{ "id": 4269770, "name": "In re DOROTHY J.N., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, PetitionerAppellee, v. Dorothy J.N., Respondent-Appellant)", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Dorothy J.N.", "decision_date": "2007-05-11", "docket_number": "No. 4-06-0780", "first_page": "332", "last_page": "342", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 332" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "769 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1076" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1090", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472381 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1095" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1090-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "797 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1076" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719384 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "792 N.E.2d 350", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "353" }, { "page": "355" }, { "page": "355" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "339 Ill. App. 3d 778", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2469777 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "781" }, { "page": "783" }, { "page": "783-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/339/0778-01" ] }, { "cite": "838 N.E.2d 226", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "231" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "232-33" }, { "page": "233" }, { "page": "232" }, { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "361 Ill. App. 3d 774", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4259728 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "779" }, { "page": "779" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780" }, { "page": "780-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/361/0774-01" ] }, { "cite": "855 N.E.2d 588", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "590" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 786", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265052 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0786-01" ] }, { "cite": "840 N.E.2d 1194", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1200" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 270", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3874716 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0270-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "797 N.E.2d 1071", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3719384 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "507 N.E.2d 89", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. App. 3d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3647077 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "324" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/154/0320-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 47", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "52", "parenthetical": "petition and treatment plan indicated written notice given was sufficient compliance" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 956", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599252 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "964", "parenthetical": "petition and treatment plan indicated written notice given was sufficient compliance" } ], "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0956-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 947", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "947" } ], "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 604", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 2 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 964, "char_count": 25533, "ocr_confidence": 0.724, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.1297561765143634e-07, "percentile": 0.7656407767402655 }, "sha256": "6a511244220b75dfd467e3f733844d2c730e68e317ae6aef481f7a60a6cb8130", "simhash": "1:c82a1bffb2dc9d64", "word_count": 4029 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:18.400209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re DOROTHY J.N., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dorothy J.N., Respondent-Appellant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nOn September 8, 2006, the trial court entered an order, authorizing the involuntary treatment of respondent, Dorothy J.N. Respondent appeals, arguing (1) the court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence and (2) the court\u2019s order failed to comply with the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (Mental Health Code) (405 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 through 6 \u2014 107 (West 2004)) because it forced the administration of a nonpsychotropic medication. We reverse.\nOn August 23, 2006, a petition was filed for the authorized involuntary treatment of respondent, alleging she was mentally ill, refused to submit to treatment by psychotropic medication, and lacked the capacity to give informed consent. An order from the trial court was sought, authorizing the involuntary treatment of respondent in the form of psychotropic medication. Prolixin was requested as the first choice of medication to be administered to respondent, with alternative medications being Zyprexa and Celexa. The petition also sought to have Metoprolol, a blood-pressure medication, administered to respondent.\nOn September 8, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on the petition. The State presented the testimony of Dr. Fareed Tabatabai, a psychiatrist. Dr. Tabatabai testified he treated respondent for schizo-affective disorder, a serious mental illness. He stated respondent received treatment for her mental illness for several years, dating back to the 1960s, and had been admitted to mental-health facilities in the past. Respondent was stable for several years while on medication; however, she stopped taking her medication, resulting in her most recent hospitalization.\nDr. Tabatabai stated respondent\u2019s symptoms included delusions that caused her not to eat or drink for several weeks, the refusal to take medication, and a general deterioration in her functioning. More specifically, respondent stated John Kennedy told her not to eat or take her medication. Dr. Tabatabai opined respondent\u2019s mental illness and symptoms were continuing and if her symptoms were not stabilized she would develop medical complications, including malnutrition, hypertension, and risk of stroke.\nDr. Tabatabai recommended respondent resume taking the medications she took previously, which included Prolixin Decanoate, Celexa, and Zyprexa. He believed those medications would alleviate her symptoms within a few weeks and would be a benefit. If respondent did not take them, she risked prolonged psychosis and eventual physical deterioration to the point that she would have to be tube fed. Dr. Tabatabai testified that side effects of the medications included sedation, dizziness, and extrapyramidal symptoms. Further, he stated he verbally made respondent aware of the possible side effects of the medications but did not provide her with any written information.\nDr. Tabatabai opined that, given respondent\u2019s past medical history and her current condition, the potential benefits of the medications outweighed any potential harm. Based on her psychiatric illness and her symptoms, he did not believe respondent had the capacity to make a reasoned decision about whether to take the medications. Additionally, Dr. Tabatabai testified that respondent really had no other treatment options other than psychotropic medication and, thus, no less-restrictive form of treatment was available.\nOn cross-examination, Dr. Tabatabai acknowledged respondent was a voluntary patient in a mental-health facility but was refusing treatment. However, on one or two occasions, she did take a dose of Zyprexa and the previous night she agreed to receive a Prolixin De-canoate shot. Dr. Tabatabai testified that the medications respondent agreed to take counted as treatment, but treatment was extremely sporadic. Further, he stated respondent\u2019s capacity to give informed consent fluctuated over time. Finally, Dr. Tabatabai testified that Metoprolol, one of the medications listed in the petition, was not a psychotropic medication.\nFollowing Dr. Tabatabai\u2019s testimony, respondent moved for a directed finding, arguing the State failed to prove she lacked capacity and the trial court did not have jurisdiction to order involuntary treatment with a nonpsychotropic medication. The court denied the motion. Respondent then additionally argued that a violation of section 2 \u2014 102 of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102 (West 2004)) occurred because she was not informed in writing about the medications. The State acknowledged that written information was not given to respondent but asserted Dr. Tabatabai or the mental-health facility\u2019s staff could provide her with it \u201cwithin the next few minutes.\u201d The court then directed staff to provide respondent with written information on the medications. The record is silent as to whether respondent ever received any information in writing.\nNext, respondent testified on her own behalf. She stated she did not want to take medicine because \u201cJohn\u201d did not want her to and because it made her feel bad. Upon inquiry by the State, respondent indicated that the John Kennedy she was referring to was \u201cJohn-John.\u201d Following respondent\u2019s testimony, the trial court authorized involuntary treatment to be administered to her as requested in the petition.\nThis appeal followed.\nInitially, we note, this appeal is moot because the trial court\u2019s order was effective for only 90 days and that time period has expired. However, review is appropriate under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine, and we will consider the merits of respondent\u2019s appeal. In re Elizabeth McN., 367 Ill. App. 3d 786, 789, 855 N.E.2d 588, 590 (2006). In applying the public-interest exception, we are given the opportunity to provide guidance and suggestions with respect to the implementation of section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004)).\nOn appeal, respondent contends the trial court\u2019s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Specifically, she argues the State failed to show, by clear and convincing evidence, that she lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding medication because she was not informed in writing about the risks and benefits of the proposed medications.\nGenerally, a trial court\u2019s order permitting the involuntary administration of psychotropic medication will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d 774, 779, 838 N.E.2d 226, 231 (2005). \u201cA judgment will be considered against the manifest weight of the evidence \u2018only when an opposite conclusion is apparent or when the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.\u2019 \u201d Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 779, 838 N.E.2d at 231, quoting In re John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d 778, 781, 792 N.E.2d 350, 353 (2003).\nPursuant to the Mental Health Code, authorized involuntary treatment may be administered to an individual where the State proves the following by clear and convincing evidence:\n\u201c(A) That the recipient has a serious mental illness or developmental disability.\n(B) That because of said mental illness or developmental disability, the recipient currently exhibits any one of the following: (i) deterioration of his or her ability to function, as compared to the recipient\u2019s ability to function prior to the current onset of symptoms of the mental illness or disability for which treatment is presently sought, (ii) suffering, or (iii) threatening behavior.\n(C) That the illness or disability has existed for a period marked by the continuing presence of the symptoms set forth in item (B) of this subdivision (4) or the repeated episodic occurrence of these symptoms.\n(D) That the benefits of the treatment outweigh the harm.\n(E) That the recipient lacks the capacity to make a reasoned decision about the treatment.\n(F) That other less[-]restrictive services have been explored and found inappropriate.\n(G) If the petition seeks authorization for testing and other procedures, that such testing and procedures are essential for the safe and effective administration of the treatment.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 107.1(a \u2014 5)(4)(A) through (a \u2014 5)(4)(G) (West 2004).\nSection 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) of the Mental Health Code (405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 102(a \u2014 5) (West 2004)) further provides as follows:\n\u201cIf the services include the administration of authorized involuntary treatment, the physician or the physician\u2019s designee shall advise the recipient, in writing, of the side effects, risks, and benefits of the treatment, as well as alternatives to the proposed treatment, to the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient\u2019s ability to understand the information communicated.\u201d\nIn Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 780, 838 N.E.2d at 232, this court determined the State failed to present clear and convincing evidence warranting the authorized involuntary treatment of the respondent because no evidence showed he received the written notification required by section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145). In so holding, we relied on John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 783, 792 N.E.2d at 355, wherein the Fifth District held that a respondent is entitled to receive the written notification required by section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145), even where he or she chose not to take the proposed medication after being verbally advised of its benefits and side effects. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 780, 838 N.E.2d at 232-33. We noted verbal notification is insufficient to ensure a respondent\u2019s due-process rights. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 780, 838 N.E.2d at 233.\nAdditionally, we stated that \u201cthe right to written notification is not subject to a harmless-error analysis\u201d and that strict compliance with the procedural safeguards of the Mental Health Code is necessary to protect the liberty interests involved. Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 780, 838 N.E.2d at 232, citing John R., 339 Ill. App. 3d at 783-84, 792 N.E.2d at 355.\nHere, Dr. Tabatabai testified he verbally advised respondent of the proposed medications\u2019 side effects. He did not provide her with any written notification as required by section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145). Moreover, not only does section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) require written notification of the proposed treatment\u2019s side effects, it also requires written notification of risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed treatment. Dr. Ta-batabai\u2019s testimony fails to reflect that he informed respondent of anything other than the proposed medications\u2019 side effects.\nThe State contends that neither Louis S. nor John R. stands for the proposition that written notice may not be provided to the respondent at the time of the hearing. Although in this instance the State suggested respondent could be provided with written notification at the hearing and the trial court directed that to happen, the record fails to indicate any such action was ever taken.\nAdditionally, the State argues that section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145)\u2019s requirement that a respondent must be advised in writing concerning proposed treatment is excused when the treating physician believes the respondent lacks the capacity to understand and act upon the information. The State notes section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (405 ILCS 5/2\u2014 102(a \u2014 5) (West 2004)) states a physician or his designee \u201cshall advise the recipient, in writing, *** to the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient\u2019s ability to understand the information communicated.\u201d We find the State\u2019s argument unpersuasive and application of its asserted approach to section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) would fail to protect the important liberty interests involved.\nAs noted by the parties, in In re Steven P., 343 Ill. App. 3d 455, 460, 797 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (2003), this court utilized the State\u2019s same argument as a basis for holding that the respondent did not have to be advised in writing concerning the proposed involuntary treatment. However, the Illinois Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority and vacated that judgment and directed this court to enter a judgment reversing and vacating the trial court\u2019s order granting the petition for authorized involuntary treatment, and remanding for compliance with the statutory requirements of section 2 \u2014 102 (a \u2014 5). In re Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d 604, 801 N.E.2d 947 (2004) (nonprecedential supervisory order on denial of petition for leave to appeal).\nMoreover, with respect to this particular case, Dr. Tahatabai testified respondent\u2019s capacity to give informed consent fluctuated over time, and he acknowledged that she agreed to take the proposed medication on at least two or three occasions while hospitalized. His testimony, therefore, indicates respondent had the capacity to understand and act upon the information she received at various points in time. In Louis S., 361 Ill. App. 3d at 780-81, 838 N.E.2d at 233, citing In re Richard C., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1090, 1095, 769 N.E.2d 1071, 1076 (2002), we noted that written notification provides a respondent with the opportunity to review the information at a time and in a manner of his choosing. Providing respondent with written information would have allowed her the opportunity to review it at a time when she had the capacity to give informed consent.\nIn this case, respondent was not advised in writing of the side effects, risks, benefits, and alternatives to the proposed medications. The State failed to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that respondent lacked the capacity to make a reasoned decision, and the trial court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Given our holding, it is unnecessary to address respondent\u2019s remaining contentions.\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McCULLOUGH" }, { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN,\nspecially concurring:\nAlthough I agree with the majority, I write specially to suggest some changes regarding how involuntary-admission proceedings are handled. I do so because (1) we have seen an increase in the number of these cases on appeal (this court alone rendered 50 such decisions last year) and (2) the same issues tend to arise in case after case.\nI. THE NEED FOR A FLOWCHART AND ADDITIONAL TRAINING\nFirst, I suggest that additional training is necessary for everyone involved in these proceedings, including judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel. The Illinois State Bar Association, the State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor, the Guardianship and Advocacy Commission, or the State Appellate Defender (or some combination of these groups) should prepare a flowchart for involuntary-admission proceedings to which all involved could refer. The flowchart should emphasize precisely who should be doing what \u2014 and when \u2014 with regard to the respondents in these proceedings. The preparation of a judicial bench book would also be very helpful, and it should include such a flowchart.\nThe flowchart (and other professional training) should make clear to prosecutors what they need to elicit from the medical professionals whom they call to testify. Neither the trial court nor this court should he required to infer what these professional witnesses, when testifying in support of a State\u2019s involuntary-admission petition, know about the respondent or his background.\nFurther, defense counsel similarly should be aware of what the State needs to prove so that if the State fails to do so, a timely, specific objection can be made. All too often defense counsel fail to object at the hearing to the prosecutor\u2019s missteps, leaving this court to wrestle with issues of forfeiture, plain error, and defense counsel ineffectiveness.\nLast, of course, the trial court should also be alert to what the State must prove, and courts should rule against the State when it has failed to meet its burden of proof or to otherwise comply with the Code\u2019s requirements (assuming, of course, that defense counsel has pointed out any such noncompliance).\nII. A PROCEDURE FOR COMPLYING WITH SECTION 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) OF THE CODE\nSecond, I suggest that the physician or his designee who comes into contact with the respondent be prepared to meet the requirements of section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) of the Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004)) by having prepared, in advance, a written list of the side effects, risks, and benefits of any proposed treatment of the respondent, as well as any alternatives to the proposed treatment. Then, during the physician\u2019s examination of the respondent, the physician could present a copy of the list to the respondent, thereby complying with the statutory requirement that the respondent be advised, in writing, of that information \u201cto the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient\u2019s ability to understand the information communicated.\u201d 405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004). Of course, I suggest that the physician or the physician\u2019s designee further attempt to explain the list\u2019s contents. If these steps are followed, whether the respondent actually read the list would not be relevant to finding compliance with section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) of the Code.\nIII. THE SUPREME COURT\u2019S SUPERVISORY ORDER IN STEVEN P\nFinally, I agree with the majority\u2019s reference to the supreme court\u2019s supervisory order in Steven P, 207 Ill. 2d 604, 801 N.E.2d 947. Normally, supreme court supervisory orders are nonprecedential and affect only the case that is the subject of the order. See People v. Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d 270, 280, 840 N.E.2d 1194, 1200 (2005). However, the supervisory order the supreme court entered in Steven P. appears to be rather more than that. In its entirety, that order reads as follows:\n\u201cIn the exercise of this court\u2019s supervisory authority, and in light of the People\u2019s factual and legal concessions, the Appellate Court, Fourth District, is directed to vacate its judgment in People v. Steven P., 343 Ill. App. 3d 455[, 797 N.E.2d 1071], The appellate court is further directed to enter a judgment reversing and vacating the Champaign County circuit court order granting the People\u2019s petition for authorization of electroconvulsive therapy and involuntary administration of medication, and remanding for compliance with the statutory requirements of section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) of the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u2014 5) (West 2002)).\u201d Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d at 604, 801 N.E.2d at 947.\nIn my judgment, the above supervisory order sounds like a substantive determination by the supreme court that this court\u2019s earlier judgment in Steven E was wrong, especially given that this court was further directed to vacate the trial court\u2019s order that was before us on appeal.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN," }, { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. I would affirm because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in authorizing administration of involuntary treatment. The common-law record includes the signed petition for administration of authorized involuntary treatment and a treatment plan that states respondent had been delivered a written notice of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment.\n\u201cI have read and understood this [pjetition and affirm that the statements made by me are true to the best of my knowledge. I affirm that I advised the individual, in writing, of the risks and benefits of the proposed treatment.\u201d\nThat notice alone is sufficient compliance with section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004)). See In re Jill R., 336 Ill. App. 3d 956, 964, 785 N.E.2d 47, 52 (2003) (petition and treatment plan indicated written notice given was sufficient compliance).\nUnfortunately, in the case sub judice, the signature is illegible, but the individual\u2019s address is listed as Vine Street Clinic. Perhaps this affirmation was signed by Dr. Tabatabai, perhaps not. Regardless, the facts of this case show sufficient compliance with section 2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004)).\nThe majority and special concurrence not only disregard the written-notice affirmation but also the court-ordered written notice and the repeated oral notices; and they effectively emasculate the language in the Act that requires written notice only \u201cto the extent such advice is consistent with the recipient\u2019s ability to understand the information communicated\u201d (405 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 102(a\u20145) (West 2004)). Respondent clearly exhibited an inability to understand the information communicated.\nConcededly, the supreme court reversed this court on the written-notice requirement in Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d 604, 801 N.E.2d 947, in a terse supervisory order. However, this appellate court had based its decision on the respondent\u2019s forfeiture of the written-notice requirement. The record was silent on any written or oral attempts to notify the respondent of the medication\u2019s side effects. Moreover, the supervisory order specifically exercised its supervisory authority \u201cin light of the People\u2019s factual and legal concessions,\u201d to which this court is not privy. In re Steven P., 207 Ill. 2d at 604, 801 N.E.2d at 947. Moreover, supervisory orders are not precedential. \u201cAs the State pointed out, supervisory orders are unpublished, recite no facts, and provide no rationale upon which the principles of stare decisis may attach.\u201d People v. Jackson, 154 Ill. App. 3d 320, 324, 507 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1987).\nOur record is not so silent. Not only was the written notice affirmed, but Dr. Tabatabai also testified he and his staff had verbally notified respondent of the potential side effects on numerous occasions.\n\u201cQ. To your knowledge, have they been given to her in writing?\nA. No. I have given these to her verbally on numerous occasions during this stay.\u201d\n(Certainly, if the affirmation of written notice was actually signed by Dr. Tabatabai, he contradicted that affirmation here.) Dr. Tabatabai further indicated respondent had a general understanding of what was being discussed but respondent replied \u201cJohn-John\u201d (Kennedy, Jr.) did not want her to take the medication. (Respondent also interjected John Kennedy, Jr., had her power of attorney for health care and that he was still alive.)\nRespondent did indeed on occasion consent to take her medications. But Dr. Tabatabai also testified respondent\u2019s capacity fluctuates over time. However, both Dr. Tabatabai and respondent agree respondent lacked the capacity to give informed consent.\n\u201cQ. When you had a discussion of the possible side effects, did she show an understanding of what you were discussing?\nA. General understanding, yes.\nQ. Was she able to provide input concerning the medication?\nA. Simply that she prefers not to take any medicine because John doesn\u2019t want her to.\nQ. In your opinion, Doctor, does the patient have the capacity to make a reasoned decision regarding whether or not to take the medication?\nA. No.\u201d\nAnd, once again, respondent was advised about the risks and benefits of the medications by staff.\n\u201cQ. Did she have capacity yesterday when she gave you informed consent?\nA. She didn\u2019t give the informed consent. We have a standing order with the staff to approach her with medication, and if she agrees to take the medication with the understanding of the risks of and benefits, that she can take it.\nQ. And that has been a standing order ever since she\u2019s been here?\nA. Yes, correct.\nQ. So, it\u2019s up to her to make the decision whether to take the medications or not, correct?\nA. Correct.\nQ. And you\u2019ve allowed that to happen? That\u2019s been the status quo since she\u2019s been here?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nMoreover, the trial court here directed staff to give respondent written notice in open court. Perhaps the court should have duly noted on the record compliance with that directive, but the court based its opinion on its observations of respondent and her apparent absence of the capacity to make a reasoned decision, rendering that written notice superfluous.\nFurther, the majority\u2019s and special concurrence\u2019s strict compliance with written notice is not mandated by the statute or in Steven P. where, as here, the respondent exhibited an inability to understand the written information.\nFinally, I must comment on the majority\u2019s and special concurrence\u2019s unrealistic view of mental-health commitment proceedings. Having prosecuted mental-health commitment proceedings and presided over them for a period of 12 years, I find the criticism of all the public servants involved in these emotional proceedings unwarranted. The proceedings are conducted at the mental-health facilities under crowded, hurried conditions for the benefit of the patient. All involved are concerned with the best interests of a very fragile patient. The continued strict statutory construction \u2014 stricter than that required by statute in fact \u2014 is a detriment to both the patient and the medical and legal establishments.\nFor these reasons, I would affirm the trial court and commend all involved for their public service in the treatment of the mentally ill.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH," } ], "attorneys": [ "Barbara A. Goeben (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Alton, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.", "John P Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re DOROTHY J.N., a Person Found Subject to Involuntary Admission of Psychotropic Medication (The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Dorothy J.N., Respondent-Appellant).\nFourth District\nNo. 4-06-0780\nArgued April 18, 2007.\nOpinion filed May 11, 2007.\nSTEIGMANN, PJ., specially concurring.\nMYERSCOUGH, J., dissenting.\nBarbara A. Goeben (argued), of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Alton, and Veronique Baker, of Guardianship & Advocacy Commission, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJohn P Schmidt, State\u2019s Attorney, of Springfield (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Timothy J. Londrigan (argued), all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0332-01", "first_page_order": 350, "last_page_order": 360 }