{
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  "name": "GLENNA MAE CECIL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM GIBSON, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Cecil v. Gibson",
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "GLENNA MAE CECIL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM GIBSON, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiffs, Glenna Mae Cecil and Ray Cecil, brought this action for severe personal injuries sustained by Glenna Mae Cecil on August 24, 1970, when the defendant, William Gibson, attempted to perform a dilation and curettage procedure on Mrs. Cecil for diagnostic and therapeutic purposes. The procedure performed by the defendant allegedly resulted in severe injury to Mrs. Cecil\u2019s uterus, necessitating a total hysterectomy in order to save her life.\nThis action was originally tried against two other physicians in addition to William Gibson for professional negligence and medical malpractice in the care and treatment of Mrs. Cecil. Ray Cecil\u2019s cause of action was brought for loss of his wife\u2019s services associated with her injury, allegedly sustained as a result of defendant\u2019s acts, and the subsequent impairment of Mrs. Cecil\u2019s ability to fully recover after her injury.\nThe jury returned a verdict in favor of all defendants and against both plaintiffs. The trial court denied plaintiffs\u2019 post-trial motions requesting a new trial, and the plaintiffs have appealed to this court as to the judgment entered in favor of William Gibson.\nPlaintiffs assign as error various remarks by defense counsel during closing argument. The plaintiffs argue that these remarks were so erroneous and grossly prejudicial as to destroy and effectively subvert all chances for a fair trial.\nIn his closing argument defense counsel characterized plaintiffs\u2019 attorney as a \u201cslick attorney from Chicago.\u201d Defense counsel referred to plaintiffs\u2019 attorney as a \u201cslick hired-hand\u201d and also referred to plaintiffs\u2019 medical expert witness as a \u201csidekick\u201d and a \u201crighthand man.\u201d\nDefense counsel claimed that plaintiffs\u2019 counsel \u201cmanufactured\u201d evidence, had a \u201cwild imagination,\u201d and was not worthy of the jury\u2019s trust. He further stated that plaintiffs\u2019 counsel was the \u201ccaptain of [the] ship\u201d who was \u201cpiloting\u201d the testimony of plaintiffs\u2019 expert witness. In addition, defense counsel compared the relationship between plaintiffs\u2019 counsel and his expert witness to that existing between the \u201cCisco Kid and Poncho\u201d and \u201cMatt Dillon and Chester.\u201d The expert was characterized as \u201ca professional witness\u201d who carries a \u201cshiny black leather bag\u201d containing instruments that \u201chave never been used.\u201d\nOther remarks of defense counsel appear in the record and are referred to in plaintiffs\u2019 brief, but, in the view we take, they need not be set forth here.\n\u201cA trial properly conducted is a dignified procedure. Counsel in the case are officers of the court and owe a duty to the court, to opposing counsel, to the cause of justice and to themselves.\u201d (Eizerman v. Behn, 9 Ill. App. 2d 263, 286, 132 N.E.2d 788.) In Paulsen v. Gateway Transportation Co., 114 Ill. App. 2d 241, 252 N.E.2d 406, an attorney in his closing argument referred to his adversary as a man who \u201cplayed fast and loose with the facts in this case\u201d and who tried to \u201cchange the facts by trickery.\u201d Although no objection was made, the court held the argument prejudicial and improper:\n\u201cThe attacks were clearly attacks upon defense counsel. It is obvious that the above remarks have no application to any issue in the case. This court views remarks of plaintiff\u2019s counsel as an unwarranted characterization of defendant\u2019s counsel and a successful effort to belittle, impugn and ridicule him and thus deprive the defendant of fair treatment by the jury.\nThe constitutional right of trial by jury is not a license to counsel to indulge in abusive and prejudicial conduct to gain a verdict, nor does it grant any privilege to embarrass, belittle and abuse an adversary before a jury to such an extent that the hope of the adversary to obtain respectful consideration at the hands of the jury is destroyed or seriously jeopardized.\u201d (Citations omitted.) 114 Ill. App. 2d 241, 247-48.\nWe believe that defense counsel\u2019s final argument clearly exceeded all bounds. An attorney in his final argument is permitted only to make reasonable comments upon the evidence. (Walsh v. Chicago Railways Co., 303 Ill. 339, 135 N.E. 709; Reinmueller v. Chicago Motor Coach Co., 341 Ill. App. 178, 93 N.E.2d 120.) We recognize that often in the heat and fervor of a sharply contested trial these standards may be overlooked. (Ryan v. Monson, 33 Ill. App. 2d 406, 179 N.E.2d 449.) When, however, arguments become unreasonable and highly prejudicial in character and counsel indulge in misleading statements, improper innuendos and inflammatory remarks, reversal must follow as a matter of course. See Owen v. Willett Truck Leasing Corp., 61 Ill. App. 2d 395, 209 N.E.2d 868.\nWe therefore hold that defense counsel\u2019s closing argument contained such erroneous and grossly prejudicial statements that plaintiffs\u2019 chances for a fair and impartial trial were denied.\nAlthough not necessary to the disposition of the case, we shall consider one other argument, urged by plaintiff, owing to the necessity for a second trial.\nDefendant, William Gibson, testified at the trial that some of the delays in making entries or changes in the plaintiff\u2019s hospital records were probably due to the fact that sometime after hospitalization he was required to prepare insurance forms for the plaintiffs. We need not consider further the circumstances surrounding the mention of insurance except to note that its injection into a law suit is reversible error. Horst v. Morand Brothers Beverage Co., 96 Ill. App. 2d 68, 237 N.E.2d 732; Schmitt v. Chicago Transit Authority, 34 Ill. App. 2d 67, 179 N.E.2d 838.\nVarious factual matters have been brought to our attention, but, in the view of the case, we take we need not consider these matters. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Peoria County is reversed and remanded, with directions that plaintiffs be granted a new trial.\nReversed and remanded, with directions.\nSTENGEL and BARRY, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE STOUDER"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Paul O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, for appellants.",
      "Heyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (James Lewis, of counsel), for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "GLENNA MAE CECIL et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAM GIBSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nThird District\nNo. 74-364\nOpinion filed April 26, 1976.\nPaul O\u2019Malley, of Chicago, for appellants.\nHeyl, Royster, Voelker & Allen, of Peoria (James Lewis, of counsel), for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0710-01",
  "first_page_order": 738,
  "last_page_order": 740
}