{ "id": 2718084, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT C. JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Jensen", "decision_date": "1976-04-12", "docket_number": "No. 61463", "first_page": "1010", "last_page": "1015", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 1010" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "241 N.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "256 N.E.2d 449", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 458", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2889895 ], "year": 1968, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0458-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 N.E.2d 203", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 60", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2967121 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "65" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0060-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Kan. 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Kan.", "case_ids": [ 511311 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/kan/211/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "433 F.2d 760", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2121099 ], "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/433/0760-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 S.W.2d 58", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.2d", "case_ids": [ 10154195 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw2d/375/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 N.E.2d 12", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "73 Ill. App. 2d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2582621 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/73/0055-01" ] }, { "cite": "277 N.E.2d 872", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "50 Ill. 2d 141", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2912118 ], "year": 1966, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/50/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 N.E.2d 293", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "24 Ill. App. 3d 718", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5307093 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/24/0718-01" ] }, { "cite": "231 A.2d 857", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "95 N.J. Super. 535", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.J. Super.", "case_ids": [ 332630 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nj-super/95/0535-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 N.E.2d 896", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2824683 ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/130/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "196 N.Y.S. 2d 878", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.S.2d", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "21 Misc. 2d 607", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Misc. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1058263 ], "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/misc2d/21/0607-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 640, "char_count": 12309, "ocr_confidence": 0.874, "pagerank": { "raw": 3.173464489733266e-07, "percentile": 0.8640719980199618 }, "sha256": "ec87587b7839e9f4401f1e8a31585e90d0bb5e3b8bb212485a1195249d71d30c", "simhash": "1:baef36dfae52c635", "word_count": 2081 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:14:56.744968+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT C. JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Robert C. Jensen was charged with violating section 6 \u2014 303 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95M, \u00a76 \u2014 303) by driving a vehicle on a public highway of Illinois while his license was suspended or revoked. He was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to probation for 1 year and a fine of *300.\nThe only witness for the State was a Cook County Forest Preserve District ranger. He testified that at approximately 8:51 p.m. on April 27, 1974, while clearing an area of the Busse Woods North Forest Preserve, he saw the defendant. At that time the defendant was not around his vehicle. After the ranger called out to defendant, the latter came toward his car which was parked in an area provided by the Forest Preserve District. The ranger stated that he noticed that the defendant was \u201cunder the influence of something\u201d while talking to him before asking him to move his car. The ranger also testified he had no idea how defendant\u2019s car got to the parking lot. The ranger told the defendant to move his vehicle and leave the area because the preserve was closing.\nThe defendant then got into his car, started it and drove about 10 feet, throwing the car in and out of gear. The ranger testified that the car at this time was on the \u201croadway.\u201d The ranger stopped the defendant, told him to get out of his car and asked for his driver\u2019s license. The defendant answered that he had no driver\u2019s license. Upon investigating, the ranger discovered that the defendant\u2019s license had been suspended. In response to the prosecutor\u2019s question, \u201cYou didn\u2019t care how he left as long as he left?\u201d the ranger replied, \u201cThat\u2019s right, sir.\u201d\nThe defendant stipulated that his driver\u2019s license was suspended on the day in question. The defendant testified he had come to the preserve in the early afternoon, accompanied by a friend who drove the defendant\u2019s car because the defendant knew that having a suspended license he could not drive it himself. The defendant testified that he had become intoxicated at the picnic. When the picnic broke up, the person who had driven him left the preserve, but promised to come back to pick up the defendant. The defendant waited around the preserve for his friend from approximately 7 p.m. until the ranger arrived and told him to leave.\nThe defendant also testified that he was in the Forest Preserve District parking lot when the ranger first saw him. Asked whether before moving his car he told the ranger that he did not have a license, the defendant replied, \u201cNo, I didn\u2019t think about that. At the time I wasn\u2019t thinking too straight and I was afraid knowing that it was my car something like this might happen and sure it did.\u201d\nThis appeal raises two issues: first, whether the defendant was driving on a \u201chighway\u201d as that word is defined in section 1 \u2014 126 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, \u00a71 \u2014 126); second, whether defendant was entrapped by the ranger into driving his automobile.\nThe statute which the defendant was charged with violating forbids driving a motor vehicle only on a \u201chighway\u201d of the State of Illinois. The State emphasizes that the ranger testified that the defendant was on the \u201croadway\u201d when he was stopped, but the record does not reveal whether the \u201croadway\u201d was part of the parking lot. However, whether the defendant\u2019s driving was confined to the parking lot is not relevant in determining his guilt. \u201cHighway\u201d is defined in section 1 \u2014 126 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, \u00a71 \u2014 126) as \u201cthe entire width between the boundary lines of every way publicly maintained when any part thereof is open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular traffic.\u201d This definition is broad enough to encompass publicly-maintained parking lots. The New York Supreme Court pointed out in Ebert v. Incorporated Village of Garden City (1960), 21 Misc. 2d 607, 608, 196 N.Y.S. 2d 878, 880, \u201cWhile a municipal parking field is, as the word \u2018parking\u2019 implies, primarily a place where vehicles are left stationary and unattended, it is essential for the use for which it is provided that both cars and pedestrians have passageway on and through it.\u201d\nThe defendant relies on People v. Kozak (1970), 130 Ill. App. 2d 334, 264 N.E.2d 896, to support his argument that the Forest Preserve District parking lot was not a \u201chighway\u201d as that word is used in the statute. In that case, however, the defendant was charged with driving a vehicle in a private parking lot, and the court noted that the parking lot was not maintained or cleaned by any governmental body. Not being \u201cpublicly maintained,\u201d the parking lot could not come under the definition of \u201chighway\u201d in section 1 \u2014 126 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, \u00a71 \u2014 126).\nWe have found no Illinois cases deciding whether a \u201cpublicly maintained\u201d parking lot is a \u201chighway.\u201d In State v. Young (1967), 95 N.J. Super. 535, 231 A.2d 857, the court applying a statute defining \u201chighway\u201d in terms identical to that of the Illinois statute decided that a parking lot controlled and meter-operated by a municipal parking authority was not a \u201chighway\u201d within the meaning of a statute making it unlawful to drive carelessly on a highway. We disagree with the Young decision. Though as the court pointed out in that case penal statutes are to be strictly construed, their construction should not be so strict as to defeat the clear intention of the legislature. (Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. City of Chicago (1974), 24 Ill. App. 3d 718, 321 N.E.2d 293.) The Illinois statute adopts a broad definition of the word \u201chighway.\u201d This is not a case in which literal interpretation of the language of the statute would lead to absurd results which the legislature could not have contemplated. The prospect of people driving in publicly-maintained parking lots with suspended licenses could be as offensive as their driving on a fast-moving expressway. The purpose of prohibiting persons from driving with a suspended license was clearly to prevent them from driving a car any place maintained by the public for the passage of traffic. We, therefore, hold that the defendant was driving on a highway with a suspended license.\nThe State, citing People v. Fleming (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 141, 277 N.E.2d 872, argues that the defendant cannot claim entrapment because he denies commission of the offense. However, in Fleming and similar cases, the defendant denied commission of the acts charged by the State. In People v. Jones (1966), 73 Ill. App. 2d 55,219 N.E.2d 12, the defense of entrapment was not precluded where defendant admitted to the acts charged by the State, but claimed that she lacked scienter. There is even less reason to block the defendant from raising the defense of entrapment when, as here, his denial that he committed the offense is not based on any factual dispute with the State but rather on a legal disagreement as to the meaning of the word \u201chighway.\u201d State v. Taylor (Mo. 1964), 375 S.W.2d 58, 62. See also United States v. Rodrigues (1st Cir. 1970), 433 F.2d 760; State v. Fitzgibbon (1973), 211 Kan. 553, 507 P.2d 313.\nThe definition of entrapment is set forth in section 7 \u2014 12 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a77 \u2014 12), which provides:\n\u201cEntrapment. A person is not guilty of an offense if his conduct is incited or induced by a public officer or employee, or agent of either, for the purpose of obtaining evidence for the prosecution of such person. However, this Section is inapplicable if a public officer or employee, or agent of either, merely affords to such person the opportunity or facility for committing an offense in furtherance of a criminal purpose which such person has originated.\u201d\nThis definition and the relevant case law indicate that there are three essential elements to the entrapment defense. First, a public officer must actively induce the suspect to commit a crime. Second, the public officer\u2019s purpose must be to obtain evidence for the prosecution of the suspect. Third, the intent to commit the crime must originate with the officer, and not the suspect. If the suspect was \u201cpredisposed\u201d to commit the crime, he cannot claim entrapment.\nEntrapment is an affirmative defense. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a77 \u2014 14.) Section 3 \u2014 2 of the Criminal Code of 1961, (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, \u00a73 \u2014 2) provides whenever the State or the defendant have introduced \u201csome evidence\u201d of entrapment, the State bears the burden of proving the absence of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt. In this case, some evidence of each element of entrapment has been introduced, and the State has failed to disprove the existence of any of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe evidence was sufficient to show the possibility of active inducement by the ranger. The ranger\u2019s request that the defendant move his vehicle was a strong inducement going beyond mere persuasion since the ranger was in uniform and acting under color of authority. Section 11 \u2014 203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 95\u00bd, \u00a711\u2014 203) provides that \u201c[n]o person shall wilfully fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order or direction of any police officer invested by law with authority to direct, control, or regulate traffic.\u201d\nThe State argues that the ranger could not have intended to obtain evidence for the prosecution of the defendant since he did not know at the time he told the defendant to move his vehicle that the defendant\u2019s license was suspended. However, the defendant\u2019s view of the encounter is that the ranger intended to induce him to drive while intoxicated. If that assertion is correct, the fact that the ranger ultimately discovered that defendant had a suspended license, and opted to charge him with that offense instead of driving \u201cunder the influence\u201d does not eliminate the element of entrapment. The defendant\u2019s assertion with respect to the ranger\u2019s purpose may not be correct, but it is supported by \u201csome evidence\u201d which the State has not disproven beyond a reasonable doubt. That the preserve was closing could explain an order to leave, but it does not satisfactorily explain the unusual conduct of an officer telling someone he knows is \u201cunder the influence of something\u201d to move his vehicle.\nFinally, the element of predisposition must be considered. Defendant\u2019s uncontradicted testimony was that a friend drove him to the preserve and that the defendant was waiting for his friend to return and drive him away. The ranger admitted he did not know who drove the car to the parking lot. The evidence that the defendant was not predisposed to drive the car with a suspended license was substantial enough to shift the burden to the State to prove predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has failed to do this. It relies heavily on the defendant\u2019s failure to volunteer to the ranger that his license was suspended when the ranger asked him to move his vehicle. Even in the confused and frightened state the defendant claims he was in, the defendant should have informed the ranger of his suspended license. However, his failure to do so under the circumstances does not prove criminal predisposition beyond a reasonable doubt.\nThe record in this case contains evidence making entrapment a reasonable possibility. Because the State has failed to disprove any one of the three elements of entrapment beyond a reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction must be reversed. It would be improper to remand, since the State does not claim that the trial court improperly excluded any evidence demonstrating lack of entrapment. (See People v. Woodall (1975), 61 Ill. 2d 60,65,329 N.E.2d 203; People v. McCoy (1970), 44 Ill. 2d 458, 256 N.E.2d 449; People v. Brown (1968), 99Ill. App. 2d281, 241 N.E.2d 653.) The judgment is reversed.\nJudgment reversed.\nBURKE and O\u2019CONNOR, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "Mr. JUSTICE SIMON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sidney H. Projansky, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Bernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Linda Ann Miller, and Bertina E. Lampkin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROBERT C. JENSEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 61463\nOpinion filed April 12, 1976.\nSidney H. Projansky, of Chicago, for appellant.\nBernard Carey, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (Laurence J. Bolon, Linda Ann Miller, and Bertina E. Lampkin, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1010-01", "first_page_order": 1038, "last_page_order": 1043 }