{ "id": 4268003, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM CLAUDIO, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Claudio", "decision_date": "2007-03-15", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20143336", "first_page": "1067", "last_page": "1071", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 1067" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 738", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 522040 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0738-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. App. 3d 930", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2594571 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "938-39" }, { "page": "939-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/201/0930-01" ] }, { "cite": "323 Ill. App. 3d 1022", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 171773 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1026" }, { "page": "1027" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/323/1022-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 164", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2600773 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "166" }, { "page": "167" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. 2d 326", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3218359 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "340" }, { "page": "338-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/124/0326-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 496, "char_count": 10393, "ocr_confidence": 0.738, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2819485204996217e-07, "percentile": 0.6177510735181858 }, "sha256": "2dc4d20f448397d9fa429fc27470407cb163a0d09358a87a059a97a15af1de10", "simhash": "1:a23ca584e5db55e9", "word_count": 1689 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:39:36.954096+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM CLAUDIO, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe State of Illinois appeals from an order entered by the circuit court of Cook County granting defendant William Claudio\u2019s motion to suppress his breath test results. On appeal, the State contends that the test results were admissible because the police officer\u2019s failure to record defendant\u2019s test in the logbook was merely a procedural and ministerial omission.\nOn February 15, 2003, defendant was stopped by Chicago police for failing to obey a stop sign. He was then charged with several traffic violations, including the illegal transportation of alcohol and two counts of driving under the influence.\nDefendant subsequently filed a motion in limine to suppress the results of his alleged breath test. Therein, defendant argued that, according to the rules of the Illinois State Police, the officer conducting the breath test was required to enter defendant\u2019s name and test information in the logbook that is kept with the breath test machine. Defendant argued that because the officer failed to enter the required information into the logbook, the State was barred from introducing the results of his alleged breath test into evidence.\nAt a hearing on the motion, defendant argued that in People v. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d 326 (1988), the Illinois Supreme Court listed five elements that must be met to lay a proper foundation for admitting the results of a breath test. The first element requires that the test was performed in accordance with the uniform standards adopted by the Illinois State Police. Defendant argued that the language in the police standards mandated that the subject test records \u201cmust be maintained\u201d in a logbook, unless an exception applied that was not relevant in this case.\nThe State acknowledged that the logbook did not contain an entry for defendant\u2019s breath test, but argued that the test results were still admissible. The State relied on the holding in People v. Stein, 212 Ill. App. 3d 164 (1991), where the court found that the failure to enter the machine\u2019s accuracy test records into the logbook was merely procedural or administrative and did not have a substantial effect on the test itself; therefore, the results of the defendant\u2019s breath test were admissible. The State also argued that the police officer\u2019s failure to record defendant\u2019s test in the logbook went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. In addition, the State argued that there was other evidence that indicated the date and time of defendant\u2019s breath test in the form of a paper ticket that was produced by the breath test machine at the time of defendant\u2019s test.\nThe trial court reviewed the case law, found that the issue raised had never been previously addressed, and granted defendant\u2019s motion to bar entry of the breath test results. The court remarked that according to the logbook, defendant was a \u201cnonentity.\u201d It then found that defendant would be at a disadvantage of not knowing the exact time of his test and having that safeguard in place. The court further stated that the test records and logbooks existed for a reason, and that allowing the test results to be admitted where they were not entered in the logbook would deprive defendant of a fair trial. The State subsequently filed a certificate of impairment and a timely notice of appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)).\nOn appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred when it suppressed defendant\u2019s breath test results, because the administering officer\u2019s failure to record those results in the machine\u2019s logbook was merely a procedural and ministerial omission that was not fatal to the admissibility of the evidence. The State further argues that the trial court\u2019s reasoning that defendant was disadvantaged by the omission was flawed because the exact date and time of the test were recorded on the breath ticket that was given to defendant. The State maintains that the police officer\u2019s failure to record the test in the logbook goes only to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility, and that all of the information that should have been recorded in the log could have been established by other means, such as the test result ticket and the officer\u2019s testimony.\nIn general, a trial court\u2019s decision to grant a motion in limine will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion; however, where, as here, the issue on appeal involves only a question of law, our review is de novo. People v. Larsen, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 1026 (2001). Pursuant to section 11 \u2014 501.2 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.2 (West 2002)), the results of defendant\u2019s breath test will be considered valid only where such test was performed in accordance with the standards promulgated by the Department of State Police. Stein, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 166.\nOur supreme court has held that in order to admit the results of a breath test into evidence, the State must lay a foundation consisting of the following five factors: (1) evidence that the test was performed in accordance with the uniform standard adopted by the Illinois Department of State Police; (2) evidence that the operator conducting the test was certified by the Department of State Police; (3) evidence that the breath test machine used for the test was a model approved by the Department of State Police, was working properly, and was tested regularly for accuracy; (4) evidence that defendant was observed for 20 minutes prior to the test, and during that time, he did not smoke, drink or regurgitate; and (5) evidence that the results on the \u201cprintout\u201d sheet are properly identified as defendant\u2019s test results. Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 340; Larsen, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1027. In laying a proper foundation, neither the Code nor the supreme court\u2019s holding in Orth requires proof of compliance with every regulation or section of the Illinois Administrative Code that pertains to breath testing. People v. Caruso, 201 Ill. App. 3d 930, 938-39 (1990).\nIn Caruso, the court determined that the first factor listed in Orth requires proof that the breath test was performed in accordance with the operational procedure approved by the Department of State Police and based upon the manufacturer\u2019s recommended testing procedure. Caruso, 201 Ill. App. 3d at 939-40. Subsequently, that court determined that failure to comply with the records maintenance regulation, which required an inspector to enter the test results certifying the accuracy of the machine into the logbook, was merely an administrative or procedural task that did not have a substantial effect on the defendant\u2019s breath test. Stein, 212 Ill. App. 3d at 167. Following Stein, the court in People v. Barwig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 738, 745 (2002), found that a police officer\u2019s failure to enter the results of the defendant\u2019s breath test into the logbook did not establish that the test was not performed according to the regulations.\nWe note that defendant argues that Stein and Barwig are inapposite to the case at bar as those cases involved the defendants\u2019 petitions to rescind the statutory summary suspensions of their driver\u2019s licenses. Defendant asserts that, because the burden in the instant case is on the State rather than on him, Stein and Barwig do not apply. We disagree. As the State noted in its reply brief, regardless of whether the proceeding is a civil statutory summary suspension hearing or a criminal trial, the evidentiary foundation for admitting the results of defendant\u2019s breath test remains the same. See Orth, 124 Ill. 2d at 338-40.\nIn this case, we agree with the holdings of Caruso, Stein and Bar-wig and find that the first foundational requirement under Orth addresses the actual performance of the breath test, which does not include the subsequent administrative task of entering the test results into the logbook. The language contained in the Code and in Orth specifically requires that the breath tests were \u201cperformed\u201d according to the standards. At the time of defendant\u2019s arrest, the standards for conducting a breath test appeared in sections 1286.310 and 1286.350 of the Illinois Administrative Code. 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7\u00a71286.310, 1286.350 (Conway-Greene CD-ROM 2001). These sections were listed under subpart D, which was entitled \u201cSampling Procedures,\u201d and detailed the operational procedures police officers were required to follow when administering hreath tests to persons suspected of driving under the influence of alcohol.\nThe regulation requiring that the test results be recorded in a logbook appeared under section 1286.70, which addressed maintenance of records for the breath test machine. 20 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a71286.70 (Conway-Greene CD-ROM 2001). This section was listed under subpart A, entitled \u201cGeneral Provisions,\u201d which also included sections on general subjects such as definitions, grievances and Department notifications. Based on the language used in the Code and by our supreme court, in addition to the language, structure and placement of the regulations in the Illinois Administrative Code, we find that the regulation requiring entry of defendant\u2019s breath test results in the logbook was administrative in nature and separate from the required standards for performing a breath test. Accordingly, the police officer\u2019s failure to record defendant\u2019s breath test results in the logbook was not fatal to the admissibility of that evidence, and defendant\u2019s motion in limine to suppress those results should have been denied.\nFor these reasons, we reverse the order of the circuit court of Cook County and remand this case to that court for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nCAMPBELL and NEVILLE, JJ, concur.\nPursuant to Public Act 91 \u2014 828 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 828, \u00a75, eff. January 1, 2001), reference to the \u201cDepartment of Public Health\u201d was replaced by the \u201cDepartment of State Police.\u201d See 625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.2(a) (West 2002).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Kathleen Warnick, and Craig L. Engebretson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.", "Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAM CLAUDIO, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20143336\nOpinion filed March 15, 2007.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Kathleen Warnick, and Craig L. Engebretson, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.\nEdwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago (Lester Finkle, Assistant Public Defender, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "1067-01", "first_page_order": 1085, "last_page_order": 1089 }