the offender\u2019s conviction of a sex offense, which the offenders have had an opportunity to challenge at trial or during juvenile adjudication proceedings. Accordingly, a due process hearing is not required prior to being subject to the Registration Act and Notification Law. In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 831-32; In re J.R., 341 Ill. App. 3d at 798; see also Logan, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 332-33 (a pre-Doe decision rejecting the defendant\u2019s procedural due process challenge to the Registration Act and Notification Law because they apply to all sex offenders meeting the statutory definition and \u201claw enforcement authorities have no discretion to determine which offenders would be exposed to public dissemination\u201d).\nThe defendant in this case acknowledges the Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Doe, as well as decisions from this court including In re J.R., and In re D.R. He contends, however, that those cases are distinguishable because they do not address lifetime registration or the designation \u201csexual predator.\u201d We reject this distinction. First, a provision of the Connecticut statute at issue in Doe did involve lifetime registration. Second, even if we were to agree with the defendant\u2019s contention that designation as a sexual predator implicates a liberty interest, he has received all the process that is due. The designation \u201csexual predator\u201d is based solely on being convicted after July 1, 1999, of an enumerated sex offense. Just as whether the respondents were currently dangerous was not material in Doe, In re J.R., or In re D.R., the instant defendant\u2019s sexual proclivity or recidivist tendencies are not relevant to the requirement that he register as a sexual predator. Even if the defendant could prove at a hearing that this conviction was a character anomaly or that he was devoid of recidivist tendencies, his conviction for attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault is sufficient to require him to register for life as a sexual predator. Under the Notification Law, the public would be entitled to having access to this fact and certain personal information via the Internet. See Milks v. State, 894 So. 2d 924 (Fla. 2005) (holding Florida\u2019s requirement that offenders convicted of certain sexual offenses register for life as \u201csexual predators\u201d and that the public be notified of this information over the Internet without a hearing to determine whether they present a danger to the community does not violate procedural due process under the federal or Florida Constitution); cf. State v. Guidry, 105 Haw. 222, 235, 96 P.3d 242, 255 (2004) (holding the Hawaii statute requiring lifetime registration for all sex offenders violates procedural due process under the Hawaii Constitution); State v. Bani, 97 Haw. 285, 298, 36 P.3d 1255, 1268 (2001) (holding the Hawaii statute requiring public notification including over the Internet of registered sex offenders without notice and a hearing violates procedural due process guarantees under the Hawaii Constitution).\nThe defendant argues that a predator is \u201cone that preys, destroys, or devours,\u201d and that this description does not accurately describe him. What he fails to note, however, is that the term \u201csexual predator\u201d is defined by statute (730 ILCS 150/2(E) (West 2004)), a definition he meets. Further, when an Internet user \u201cclicks on\u201d the designation \u201cSexual Fredator\u201d appearing under the defendant\u2019s information on the Department of State Police website, the statutory definition readily appears. The website, like that at issue in Doe, also provides a disclaimer providing in part that the Department of State Police\n\u201chas not considered or assessed the specific risk of re-offense with regard to any individual prior to his or her inclusion on this Registry and has made no determination that any individual included in the Registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included on the Registry are included solely by virtue of their conviction record and Illinois state law.\u201d\nThe user must \u201cagree\u201d to the terms of this disclaimer before being allowed access to the sex offender database.\nFor these reasons, we reject the defendant\u2019s contention that his procedural due process rights under the federal constitution have been violated.\nWe similarly reject his contention that his right to procedural due process under the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a72) has been violated. As the defendant notes, the due process clause of our state constitution may be construed more broadly than its federal counterpart. See People v. Washington, 171 Ill. 2d 475, 485-86, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (1996). However, the defendant has presented no argument that the due process clause of our state constitution construed \u201cmore broadly\u201d than the federal due process clause leads to a different result. Further, we note that the courts in In re Phillip C., 364 Ill. App. 3d 822, and Grochocki, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 673, rejected the notions that the Registration Act and the Notification Law violate our state\u2019s due process clause. See also Cornelius, 213 Ill. 2d at 203-05 (holding the Notification Law does not violate the substantive due process guarantees of the Illinois Constitution).\nThe defendant also argues that the Registration Act and Notification Law violate his right to procedural due process as applied in this case. He asserts that the facts underlying his conviction, including that this was his first offense, that he stopped his actions after looking into the victim\u2019s face, that he readily confessed his actions to the police, and that he expressed remorse at the time of his arrest as well as at trial, demonstrate he is not a sexual predator. To the contrary, the trial court found him guilty of attempted aggravated criminal sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt. He therefore meets the statutory definition of a sexual predator and is therefore subject to the Registration Act and Notification Law.\nIll\nThe defendant\u2019s final contention is that section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2004)) entitles him to a $5-per-day credit for the 212 days he spent in pretrial custody to be applied toward the $100 sexual assault fine assessed under section 5 \u2014 9\u20141.7(b)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.7(b)(1) (West 2004)). The State concedes, and we agree, the defendant is entitled to the $100 credit under the version of section 110 \u2014 14 in effect when he was sentenced. People v. Hawkins, 311 Ill. App. 3d 418, 432, 723 N.E.2d 1222 (2000). We therefore order that the defendant\u2019s sexual assault fine be offset by his credit.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated above, we affirm the defendant\u2019s convictions and order that his $100 sexual assault fine be offset by his pretrial credit.\nAffirmed as modified.\nMcBRIDE, EJ., and R. GORDON, J., concur.\nIn his opening brief, the defendant also challenged the sufficiency of the trial court\u2019s admonishments of his appellate rights. However, he withdrew that contention in his reply brief.\nThe Registration Act and Notification Law have undergone numerous amendments in recent years. We address the statutes as they read at the time the defendant was convicted as the amendments are not relevant to the outcome of this case.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GARCIA" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Caroline E. Bourland, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Boland, Samuel Shim, and Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHRISTOPHER STANLEY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20141790\nOpinion filed October 30, 2006.\nRehearing denied January 11, 2007.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Caroline E. Bourland, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Mary Boland, Samuel Shim, and Peter Maltese, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0441-01", "first_page_order": 457, "last_page_order": 468 }