{ "id": 4270242, "name": "REINHARD R. GELLERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JILL A. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Gellert v. Jackson", "decision_date": "2007-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 2-06-0514", "first_page": "149", "last_page": "152", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 149" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 75", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875634 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83", "parenthetical": "stating the doctrine for statutes" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0075-01" ] }, { "cite": "306 Ill. App. 3d 853", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1336032 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" }, { "page": "860" }, { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/306/0853-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 298", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3582044 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "301" }, { "page": "301" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0298-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 628", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2922728 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "631" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0628-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256247 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "377" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 476, "char_count": 8842, "ocr_confidence": 0.749, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.061447019797991e-08, "percentile": 0.3186382680998004 }, "sha256": "f1877fa14738cd227b05507f526e5740c299c12e77804ff6284397e4c1e5b070", "simhash": "1:48edbe6efb70f2ef", "word_count": 1514 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:18.400209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "REINHARD R. GELLERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JILL A. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court: Plaintiff, Reinhard R. Gellert, appeals from the entry of judgment on an arbitration decision that rejected the claims in his suit and from the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to vacate that judgment. The court entered judgment on the arbitration decision because it found that plaintiff filed his rejection of it too late. Plaintiff contends that his rejection of the arbitration decision was timely because the office of the circuit court clerk was closed at 4:40 p.m. on March 13, 2006, when he tried to file the rejection, even though a local rule required the office to be open until 5 p.m. We agree that the local rule required the office to be open to 5 p.m. We further agree that plaintiffs being at the office to file the rejection at 4:40 p.m. that day would be a basis on which the trial court should vacate the judgment. We therefore vacate the trial court\u2019s denial of the motion to vacate, and we remand the matter for the court to reconsider the motion.\nPlaintiff sued defendant, Jill A. Jackson, for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He asked for damages of $16,000. Therefore, under Supreme Court Rules 86(b) and (c) (155 Ill. 2d Rs. 86(b), (c)) and 19th Judicial Circuit Court Rule 17.01(c) (19th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 17.01(c) (eff. March 1, 2002)), this was a mandatory arbitration case. On February 10, 2006, the arbitrators found for defendant. On Tuesday, March 14, 2006, plaintiff filed a notice of rejection. Supreme Court Rule 93 (166 Ill. 2d R. 93) gives a party 30 days to reject a decision; the thirtieth day here fell on Sunday, March 12. Therefore, plaintiff filed his rejection a day late. On March 15, 2006, the court held a hearing to consider entry of judgment on the arbitration decision. At the hearing, plaintiff explained that he was running close to the deadline because he had been trying to fax a copy of the rejection to defendant\u2019s lawyer. His representations suggest that he believed that he needed proof of defendant\u2019s receipt of the rejection notice before he could file the notice with the clerk. The court entered judgment on the arbitration decision; it ruled that the rejection was untimely.\nPlaintiff filed a timely motion to vacate the judgment. In it, he asserted that he had arrived at the entrance to the McHenry county courthouse at exactly 4:40 p.m. on March 13, 2006, but that security personnel told him that the courthouse closed at 4:30 p.m. He further asserted that he was there to file three \u201cmotions,\u201d one of which was the rejection. Finally, plaintiff noted that Rule 1.11(c) of the 19th Circuit states:\n\u201cThe Office of Clerk of the Circuit Court will be open for business from 8:30 A.M. until 5:00 EM., except Saturday, Sunday and holidays as prescribed annually by Administrative Order. Upon request of the Clerk of the Circuit Court, and upon approval by the Chief Judge, hours may be expanded.\u201d 19th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 1.11(c) (eff. January 2, 1997).\nAttached to the motion was an affidavit in which plaintiff averred that he had arrived at the court at 4:40 p.m. to file \u201cthree motions\u201d and that the clerk\u2019s office was closed.\nDefendant responded, asserting that plaintiff had failed to allege that he tried to file the rejection on the 13th; however, a careful reading of the motion rebuts that assertion. Defendant also asserted that the government center is closed every business day at 4:30 p.m. by order of the sheriff and the court. She did not explain what these orders were or how they superceded the rules.\nThe court heard argument from the parties on the motion. Its questions to plaintiff focused on why he was trying to file at the last minute. It denied the motion, making no findings of fact concerning the truth of the motion\u2019s allegations. On appeal, plaintiff asserts that, because the rules obligated the clerk to have the office open when plaintiff tried to file his rejection, the court should have deemed the rejection timely and vacated the judgment in favor of defendant. Defendant has not filed an appellate brief, but this appeal is amenable to decision on the merits under the principles of First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).\nWe review for an abuse of discretion a court\u2019s decision on a motion to vacate a judgment. Mann v. Upjohn Co., 324 Ill. App. 3d 367, 377 (2001). Here, if one accepts as true that plaintiff tried to file the rejection at 4:40 p.m. on March 13, 2006, the judgment was a direct consequence of the clerk\u2019s office being closed when Rule 1.11(c) required it to he open. As we explain, that would be a basis on which the trial court should have vacated the judgment. It should have denied plaintiffs motion only if it rejected his factual allegations.\nA trial court has the power under Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183) to extend the time for filing a rejection of an arbitration decision for good cause, even after the filing deadline is past. Ianotti v. Chicago Park District, 250 Ill. App. 3d 628, 631 (1993). Thus, we see no insurmountable barrier, such as a lack of jurisdiction, to a court\u2019s allowing a case to proceed despite a technically untimely rejection of an arbitration decision.\nWe find in the case law no precise parallel to the circumstances here. However, such precedent as exists suggests that, where the untimeliness of a filing is attributable to the clerk, a court should deem the filing timely. Azim v. Department of Central Management Services, 164 Ill. App. 3d 298 (1987), and Westinghouse Airbrake Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 306 Ill. App. 3d 853, 860 (1999), are the cases most directly on point. In Azim, a Third District panel held that an administrative review summons should be deemed timely when the clerk issued the summons late because the plaintiffs relied on incorrect information from a clerk\u2019s employee regarding procedures for issuance. Azim, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 301. The clerk\u2019s employee had mistakenly told the plaintiffs that the clerk would issue the summons even though the plaintiffs had failed to send a required fee. Azim, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 301. In Westinghouse Airbrake, the Industrial Commission Division, following Azim, held that an administrative review of plaintiffs request for summons was timely, even though the clerk had given it a file stamp that showed it to be late. Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 860. The plaintiff had given the request for summons to the clerk before the deadline, but the clerk had not properly stamped it. Westinghouse Airbrake Co., 306 Ill. App. 3d at 860. In each case, the clerk\u2019s office was the cause of a party\u2019s untimely action, and in each case, the reviewing court held that the action in question should be deemed timely.\nThe closure of the clerk\u2019s office earlier than Rule 1.11(c) permitted would make the untimeliness here attributable to the clerk. Rule 1.11(c) states that the \u201cOffice of Clerk of the Circuit Court will be open for business from 8:30 A.M. until 5:00 EM., except Saturday, Sunday and holidays as prescribed annually by Administrative Order.\u201d 19th Judicial Cir. Ct. R. 11.1(c) (eff. January 2, 1997). Thus, when a party arrives with a filing on a business day before 5 p.m., the clerk\u2019s office ought to be open to accept his or her filing. That the early clos\u2018-ing may have been widely known in the community, and indeed, may have been known to plaintiff, does not change the result. We can see no possible justice in penalizing a party when it is the court that has failed to follow its own rule.\nIf the trial court accepts the allegations in plaintiffs motion to vacate, it must grant the motion. We therefore vacate the denial of the motion to vacate, and we remand the matter for further proceedings on the motion. In those proceedings, the court should limit itself to deciding the truth of plaintiff\u2019s assertions in the motion. If it finds that, before 5 p.m. on the rejection\u2019s due date, plaintiff was at the building containing the clerk\u2019s office, with the rejection fully ready for filing, but the office was closed, it should grant plaintiffs motion to vacate.\nVacated and remanded with directions.\nMcLAREN and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ, concur.\nUnder the rule, only holidays, not hours, can be set by administrative order. Under the last antecedent doctrine, qualifying words or phrases in a statute or similar provision modify only the immediately preceding words or phrases, and not those that are more remote. See Bowman v. American River Transportation Co., 217 Ill. 2d 75, 83 (2005) (stating the doctrine for statutes).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Reinhard R. Gellert, of Zion, appellant pro se.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "REINHARD R. GELLERT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JILL A. JACKSON, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-06-0514\nOpinion filed May 4, 2007.\nReinhard R. Gellert, of Zion, appellant pro se.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0149-01", "first_page_order": 167, "last_page_order": 170 }