{ "id": 4267062, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHIOKE HOLLIDAY, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Holliday", "decision_date": "2007-01-04", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201405\u20140473", "first_page": "678", "last_page": "683", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 678" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "743 N.E.2d 126", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "138" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725355 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "20" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 187", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604853 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "273" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0187-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266193 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1155" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1146-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 55", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57", "parenthetical": "\"to the extent that the [trial] court treated defendant's [mandamus] petition as a postconviction petition in summarily denying it, the court erred\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 197", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5437220 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "200", "parenthetical": "\"to the extent that the [trial] court treated defendant's [mandamus] petition as a postconviction petition in summarily denying it, the court erred\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0197-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 827", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "830-31" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828089 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "68" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "833 N.E.2d 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "868" }, { "page": "870" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828632 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53" }, { "page": "57" }, { "page": "58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "1997 Ill. Laws 2673", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "649 N.E.2d 1385", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "272 Ill. App. 3d 48", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 251298 ], "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/272/0048-01" ] }, { "cite": "825 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1238" }, { "page": "1238-39" }, { "page": "1238" }, { "page": "1238" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 524", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3748636 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" }, { "page": "528-29" }, { "page": "528-29" }, { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0524-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 554, "char_count": 12058, "ocr_confidence": 0.777, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.3122717589184069e-07, "percentile": 0.6247259975388526 }, "sha256": "8aff967dc04d3b56a80725c2dd551ff2bc38750e3d2b9a167a4ef984bccdc001", "simhash": "1:9b98d616162c8dd4", "word_count": 1946 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:04:07.948493+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHIOKE HOLLIDAY, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn April 1998, defendant, Chioke Holliday, pleaded guilty to one count of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1(a)(1) (West 1998)), and the trial court later sentenced him to 30 years in prison. Defendant later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea and reconsider his sentence, which the trial court denied. He appealed, and this court affirmed. People v. Holliday, No. 4\u201401\u20140273 (December 18, 2002) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23).\nIn January 2005, defendant filed a document entitled \u201chabeas corpus petition actual innocence claim,\u201d purportedly under the habeas corpus article of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 101 through 10 \u2014 137 (West 2004)), in which defendant claimed that he was being held unlawfully in prison. In March 2005, the State moved to dismiss defendant\u2019s petition. In April 2005, the trial court granted the State\u2019s motion and dismissed the petition.\nDefendant appeals, arguing only that the trial court erred by dismissing his habeas corpus petition because the court should have recharacterized it as a postconviction petition that should have survived first-stage scrutiny under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 through 122 \u2014 8 (West 2004)). Because we conclude that the trial court did not err by not recharacterizing defendant\u2019s petition, we affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nDefendant\u2019s January 2005 petition identified itself as a habeas corpus petition and stated that it was being brought pursuant to \u201c735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 102 et seq.\u201d the Code\u2019s habeas corpus article. The petition did not identify itself as being brought pursuant to the provisions of the Act.\nIn the State\u2019s March 2005 motion to dismiss defendant\u2019s petition, the State asserted, in pertinent part, that because the petition did not assert any of the grounds for habeas corpus relief set forth in section 10 \u2014 124 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 124 (West 2004)), the trial court should dismiss it. In April 2005, the court granted the State\u2019s motion and dismissed defendant\u2019s petition.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. DEFENDANT\u2019S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE RECHARACTERIZED HIS HABEAS CORPUS PETITION AS A POSTCONVICTION PETITION\nDefendant argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his habeas corpus petition because the court should have recharacterized it as a postconviction petition. Defendant asserts that, if the court had done so, it would have (1) found that the petition stated the gist of a meritorious claim that defendant\u2019s trial counsel was ineffective and (2) realized that the State\u2019s motion to dismiss the petition at what should have been the first stage of postconviction proceedings was improper. In making these arguments, defendant concedes that he did not raise any issues in his petition that were cognizable under the habeas corpus statute.\nA. The Trial Court\u2019s Authority To Recharacterize a Pleading as a Postconviction Petition\nIn People v. Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d 524, 528, 825 N.E.2d 1234, 1238 (2005), the trial court recharacterized the defendant\u2019s habeas corpus petition as a postconviction petition (believing, erroneously, that it was required to do so under People v. Sturgeon, 272 Ill. App. 3d 48, 649 N.E.2d 1385 (1995)). The court then dismissed the defendant\u2019s petition as frivolous and patently without merit. We affirmed the court\u2019s dismissal of the defendant\u2019s petition, but in doing so, we noted that the court was not required to recharacterize the defendant\u2019s habeas corpus petition as a postconviction petition under the Act. Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29, 825 N.E.2d at 1238-39. We pointed out that, although prior cases (such as Sturgeon) held that a trial court was so required, the General Assembly amended the Act in 1997 through the passage of Public Act 89 \u2014 609 (Pub. Act 89 \u2014 609, \u00a75, eff. January 1, 1997 (1997 Ill. Laws 2673, 2674)) to add subsection (d) to section 122 \u2014 1 of the Act, which states as follows:\n\u201cA person seeking relief by filing a petition under this [s]ection must specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this [s]ection. A trial court that has received a petition complaining of a conviction or sentence that fails to specify in the petition or its heading that it is filed under this [s]ection need not evaluate the petition to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under this [a]rticle.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1(d) (West 2004).\nWe further commented upon section 122 \u2014 1(d) of the Act, as follows:\n\u201cBecause [the defendant\u2019s] petition did not indicate in any way that he sought relief under the Act, under the plain meaning of section 122 \u2014 1(d), the trial court was not required to treat his petition as a postconviction petition.\nThe language of section 122 \u2014 1(d) suggests that although a trial court need not evaluate a petition that does not specify it is being filed under the Act to determine whether it could otherwise have stated some grounds for relief under the Act, the court still has discretion to do so. However, that course of action is one a trial court should take only in unusual and compelling circumstances, none of which are present in this case.\u201d Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 528-29, 825 N.E.2d at 1238.\nSince our decision in Purnell, the Supreme Court of Illinois has twice addressed the ability of a trial court to recharacterize a pleading as a postconviction petition even though it is not so labeled. In People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 53, 833 N.E.2d 863, 868 (2005), the supreme court recognized that although trial courts have the authority to recharacterize pleadings under section 122 \u2014 1(d) of the Act, they are under no obligation to do so. In addition, the court held as follows:\n\u201c[W]hen a circuit court is recharacterizing as a first postconviction petition a pleading that a pro se litigant has labeled as a different action cognizable under Illinois law, the circuit court must (1) notify the pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading, (2) warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that any subsequent postconviction petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions, and (3) provide the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it contains all the claims appropriate to a postconviction petition that the litigant believes he or she has.\u201d Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 57, 833 N.E.2d at 870.\nIn People v. Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d 58, 66, 833 N.E.2d 827, 830-31 (2005), the supreme court rejected the defendant\u2019s argument that the trial court erred by recharacterizing his section 2 \u2014 1401 petition for relief from judgment (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1401 (West 2004)) as a postconviction petition. However, the court also held that the three steps required of trial courts under Shellstrom also applied to successive postconviction pleadings. Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 68, 833 N.E.2d at 832.\nAfter considering Shellstrom and Pearson, as well as decisions from the appellate court addressing section 122 \u2014 1(d), we adhere to our holding in Purnell that, although trial courts have the authority to consider a defendant\u2019s pleading as a postconviction petition, trial courts should be hesitant to use this authority and do so only in \u201cunusual and compelling circumstances.\u201d Purnell, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 529, 825 N.E.2d at 1238.\nIn so holding, we note the following. Since the enactment of section 122 \u2014 1(d) of the Act, no case has held that a trial court erred by failing to recharacterize a defendant\u2019s petition as a postconviction petition. On the other hand, several cases demonstrate the challenges awaiting a trial court that chooses to do so. See, for instance, Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 58, 833 N.E.2d at 871 (trial court erred by failing to notify the defendant prior to recharacterizing the defendant\u2019s post-conviction petition of the consequences of the court\u2019s taking that action); Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 68, 833 N.E.2d at 832 (trial court erred by recharacterizing the defendant\u2019s petition without following Shellstrom); People v. Marino, 349 Ill. App. 3d 197, 200, 812 N.E.2d 55, 57 (2004) (\u201cto the extent that the [trial] court treated defendant\u2019s [mandamus] petition as a postconviction petition in summarily denying it, the court erred\u201d).\nIn addition, the intent of the legislature in enacting section 122\u2014 1(d) seems clear. The legislature wished to undo the line of Illinois cases (including Sturgeon) holding that a trial court was required to recharacterize a defendant\u2019s pleading as a postconviction petition if such a recharacterization could fairly be done based upon the contents of the pleading, even though the pleading made no reference to the Act. Given (1) the enactment of section 122 \u2014 1(d) and (2) the procedural hurdles a trial court faces when recharacterizing a defendant\u2019s pleading as a postconviction petition, we conclude that our advice to trial courts that recharacterization should occur only in unusual and compelling circumstances remains sound.\nWe also take judicial notice that hundreds of prison inmates every year manage to comply with the pleading requirements of the Act when it is their intent to file a petition thereunder.\nFinally, not recharacterizing a pleading as a postconviction petition essentially costs the defendant nothing \u2014 that is, the defendant (if he really wishes to file a postconviction petition under the Act) may still do so. For instance, in this case, affirming the trial court\u2019s dismissal of defendant\u2019s habeas corpus petition will not bar defendant from later filing a postconviction petition.\nB. The Trial Court\u2019s Recharacterization Decision\nCiting Purnell, defendant concedes that the trial court was not required to recharacterize his habeas corpus petition as a postconviction petition, but he argues that the court should have done so nonetheless. Specifically, he contends that, \u201cIn this case, fundamental fairness suggests that the court should have [recharacterized his petition because], otherwise, defendant\u2019s claims would go completely unheard.\u201d We are not persuaded.\nIn Shellstrom, the supreme court made clear that after the enactment of section 122 \u2014 1(d) of the Act, a trial court was neither required to \u2014 nor prohibited from \u2014 recharacterizing a defendant\u2019s petition that contains allegations that are cognizable under the Act as a postconviction petition. Thus, a trial court\u2019s decision regarding recharacterization is addressed to its sound discretion and will be reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Accordingly, we will not reverse such a decision unless it was unreasonable, or \u201c \u2018no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.\u2019 \u201d People v. Johnson, 368 Ill. App. 3d 1146, 1155 (2006), quoting People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 273 (2006), quoting People v. Hall, 195 Ill. 2d 1, 20, 743 N.E.2d 126, 138 (2000).\nIn this case, other than defendant\u2019s bare assertion that \u201cfundamental fairness\u201d suggests that the trial court should have recharacterized his habeas corpus petition as a postconviction petition, defendant has provided us with no cogent argument that the court abused its discretion by not doing so. Clearly, the circumstances of this case are far from \u201cunusual and compelling.\u201d We thus conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. As part of our judgment, we grant the State\u2019s request that defendant be assessed $50 as costs for this appeal.\nAffirmed.\nMcCULLOUGH and MYERSCOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Paige Clark Strawn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "Jack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHIOKE HOLLIDAY, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201405\u20140473\nOpinion filed January 4, 2007.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Paige Clark Strawn, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nJack Ahola, State\u2019s Attorney, of Decatur (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Dodegge, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0678-01", "first_page_order": 694, "last_page_order": 699 }