{ "id": 4269917, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSSELL E. ANDREWS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Andrews", "decision_date": "2007-04-19", "docket_number": "No. 3\u201402\u20140569", "first_page": "960", "last_page": "967", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 960" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 108", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592162 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0108-01" ] }, { "cite": "467 U.S. 431", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6201711 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/467/0431-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1101", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833399 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1101-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719712 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "officers impermissibly prolonged stop and increased confrontational nature because questions asked of passenger were not related to purpose of the stop" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "392 U.S. 1", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6167798 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "19-20" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "1879" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/392/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609689 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "226" }, { "page": "228" }, { "page": "235" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "440 U.S. 648", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6187389 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/440/0648-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 1001", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132365 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/1001-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 282", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703639 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0282-01" ] }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 405", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902584 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0405-01" ] }, { "cite": "125 S. Ct. 1292", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "161 L. Ed. 2d 94", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 1135", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5928962, 5929252, 3437957, 5889897, 5948596, 5944959 ], "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/1135-04", "/us/543/1135-05", "/us/543/1135-06", "/us/543/1135-01", "/us/543/1135-03", "/us/543/1135-02" ] }, { "cite": "802 N.E.2d 219", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 515", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975003 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "536", "parenthetical": "Fitzgerald, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Carman, JJ." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0515-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 109", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6194938 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "122" }, { "page": "100" }, { "page": "1661" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0109-01" ] }, { "cite": "671 N.E.2d 1154", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1161" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "284 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1260367 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/284/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "501 U.S. 429", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1108039 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "439" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "2388" }, { "page": "439" }, { "page": "401" }, { "page": "2388" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/501/0429-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 N.E.2d 187", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 530", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3602037 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "549" }, { "page": "549" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/222/0530-01" ] }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 556", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801366 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0556-01" ] }, { "cite": "854 N.E.2d 317", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 193", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265784 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "201" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0193-01" ] }, { "cite": "853 N.E.2d 1230", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "543 U.S. 405", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5902584 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "408-09" }, { "page": "847" }, { "page": "837-38" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/us/543/0405-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 797, "char_count": 17947, "ocr_confidence": 0.773, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.4265276719536815e-08, "percentile": 0.27761058656315485 }, "sha256": "e974c4205d6ddc6ea02f7deac48948477adf30dc2587213094da73a80b71d6ec", "simhash": "1:3bef9cd736c28b4d", "word_count": 2929 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:46:01.247775+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSSELL E. ANDREWS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Russell E. Andrews, was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550 \u2014 4(b) (West 2000)). His motion to suppress the evidence was denied. Following a stipulated bench trial, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to, among other things, one year of conditional discharge and 60 days in the county jail. His motion for a new trial was also denied. On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress.\nOn September 27, 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court entered a supervisory order instructing us to vacate our judgment and reconsider this case in light of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), and People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282 (2006). We now reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction.\nBACKGROUND\nOn April 28, 2001, the defendant was the only passenger in his son\u2019s pickup truck in Macomb. His son was driving. At the suppression hearing, Officer Jason York testified that he stopped the vehicle for a traffic violation. Although he did not remember the specific traffic violation, he stated that it could have been a vehicle tag violation. York said that as he approached the vehicle, he recognized the defendant and the defendant\u2019s son.\nYork asked the driver for his driver\u2019s license, which the driver gave to him. York did not recall whether he also requested identification from the defendant. The defendant, however, testified that York requested identification from him. The defendant said that he gave York a valid Illinois state identification card.\nYork then returned to the squad car and ran background checks on the defendant and his son. The officer stated that he would have run a background check on the defendant regardless of whether he had the defendant\u2019s identification because he knew the defendant\u2019s name. The background check on the defendant showed an active body attachment. York arrested the defendant based on the body attachment and conducted a search of the defendant\u2019s person incident to that arrest. During the search, York found cannabis on the defendant\u2019s person. York then also arrested the defendant for possession of cannabis.\nAt the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial judge found that York had asked the defendant for his identification. The trial judge stated that, regardless of whether York obtained the defendant\u2019s identification, it was inevitable that York would have run a background check on the defendant because York knew the defendant\u2019s name. The court, therefore, denied the motion to suppress.\nFollowing the trial, the defendant was found guilty and was sentenced as indicated above. Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the court erred by denying his motion to suppress. The court denied the motion, and the defendant appealed.\nANALYSIS\nThe ruling of a trial court on a motion to suppress frequently presents mixed questions of fact and law. People v. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1001 (2001). The trial court\u2019s findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are manifestly erroneous. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1001. Concerning questions of law, the ruling of the trial court is subject to de novo review. Simac, 321 Ill. App. 3d 1001.\nUnder the fourth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States, a person has a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amends. IV, XIV In Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 59 L. Ed. 2d 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391 (1979), the United States Supreme Court stated that a traffic stop is a seizure which is subject to the fourth amendment\u2019s reasonableness standards. The temporary detention of individuals, passengers and drivers alike during a vehicle stop constitutes a seizure of persons within the meaning of the fourth amendment. People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003). Because a traffic stop is more analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed under Terry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226. A Terry analysis involves a dual inquiry: \u201c(1) \u2018whether the officer\u2019s action was justified at its inception,\u2019 and (2) \u2018whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.\u2019 \u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228, quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 20 L. Ed. 2d at 905, 88 S. Ct. at 1879.\nIn Gonzalez, the Illinois Supreme Court set out an analytical framework for courts to use in determining whether police questioning during a traffic stop seizure is consistent with fourth amendment protections. If the question is reasonably related to the initial purpose of the stop, no fourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that would justify the question. \u201cIn the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop.\u201d Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.\nIn this case, no issue exists concerning the lawfulness of the initial stop. Rather, this appeal concerns the lawfulness of the officer\u2019s conduct following the initial stop. Officer York\u2019s initial questioning of the driver and request for identification was justified. Those queries were reasonably related to the initial purpose of the encounter; the investigation of a traffic violation. However, the background check of defendant was not related to the initial justification for the stop. Defendant was simply a passenger in the truck and was not implicated in the traffic violation. Further, the background check was not supported by any reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Officer York neither saw nor suspected that defendant had committed any wrongdoing.\nIn the absence of a reasonable articulable suspicion, we must consider whether the check impermissibly prolonged the detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. The record does not resolve clearly how long the background check prolonged the detention. York testified that he returned to the squad car and ran a background check on both defendant and his son at the same time. York did not testify that the check performed on defendant was completed before the check on the driver. The background check on defendant could well have lengthened the duration of the detention if the officer had to wait for the results of the check.\nRegardless of the duration of any extended detention, however, the background check was impermissible because it changed the fundamental nature of the traffic stop. The check converted the stop from a routine traffic stop into an inquiry into defendant\u2019s past misconduct. People v. Miles, 343 Ill. App. 3d 1026 (2003) (officers impermissibly prolonged stop and increased confrontational nature because questions asked of passenger were not related to purpose of the stop). People v. Jones, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1101 (2004).\nWe note that our conclusion is consistent with the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005), and the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s revised opinion in People v. Caballes, 221 Ill. 2d 282 (2006). Our case does not involve a dog sniff, nor was the decision based on any analysis of the issues under the Illinois Constitution. The cases are further distinguished because Caballes was the driver of the speeding car while defendant was a passenger in a car whose driver was stopped for a \u201cvehicle tag violation,\u201d and, in Caballes, there was no claim of improper extension of the time or scope of the original stop.\nThe State claims that even if the officer\u2019s conduct violated defendant\u2019s constitutional right, the trial court properly denied defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence and quash the arrest by applying the doctrine of inevitable discovery.\nUnder the inevitable discovery doctrine, evidence obtained by an officer in violation of a defendant\u2019s constitutional rights, which otherwise would be inadmissible, may be admitted if the prosecution can show that the evidence inevitably would have been discovered without reference to the officer\u2019s error. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 81 L. Ed. 2d 377, 104 S. Ct. 2501 (1984); People v. Edwards, 144 Ill. 2d 108 (1991).\nHere, there was nothing inevitable about defendant\u2019s arrest for cannabis. Officer York never articulated a reasonable suspicion that defendant had committed or was about to commit a crime. Knowing someone\u2019s name does not qualify as a reasonable articulable suspicion. The request for identification and background check of the defendant, a passenger, was impermissible under Gonzalez, no matter how the officer got his name. Thus, the defendant\u2019s seizure was unreasonable.\nThe trial court erred as a matter of law when it denied the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress. Accordingly, we must reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction for cannabis possession.\nThe order of the circuit court of McDonough County denying the defendant\u2019s motion to suppress the evidence is reversed, and the judgment of conviction is reversed.\nReversed.\nHOLDRIDGE, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT,\ndissenting:\nThe majority holds that it is impermissible for a police officer to run a warrant check on a passenger during a routine traffic stop absent a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. It then professes that its holding comports to Illinois v. Caballes and People v. Caballes. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 963. It does not and, therefore, I dissent.\nA little history of this case seems appropriate. The original order of this court, a 2 to 1 majority (People v. Andrews, No. 3\u201402\u20140569 (2004) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23)) that came to the same conclusion as does the majority here, was vacated by our supreme court in a supervisory order that directed us to reconsider the case in light of Illinois v. Caballes and People v. Caballes. People v. Andrews, 221 Ill. 2d 644, 853 N.E.2d 1230 (2006).\n\u201cBy the logic of Caballes, checking for warrants on a passenger changes the fundamental nature of the traffic stop only if (1) it causes the seizure to last longer than the time reasonably required for such a traffic stop or (2) it infringes upon the passenger\u2019s legitimate interest in privacy.\u201d People v. Roberson, 367 Ill. App. 3d 193, 201, 854 N.E.2d 317, 324 (2006). (Roberson contains an excellent analysis of the issues that I will not repeat here.)\nThere is no evidence in the record before us to support an allegation that the warrant search prolonged the duration of this traffic stop. In fact, as the majority acknowledges, there is no evidence in the record before us indicating how long the traffic stop lasted. Any doubts raised by the incompleteness of the record will he resolved against the appellant. People v. Stewart, 179 Ill. 2d 556, 689 N.E.2d 1129 (1997).\nSince nothing in the record indicates the duration of the stop was expanded by Officer York\u2019s actions, our next task should be to determine whether his actions infringed upon defendant\u2019s legitimate interest in privacy. If it did not, under Caballes, it could not have impermissibly changed the nature of the traffic stop.\nOfficers have the right to ask citizens questions, even incriminating ones, when the officer has no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. People v. Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d 530, 857 N.E.2d 187 (2006). The Luedemann court acknowledged the theory that \u201c \u2018police officers can approach individuals as to whom they have no reasonable suspicion and ask them potentially incriminating questions\u2019 \u201d is well settled in the law and has been endorsed by the United States Supreme Court \u201c \u2018any number of times.\u2019 \u201d Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 549, quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 401, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991). \u201c[T]he law clearly provides that a police officer does not violate the fourth amendment merely by approaching a person in public to ask questions if the person is willing to listen. [Citations.] *** [T]he police have the right to approach citizens and ask potentially incriminating questions.\u201d Luedemann, 222 Ill. 2d at 549, citing Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 115 L. Ed. 2d 389, 401, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2388 (1991). Officer York was well within his rights in asking defendant for identification. The majority concedes this point.\n\u201cThe existence of an arrest warrant is a matter of public record.\u201d Gist v. Macon County Sheriff\u2019s Department, 284 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377, 671 N.E.2d 1154, 1161 (1996). \u201c[T]he expectation \u2018that certain facts will not come to the attention of the authorities\u2019 is not the same as an interest in \u2018privacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable.\u2019 \u201d Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09, 160 L. Ed. 2d 842, 847, 125 S. Ct. 834, 837-38 (2005), quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122, 80 L. Ed. 2d 85, 100, 104 S. Ct. 1652, 1661 (1984). The defendant had no legitimate privacy interest in the fact that an outstanding writ of attachment for his arrest existed at the time of the traffic stop.\nOn the other hand, the majority erroneously characterizes Officer York\u2019s actions in running a warrant check as converting \u201cthe stop from a routine traffic stop into an inquiry into defendant\u2019s past misconduct.\u201d 372 Ill. App. 3d at 963. The language and analysis employed by the majority are strikingly similar to that used in People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d 515, 802 N.E.2d 219 (2003). The United States Supreme Court has vacated the Harris decision and instructed our supreme court to revisit its analysis in light of Illinois v. Caballes. Illinois v. Harris, 543 U.S. 1135, 161 L. Ed. 2d 94, 125 S. Ct. 1292 (2005).\nThe fact is, a warrant check is a computer check to determine whether there are any current outstanding warrants or writs for the individual\u2019s arrest. Justice Fitzgerald\u2019s dissent in Harris, joined by Justices Thomas and Carman, recognized this. People v. Harris, 207 Ill. 2d at 536 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting, joined by Thomas and Carman, JJ.). In Illinois, police officers routinely run warrant checks simultaneously through the Law Enforcement Agency Data System (LEADS) and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). Even 25 years ago, these warrant checks took only moments to complete.\nNothing Officer York did changed the nature of this traffic stop from a constitutionally permissible stop to an unconstitutional stop. It was permissible for the officer to ask defendant questions. It was permissible for the officer to run a warrant check. It was proper for the officer to search the defendant\u2019s person once he lawfully arrested defendant pursuant to the outstanding writ.\nFrom a commonsense standpoint, to require police to have a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to run a warrant check seems somewhat silly. What is the likelihood that police will find a warrant for a crime that a person has just committed or is about to commit? What about the officer who recognizes someone on the street and simply requests a warrant check on the individual without first stopping him? Is that an invasion of the person\u2019s constitutional rights to privacy? In the real world, police officers do this every day. It is a practice which leads to many arrests based on outstanding warrants and writs. As long as the warrant check on the passenger does not unreasonably prolong the traffic stop, I can think of no relevant difference between the warrant check at issue here and one where the officer runs a warrant check on someone the officer recognizes standing on the street or passing by in a car. If the law requires a reasonable, articulable suspicion to check public records as the majority holds here today, both are impermissible.\nFinally, although I find that no unconstitutional action was taken by Officer York, I feel it necessary to address the \u201cinevitable discovery\u201d issues raised by the State as it appears the majority misconstrues the State\u2019s argument. The majority concludes that since \u201cthere was nothing inevitable about the defendant\u2019s arrest for cannabis,\u201d the inevitable discovery doctrine does not cure what the majority incorrectly determined to be an improper search. 372 Ill. App. 3d at 964. The State did not argue simply that the arrest for cannabis was inevitable but rather the warrant check was inevitable, given Officer York\u2019s familiarity with the defendant. This, in turn, made defendant\u2019s arrest based upon the writ inevitable. This was so, even though defendant argued below that the officer\u2019s request for his identification was a fourth amendment violation. That is, the State argued that even if the court found the request for identification constitutionally infirm, the officer knew defendant. The trial court made the specific finding that the officer recognized defendant and would have run a warrant check even without securing defendant\u2019s identification. The State\u2019s \u201cinevitability\u201d argument did not address or anticipate the majority ruling that it was the running of the warrant check, as opposed to requesting identification, where the officer went afoul of the fourth amendment.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE SCHMIDT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Sherry R. Silvern, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.", "William Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (Lawrence M. Bauer and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUSSELL E. ANDREWS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201402\u20140569\nOpinion filed April 19, 2007.\nRehearing denied June 5, 2007.\nSherry R. Silvern, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Ottawa, for appellant.\nWilliam Poncin, State\u2019s Attorney, of Macomb (Lawrence M. Bauer and Richard T. Leonard, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0960-01", "first_page_order": 976, "last_page_order": 983 }