{ "id": 4269783, "name": "BELL LEASING BROKERAGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER AUTO SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Waldermar Rodriguez et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Bell Leasing Brokerage, LLC v. Roger Auto Service, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20142313", "first_page": "461", "last_page": "474", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 461" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "173 Ill. App. 3d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3478544 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "115" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/173/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 1150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5767534 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1160" }, { "page": "1160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/1150-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 159", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262775 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "180" }, { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1020", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472350 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1037-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1020-01" ] }, { "cite": "36 Ill. App. 3d 186", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2632380 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" }, { "page": "189" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/36/0186-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 144", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4261376 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153-54", "parenthetical": "concluding that the trial court's findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence, but affirming the ultimate judgment because the error was harmless" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0144-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 545", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731945 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0545-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 806", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262351 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "812", "parenthetical": "a trial court's factual determinations are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if all reasonable people would find the opposite conclusion to be clearly evident" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0806-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Ill. 2d 267", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 243870 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/186/0267-01" ] }, { "cite": "139 Ill. App. 3d 374", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3568597 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/139/0374-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 870", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126402 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "875" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0870-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1026, "char_count": 32007, "ocr_confidence": 0.776, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.987217265301015e-08, "percentile": 0.5027723624041401 }, "sha256": "1605edb822812bb3c813393f75bd1ce477a5991361728fe10f093df397c81f3d", "simhash": "1:ab491f1476488960", "word_count": 5405 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:46:01.247775+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "BELL LEASING BROKERAGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER AUTO SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Waldermar Rodriguez et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019HARA FROSSARD\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nBell Leasing Brokerage, LLC (Bell), brought an action sounding in detinue and conversion against Roger Auto Service, Inc. (Roger\u2019s Towing), alleging that Roger\u2019s Towing wrongfully towed and retained a vehicle in which Bell had a perfected security interest, and sued Waldermar Rodriguez and Carmen Rodriguez for breach of contract. Following a bench trial, the circuit court ordered Roger\u2019s Towing to return the vehicle to Bell and pay $10,000 damages. On appeal, Roger\u2019s Towing contends that (1) the trial court\u2019s finding that the vehicle was not abandoned was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court\u2019s imposition of a money judgment based partly on a finding that Roger\u2019s Towing did not comply with a default order was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that Bell was not required to present law enforcement with proof of its right to possession, that Bell was not required to pay Roger\u2019s Towing for incurred towing and storage charges, and that Roger\u2019s Towing was required to respond to a phone call from Bell\u2019s president and a letter from Bell\u2019s attorney; and (4) the trial court\u2019s award of damages was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. Waldermar Rodriguez and Carmen Rodriguez are not parties to this appeal.\nBACKGROUND\nOn February 24, 2003, Waldermar Rodriguez and Carmen Rodriguez purchased a van from Bell. Pursuant to the retail installment contract they executed, the Rodriguezes granted a security interest in the van to Bell. Bell perfected its security interest in the van by delivering the original certificate of title to the Illinois Secretary of State.\nAt trial, Officer Paul Norrington testified that on January 2, 2004, the van was parked on a public roadway .in Franklin Park, Illinois. He stated that the van did not have a license plate or municipal vehicle sticker, and was missing one rear window wiper blade. He agreed that, overall, the van was \u201cin pretty good condition.\u201d Officer Norrington testified that he placed a sticker on the van indicating it was abandoned. Eight days later, on January 10, 2004, Officer Norrington observed the van in the same location and the same condition. He concluded that the van was deserted based on \u201c[t]he amount of dirt and snow that had accumulated around the vehicle, the dirt that had deposited itself on the vehicle.\u201d Officer Norrington notified his dispatchers about the van, which was then towed away by Roger\u2019s Towing.\nBell\u2019s president, Robert Doppelt, testified that on January 28, 2004, Bell received a letter from the Cook County sheriff regarding the van being towed. The letter, which was admitted into evidence, was titled \u201cOwner Notification\u201d and indicated that the van had been towed and was being stored at Roger\u2019s Towing. According to Doppelt\u2019s testimony, the Rodriguezes were current in their payments to Bell at that time. The next day, Doppelt called Roger\u2019s Towing and related that Bell was the lienholder on the van. When the person on the phone reported that Bell would have to pay $1,000 to get the van back, Doppelt said, \u201c[H]ave your boss call me.\u201d Doppelt did not receive a call, so he contacted Bell\u2019s legal firm. Doppelt testified that the van was never delivered to Bell.\nOn February 2, 2004, Bell\u2019s counsel sent a letter to Roger\u2019s Towing seeking to make arrangements for the return of the van and stating that Bell would be willing to pay $175 for the cost of towing and storage. Roger Tomaras, the president of Roger\u2019s Towing, testified that he did not respond to the letter, either orally or in writing. When asked his reason for not responding, he stated, \u201cWell, I\u2019m not in a custom of having people tell me what they\u2019re going to pay for what I do, my services.\u201d\nOn February 19, 2004, Bell filed suit. Bell\u2019s complaint originally listed the president of Roger\u2019s Towing, Roger Tomaras, as party defendant. Tomaras acknowledged that he was personally served with process on February 20, 2004. He testified that he did not appear in court in response to the summons because, \u201cI was trying to contact people to find out what I had to do. Police, lawyers, that type of thing.\u201d Tomaras denied that he forgot about the court hearing and denied that he overlooked it.\nOn February 26, 2004, the trial court entered a default judgment against Tomaras based on his failure to appear or answer. The order compelled Tomaras to \u201cdeliver the Vehicle to Plaintiffs principal place of business at 2296 N. Rand Road, Palatine, Illinois, on or before March 4, 2004.\u201d Tomaras testified that he did not comply with the default order. When asked at trial why he did not deliver the van to Bell, Tomaras answered as follows:\n\u201cI wanted to retain an attorney to see what I had to do here. This was not, I believe, in the company\u2019s name, it was in my personal deal. I was just totally confused and I wasn\u2019t getting response [sic] of what this was all about. I\u2019m just not used to all this. This is \u2014 I don\u2019t do this. I got called to tow a car. We tow the car, we have a bill of towing and storage, then I\u2019m told to take the car and bring it somewhere else. I wanted to get confirmation of what this was all about.\u201d\nOn March 19, 2004, Tomaras filed a motion to vacate the default order, and on April 16, 2004, the trial court entered an order vacating the default judgment and substituting Roger\u2019s Towing as party defendant.\nAt trial, Officer Robert Rudow, an investigator with the Cook County sheriffs police department who had been working in the sheriffs automobile department for five years, testified that he was familiar with the condition of the van at issue and was familiar generally with values of automobiles. Each month, he generated a report indicating the value of all the vehicles that were recovered stolen. Officer Rudow testified that he saw the van at Roger\u2019s Towing on April 16, 2004, and in his opinion, the market value of the van was approximately $6,000.\nOn April 13, 2005, the trial court entered an order finding that Bell was entitled to possession of the van when it was towed; that Roger\u2019s Towing failed to prove the van was abandoned; that even if the van was abandoned, Bell was nevertheless entitled to immediate possession on January 29, 2004; that Roger\u2019s Towing had an implied duty to respond to the letter sent by Bell\u2019s counsel; and that the failure of Roger\u2019s Towing to comply with the terms of the default judgment \u201cconstitutes another basis for imposing liability for its actions and conduct in connection with the vehicle.\u201d The trial court concluded that Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s continued possession of the van after January 29, 2004, was wrongful, and that because Roger\u2019s Towing did not comply with the provisions of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/1\u2014100 et seq. (West 2004)), it was not entitled to the limited immunity conferred by the Code. The court ordered Roger\u2019s Towing to deliver the van to Bell on or before April 15, 2005, and to pay $10,000 in damages.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Roger\u2019s Towing contends that (1) the trial court\u2019s finding that the van was not abandoned was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court\u2019s imposition of a money judgment based partly on a finding that Roger\u2019s Towing did not comply with a default order was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred in finding that Bell was not required to present law enforcement with proof of its right to possession, that Bell was not required to pay Roger\u2019s Towing for incurred towing and storage charges, and that Roger\u2019s Towing was required to respond to Bell\u2019s phone call and letter; and (4) the trial court\u2019s award of damages was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion.\nI. Jurisdiction\nBefore addressing the contentions raised by Roger\u2019s Towing, we must consider Bell\u2019s assertion that we lack jurisdiction to address this appeal because the notice of appeal was filed 78 days after the entry of the final judgment from which Roger\u2019s Towing is appealing.\nOn April 13, 2005, the same day the trial court entered judgment, Roger\u2019s Towing filed a motion to reconsider, requesting \u201cleave to supplement this motion with a transcript of the report of proceedings and a memorandum of law setting forth in detail [Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s] argument in support of [the] motion.\u201d On May 4, 2005, the trial court entered an order granting Roger\u2019s Towing until May 18, 2005, to file its memorandum of law and setting a hearing on the motion for June 29, 2005. On June 28, 2005, Roger\u2019s Towing filed an emergency motion to withdraw the motion to reconsider and to stay enforcement of the money judgment. On June 29, 2005, the trial court ordered that the motion to reconsider was withdrawn and that enforcement of the money judgment would be stayed. The next day, June 30, 2005, Roger\u2019s Towing filed its notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s judgment of April 13, 2005.\nSupreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), which governs the timing of filing the notice of appeal, provides as follows:\n\u201cExcept as provided in paragraph (b) below [regarding amendments to the notice of appeal], the notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, whether in a jury or a non-jury case, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1).\nBell argues that the agreed order providing for the voluntary withdrawal of the motion to reconsider does not constitute an \u201corder disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion\u201d as contemplated in Rule 303(a)(1), and that therefore, Roger\u2019s Towing was untimely in the filing of its notice of appeal. However, Bell acknowledges in its brief that in its research, it could not locate any authority directly on point.\nWe find informative Pokora v. Warehouse Direct, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d 870 (2001). Pokora involved the following timeline of events:\n\u2022 December 15, 1999: the trial court granted summary judgment in the plaintiffs favor.\n\u2022 March 24, 2000: following a hearing, the trial court entered judgment on damages, including language that the order was final and appealable.\n\u2022 June 21, 2000: the trial court denied the defendant\u2019s May 25, 2000, motion for sanctions.\n\u2022 July 24, 2000: the defendant filed a motion to reconsider its request for sanctions.\n\u2022 August 17, 2000: the defendant moved to withdraw its motion to reconsider.\n\u2022 September 7, 2000: the trial court entered an agreed order granting the defendant\u2019s motion to withdraw the motion to reconsider.\n\u2022 September 22, 2000: the defendant filed a notice of appeal from the trial court\u2019s orders of December 15, 1999, March 24, 2000, and June 21, 2000.\nThe Pokora court commented that the notice of appeal \u201cindicated that the last order became final on September 7, 2000, when the trial court disposed of defendant\u2019s motion to reconsider.\u201d Pokora, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 875. Without discussing the issue of appellate jurisdiction, the Pokora court proceeded to address the merits of the appeal. In keeping with Pokora, which involved circumstances strikingly similar to those presented in the instant case, we too will proceed to consider the contentions raised on appeal.\nII. Abandoned Vehicle\nRoger\u2019s Towing first contends that the trial court\u2019s finding that the van was not abandoned was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Roger\u2019s Towing notes that the only witness to testify concerning the location and physical condition of the van was Officer Norrington. Roger\u2019s Towing argues that according to Officer Norrington\u2019s testimony, the van appeared to be deserted given the amount of dirt and snow that accumulated on and around it, and appeared not to have been moved for seven consecutive days given that it was in the same location and same physical condition from January 2, 2004, until January 10, 2004.\nThe Code defines an \u201cabandoned vehicle\u201d as \u201cany vehicle in a state of disrepair rendering the vehicle incapable of being driven in its condition or any vehicle that has not been moved or used for 7 consecutive days or more and is apparently deserted.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/1\u2014101.05 (West 2004). In general, property is considered to be abandoned when the owner, intending to relinquish all rights to the property, leaves it free to be appropriated by any other person. Michael v. First Chicago Corp., 139 Ill. App. 3d 374, 382 (1985). A finding of abandonment is a factual determination which will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People ex rel. Illinois Historic Preservation Agency v. Zych, 186 Ill. 2d 267, 278 (1999). Where there are different ways to view the evidence, or alternative inferences to be drawn from it, the view of the trier of fact must be accepted so as long as it is reasonable. Zych, 186 Ill. 2d at 278; see also City of Chicago v. Old Colony Partners, L.P., 364 Ill. App. 3d 806, 812 (2006) (a trial court\u2019s factual determinations are contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence only if all reasonable people would find the opposite conclusion to be clearly evident). It is not the function of a reviewing court to reweigh evidence.\nAt trial, Officer Norrington testified that the van was dirty, did not have a license plate or municipal vehicle sticker, and was missing one rear window wiper blade, but he agreed that the van was \u201cin pretty good condition.\u201d Officer Norrington concluded that the van had been deserted based upon the \u201camount of dirt and snow that had accumulated around the vehicle, the dirt that had deposited itself on the vehicle.\u201d Despite Officer Norrington\u2019s testimony, the trial court found Roger\u2019s Towing failed to prove the van was abandoned as defined in the Code, since it did not present competent evidence establishing that the van had not been moved or used for seven consecutive days and was apparently deserted. We cannot say that the conclusion regarding apparent desertion was unreasonable. As pointed out by Bell in its brief, most vehicles parked on public roadways in the Chicago metropolitan area in the middle of January are covered with dirt and snow. Accumulations of dirt and snow on a vehicle are not so conclusive of desertion that all reasonable people would find a conclusion opposite of the trial court\u2019s to be clearly evident. Accordingly, we find that the trial court\u2019s ruling on the issue of abandonment was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nIII. Compliance With Default Order\nRoger\u2019s Towing\u2019s next contention is that the trial court\u2019s imposition of the $10,000 money judgment based partly on a finding that Roger\u2019s Towing did not comply with a default order was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. Roger\u2019s Towing notes that the default judgment was entered against Roger L. Tomaras, who was dismissed as a defendant in the case, and argues that, therefore, the default judgment was of no force and effect with respect to Roger\u2019s Towing, which was not substituted as a party to the case until after the default order was vacated.\nThe portion of the trial court\u2019s order to which Roger\u2019s Towing objects is as follows:\n\u201cThe Court further finds that Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s failure to deliver the vehicle to Plaintiffs principal place of business by March 4, 2004, as ordered by this Court on February 26, 2004, constitutes another basis for imposing liability for its actions and conduct in connection with the vehicle. If Roger\u2019s Towing objected to the entry of this Court\u2019s February 26, 2004, default judgment, it could have appeared on that date instead of admittedly \u2018overlooking it\u2019 or filed an appropriate motion prior to March 4, 2004. It did neither.\u201d\nWhen read in context with the trial court\u2019s entire order, it becomes clear that the trial court based its decision to impose a $10,000 money judgment on factors in addition to Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s failure to deliver the van to Bell\u2019s principal place of business by March 4, 2004. Before reaching the paragraph quoted above, the trial court found that Bell had a perfected security interest in the van and was entitled to possession of the van when it was towed; that an employee of Roger\u2019s Towing told Bell it would have to pay in excess of $1,000 to recover the van; that Bell\u2019s counsel sent a letter to Roger\u2019s Towing on February 2, 2004, seeking to arrange for recovery of the van; that counsel\u2019s letter was ignored; that Tomaras, the president of Roger\u2019s Towing, was personally served with process but \u201coverlooked\u201d the initial appearance date; that Roger\u2019s Towing had failed to prove the van was abandoned; that even if the van was abandoned, Bell was entitled to immediate possession on January 29, 2004, because Roger\u2019s Towing had no right to demand a payment in excess of $1,000 when the maximum rate it could have charged as of that date was $325; and that Roger\u2019s Towing had an implied duty to respond to Bell\u2019s counsel\u2019s letter.\nFurther, following the paragraph quoted above, the trial court found that because Roger\u2019s Towing did not comply with all provisions of the Code, it was not entitled to the limited immunity offered by the Code and that Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s continued possession of the van after January 29, 2004, was wrongful. The trial court concluded, \u201cDamages in detinue, based upon Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s wrongful detention of the Vehicle, and the estimated fair market value of the Vehicle as of January 22, 2004, is $10,000.\u201d\nNot every error committed by the trial court in a civil case leads to reversal. Central Illinois Electrical Services, L.L.C. v. Slepian, 358 Ill. App. 3d 545, 550 (2005). If the outcome of a case would not have been different absent the error, a judgment or decree will not be disturbed. Slepian, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 550; see also In re Marriage of Wojcik, 362 Ill. App. 3d 144, 153-54 (2005) (concluding that the trial court\u2019s findings of fact were against the manifest weight of the evidence, but affirming the ultimate judgment because the error was harmless). Moreover, we may affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment on any basis in the record, regardless of the trial court\u2019s reasoning. Slepian, 358 Ill. App. 3d at 550.\nGiven the trial court\u2019s thorough explanation of its multiple reasons for entering a money judgment in this case, we conclude that any error in considering Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s noncompliance with the vacated default judgment was harmless. The trial court\u2019s ultimate determination regarding damages would not have been any different had it not considered the default judgment. Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s argument fails.\nIV Interpretation of Code Provisions\nRoger\u2019s Towing next contends that the trial court erred in construing section 4\u2014207 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/4\u2014207 (West 2004)) to relieve Bell of its duties to present law enforcement with proof of its right to possession and to pay Roger\u2019s Towing for incurred towing and storage charges. Section 4\u2014207, titled \u201cReclaimed vehicles; expenses,\u201d provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any time before a vehicle is sold at public sale or disposed of as provided in Section 4\u2014208, the owner, lienholder or other person legally entitled to its possession may reclaim the vehicle by presenting to the law enforcement agency having custody of the vehicle proof of ownership or proof of the right to possession of the vehicle.\n(b) No vehicle shall be released to the owner, lienholder, or other person under this Section until all towing, storage, and processing charges have been paid.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014207 (West 2004).\nWe have reviewed the trial court\u2019s order and cannot locate where the trial court allegedly construed section 4\u2014207 \u201cto relieve the plaintiff lienholder of its duties to present to the law enforcement agency having custody of the subject motor vehicle proof of the plaintiffs right to possession of the vehicle, and to pay the towing service all incurred towing and storage charges.\u201d Our review of the trial court\u2019s order reveals that the only times the trial court touched upon section 4\u2014207 were (1) when the trial court recited that section 4\u2014207 \u201cprovides that any person entitled to possession of a vehicle may reclaim a towed vehicle by (a) presenting proof of ownership or right to possession, and (b) paying all towing, storage and processing charges,\u201d and (2) when the trial court stated that it \u201creject[ed] Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s position that Plaintiff was required to appear at its business premises and tender the amount it claimed was due for the towing and storage charges associated with the vehicle without first having been told the correct amount due for such charges.\u201d We cannot find that the trial court construed section 4\u2014207 in the manner alleged by Roger\u2019s Towing, much less find that the trial court erred in doing so.\nRoger\u2019s Towing further contends that the trial court erred in finding that it \u201cwas required by the Motor Vehicle Code to return the phone call of Plaintiffs president and to respond to the demand letter of Plaintiffs attorney in order for Defendant to preserve its rights as a towing service authorized to tow an abandoned vehicle\u201d because \u201csuch duties do not appear in the Motor Vehicle Code.\u201d Again, we have reviewed the trial court\u2019s order and find no holding that Roger\u2019s Towing was required to return Doppelt\u2019s phone call. With regard to the demand letter, the trial court held, \u201cThe Court further finds that Roger\u2019s Towing had an implied duty under the Code to respond either orally or in writing to Plaintiffs counsel\u2019s February 2, 2004, letter.\u201d The letter provided as follows:\n\u201cThis office represents Bell Leasing Brokerage, LLC, the first lienholder of the above-referenced vehicle (the \u2018Vehicle\u2019). You are wrongfully detaining the Vehicle since it is my client\u2019s understanding that it was not abandoned by its owner when it was towed to your business premises. To avoid litigation, my client would agree to pay you $175 for the reasonable cost of the tow ($100) and storage ($75). If arrangements are not made by February 5, 2004, for redelivery for the Vehicle to my client, I have been authorized to pursue all available remedies, including filing a detinue action in the Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois.\u201d\nThe president of Roger\u2019s Towing, Tomaras, testified at trial that he did not respond to the letter sent by Bell\u2019s counsel because he was \u201cnot in a custom of having people tell me what they\u2019re going to pay for what I do, my services.\u201d\nSection 4\u2014207 of the Code, titled \u201cReclaimed vehicles; expenses,\u201d deals with the process of reclaiming vehicles that have been towed as abandoned vehicles. 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014207 (West 2004). As noted above, section 4\u2014207 provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Any time before a vehicle is sold at public sale or disposed of as provided in Section 4\u2014208, the owner, lienholder or other person legally entitled to its possession may reclaim the vehicle by presenting to the law enforcement agency having custody of the vehicle proof of ownership or proof of the right to possession of the vehicle.\n(b) No vehicle shall be released to the owner, lienholder, or other person under this Section until all towing, storage, and processing charges have been paid.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014207 (West 2004).\nGiven the requirement of section 4\u2014207(b) that a lienholder must pay all towing charges before a vehicle may be released to it, we find it reasonable to imply a duty on a towing company to respond to inquiries about or challenges to the amount of those charges. Additionally, we agree with Bell that the trial court\u2019s determination that a towing company has an implied duty to respond to a letter from a lienholder stating that a vehicle which was towed due to alleged abandonment was not actually abandoned is reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we reject Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s contention that the trial court erred in finding it had a duty to respond to the letter sent by Bell\u2019s counsel.\nV Damages\nThe trial court awarded Bell $10,000 as \u201c[djamages in detinue, based upon Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s wrongful detention of the Vehicle, and the estimated fair market value of the Vehicle as of January 22, 2004.\u201d Roger\u2019s Towing contends that the trial court\u2019s award of damages was contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and constituted an abuse of discretion. Aside from setting forth the standard of review, Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s entire argument on this issue is as follows:\n\u201cThe damage award in this case should be reversed. First, no competent evidence concerning the fair market value of the vehicle was presented. Second, the vehicle was delivered to Plaintiff before June 29, 2005, pursuant to the judgment of April 13, 2005. Third, the Defendant should have been found to be immune from civil liability pursuant to 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014213. Fourth, the award of punitive damages based on Defendant\u2019s actions as revealed by the evidence presented to the trial court does not warrant punitive damages. The award of punitive damages in this case is not supported by the record and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the award of damages should be reversed, because no reasonable person would award punitive damages under the facts of this case.\u201d\nAs an initial matter, we address Roger\u2019s Towing\u2019s argument that it should have been found to be immune from civil liability. Section 4\u2014213(a) of the Code provides in relevant part as follows:\n\u201c[A] towing service owner, operator, or employee shall not be held to answer or be liable for damages in any action brought by the registered owner, former registered owner, or his legal representative, lienholder or any other person legally entitled to the possession of a vehicle when the vehicle was processed and sold or disposed of as provided by this Chapter.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014213(a) (West 2004).\nThe trial court determined that Roger\u2019s Towing was not entitled to immunity under this section because it \u201cdid not comply with each of the provisions of the Code.\u201d We agree with this conclusion because the van was not an \u201cabandoned vehicle\u201d as defined by section 1\u2014101.05 (625 ILCS 5/1\u2014101.05 (West 2004)); and Roger\u2019s Towing improperly demanded payment of an amount in excess of $875, which the parties agreed at trial was the maximum amount Roger\u2019s Towing was authorized to demand for towing and storage services under the Code (see 625 ILCS 5/4\u2014203(g), 4\u2014214(b) (West 2004)). Accordingly, we reject the argument that Roger\u2019s Towing should have been found to be immune from liability.\nIn general, \u201cthe measure of damages in a detinue action is the rental value of the chattel during the period of the wrongful detention.\u201d L&LC Trucking Co. v. Jack Freeman Trucking Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d 186, 189 (1976). \u201c[W]hether the plaintiff actually rented a replacement [is irrelevant], since damages are awarded as compensation to the owner of the chattel for being wrongfully deprived of [its] use and enjoyment.\u201d L&LC Trucking Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d at 189. \u201cIn essence, the defendant is regarded as having rented the *** chattel from the plaintiff for the period of the wrongful detention.\u201d L&LC Trucking Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d at 189. A trial court\u2019s award of compensatory damages will be reversed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1037-38 (2002).\nIn the instant case, evidence of the value of the van was provided by Officer Robert Rudow, who testified at trial that the van\u2019s fair market value in April 2004 was approximately $6,000. Evidence of the rental value of the van was provided by the installment contract signed by Waldermar Rodriguez and Carmen Rodriguez, which indicated their monthly installment payments were $373.61. This monthly amount, multiplied over the 14 months that Roger\u2019s Towing held the van, reflects a total rental value of $5,230.54. As noted above, \u201cthe measure of [compensatory] damages in a detinue action is the rental value of the chattel during the period of the wrongful detention.\u201d L&LC Trucking Co., 36 Ill. App. 3d at 189. Accordingly, an award of compensatory damages of $5,230.54 in the instant case is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nThe remaining $4,769.46 of the trial court\u2019s damage award apparently reflects punitive damages. When reviewing a trial court\u2019s decision to award punitive damages, we take a three-step approach, considering: \u201c(1) whether punitive damages are available for the particular cause of action, using a de novo standard; (2) whether, under a manifest weight of the evidence standard, the defendant acted fraudulently, maliciously[,] or in a manner that warrants such damages; and (3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in imposing punitive damages.\u201d Caparos v. Morton, 364 Ill. App. 3d 159, 178 (2006).\nIn the instant case, Bell sued Roger\u2019s Towing under theories of detinue and conversion. The tort of conversion supports an award of punitive damages. Turner v. Firstar Bank, N.A., 363 Ill. App. 3d 1150, 1160 (2006). Withholding chattel until a plaintiff pays storage fees constitutes a conversion where the defendant does not have a valid possessory lien. Glaser v. Kazak, 173 Ill. App. 3d 108, 115 (1988). Here, Roger\u2019s Towing did not have a valid possessory lien on the van because it failed to adhere to all the provisions of the Code when it demanded an unlawful amount of money for the recovery of the van. Accordingly, a finding of conversion was appropriate, and punitive damages are available in this case.\nThe evidence at trial established that Roger\u2019s Towing, through its employee, misrepresented the amount of money required to recover the van. In addition, the president of Roger\u2019s Towing, Tomaras, testified that he did not respond to the letter sent by Bell\u2019s attorney because he was \u201cnot in a custom of having people tell me what they\u2019re going to pay for what I do, my services\u201d; was served with a summons relating to the suit but did not file an appearance or responsive pleading because he \u201cwas trying to contact people to find out what I had to do,\u201d not because he forgot about or overlooked the summons; and received a copy of the default judgment but did not comply with it while it was in effect because \u201cI wanted to retain an attorney to see what I had to do here.\u201d Punitive damages for conversion are proper where \u201cthe defendant acts willfully or with such gross negligence to indicate a wanton disregard of the rights of others.\u201d Turner, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 1160. In light of the circumstances of the instant case, it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence to conclude that Roger\u2019s Towing acted willfully and with wanton disregard of Bell\u2019s rights, and that Roger\u2019s Towing acted in a manner that warrants punitive damages.\nFinally, \u201c[a] trial court does not abuse its discretion [in assessing punitive damages] unless no reasonable person could assume its view.\u201d Caparos, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 180. Punitive damages serve dual purposes: \u201cretribution against the wrongdoer and deterrence of similar conduct by that party and by others in general.\u201d Caparos, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 180. We cannot say that a punitive damage award of $4,769.46 in this case does not serve those purposes. We find no abuse of discretion.\nBased on the rental value of the van and the three-step test for punitive damages set out above, we affirm the trial court\u2019s damages award.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons explained above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019BRIEN, PJ., and GALLAGHER, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019HARA FROSSARD" } ], "attorneys": [ "Hyink Law Firm, of Oak Brook (Benjamin E Hyink, of counsel), for appellant.", "Robbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert E Rabin, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "BELL LEASING BROKERAGE, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROGER AUTO SERVICE, INC., Defendant-Appellant (Waldermar Rodriguez et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142313\nOpinion filed March 30, 2007.\nHyink Law Firm, of Oak Brook (Benjamin E Hyink, of counsel), for appellant.\nRobbins, Salomon & Patt, Ltd., of Chicago (Robert E Rabin, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0461-01", "first_page_order": 477, "last_page_order": 490 }