{ "id": 4269128, "name": "MJ ONTARIO, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD M. DALEY, as Mayor of the City of Chicago and Local Liquor Control Commissioner, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Mj Ontario, Inc. v. Daley", "decision_date": "2007-01-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201404\u20142249", "first_page": "140", "last_page": "151", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 140" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 572", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "documents not otherwise before court, but attached to appellate brief, are not part of record on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "263 Ill. App. 3d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5366209 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "656", "parenthetical": "documents not otherwise before court, but attached to appellate brief, are not part of record on appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/263/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "765 N.E.2d 1052", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "328 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2183314 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517-18" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/328/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "778 N.E.2d 285", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2560434 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "385-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-2d/82/0377-01" ] }, { "cite": "652 N.E.2d 848", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 292", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258774 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "298" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0292-01" ] }, { "cite": "573 N.E.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "testimony on matters of which the witness has personal knowledge through his own senses is admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. App. 3d 203", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5297254 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "215", "parenthetical": "testimony on matters of which the witness has personal knowledge through his own senses is admissible" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/214/0203-01" ] }, { "cite": "570 N.E.2d 716", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "lay witness may provide opinion testimony that is rationally based on the witness's perception and is helpful to clear understanding and determination of matter at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. App. 3d 825", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2528440 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846-47", "parenthetical": "lay witness may provide opinion testimony that is rationally based on the witness's perception and is helpful to clear understanding and determination of matter at issue" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/211/0825-01" ] }, { "cite": "734 N.E.2d 87", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 492", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980696 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "497" }, { "page": "497" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0492-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 36", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 897", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073721 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0897-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 477", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 419", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291708 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "427" }, { "page": "440-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0419-01" ] }, { "cite": "692 N.E.2d 295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 191", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821407 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "204" }, { "page": "205" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0191-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 214", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. 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App. 3d 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132353 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0487-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1136, "char_count": 28024, "ocr_confidence": 0.745, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.163705987167242e-08, "percentile": 0.47489139328200214 }, "sha256": "da42652fb74513cd8a31fe07057e565653fccc9c8550b04997a17f64a6d35da2", "simhash": "1:f35464e12d550d31", "word_count": 4447 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:39:36.954096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MJ ONTARIO, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD M. DALEY, as Mayor of the City of Chicago and Local Liquor Control Commissioner, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff MJ Ontario, Inc., an Illinois corporation (plaintiff or MJ Ontario), sought administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County of a decision by the defendant License Appeal Commission of the City of Chicago (LAC), which, after a hearing, affirmed an order by the defendant Local Liquor Control Commission of the City of Chicago (LLCC) denying plaintiffs application for a late-hour liquor license. The circuit court upheld the LAC\u2019s decision. Plaintiff appeals, contending the LAC improperly construed the ordinance concerning the issuance of late-hour liquor licenses and improperly admitted certain evidence at the hearing. Plaintiff contends, in the alternate, that the LAC\u2019s findings were arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsupported by sufficient evidence. We affirm.\nMJ Ontario is located at 224 West Ontario Street, which is near the intersection of Franklin and Ontario Streets in Chicago. Plaintiff applied for and was granted a liquor license. It also applied for a late-hour license to extend the time it is allowed to serve alcoholic beverages on the premises, seeking to do so for an additional two hours, i.e., until 4 a.m. on Monday through Saturday and until 5 a.m. on Sunday.\nOn October 21, 2002, the former director of the LLCC, Winston Mardis (Director), issued an order denying the application from MJ Ontario and Mark Jurczyk, president of MJ Ontario, for a late-hour liquor license. The order stated that, upon consideration of police department \u201creview & reports\u201d and the written objections of the alderman where the premises are located, the Director found the public interest would be served by denying the license. The order also stated that the area had been \u201cplagued with numerous problems including: noise, litter and other problems which endanger and disrupt the local community.\u201d* ** Additionally, it contained the Director\u2019s further finding that granting a license would have a deleterious impact on the health, safety and welfare of the surrounding community.\nPlaintiff appealed the denial of the application to the LAC, which held a hearing on the application on March 18, 2003. At the hearing, the LLCC presented three witnesses: Alderman Burton Natarus, Chicago police lieutenant Robert Cooper, and area resident Mary Ellen Rosemeyer, who testified personally and on behalf of the River North Residents Association. Jurczyk, the owner of MJ Ontario, testified for plaintiff, as did Alderman Theodore Matlak, who represents a ward where Jurczyk\u2019s other club property is located, and by stipulation, Mor ene Dunn, the representative of another area association. We briefly summarize the testimony.\nAlderman Natarus testified that 224 W. Ontario is located within the 42nd ward, which he has represented for 32 years. He testified as to his impressions of traffic congestion around the location, his observations of heavy late-night traffic in the area at another nightclub, and the overcrowding due to the mass exodus of cars from Ontario Street after 5 a.m. on weekends that resulted in a public safety problem. The alderman testified that he lived four blocks from the location of MJ Ontario, he walked the streets of his ward late at night, and was extremely concerned about overcrowding in nightclubs since the E2 nightclub incident. Alderman Natarus personally observed fights, crowds of inebriated people, and individuals soliciting sex and controlled substances around 224 W Ontario.\nBy agreement, a letter Alderman Natarus had written in objection to the late-hour license was considered as substantive evidence. In the letter, the alderman expressed his opinion that the issuance of such license would increase noise and litter, and adversely affect public safety.\nLieutenant Cooper testified that he had been a Chicago police officer for more than 30 years, and for the last 10 years, he had been assigned to the district encompassing the MJ Ontario location, working the overnight shift. He testified that the issuance of a late-hour license would create problems for the police department, since the department operates after 2 a.m. in that district with a skeleton crew and there are dramatically fewer officers available to respond to calls. Officers who respond to calls involving complaints of \u201cdrunk and disorderly\u201d behavior are kept from answering emergency calls. The lieutenant testified that, after 2 a.m., manpower for the district decreases by 50%; he noted that bar patrons who are unruly at 2 a.m. become even more so by 4 a.m., and that the issuance of a 4 a.m. license would attract a greater criminal element to the area.\nLieutenant Cooper further testified that he and his district commander, Joseph Griffin, speak several times during the week and have discussed the late-hour license. Lieutenant Cooper testified that he was there to represent the police department and Commander Griffin, and that Commander Griffin opposed the issuance of the license. Based upon his own experience as a police officer, Lieutenant Cooper also opposed the late-hour license.\nOver objection, Lieutenant Cooper testified that the City\u2019s Exhibit No. 2 was a memorandum summarizing calls for service that the police department had received between 8 p.m. and 6 a.m. in the immediate vicinity of MJ Ontario over a period of about eight months, from July 1, 2002, through March 5, 2003. The document was prepared at his direction in preparation for the hearing and reflected numerous calls in the one-block radius of the Franklin-Ontario intersection; the calls included criminal damage, parking complaints, reckless conduct, robbery, deceptive practices, and theft. The LAC admitted the document over objection to \u201cclarify and support\u201d Lieutenant Cooper\u2019s opinion.\nRosemeyer, who is the attorney for the River North Residents Association, testified in opposition to issuance of the late-hour license. She further testified that, for almost 10 years, she has lived several blocks away from 224 W. Ontario. Over plaintiff\u2019s objection, Rosemeyer testified as to the concerns and objection of the River North Residents Association to the issuance of the license. The City then rested.\nFor plaintiff, Alderman Matlak testified that he went often to Jurczyk\u2019s other club. He believed Jurczyk was a responsible licensee and a good businessperson.\nJurczyk testified on his own behalf, in support of the issuance of the license. He said he operated the previously mentioned club in Alderman Matlak\u2019s ward and he was renovating 224 W Ontario with plans to institute a $20 cover charge and serve expensive wines (a bottle of which would cost, on average, about $300). Jurczyk also testified the premises would be 4,500 square feet and have a capacity of 217 people.\nBoth sides agreed by stipulation that, if called, Morene Dunn would testify that she is the executive director of the River North Association, a group representing area businesses, and that the association was in favor of the issuance of a late-hour license to 224 W. Ontario and she believed it would not deleteriously impact the community.\nOn July 30, 2003, the LAC issued an order affirming the LLCC\u2019s denial of the application for a late-hour liquor license. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing, which the LAC denied.\nOn August 8, 2003, MJ Ontario filed a complaint for administrative review of the denial of its application. On February 6, 2004, the court issued an order upholding the denial of the late-hour license. Plaintiff subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 16, 2004, the court denied the motion.\nPlaintiff now appeals the orders of February 6 and July 16, 2004.\nOn appeal, plaintiff first contends that the LAC improperly construed the section of the ordinance concerning the issuance of late-hour liquor licenses. According to plaintiff, under the ordinance the LAC was required to prove that the issuance of a late-hour license would cause a deleterious impact to the surrounding community, but, plaintiff further claims, the LAC failed to meet its burden because it failed to present relevant evidence.\nThe parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review. Plaintiff claims that, as a question of an administrative agency\u2019s interpretation of an ordinance, review is de novo. Although the City does not disagree that a question of statutory interpretation presents a question of law, which is subject to de novo review, it contends that here, however, there is no question of law at issue. Rather, the City maintains that plaintiff in fact challenges the LAC\u2019s finding of deleterious impact, which is subject to review under a standard of manifest weight of the evidence. We agree with the City.\nInitially, we note that this court reviews the administrative agency\u2019s final decision and not the decision of the circuit court. See Gounaris v. City of Chicago, 321 Ill. App. 3d 487, 491, 747 N.E.2d 1025 (2001).\nIn the instant case, the Liquor Control Act of 1934 (235 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 11 (West 2002)) provides that judicial review of all final administrative decisions be pursuant to the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et sea. (West 2002)). The latter statute provides that judicial review extends to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2002); Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88, 606 N.E.2d 1111 (1992).\nThe standard applied on review of an agency\u2019s decision depends upon whether the issue presented is one of fact or of law. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc. v. Illinois Department of Employment Security, 201 Ill. 2d 351, 369, 776 N.E.2d 166 (2002). Where the agency\u2019s decision involves a pure question of law, the decision is reviewed de novo. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc., 201 Ill. 2d at 369; Daley v. License Appeal Comm\u2019n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 194, 201, 724 N.E.2d 214 (1999). On the other hand, review of purely factual findings made by an administrative agency is conducted under a manifest weight of the evidence standard. Carpetland U.S.A., Inc., 201 Ill. 2d at 369. Under such review, the agency\u2019s findings and conclusions on questions of fact are entitled to deference, being deemed prima facie true and correct. See 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2002); Carpetland U.S.A., Inc., 201 Ill. 2d at 369; City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 204, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998).\nA reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the agency, nor does it reweigh the evidence or make an independent determination of the facts; instead, it should inquire whether the findings of the agency are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88; Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 151 Ill. 2d 419, 427, 603 N.E.2d 477 (1992). An administrative agency\u2019s decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. However, the \u201cmere fact that an opposite conclusion is reasonable or that the reviewing court might have ruled differently\u201d does not justify reversal of the agency\u2019s decision. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88. If there is evidence in the record supporting the administrative agency\u2019s decision, it should be affirmed. Abrahamson, 153 Ill. 2d at 88; O\u2019Neill v. Rodriguez, 298 Ill. App. 3d 897, 903, 699 N.E.2d 1081 (1998).\nThe ordinance at issue provides that the local liquor control commissioner \u201cmay deny an application for a city liquor dealer\u2019s license if the issuance of such license would tend to create a law enforcement problem, result in or add to an undue concentration of licenses, or have a deleterious impact on the health, safety or welfare of the community in which the licensed premises is to be located.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a74 \u2014 60\u2014040(h) (2005).\nPlaintiff argues that the burden of proof of deleterious impact rests on the City and that the City failed to carry its burden because it presented irrelevant opinion testimony. As the City points out, plaintiff does not claim that the LAC misconstrued the meaning of \u201cdeleterious impact\u201d or any other phrase in the ordinance. Rather, plaintiff argues that the evidence did not support the finding of fact that granting MJ Ontario a late-hour license would have a deleterious impact on the community. Therefore, the issue does not present a question of statutory interpretation. We agree with the City that, instead, the issue raised by plaintiff is whether the finding of deleterious impact is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe evidence presented in the instant case is, if anything, more compelling than that in Ace Produce, Inc. v. Illinois Liquor Control Comm'n, 93 Ill. App. 3d 381, 417 N.E.2d 214 (1981), upon which plaintiff heavily relies. There, a produce store\u2019s application to sell packaged alcoholic beverages was denied based solely upon the applicant\u2019s inadequate parking area which created a hazardous traffic condition at a busy intersection. The Commission considered evidence including photographic exhibits depicting a nearby busy highway intersection and testimony as to the dimensions of the applicant store\u2019s parking lot and concluded that the traffic conditions would be exacerbated by the issuance of a license. On review, the denial was affirmed as the Commission\u2019s findings were based on competent evidence and not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Ace Produce, Inc., 93 Ill. App. 3d at 383.\nIn the instant case, evidence was presented of already existing problems in the neighborhood that would be exacerbated, as in Ace Produce, Inc., by the issuance of the license. The problems here were not confined solely to traffic-related concerns, however. Rather, there was evidence of existing problems with public drinking, noise, litter, and criminal activity, which would be exacerbated with the issuance of a late-hour license. Moreover, we agree with the City that plaintiff appears to misinterpret Ace Produce, Inc. as requiring \u201csite-specific\u201d information at the hearing. Plaintiff has thus characterized the evidence in that case, which included photographs of traffic patterns and police testimony about traffic accidents, in addition to testimony about the specific dimensions of the parking lot. We do not read Ace Produce, Inc. as requiring evidence in the manner that plaintiff suggests, such that it concern only the applicant property. Rather, the evidence in the instant case, which concerned the immediate area of MJ Ontario, was proper because the ordinance concerns the potential impact of the late-hour license on the health, safety or welfare of the applicant\u2019s community.\nAdditionally, we reject plaintiffs assertion, expressed in terms of a failure to sustain a burden of proof, that the City essentially presented \u201cno evidence\u201d because it presented nothing more than speculative opinion testimony. For this claim, plaintiff relies entirely upon City of Evanston v. City of Chicago, 279 Ill. App. 3d 255, 664 N.E.2d 291 (1996). There, while the court did state that opinion testimony \u201cthat is based purely on guess, surmise or conjecture is inadmissible and is tantamount to no evidence at all,\u201d it did so in an entirely different context. City of Evanston, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 269. That case does not involve an administrative proceeding but, instead, proceedings in the circuit court for injunctive relief. On review, the court held that there had not been an abuse of discretion in the exclusion of lay opinion testimony. City of Evanston, 279 Ill. App. 3d at 270. Here, however, rules concerning the admission of evidence, which we address later in consideration of another of plaintiffs claims, are relaxed and, in any event, the opinion testimony objected to did not involve the opinion of third parties but of the witnesses themselves. Here, unlike in the City of Evanston, the testimony was based on the witnesses\u2019 personal observations, and therefore, it was not \u201cspeculative\u201d in the way plaintiff asserts.\nIn conjunction with this point, plaintiff also maintains that an agency decision must be supported by expert testimony. For this, plaintiff relies entirely upon Obasi v. Department of Professional Regulation, 266 Ill. App. 3d 693, 639 N.E.2d 1318 (1994), which involved proceedings to contest the revocation of a physician\u2019s medical license. There, one finding of abandonment of a patient was reversed because the charge was not supported with sufficient evidence; the only opinion expressed as to patient abandonment was elicited from the Department\u2019s expert, who testified that, in two hypothetical questions posed, there was no patient abandonment. Obasi, 266 Ill. App. 3d at 700-01. The instant case does not involve complex medical situations evaluated by experts but, rather, determinations made based on reasonable inferences from testimony that was, in turn, based upon personal knowledge and experience.\nContrary to plaintiffs claims, the record contains ample support for the LAC\u2019s finding that issuance of a late-hour license to plaintiff would have a deleterious impact on the health, safety, or welfare of the community in which MJ Ontario is located, thus justifying the denial of the license. The finding was based upon testimony from two area residents, Alderman Natarus and Rosemeyer, both of whom lived within a short distance of the plaintiffs premises. The alderman testified as to his impressions, which were based not only upon representation of the ward but upon his personal observations of the pedestrian and vehicular traffic, and of parking problems, in the immediate area of the premises. The area, according to Alderman Natarus, was becoming residential. He personally had witnessed fights occurring, crowds of people, inebriated people walking into the streets, and people soliciting drugs and sex. He had also witnessed sex acts occurring in cars. Additionally, Alderman Natarus testified that, on occasion, the City had to bring in trucks for intoxication testing, and that the amount of litter necessitated street sweeping even in the early hours of the morning. Alderman Natarus also explained that there were fewer police officers available during the early morning hours and his concerns were for the public health, safety, and welfare.\nRosemeyer testified that her personal opinion and the opinion of the residents\u2019 association she represents were the same. She testified to personal observations similar to those of Alderman Natarus. Rosemeyer stated that there were late-night problems with noise, traffic congestion, blaring radios, and litter. According to her, people frequently continued to \u201cparty\u201d in public areas, meaning that they would drink, engage in sexual activity, defecate, and litter the streets. Incidents of vandalism had also increased at night.\nAdditionally, as earlier noted, Lieutenant Cooper testified as to policing problems in the immediate vicinity of plaintiffs premises, the late-hour police-staffing concerns related to the alcohol-related problems in that area and the strain on the police department\u2019s ability to police the area. Furthermore, Jurczyk himself admitted there were problems with crime, litter, noise, and drunken patrons in the area. Thus, given such testimony, the LAC\u2019s conclusion that granting a late-hour license to MJ Ontario would exacerbate those problems was reasonable. Accordingly, because there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the finding of deleterious impact, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nPlaintiff next contends that the LAC improperly admitted certain evidence at the hearing. Specifically, plaintiff argues that, although hearsay evidence is inadmissible in an administrative hearing, most of Lieutenant Cooper\u2019s testimony was based upon a \u201chearsay document,\u201d the City\u2019s Exhibit No. 2 (the memorandum of calls for police service in the area), which the LAC also improperly admitted. Plaintiff further claims that neither the lieutenant nor Rosemeyer should have been allowed to testify on behalf of others; that is, that Lieutenant Cooper should not have been allowed to testify on behalf of Commander Griffin, nor should Rosemeyer, on behalf of the River North Residents Association.\nHowever, plaintiff fails to acknowledge that \u201c[o]ur supreme court has held that the strict rules of evidence that apply in a judicial proceeding do not apply in proceedings before an administrative agency.\u201d Ivy v. Illinois State Police, 263 Ill. App. 3d 12, 19, 636 N.E.2d 738 (1994); see also Huff v. Rock Island County Sheriff\u2019s Merit Comm\u2019n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 477, 483, 689 N.E.2d 1159 (1998); McCleary v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 251 Ill. App. 3d 988, 993, 622 N.E.2d 1257 (1993).* ***** Moreover, an administrative agency\u2019s \u201cdecision regarding the admission of evidence is discretionary and should be reviewed as such.\u201d Wilson v. Department of Professional Regulation, 344 Ill. App. 3d 897, 909, 801 N.E.2d 36 (2003); Morelli v. Ward, 315 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497, 734 N.E.2d 87 (2000). Such decisions will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of discretion. Morelli, 315 Ill. App. 3d at 497.\nWe find no abuse of discretion in the admission of the testimony from any of the witnesses. Contrary to plaintiffs assertion that Aider-man Natarus\u2019 testimony was speculative or lacking in foundation, as previously noted, the alderman testified as to the basis for his opinion, which was his personal experience as an area resident and his personal observations. Such lay opinion testimony was properly admitted. See, e.g., Hopkinson v. Chicago Transit Authority, 211 Ill. App. 3d 825, 846-47, 570 N.E.2d 716 (1991) (lay witness may provide opinion testimony that is rationally based on the witness\u2019s perception and is helpful to clear understanding and determination of matter at issue); see also Northern Illinois Gas Co. v. Vincent DiVito Construction, 214 Ill. App. 3d 203, 215, 573 N.E.2d 243 (1991) (testimony on matters of which the witness has personal knowledge through his own senses is admissible). Further, contrary to plaintiff\u2019s claim that Lieutenant Cooper\u2019s testimony was based \u201calmost exclusively\u201d on the City\u2019s Exhibit No. 2, our review of the record shows otherwise. In fact, most of his testimony was based on the lieutenant\u2019s own knowledge as well as his general experience and observations in the area. The exhibit concerned only the numbers and types of calls for police assistance, yet Lieutenant Cooper testified to numerous other points, such as lack of police personnel at certain hours, that were not subjects of the document. Further, a foundation was established for admission of the exhibit, and the data therein was recorded in the regular course of the police department\u2019s business; therefore, we believe the exhibit was properly admitted. See Champaign National Bank v. Babcock, 273 Ill. App. 3d 292, 298, 652 N.E.2d 848 (1995). However, because essentially all of the lieutenant\u2019s testimony would have been admissible and, thus, would not have been affected by exclusion of the exhibit, even if the admission of the document were deemed improper, such admission would not be reversible error. See McCleary, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 994; Pratico v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners, 82 Ill. App. 2d 377, 385-86, 226 N.E.2d 505 (1967). Finally, because both Lieutenant Cooper and Rosemeyer testified as to their own opinions, which were based, again, on personal experience and observations, we find no abuse of discretion in the admission of their testimony on behalf of, respectively, Commander Griffin and the River North Residents Association.\nFinally, plaintiff contends that LAC\u2019s decision was improper because it was inconsistent with a subsequent decision of the LAC reversing the denial of a late-hour license to a neighboring property. Specifically, plaintiff claims that a February 2005 decision, a copy of which was appended to plaintiffs appellate brief, concerning a license for the property at 226 West Ontario demonstrates that the decision concerning MJ Ontario was incorrect. We reject this contention for several reasons. First, because the order concerning 226 W Ontario is not contained in the record, we may not consider it. See Zimmer v. Melendez, 222 Ill. App. 3d 390, 394-95, 583 N.E.2d 1158 (1991) (attachments to briefs that are not included in record are not properly before reviewing court); see also Tiller v. Semonis, 263 Ill. App. 3d 653, 656, 635 N.E.2d 572 (1994) (documents not otherwise before court, but attached to appellate brief, are not part of record on appeal). Second, because plaintiff did not raise such argument before the circuit court, it is deemed waived. See, e.g., Bonner v. City of Chicago, 334 Ill. App. 3d 481, 487, 778 N.E.2d 285 (2002). Finally, even if the order were properly included in the record and argument concerning that case had not been waived, the different outcome there would not establish that the findings in the instant case were incorrect. The circumstances in that case are significantly different; there, the applicant already had a late-hour license but sought expansion to the basement of the premises, so different conclusions could reasonably be reached in the separate instances.\nTherefore, for the reasons stated above, we affirm the order of the circuit court upholding the LAC\u2019s decision.\nAffirmed.\nMcNULTY and O\u2019MALLEY, JJ., concur.\nWe refer to the defendants LAC and LLCC specifically where necessary; however, we refer to defendants generally as \u201cthe City.\u201d\nA motion has been granted changing the caption of the case to reflect Scott Bruner as the current Director of the Mayor\u2019s License Commission of the City of Chicago.\nThe order noted that a late-hour license had already been issued for premises at 226 W Ontario, next door to the applicant.\nWe note that the City correctly mentions that plaintiff does not raise an argument concerning the circuit court\u2019s application of the clearly erroneous standard, which is used to review mixed questions of law and fact. See City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205.\nWe note that Obasi appears to be the sole authority for plaintiff\u2019s alternate contention that the LAC\u2019s findings were arbitrary, unreasonable, and unsupported by sufficient evidence. However, plaintiff does not address what difference, if any, would result from the application of this standard as opposed to the manifest weight standard. In any event, we do not find the LAC\u2019s findings to he contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; to the contrary, as we explain, the record shows ample evidence supports the decision and, thus, we would not find the decision to be arbitrary or unreasonable.\nWe note also plaintiffs assertion that the LAC\u2019s decision here should be reversed based upon the circuit court\u2019s reversal of the LAC\u2019s denial of a license in several other cases. Because plaintiff cites no legal authority for the proposition, in contravention of Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)), we do not address the point at any length, but note only that a similar argument (for comparison of disciplinary cases) was rejected by our supreme court (Launius, 151 Ill. 2d at 440-42).\nAs the City notes, although plaintiff bases his claim on section 10 \u2014 40 of the Administrative Procedure Act (5 ILCS 100/10 \u2014 40 (West 2002)), the Administrative Procedure Act is inapplicable to the LAC (El Sauz, Inc. v. Daley, 328 Ill. App. 3d 508, 517-18, 765 N.E.2d 1052 (2002)).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE FITZGERALD SMITH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Dimitrios G. Christopoulos, of Christopoulos Law Group, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Erica M. Landsberg, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MJ ONTARIO, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RICHARD M. DALEY, as Mayor of the City of Chicago and Local Liquor Control Commissioner, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201404\u20142249\nOpinion filed January 19, 2007.\nDimitrios G. Christopoulos, of Christopoulos Law Group, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.\nMara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon, and Erica M. Landsberg, Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0140-01", "first_page_order": 158, "last_page_order": 169 }