{ "id": 4270091, "name": "In re STEPHEN K., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois Petitioner-Appellee, v. Kathy K., Mother of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant); In re STEPHEN K, a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Stephen K., Sr., Father of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Kathy K.", "decision_date": "2007-04-13", "docket_number": "Nos. 1-06-2135, 1-06-2061 cons.", "first_page": "7", "last_page": "30", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 7" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "727 N.E.2d 990", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229710 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "13" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 N.E.2d 544", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" }, { "page": "550" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4262364 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "803" }, { "page": "803" }, { "page": "803" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "782 N.E.2d 835", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" }, { "page": "841" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 98", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599286 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" }, { "page": "104" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0098-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 351", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 153", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79371 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0153-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 108", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 239", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022496 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "258" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0239-01" ] }, { "cite": "761 N.E.2d 1249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1255", "parenthetical": "child's best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 70", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79467 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "77", "parenthetical": "child's best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0070-01" ] }, { "cite": "799 N.E.2d 304", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "321" }, { "page": "321" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719126 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "574 N.E.2d 893", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "896" }, { "page": "896" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1059", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293563 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1062" }, { "page": "1062" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1059-01" ] }, { "cite": "756 N.E.2d 422", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "429-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256341 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "670" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 113", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "118" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527715 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "709" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "579 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592553 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "642 N.E.2d 128", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "162 Ill. 2d 47", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 477535 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/162/0047-01" ] }, { "cite": "697 N.E.2d 862", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "866-67" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "297 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 910204 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1096-97" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/297/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "460 F. Supp. 713", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 5892001 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" }, { "page": "718" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/460/0713-01" ] }, { "cite": "760 N.E.2d 85", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98", "parenthetical": "\"Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived\"" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" }, { "page": "110" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 225", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281379 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "242", "parenthetical": "\"Where a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived\"" }, { "page": "256" }, { "page": "257" }, { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0225-01" ] }, { "cite": "745 N.E.2d 13", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "319 Ill. App. 3d 411", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1527757 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/319/0411-01" ] }, { "cite": "571 N.E.2d 905", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. App. 3d 849", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2599999 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "890" }, { "page": "890", "parenthetical": "\" The circuit court *** cannot second-guess medical experts. If the circuit court does not follow [expert] medical evidence that is not refuted by other medical evidence, the circuit court is acting contrary to the evidence' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/212/0849-01" ] }, { "cite": "723 N.E.2d 678", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "680, 685-86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 996", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349587 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "999-1000, 1007-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0996-01" ] }, { "cite": "819 N.E.2d 734", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "746" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 441", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444184 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "463" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0441-01" ] }, { "cite": "682 N.E.2d 95", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" }, { "page": "99" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 728", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1597007 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "734-35" }, { "page": "735" }, { "page": "735" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0728-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 1087", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1093" }, { "page": "1094", "parenthetical": "the trial court has no authority to disregard undisputed medical testimony" }, { "page": "1097" }, { "page": "1098" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 55", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950379 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62" }, { "page": "62-63" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "63" }, { "page": "64" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0055-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1777, "char_count": 59259, "ocr_confidence": 0.716, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2444905155005648e-07, "percentile": 0.608680081348372 }, "sha256": "90112e0bdcd4019d05abdb3e434e9ae64ac1e1f0b0f6747f67c5805cdcf39cde", "simhash": "1:2a99bb3e7a91c23d", "word_count": 9763 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:18.400209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re STEPHEN K., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois Petitioner-Appellee, v. Kathy K., Mother of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant). \u2014 In re STEPHEN K, a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Stephen K., Sr., Father of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAt an adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court found the respondents, Kathy K. and Stephen K., medically neglected and exposed their child, S.K., to an injurious environment. At a subsequent dispositional hearing, the court ruled that the respondents were unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline their child, and the minor was made a ward of the court and placed in the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services. The respondents now appeal.\nThe mother, Kathy K., contends that: (1) the State failed to establish S.K. was medically neglected as a result of her actions; (2) the trial court\u2019s finding that she was unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline her child was against the manifest weight of the evidence; (3) the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of S.K.\u2019s hospitalization after he was removed from the respondents\u2019 home and while in foster care; and (4) the adjudication of wardship should be dismissed because under Illinois law she had no duty to obey specific treatment plans and recommendations of the healthcare professionals treating her child.\nThe father, Stephen K., solely contends that he was denied due process when, at the adjudicatory hearing, the circuit court refused to admit evidence demonstrating the minor\u2019s need for hospitalization while under the care of the foster parents. For the following reasons we affirm the trial court\u2019s adjudicatory and dispositional hearing orders.\nI. BACKGROUND\nS.K. was born on November 7, 1990, and was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis shortly thereafter. On August 4, 2005, S.K. was taken into the custody of the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) and on August 5, 2005, the State filed a petition for an adjudication of wardship. In that petition, the State alleged that S.K. suffered medical neglect and malnutrition, lived in an injurious environment and suffered a risk of physical harm by respondents Kathy K. and Stephen K., in violation of sections 2 \u2014 3(l)(a), 2 \u2014 3(l)(b) and. 2 \u2014 3(2)(ii) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act). 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(a), (l)(b), 2 \u2014 3(2) (ii) (West 2002). The State alleged the following facts in support of these allegations:\n\u201cOn or about July 20, 2005, this minor was admitted to the University of Chicago Children\u2019s Hospital with a history of coughing up blood. Medical personnel have diagnosed this minor with cystic fibrosis, chronic malnourishment, and long standing medical neglect. Further, medical personnel have indicated that this minor\u2019s condition is potentially life threatening if not treated appropriately. Mother and father have an extensive history of marginal medical compliance on behalf of this minor. This minor will require close monitoring, exact medication compliance and regular medical follow-up upon discharge. Mother and father were residing together until approximately July, 2005. Mother reports a history of domestic violence with father.\u201d\nAt the adjudicatory hearing, the State\u2019s first witness was Dr. Jill Glick, the medical director of the child protective services (CPS) team at the University of Chicago Hospital (UCH). The court qualified Dr. Glick as an expert in pediatrics, pediatric emergency, and child abuse pediatrics. On direct examination, Dr. Glick testified that as head of the CPS team at UCH, in July 2005, she was first involved with S.K\u2019s case when she was approached by pulmonologist Dr. Lucille Lester, S.K\u2019s primary treating physician. Dr. Lester had expressed her longstanding concern about the respondents\u2019 ability to provide S.K. with adequate medical care. Dr. Lester indicated that even though S.K. had a worsening lung disease, the family did not follow through with instructions to obtain adequate medication. Dr. Lester was also concerned that S.K. suffered from \u201cchronic malnourishment secondary to lack of appropriate environmental nutrition given to him,\u201d because he \u201chad not gained weight since [Mjarch of [2005].\u201d According to Dr. Glick, Dr. Lester was \u201cvery uncomfortable\u201d sending S.K. home, as he appeared depressed and was missing school, and she wanted Dr. Glick\u2019s assessment of the situation.\nDr. Glick further testified that S.K. was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis shortly after birth and that he had been treated for the disease at UCH many times throughout his life. Dr. Glick explained that cystic fibrosis is a multisystem disease which primarily affects the lungs and the gastrointestinal (GI) tract. According to Dr. Glick, cystic fibrosis patients are missing enzymes for digestion, have abnormalities in their salt metabolism, and a progressive pulmonary disease. Consequently, cystic fibrosis patients need daily ongoing medication by mouth and by aerosol to keep their airways open, and physiotherapy (with a \u201cvibratory\u201d vest) to battle the mucus production that clogs up their airways. Dr. Glick noted that without a daily regimented plan of medication, and chest therapy, the disease will progress.\nDr. Glick also testified that because a good number of cystic fibrosis patients have problems with their GI track and digestion, resulting in serious diarrhea and weight loss, they must eat a caloric- and vitamin-enriched diet. Moreover, the diet must include a series of enzymes that help digestion and are timed and administered according to the type of food the patient is eating.\nAccording to Dr. Glick, children with cystic fibrosis are susceptible to infections because their immune systems are suppressed by the disease, often causing them to cough up blood or have bad coughing spells or fever. Dr. Glick also testified that although many patients with cystic fibrosis die in their 30s and 40s, if treated properly \u201cthey can have productive lives,\u201d and some may live longer. However, Dr. Glick also admitted that even with optimal care, cystic fibrosis patients will have exacerbations and pulmonary problems.\nDr. Glick next testified that in assessing S.K.\u2019s situation, she consulted the minor\u2019s treating medical team, including Dr. Lester, nurse Jeanine Cheetham, and other pediatric residents working under Dr. Lester\u2019s guidance. Dr. Glick stated that she also reviewed S.K.\u2019s medical records and spoke with the social worker assigned to his case. In her assessment, in July 2005, Dr. Glick also interviewed and physically examined S.K., and remarked that he was not interactive and instead appeared very depressed and very thin at the waist.\nDr. Glick further testified that Dr. Lester had informed her that she and her staff had educated both of the respondents about cystic fibrosis on numerous occasions, and had informed them about the \u201cvery ultimate importance of strict medical compliance,\u201d including attending all of S.K.\u2019s medical appointments, and providing him with proper nutrition. Dr. Glick also testified that based on S.K\u2019s medical records, the respondents had been offered assistance in obtaining the proper nutrition-based medications and pancreatic enzyme. As Dr. Glick testified:\n\u201cThere were, I have to say to summarize there were multiple, multiple interventions that were offered. The most important was ensuring the pancreatic enzyme. That\u2019s very important for [S.K\u2019s] body to be able to absorb nutrients as well as the vitamins; particularly A, D, E and K. Those are the four vitamins that are fat soluble that are malabsorbed.\nI know that we had documentation very clearly that they had offered \u2014 there is an assistance program so that if you get the enzyme and you turn in your receipts you get reimbursed, and there is a whole bunch of different agencies to apply [to] ensure getting the proper nutrition-based medications, and there was a truly [sic] lack of follow through by the family; particularly with the enzyme ***.\u201d\nDr. Glick finally testified that at the end of her assessment, based on her review of S.K\u2019s medical records and her discussions with S.K\u2019s treating team, she agreed with Dr. Lester that it was reasonable to file a complaint with DCFS because S.K. was suffering from medical neglect and was not provided appropriate medical care on a daily basis.\nOn cross-examination by the guardian ad litem, representing the minor, Dr. Glick testified that the medical records indicated that during his hospital stays in January 2005 and July 2005, S.K. had gained weight and had exhibited lung function improvement. Dr. Glick also testified that after his release from the hospital in January 2005, S.K. missed four medical appointments.\nOn cross-examination by counsel for the respondent father, Dr. Glick also testified that although she did not review every single page of S.K.\u2019s medical records, she had spent hundreds of hours reviewing them and had attempted to independently verify and corroborate the information she had received.\nWhen questioned about the apparent increase in S.K.\u2019s weight indicated by his admission and discharge summaries for hospitalizations in January 2005 and July 2005, Dr. Glick stated that discharge and admission summaries are often written by residents, do not necessarily have accurate weights, and are not reliable data points. In fact, according to Dr. Glick, they are \u201cnotoriously incorrect.\u201d Accordingly, Dr. Glick testified that for a reliable and accurate review of S.K.\u2019s weight, she had used Dr. Lester\u2019s growth chart, which was opened when S.K. was born.\nDr. Glick further testified on cross-examination that S.K. was admitted to the hospital on July 20, 2005, because he was spitting up blood and coughing constantly for a week. Dr. Glick acknowledged that S.K.\u2019s medical records indicated that on July 13, 2005, one of the respondents had taken the minor to see Dr. Lester, and that S.K. was prescribed Cipro. Dr. Glick, however, went on to state that this fact did not change her opinion that S.K. was medically neglected.\nDr. Glick finally testified that, at the time of the adjudicatory hearing, S.K. was in the hospital because he had \u201ca fever and exacerbation, and needed antibiotics.\u201d Dr. Glick stated, however, that she had just visited S.K. in the hospital, that he was gaining weight and \u201cdoing very well with his disease.\u201d\nOn cross-examination by counsel for the respondent mother, Dr. Glick also testified that in assessing S.K.\u2019s case, she never spoke to the respondent mother because numerous people had done so in the past.\nOn redirect examination, Dr. Glick testified that in a case of a discrepancy between a medical record and information from the treating physician, she gives more weight to the treating physicians\u2019s original files, and that she had done so in S.K\u2019s case. In conclusion, Dr. Glick testified that in her opinion S.K. was at risk if he went back home to his parents.\nThomas White, a child protective specialist with DCFS, next testified that he was assigned to investigate allegations of medical neglect and inadequate food at the respondents\u2019 home. During his investigation, White first visited S.K. in the hospital. On July 26, 2005, White also visited the mother. White noticed that her home was cluttered but not filthy. He further stated that although he found food in the house, it was not the kind of food that a child could easily eat because it would require a lot of preparation and \u201cassistance of someone like a mother or a caretaker to actually prepare [this kind of] food for him.\u201d More specifically, White indicated that he failed to find any \u201chappy food,\u201d which a child in S.K.\u2019s condition \u201cwould just get up and fix for himself.\u201d\nWhite further testified that the mother denied having been neglectful and stated that on the advice of Dr. Lester she had turned over to S.K. the responsibility of taking his own medication, supplements, and food. The mother explained that she wished to make S.K. more independent. With regard to food, the mother stated that the father was not giving her money to purchase necessary food items and that she was considering taking him to court to compel support. White also testified that at the time of the interview, the father had not been residing with the mother for approximately one month. During the interview, the mother expressed her belief that \u201cher husband and her sister were setting her up by calling\u201d DCFS. White further testified that he questioned the mother about substance abuse and that she replied that she was taking diet pills and \u201cthat was the only thing she was taking.\u201d The mother also stated that she had not drunk alcohol in 10 or 15 years.\nWhite also testified that around August 2, 2005, he interviewed the father, who told him that the mother may be using some type of drugs. The father also told White that he did not think that the mother was giving S.K. proper care and that S.K. \u201cmight be better off\u2019 living with his sister, who was married to a doctor in Wisconsin and who was willing to allow S.K. to live in her home for two to three weeks. According to White, the mother rejected this plan, and the father\u2019s efforts in that regard failed.\nThe father also told White that he had been \u201cput out\u201d of the family home, that he did not have a permanent residence, that he worked 80 hours a week, and that there had been an order of protection initiated by the mother against him that barred him from seeing his children. Accordingly, he told White that he \u201ccould not be there\u201d to provide the care S.K. needed.\nAccording to White, at the conclusion of his investigation, he \u201cindicated\u201d S.K.\u2019s case for medical neglect, but found the charges of inadequate food unfounded. White explained that \u201cindicating a case\u201d meant that DCFS found it had credible evidence that if the situation was not corrected, the child would be at risk of harm.\nOn cross-examination by the respondent father, White stated that the evidence that led DCFS to indicate the case for medical neglect was information by Drs. Glick and Lester and other UCH staff, as well as medical reports, indicating that S.K. had not been eating properly, or taking his supplements regularly, and that as a result he had lost 12 pounds, 6 of which he regained once he was readmitted to the hospital.\nOn cross-examination, White stated that in his investigation of the inadequate food issue, he simply looked into the cupboards to see if there was food that was sufficient to sustain life for that day, and was not looking to find any special food items. White testified that he observed food in the house that was sufficient to feed a family. White also defined \u201chappy food\u201d as a \u201chot dog [or] pizza,\u201d but admitted that he had \u201cno medical opinion\u201d of whether either of these was nutritionally adequate for S.K.\nOn cross-examination by the respondent mother, White testified that the mother rejected the father\u2019s plan because it would have involved S.K. moving out of state to live with the father\u2019s, and not with her, relatives.\nDuring the adjudicatory hearing, the State also moved and was permitted without objection to admit People\u2019s Exhibit No. 1, 1,470 pages of certified and delegated medical records from UCH made in the course of S.K\u2019s treatment. The State drew the court\u2019s attention to discharge summaries dated August 5, 2005, January 14, 2005, June 28, 1999, December 15, 1998, and August 20, 1996; the Multidisciplinary Pediatric Education and Evaluation Consortium (MPEEC) report; social service notes dated July 21, 2005, and August 4, 2005; and a social work note and assessment dated November 15, 2004. The State then rested.\nThe guardian ad litem, on behalf of S.K., was allowed to publish from the medical records. The record reflecting S.K\u2019s admission to the hospital on July 20, 2005, showed that the \u201cComplaints on Admission and Pertinent History\u201d read in part \u201csignificant 5 pound weight loss in the last three months.\u201d A social history from the same document stated that S.K.\u2019s \u201csocial environment contribute[d] dramatically to his poor health. *** There is rarely enough food in the house, and, therefore, he is malnourished. He receives little supervision to guarantee that he gets his medications.\u201d The document further indicated that after respiratory therapy, S.K. \u201csignificantly improved *** which was a signal of noncompliance at home.\u201d The record further showed that S.K. was admitted with a weight of 46 kg and within two days had gone up to 48.9 kg, which he maintained until discharge.\nSimilarly, a social work note in S.K\u2019s patient record dated July 21, 2005, indicated:\n\u201cDuring [S.K.\u2019s] previous [UCH] hospitalization, his lung function improved and he gained weight. Over the last three months (since he was last seen by Dr. Lester), his lung function has decreased again and he has lost five pounds. Other concerns involve the home situation/environment. *** Aunt has provided food to S.K. and his brother and they know they can go down to her house when needed (which they have done).\u201d\nAnother \u201cSocial Service Note\u201d referring to the same hospitalization, and dated August 4, 2005, stated:\n\u201cHome: [S.K.] understands that DCFS was contacted and that his home situation, including his mother\u2019s parenting skills, are being evaluated. [S.K.] appears to agree with concerns about mother\u2019s parenting abilities and his living environment. He describes his mother as being \u2018not responsible,\u2019 \u2018not like a normal mom.\u2019 *** He further reports that she sleeps during the day and is believed to take \u2018diet pills.\u2019 [S.K.] also reports that the household often lacks food.\u201d\nThe guardian ad litem also published from S.K.\u2019s hospital discharge summary of January 14, 2005. That summary included the following: \u201cit was determined that [S.K.] needed to be admitted for IV antibiotics due to non-adherence [to his medication regimen].\u201d In the same discharge summary, problem number three reads as: \u201cSocial. *** [A] social worker, followed and coordinated a family meeting. A family meeting was arranged and the importance of the patient\u2019s medication regimen was again addressed with the family.\u201d\nAfter the guardian ad litem rested, counsel for the respondent father opened his case in chief by asking the trial court to introduce into evidence the portion of Dr. Glick\u2019s testimony concerning S.K.\u2019s current hospitalization. Counsel argued that during the adjudicatory hearing, he had learned that S.K. was back in the hospital even though he was in the custody of foster parents, who \u201ceveryone would agree\u201d had given S.K. \u201coptimum medical care.\u201d Counsel argued that the present hospitalization was relevant because it showed that even with such optimal care S.K. could get ill and be rehospitalized. Counsel asked for leave of court and for time to brief this issue. Permission to do so was denied on the grounds of relevance.\nIn denying the request, the court specifically noted that the fact that S.K. was hospitalized was already in evidence, and that \u201cthis petition was not filed because S.K. ended up in the hospital,\u201d but because he was not getting the appropriate care in the respondents\u2019 home. The trial court explained the standard of care:\n\u201c[T]here\u2019s no petition against the [foster parents,] that \u2014 we don\u2019t measure it against care for [foster parents]. We measure it against the standard of care that was appropriate for [S.K.] at that time. [Foster parents] may be the greatest caretakers or mediocre caretakers or marginal caretakers. That\u2019s not relevant.\u201d\nThe trial also court pointed out that \u201cthe fact that S.K.\u2019s cystic fibrosis is not resolved is not only irrelevant, it\u2019s completely expected,\u201d and that it was not in S.K.\u2019s interest or the father\u2019s interest to delay the adjudication.\nThe respondent father then requested a five-minute recess to decide whether or not to testify, and the trial court instructed him to use the recess to decide whether he wanted to add something to his prior request to brief the issue of S.K.\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization for purposes of an offer of proof so that the record on this issue was preserved. After that recess the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: First of all, relative \u2014 is there anything else relative to your offer of proof that you want to say relative to your request to put in evidence as to [S.K.\u2019s] recent hospitalization. Anything further you want to say in reference to that?\nMR. NAGELBERG: I can\u2019t make an offer of proof because I would need to investigate more further [sfc] some of the facts behind the hospitalization. It only became known to me the day before the trial started.\u201d\nThe respondent father then requested a continuance to allow him to investigate S.K.\u2019s recent hospitalization so that he could make an offer of proof, and the court denied his request. Throughout the discussion of this issue, counsel for the respondent mother expressed no position or argument. Neither of the respondents presented further evidence.\nAt the close of the adjudicatory hearing, the trial court found that the State had proved by a preponderance of the evidence that both of the respondents had neglected S.K. when they withheld from him the requisite medical care to battle his cystic fibrosis and when they created for him an injurious environment. The court indicated that in coming to this conclusion it had relied on the testimony of Dr. Glick, whom the court found to be a credible witness, and on S.K.\u2019s medical records. According to the court, the worsening of S.K\u2019s cystic fibrosis condition was the direct result of his parents \u201csub-optimal, inconsistent approach\u201d to his medical care. The court further declined to make a finding of abuse, which would have been predicated upon subjecting the child to a substantial risk of injury, because there were \u201cmany things that [the parents] did right,\u201d including, inter alia, \u201csticking with\u201d the UC hospitals, seeking a prescription for Cipro, and getting S.K. hospitalized in July 2005.\nOn June 27, 2006, at the beginning of the dispositional hearing, the trial court noted that S.K. wished to address the court in chambers. The court and counsel participated in this in camera discussion, and afterward, the court summarized for everyone the concerns that S.K. had raised. According to the trial court, S.K. was frustrated by the length of time his case had taken without any real changes or progress on his parents\u2019 part. S.K. felt that he had been \u201cworking very hard *** to try to make things better and that [his parents were] not getting that.\u201d Additionally, the court noted that in camera everyone had agreed that \u201cfamily therapy should really [be] put in place, sooner rather than later; because there [were] a lot of family dynamic issues that need[ed] to be addressed, and [S.K.] need[ed] a place [where] he [could] talk to the parents about their behavior, in a setting that fe[lt] safe.\u201d\nThe State then called caseworker Matt Gerber, of Luther Social Services of Illinois, who testified that he was assigned to S.K.\u2019s case on June 7, 2006. Gerber assessed both of the respondents for services and recommended that the mother partake in a drug assessment, sign up for individual counseling, and \u201ckeep up with S.K\u2019s medical appointments.\u201d According to Gerber, the mother\u2019s substance abuse test showed that she did not need drug treatment. As far as counseling, Gerber testified that the mother had consistently been attending her weekly sessions. With regard to responsibility for S.K.\u2019s care, she had maintained regular contact with the caseworker and the agency, and participated in unsupervised weekly visits with her son, during which no unusual incident had been reported. However, the mother continued to miss S.K\u2019s medical appointments. According to Gerber, her overall rating was nevertheless satisfactory.\nIn assessing the respondent father, Gerber recommended that he sign up for individual therapy, a drug assessment and domestic violence screening, and that he regularly attend S.K.\u2019s medical appointments. Following these tests, Gerber determined that the father did not require any drug or alcohol treatment or domestic violence counseling. Gerber further testified that although the father regularly participated in his individual counseling sessions, he failed to attend some of S.K.\u2019s medical appointments.\nGerber further testified that S.K. was currently living with his maternal aunt. Gerber had visited the aunt\u2019s home and found it to be safe and appropriate. According to Gerber, the aunt was meeting all of S.K.\u2019s special medical needs, including attending all of S.K\u2019s doctors\u2019 appointments consistently and making sure that S.K. took his medication and received his chest treatment on a daily basis.\nGerber also stated that he had reviewed reports from S.K\u2019s doctors which showed that the minor was experiencing \u201cnormal flareups.\u201d These reports also showed that S.K. was gaining and maintaining weight satisfactorily and receiving his medication and treatment as required. According to Gerber, based on all this information, the agency\u2019s recommendation was that a legal guardian be appointed for S.K, with an ultimate goal of returning him home.\nIn closing argument, the State requested that S.K. be adjudged a ward of the court and that DCFS be appointed his legal guardian. The guardian ad litem also asked that the permanency goal be set at \u201creturn home.\u201d Counsel for the respondent father asked for a finding that the respondent father was unable to care for S.K., as he was overwhelmed with his own problems, including financially supporting the family. Counsel for the respondent mother expressed agreement with the recommendations of the State.\nAt the end of the dispositional hearing, the trial court adjudicated S.K. a ward of the court and found that both of the respondents were unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline S.K. The trial court found that reasonable efforts for family preservation had been made but were unsuccessful and appointed DCFS as S.K\u2019s guardian.\nWith the agreement of all the parties, the court entered a permanency order setting the permanency goal for S.K. as \u201creturn home within 12 months.\u201d This goal was set because the court found that the \u201c[pjarents [were] visiting [S.K.] regularly and [were] in services,\u201d even though the \u201c[m]other [was] not consistent with therapy [and] [n]either parent regularly participate[ed] in medical visits.\u201d The trial court also found that the respondent mother had made \u201csome progress,\u201d while the respondent father had made \u201csubstantial progress\u201d toward S.K.\u2019s return home. Respondents now appeal.\nII. ANALYSIS\n1. Trial Court\u2019s Finding of Medical Neglect\nA. Adjudicatory Hearing\nThe respondent mother first argues that the evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing did not support the conclusion that S.K. was medically neglected. She specifically asserts (1) that S.K. complied with his medication requirements; (2) that the hospital records did not show that S.K. needed to abide by a special diet at home; (3) that there was no documentation that a medical appointment was missed; (4) that prior to his hospitalization, S.K. was taken to the doctor and prescribed Cipro, and therefore the respondents did comply with his medical needs; and (5) that allegations of S.K.\u2019s weight loss were unfounded because Dr. Glick testified that weight evaluations on admission records and discharge summaries are \u201cerroneous\u201d and \u201cnotoriously incorrect.\u201d Both the State and the public guardian contend that there was ample evidence to support the trial court\u2019s findings. We agree.\nWhenever a petition for adjudication of wardship is brought under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the \u201c \u2018best interests of the child is the paramount consideration.\u2019 \u201d In re F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d 55, 62, 806 N.E.2d 1087, 1093 (2004), quoting In re K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d 728, 734-35, 682 N.E.2d 95, 99 (1997). Following the filing of a petition for wardship, the State must prove abuse or neglect by a preponderance of the evidence. 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(1), 2 \u2014 21 (West 2002); F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 62, 806 N.E.2d at 1093. \u201cPreponderance of the evidence is that amount of evidence that leads a trier of fact to find that the fact at issue is more probable than not.\u201d K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 682 N.E.2d at 99.\nThe trial court is afforded broad discretion when determining whether a child has been abused or neglected within the meaning of the Act, and this court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s findings unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 62-63, 806 N.E.2d at 1093. \u201cA trial court\u2019s finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if review of the record clearly demonstrates that the opposite result would be the proper one.\u201d K.G., 288 Ill. App. 3d at 735, 682 N.E.2d at 99. Because the trial court has the best opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the parties and witnesses, it is in the best position to determine the credibility and weight to be given to the witnesses\u2019 testimony. F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 63, 806 N.E.2d at 1093.\nNeglect is generally defined as the failure to exercise the care that circumstances justly demand and encompasses both willful and unintentional disregard of parental duty. In re Arthur H., 212 Ill. 2d 441, 463, 819 N.E.2d 734, 746 (2004). Pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3(l)(a) of the Act, a neglected minor includes \u201cany minor under 18 years of age who is not receiving the proper or necessary support, education as required by law, or medical or other remedial care recognized under State law as necessary for [his] well-being.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(1) (a) (West 2002). Illinois courts have held that a child who does not receive appropriate medical evaluations or care is neglected. See In re N., 309 Ill. App. 3d 996, 999-1000, 1007-08, 723 N.E.2d 678, 680, 685-86 (1999) (the trial court\u2019s finding of medical neglect for a premature infant was upheld where parents had not followed up on various medical evaluations, even though none of the appointments concerned life-threatening conditions, but were necessary for the infant\u2019s well-being and the infant\u2019s condition had the potential to create lifelong problems). However, because our courts have recognized that the concept of neglect has no fixed meaning, cases adjudicating neglect are sui generis and must be decided on the basis of their own particular facts. F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 63, 806 N.E.2d at 1093.\nIn the present case, the unrebutted testimony of Dr. Glick and the evidence contained in S.K.\u2019s medical records amply supports the trial court\u2019s conclusion that S.K. was neglected as a result of the respondents\u2019 failure to provide him with necessary medical care. The evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing showed that S.K. was diagnosed with cystic fibrosis shortly after birth and had been battling the disease for nearly 14 years. Dr. Glick\u2019s testimony established that proper care for a patient with this disease included a regimented schedule of daily medication, regular physical therapy, and a nutritious diet, including the intake of specific enzymes, which would decrease the likelihood of weight loss. Dr. Glick\u2019s testimony further established that despite the fact that S.K. had been admitted to UCH on numerous occasions and numerous efforts were made by UCH staff to educate the respondents about the disease, both of the parents consistently missed S.K\u2019s medical appointments, failed to comply with Dr. Lester\u2019s treatment suggestions, and neglected to utilize programs that would have provided them with subsidized nutritional supplements, including the necessary pancreatic enzyme. Dr. Glick also testified that as a result of the respondents\u2019 persistent noncompliance, S.K. consistently failed to gain necessary weight and upon admission to the hospital in July 2005 was found to be \u201cchronically malnourished.\u201d\nMoreover, Dr. Glick\u2019s conclusions are well supported by S.K.\u2019s medical records, which indicate that as early as 1996, S.K\u2019s treating physicians expressed concerns about S.K.\u2019s failing health due to inconsistent and inadequate medical care. Notes from August 8, 1996, indicate \u201cconcern re: home situation include *** noncompliance with medications, *** canceling counseling sessions.\u201d Similarly, records from August 20, 1996, establish that both of the respondents were educated about cystic fibrosis treatment and the importance of cystic fibrosis management.\nThe record dated September 29, 2003, reflects S.K.\u2019s visit to his doctor and several concerns by the doctor arising from that visit, including that S.K. \u201cis not getting his airway clearance on a regular basis, as the household is somewhat chaotic\u201d; that the respondent mother gave S.K. \u201ccough medicine *** with his recent illness, which is definitely not recommended in cystic fibrosis where the point should be to get him to expectorate the sputum\u201d; and that S.K. lost \u201cfive pounds in the last six months.\u201d This record also confirms that S.K. \u201chas not been able to get high calorie supplement ] *** because the family has not done the necessary paperwork to obtain these for free, which is offered to cystic fibrosis patients.\u201d\nFinally, the record from S.K\u2019s January 2005 hospital admission shows that S.K. was admitted for \u201cintravenous antibiotics\u201d because \u201cthere [was] questionable adherence to S.K\u2019s medication regimen as well [as] his family\u2019s compliance with the medication regimen.\u201d Records from S.K.\u2019s July 2005 hospitalization indicate that S.K. had a \u201c5 pound weight loss in the last three months,\u201d and that \u201c[t]he patient\u2019s social environment contributes dramatically to his poor health. *** There is rarely enough food in the house and, therefore, he is malnourished. He receives little supervision to guarantee that he gets his medications ***.\u201d\nWe also note that neither of the respondents presented any evidence in his or her respective case in chief to rebut the testimony of Dr. Glick and the extensive medical records introduced at trial. Accordingly, the circuit court properly relied upon the expert\u2019s medical testimony in reaching its conclusion that both of the respondents medically neglected S.K. See In re Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d 849, 890, 571 N.E.2d 905, 930 (1991) (\u201cThe circuit court cannot disregard expert medical testimony that is not countervailed by other competent medical testimony or medical evidence\u201d or \u201csecond-guess medical experts.\u201d \u201cIf the circuit court does not follow medical evidence that is not refuted by other medical evidence, the [court] is acting contrary to the evidence\u201d); F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 64, 806 N.E.2d at 1094 (the trial court has no authority to disregard undisputed medical testimony).\nThe respondent mother next contends that the petition for adjudication of wardship should be dismissed because under Illinois law she had no duty to follow the specific treatment plan recommended by UCH, but only to provide proper medical care for her child. The State contends that the respondent mother has waived this issue because she has failed to properly preserve it for review. We agree.\nWe first note that the respondent mother has waived this issue for purposes of appeal because she did not raise this issue at the trial level. See People v. Primm, 319 Ill. App. 3d 411, 423, 745 N.E.2d 13, 25 (2000); see also In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d 225, 242, 760 N.E.2d 85, 98 (2001) (\u201cWhere a party fails to make an appropriate objection in the court below, he or she has failed to preserve the question for review and the issue is waived\u201d). In the instant case, the issue of whether the respondent mother had a parental duty to obey the treatment plans and recommendations of S.K.\u2019s medical team was never raised at the trial level.\nWaiver aside, we find that the respondent mother cannot prevail with this contention because it has no bearing on the outcome of her case. Under section 2 \u2014 3(l)(a) of the Act, a neglected minor is \u201cany minor *** who is not receiving the proper or necessary *** medical *** care recognized under State law as necessary for his well-being.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 3(l)(a) (West 2002). The respondent mother argues that it would be unwise for us to presume that any medical care or treatment recommended by S.K.\u2019s physicians at UCH is per se correct because it would ultimately compromise the rights of patients. She further alleges that there are \u201csigns *** that [S.K.] received imperfect care\u201d at UCH because it was unclear whether UCH staff knew that S.K. had gained or lost weight, and cites to Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713, 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978), for the proposition that UCH treatment plans are unreliable.\nHowever, under the facts of this case, there is no need for us to deal with the respondent mother\u2019s attempt to determine whether Illinois law mandates total submission to the recommendations of treating physicians since at the adjudicatory hearing neither of the respondents introduced any evidence of alternative medical advice or recommendations. Moreover, neither of the respondents offered expert testimony refuting Dr. Glick\u2019s description of the general care and treatment offered to cystic fibrosis patients or indicating that the treatment plan recommended by UCH was inappropriate for S.K.\u2019s condition. Finally, the respondents did not testify that they disagreed with the health care providers at UCH or that they had sought a second opinion. Accordingly, the treatment provided and recommended for S.K. by UCH was the only relevant treatment plan and the only one that the trial court could properly consider. See In re Marcus H., 297 Ill. App. 3d 1089, 1096-97, 697 N.E.2d 862, 866-67 (1998), quoting Ashley K., 212 Ill. App. 3d at 890 (\u201c The circuit court *** cannot second-guess medical experts. If the circuit court does not follow [expert] medical evidence that is not refuted by other medical evidence, the circuit court is acting contrary to the evidence\u2019 \u201d).\nMoreover we find that Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 718, cited by the respondent mother has absolutely no bearing on the case at bar. In Mink, a class of women sued UCH because without knowledge or consent, each woman received an experimental treatment at the hospital as part of her prenatal care, ultimately resulting in harm to her baby. In reversing the district court\u2019s motion to dismiss the plaintiffs battery action, that court noted that the administration of the drug to the patients was clearly intentional and part of a planned experiment conducted by defendants. Mink, 460 F. Supp. at 718. Unlike Mink, in the case at bar, there were no allegations presented at the adjudicatory hearing that the treatment initiated by UCH was inappropriate or harmful to S.K. Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence in this case that UCH staff performed any treatment on S.K. without the knowledge or consent of the respondents, much less that such a treatment was \u201cexperimental.\u201d\nB. Disposition Hearing\nThe respondent mother next contends that the evidence presented to the trial court did not support its findings that she was unable for some reason other than financial circumstances alone to care for, protect, train or discipline S.K., and that services aimed at family preservation were unsuccessful. The State contends that the respondent mother is precluded from attacking the trial court\u2019s finding at the disposition hearing. The State specifically argues that the respondent mother failed to specify in her the notice of appeal that she wished to appeal both the adjudicatory and the dispositional orders, and that therefore this court lacks jurisdiction to consider her claim. We disagree.\n\u201cThe purpose of the notice of appeal is to inform the prevailing party that the unsuccessful party has requested review of the judgment complained of and is seeking relief from it.\u201d F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 68, 806 N.E.2d at 1097. As such, Supreme Court Rule 303(b) states that a notice of appeal \u201cshall specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court.\u201d 155 Ill. 2d R. 303(b)(2). Because notices of appeal are generally to be construed liberally (Daniels v. Anderson, 162 Ill. 2d 47, 62, 642 N.E.2d 128, 135 (1994); Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 188-89, 579 N.E.2d 322, 326 (1991)), the failure to specify a particular order in a notice of appeal does not preclude our review of that order \u201cso long as the order that is specified directly relates back to the judgment or order from which review is sought\u201d (emphasis added) (Perry v. Minor, 319 Ill. App. 3d 703, 709, 745 N.E.2d 113, 118 (2001)). With regard to child abuse and neglect cases, we have held that an adjudication order cannot directly relate back to the disposition order because the adjudication order preceded the disposition order. F.S., 347 Ill. App. 3d at 69, 806 N.E.2d at 1098.\nIn the present case, the State argues that the notice of appeal filed by the respondent mother shows only that she is appealing from the trial court\u2019s finding of neglect made at the adjudication hearing. We disagree. The respondent mother\u2019s notice reads:\n\u201cAn appeal is taken from the order or judgment described below:\nJUDGMENT: *** Finding after an adjudicatory hearing of neglect.\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 5/23/06 & 6/27/06 Dispo.\u201d\nWhen read liberally, the handwritten marking \u201c6/27/06 Dispo.\u201d adequately indicates that the respondent mother wished to appeal both the adjudicatory order entered on May 23, 2006, and the dispositional hearing order entered on June 27, 2006. This is especially true, when the marking is read in context of a standardized notice of appeal form, such as the one used in this case, which requires the appellant to check off appropriate boxes, none of which explicitly indicates an \u201cappeal from a dispositional hearing.\u201d As we have jurisdiction to review the respondent mother\u2019s claim, we proceed to the merits.\nThe public guardian alternatively argues that the respondent mother is estopped from challenging the trial court\u2019s finding at the dispositional hearing because at that hearing, her counsel expressed agreement with the recommendations of the State that S.K. be made a ward of the court and that DCFS be appointed his legal guardian. We agree. A party is estopped from taking a position on appeal that is inconsistent with a position the party took in the trial court. See In re E.S., 324 Ill. App. 3d 661, 670, 756 N.E.2d 422, 429-30 (2001).\nWaiver aside, however, we would find that the respondent mother\u2019s challenge to the dispositional order is without merit. \u201cPursuant to section 2 \u2014 27 of the [Act], a minor may be adjudged a ward of the court and custody taken away from the parents where it is determined that the parents are either unfit or unable, for some reason other than financial circumstances alone, to care for, protect, train or discipline a minor or are unwilling to do so.\u201d In re April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 256, 760 N.E.2d at 110, citing 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 27(1) (West 2002). \u201cThe standard of proof in a trial court\u2019s section 2 \u2014 27 finding of unfitness that does not result in a complete termination of all parental rights is [the] preponderance of the evidence.\u201d April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 760 N.E.2d at 110. \u201cOn review, the trial court\u2019s determination will be reversed only if the findings of fact are against the manifest weight of the evidence or if the trial court committed an abuse of discretion by selecting an inappropriate dispositional order.\u201d In re T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d 1059, 1062, 574 N.E.2d 893, 896 (1991). A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence where a review of the record clearly demonstrates that the result opposite to that reached by the trial court was the proper result. T.B., 215 Ill. App. 3d at 1062, 574 N.E.2d at 896. Because the trial court is in a superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, a reviewing court will not overturn the trial court\u2019s findings merely because the reviewing court may have reached a different decision. April C., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 257, 760 N.E.2d at 110.\nIn the present case, there was ample evidence presented at the disposition hearing for the trial court to find that the respondent mother was unable to care for S.K. Although we agree that the record indicated that the respondent mother was cooperative in completing the services recommended by DCFS, by passing her drug test and attending her counseling sessions, the evidence nevertheless showed that she continued to miss S.K\u2019s scheduled medical appointments, an action that the trial court had relied on in finding her neglectful in the first place.\nMoreover, we agree with the guardian ad litem that the purpose of the dispositional hearing is for the court to determine whether it was in the best interest of S.K. to be made a ward of the court. In re Edward T, 343 Ill. App. 3d 778, 800, 799 N.E.2d 304, 321 (2003); see also In re J.J., 327 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77, 761 N.E.2d 1249, 1255 (2001) (child\u2019s best interests are superior to all other factors even if the parent is not found to be unfit). The evidence presented by the caseworker showed that S.K. was presently living with his maternal aunt, and that the aunt\u2019s home was safe and appropriate. The caseworker also testified that the aunt\u2019s home met all of S.K\u2019s special medical needs, including regularly attending doctor\u2019s appointments, and receiving medication and physical therapy on a daily basis. Because the court was not limited only to considering the respondent\u2019s compliance with DCFS service plans (Edward T, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 800, 799 N.E.2d at 321), we find that it properly ruled that it was in the best interest of S.K. to be placed in the guardianship of DCFS and remain with his foster aunt.\n2. Evidence of S.K.\u2019s Hospitalization While in Foster Care\nBoth of the respondents next argue that the trial court improperly barred the introduction of evidence of care given to S.K. after he was removed from their home and while living in foster care. Although only the respondent father moved for the introduction of such evidence at the adjudicatory hearing, on appeal, the respondent mother argues that this evidence should have been admitted by the trial court as to her case \u201csua sponte,\u201d because its admission would have protected her constitutional rights and afforded her an opportunity to demonstrate that her care of S.K. was lawful and adequate. The respondent father similarly argues that he was substantially prejudiced by the court\u2019s refusal to admit this evidence at the adjudicatory hearing because it would have established that cystic fibrosis manifests the need for emergency intervention independent of and not related to the quality or consistency of care administered by the respondents, and could occur even in circumstances which the court considered to be \u201coptimal care.\u201d\nAs to the respondent father, we first note that he has waived this issue for purposes of appeal because he has failed to present an offer of proof. Generally, a party who fails to make an offer of proof as to evidence it intended to introduce at trial and which was excluded waives any challenge with respect to that evidence. In re Jaron Z., 348 Ill. App. 3d 239, 258, 810 N.E.2d 108, 124 (2004). In the present case, the record shows that the respondent father attempted to introduce into evidence a portion of Dr. Glick\u2019s testimony indicating that S.K. was hospitalized while he was in the custody of his foster parents, and asked for a chance to brief this issue. He also asked to introduce testimony as to what kind of care S.K. was receiving while in the custody of the foster parents. The trial court denied this request and instructed the respondent father to use a five-minute recess to decide whether he wanted to add anything to his request for purposes of an offer of proof so that the record on this issue was preserved. After that recess the following colloquy occurred:\n\u201cTHE COURT: ***[I]s there anything else relative to your offer of proof that you want to say relative to your request to put in evidence as to [S.K.\u2019s] recent hospitalization. Anything further you want to say in reference to that?\nMR. NAGELBERG: I can\u2019t make an offer of proof because I would need to investigate more further [sic] some of the facts behind the hospitalization.\u201d\nAlthough the respondent father subsequently made no offer of proof, he nevertheless contends that he should have been given more time to investigate S.K.\u2019s hospitalization in order to make an offer of proof, as this would have established the materiality of this evidence and allowed him to proceed with it at the adjudicatory hearing. The guardian ad litem contends that the circuit court did not err in denying the respondent father\u2019s request for a continuance. We agree.\nOur courts have long recognized that there is no absolute right to a continuance. In re D.P, 327 Ill. App. 3d 153, 158, 763 N.E.2d 351, 355 (2001). Because Illinois recognizes that \u201cserious delay in the adjudication of abuse, neglect, or dependancy cases can cause grave harm to the minor\u201d (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14 (West 2002)), \u201c[i]t is within the juvenile court\u2019s discretion whether to grant or deny a continuance motion and the court\u2019s decision will not be disturbed absent manifest abuse or palpable injustice.\u201d In re K.O., 336 Ill. App. 3d 98, 104, 782 N.E.2d 835, 841 (2002). \u201cThe denial of a request for continuance is not a ground for reversal unless the complaining party has been prejudiced by such denial.\u201d K.O., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 782 N.E.2d at 841.\nUnder section 2 \u2014 1007 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure \u201c[o]n good cause shown, in the discretion of the court and on just terms, additional time may be granted for the doing of any act or the taking of any step or proceeding prior to judgment.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1007 (West 2000). Continuances in juvenile cases may be granted upon \u201cwritten motion of a party filed no later than 10 days prior to hearing, or upon the court\u2019s own motion and only for good cause shown.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14(c) (West 2000). \u201cThe term, \u2018good cause\u2019 as applied in the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 [citation], is strictly construed and must be in accordance with Supreme Court Rules 231(a) through (f).\u201d K.O., 336 Ill. App. 3d at 104, 782 N.E.2d at 841; 705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14(c) (West 2000); 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 231(a) through (f). As a result, the court may continue the hearing \u201conly if the continuance is consistent with the health, safety and best interests of the minor.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/2\u2014 14(c) (West 2002).\nIn the instant case, the respondent father moved for a continuance in the middle of the adjudication hearing, not 10 days in advance as required by statute (705 ILCS 405/2 \u2014 14(c) (West 2002)), even though he became aware of S.K.\u2019s hospitalization a day before the adjudicatory hearing. Moreover, the respondent father failed to show good cause for not requesting the continuance earlier. The record shows that the petition for adjudication was filed on August 5, 2005. The adjudicatory hearing began on April 7, 2006, with the introduction of medical records and resumed on April 27, 2006, for the testimony of Dr. Glick. The hearing was then continued again, to May 1, 2006, for the respondents\u2019 case in chief. On that date, the respondent father first stated that he had recently discovered that S.K. was hospitalized and that he wanted to put into evidence testimony about the medical care S.K. was receiving in the home of his maternal aunt. When the court invited the respondent father to make an offer of proof, he indicated that he could not make one, as he had learned about the hospitalization one day before Dr. Glick\u2019s testimony, on April 26, 2006, and needed more time to investigate. As such, the respondent father had six days from the time he discovered S.K. was hospitalized and the time the adjudicatory hearing resumed on May 1, 2006, to offer an affidavit requesting a continuance and establishing good cause to warrant it. However, the respondent father offered no such affidavit and failed even to investigate the simple fact of when exactly S.K. had been hospitalized.\nHowever, even if we would not find waiver by reason of his failure to submit an offer of proof, no prejudice would have resulted to the respondent father in barring his introduction of S.K\u2019s hospitalization during foster care, since that fact was, at best, remotely relevant and could not have changed the outcome of the adjudicatory hearing. The purpose of the adjudicatory hearing is \u201cto determine whether the allegations of a petition *** that a minor *** is *** neglected *** are supported by a preponderance of the evidence.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 3(1) (West 2002). Under the Act, the rules of evidence in the nature of civil proceedings are applicable to the adjudicatory hearing. 705 ILCS 405/ 2 \u2014 18(1) (West 2002). \u201cWhether evidence is admissible is within the discretion of the circuit court, and its ruling will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion.\u201d In re Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d 797, 803, 847 N.E.2d 544, 550 (2006). \u201cAll evidence must be relevant to be admissible.\u201d Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 803, 847 N.E.2d at 550. \u201cEvidence is relevant if it tends to prove a fact in controversy or render a matter in issue more or less probable.\u201d Kenneth D., 364 Ill. App. 3d at 803, 847 N.E.2d at 550.\nIn the present case, the record is sufficient to show how evidence of S.K\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization would not have been material to the issue of the respondents\u2019 medical neglect. We agree with the trial court\u2019s determination that the petition for adjudication of wardship was not filed because S.K. was hospitalized but rather because of concerns that S.K. was not receiving adequate care at home prior to his hospitalization in July 2005. This petition specifically alleged that S.K. suffered from long-standing medical neglect and chronic malnourishment because the respondents had a long history of marginal medical compliance in his home care. Based on that, there was no reason to delay the proceedings in order to brief this issue. As already noted, the granting of continuances is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and in exercising that discretion, the trial court should take into account that our supreme court has recognized that keeping a minor\u2019s status in limbo for an extended period of time is not in the best interest of the child. In re D.L., 191 Ill. 2d 1, 13, 727 N.E.2d 990, 996 (2000). As S.K. was 15\u00bd years old at the time of the adjudicatory hearing, and had been taken into protective custody eight months earlier, in August 2005, the circuit court properly recognized the importance of avoiding undue delay and concluded that it was not in the minor\u2019s best interest to grant the respondent father\u2019s request to brief the issue of S.K\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization. Based on the foregoing, the respondent father has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion resulting from the trial court\u2019s refusal to admit this evidence.\nHowever, even if we were to find that the court abused its discretion by refusing to admit at trial evidence of the minor\u2019s hospitalization while in the custody of his foster parents, we would find no reversible error as the respondent father was not prejudiced by this denial. As discussed above, the unrebutted evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing overwhelmingly supported the trial court\u2019s finding of medical neglect. Moreover, the record below clearly establishes that evidence of S.K.\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization already came into evidence through the testimony of Dr. Glick. As such, we do not see how further evidence regarding S.K.\u2019s hospitalization could have affected the outcome of the adjudicatory hearing.\nAs to the respondent mother\u2019s claim that the court should have sua sponte admitted the evidence of S.K\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization, both the State and the guardian ad litem contend that she has waived this issue by failing to properly preserve it for appellate review. We agree. As noted, the record below indicates that the respondent mother never proffered any evidence of S.K.\u2019s post-foster-care hospitalization, nor argued or rendered any opinion whatsoever with regard to this matter at the adjudicatory hearing. As such she has waived the issue for purposes of this appeal.\nHowever, waiver aside, even if the court had been obligated to admit this evidence sua sponte, for the reasons already discussed with regard to the respondent father\u2019s claim, we find no reversible error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nFITZGERALD SMITH, P.J., and McNULTY, J., concur.\nDr. Glick was not qualified as an expert in cystic fibrosis.\nThe discharge summary for S.K\u2019s hospitalization in January 2005, part of People\u2019s Exhibit No. 1, states that S.K.\u2019s weight on admission was 43.7 kg. The discharge summary of S.K.\u2019s hospitalization in July 2005, states that upon admission to the hospital in July 2005, S.K\u2019s weight was 46 kg. Both discharge summaries were written by residents.\nThe transcript incorrectly states that the history reads \u201csignificant 45 [lb.] weight loss.\u201d\nBeyond the portion published by the guardian ad litem, the note additionally stated that S.K. felt that his home was \u201cunlivable,\u201d and that these concerns had started to escalate the previous summer. The note further stated that S.K. had recently graduated from eighth grade, but did not look forward to high school, because he had very few friendships and had no one to turn to for support. S.K. stated that his grades had diminished greatly in the previous year because his attendance record was \u201cso bad.\u201d S.K. further stated that he felt overwhelmed with decisions that he felt too young to be making. S.K. also reported that his mother was discouraging him from divulging too much about his family life. The note also pointed out that throughout the interview, S.K. never smiled or laughed, and that he had a \u201cflat affect and at times appear [ed] angry.\u201d\nCounsel for the respondent father.\nAccording to DCFS, S.K. would continue to reside in foster care with his maternal aunt.\nDr. Glick also testified that upon admission to the hospital, S.K. experienced a significant weight gain.\nCounsel for respondent father.\ntestimony by the caseworker at the disposition hearing established that S.K. was hospitalized on April 18, 2006, and successfully discharged at some unspecified date.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE JOSEPH GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Edwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Kathy K.", "Sheldon B. Nagelberg, of St. Charles, for appellant Stephen K, Sr.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People.", "Robert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and Jean M. Agathen, of counsel), guardian ad litem." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re STEPHEN K., a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois Petitioner-Appellee, v. Kathy K., Mother of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant). \u2014 In re STEPHEN K, a Minor, Respondent-Appellee (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Stephen K., Sr., Father of Stephen K., Respondent-Appellant).\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNos. 1-06-2135, 1-06-2061 cons.\nOpinion filed April 13, 2007.\nRehearing denied April 10, 2007.\nEdwin A. Burnette, Public Defender, of Chicago, for appellant Kathy K.\nSheldon B. Nagelberg, of St. Charles, for appellant Stephen K, Sr.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago, for the People.\nRobert F. Harris, Public Guardian, of Chicago (Kass A. Plain and Jean M. Agathen, of counsel), guardian ad litem." }, "file_name": "0007-01", "first_page_order": 25, "last_page_order": 48 }