{ "id": 4270679, "name": "ANTIOCH COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 17, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 209, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Antioch Community High School District 17 v. Board of Education", "decision_date": "2007-05-04", "docket_number": "No. 2-06-0430", "first_page": "544", "last_page": "554", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 544" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 656", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511421 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "657" }, { "page": "658-59" }, { "page": "657" }, { "page": "660" }, { "page": "660" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0656-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1156", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472363 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1165-66", "parenthetical": "the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature, and a statute should not be construed to produce an absurd, unjust, or unreasonable result" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1156-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 U.S.C. \u00a71400", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "357 Ill. App. 3d 172", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4135400 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0172-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 402", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 209, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Antioch Community High School District 17 (Antioch), filed a three-count complaint seeking reimbursement from defendant, the Board of Education, Proviso Township High School District 209 (Proviso), for the educational component of residential services provided to Carlos J., a minor. For three months, Carlos was a resident at the Gateway Youth Care Foundation (Gateway), which is a private residential alcohol and drug treatment facility within Antioch\u2019s attendance borders. During Carlos\u2019s stay, his mother resided in May-wood, which is within Proviso\u2019s attendance borders.\nAntioch alleges that section 10 \u2014 20.12a of the School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12a (West 2004)) obligated Proviso to pay for Carlos\u2019s educational services because his mother had retained custody of him and resided within Proviso\u2019s boundaries. Proviso responds that Carlos was placed at Gateway pursuant to the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Act) (705 ILCS 405/1 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2004)), and because Proviso had no input into Carlos\u2019s placement, the reimbursement provisions of the Code do not apply.\nThe parties filed opposing motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Proviso summary judgment, concluding that Carlos was a ward of the juvenile court and that, therefore, the court had placed him as a resident of Antioch. Antioch appeals, arguing that the reimbursement provisions of the Code entitle it to reimbursement from Proviso. Consistent with the supreme court\u2019s recent decision in In re D.D., 212 Ill. 2d 410 (2004), we hold that, because Carlos\u2019s placement was accomplished not under the Code but exclusively pursuant to the Act and Proviso had no input into his placement, Antioch may not obtain reimbursement under the Code. We affirm.\nFACTS\nOn October 5, 2005, Antioch filed a three-count complaint alleging claims for reimbursement under the Code (see 105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12a (West 2004)), unjust enrichment, and quantum meruit. Antioch alleges damages of $6,052 for Gateway\u2019s cost of educational services to Carlos.\nOn January 9, 2006, Proviso moved for summary judgment, arguing that, while the Code generally provides for the type of reimbursement sought by Antioch, such reimbursement is not warranted in this case because (1) Proviso was not involved in placing Carlos at Gateway, (2) Proviso was never alerted to his special needs, and (3) there was no determination that Proviso could not meet Carlos\u2019s needs within its own boundaries.\nIn support of its summary judgment motion, Antioch attached documents showing that, since January 2004, Carlos\u2019s mother, Shar-ese Bell, has lived at a residence within Proviso\u2019s attendance borders. Proviso countered with an affidavit in which Proviso\u2019s superintendent stated that Carlos has never been enrolled in one of Proviso\u2019s schools. Proviso also submitted an order dated April 19, 2004, in which the circuit court of Cook County ordered that Carlos \u201ccomplete the Gateway Youth Care Residential Program in Lake Villa.\u201d The record also contains a document labeled \u201cGateway Educational Program Intake Face Sheet,\u201d which identifies the Juvenile Probation Department of Cook County as the agency placing Carlos at Gateway. In its opening brief, Antioch admits that \u201cth[e] placement was ordered as a condition of Carlos\u2019 probation in Juvenile Court case number 02\u2014 JD \u2014 04694, a delinquency matter.\u201d\nFrom May 5, 2004, to August 6, 2004, Carlos was enrolled at Gateway for 56 school days. Each month during Carlos\u2019s stay, Antioch billed Proviso for the educational services. Proviso denied financial liability and refused to pay any of the bills. According to Proviso, it did not learn of Carlos\u2019s placement until Antioch began submitting the bills.\nThe trial court granted Proviso summary judgment on count I of the complaint, which sought reimbursement under the Code (see 105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12a (West 2004)). The parties stipulated that, for purposes of appeal, the summary judgment ruling would also apply to counts II and III, which alleged the claims of unjust enrichment and quantum meruit. The trial court entered a written finding of appeal-ability under Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and Antioch\u2019s timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nThe law of summary judgment is well settled. In an appeal from a summary judgment ruling, we conduct a de novo review. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 102 (1992). Summary judgment is governed by the provisions of section 2 \u2014 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2004). Under section 2 \u2014 1005(c), a party is entitled to summary judgment \u201cif the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2004). Because summary judgment is a drastic method of terminating litigation, the movant\u2019s entitlement must be free from doubt. Logan v. Old Enterprise Farms, Ltd., 139 Ill. 2d 229, 233 (1990). Accordingly, the reviewing court must construe the evidence strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Logan, 139 Ill. 2d at 234. Where reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from undisputed facts, summary judgment should be denied. Loyola Academy v. S&S Roof Maintenance, Inc., 146 Ill. 2d 263, 272 (1992).\nWhen, as in this case, \u201cthe parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, they concede the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and invite the court to decide the questions presented as a matter of law.\u201d Bangert v. Northern Trust Co., 362 Ill. App. 3d 402, 407 (2005). \u201cHowever, the filing of cross-motions for summary judgment does not establish the absence of issues of material fact and does not oblige a trial court to rule without further fact-finding; this court, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo, may determine that, despite the summary judgment filings, a material issue of fact remains which precludes the entry of summary judgment for either party.\u201d Kalis v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 357 Ill. App. 3d 172, 174 (2005).\nAntioch confines its appellate argument to count I of its complaint, which alleged a claim for reimbursement under the Code. For purposes of section 10 \u2014 20.12b of the Code, the residence of a person who has legal custody of a pupil is deemed to be the residence of the pupil, and \u201clegal custody\u201d can mean custody exercised by a natural or adoptive parent with whom the pupil resides. 105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12b(a) (West 2004). Antioch argues that, pursuant to section 10 \u2014 20.12b(a), Carlos was a resident of Proviso during his stay at Gateway because his mother lived within Proviso\u2019s borders and had legal custody of him.\nBased on the premise that Carlos was treated at Gateway for drug and alcohol dependency while a resident of Proviso pursuant to section 10 \u2014 20.12b(a) of the Code, Antioch alleges a claim for reimbursement for educational services under section 10 \u2014 20.12a. Section 10\u2014 20.12a of the Code provides in relevant part as follows:\n\u201cUnless otherwise agreed to by the parties involved and where the educational services are not otherwise provided for, educational services for an Illinois student under the age of 21 in a residential program designed to correct alcohol or other drug dependencies shall be provided by the district in which the facility is located and financed as follows. The cost of educational services shall be paid by the district in which the student resides in an amount equal to the cost of providing educational services in a treatment facility. Payments shall be made by the district of the student\u2019s residence and shall be made to the district wherein the facility is located no less than once per month unless otherwise agreed to by the parties.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12a (West 2004).\nProviso argues that Carlos was placed at Gateway pursuant to the Act and that, therefore, any potential reimbursement would be prescribed by the Act, not the Code. Proviso concludes that the Act does not obligate it to reimburse Antioch. Antioch counters that, because (1) it stakes its claim for reimbursement under the Code rather than the Act; and (2) Carlos remained a resident of Proviso under the Code, section 10 \u2014 20.12a of the Code obligates Proviso to pay for the educational component of Carlos\u2019s residential placement. Contrary to Antioch\u2019s assertion, this case is governed by D.D., which supports Proviso\u2019s position.\nD.D., a special education student, was adjudicated a delinquent minor and placed on probation under section 5 \u2014 715 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 715 (West 1998)). As a condition of probation, the juvenile court placed D.D. at a residential treatment and education center in Utah. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 412. The juvenile court ordered D.D.\u2019s resident school district to pay the State for the educational component of D.D.\u2019s residential placement at the center. The appellate court reversed the order, ruling that the juvenile court lacked authority under the Code and the Act to order the school district to pay the State for the educational component of D.D.\u2019s residential placement. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 413.\nIn D.D., the supreme court harmonized the Act and the Code in the context of reimbursement for a special education student\u2019s educational expenses and that harmonization guides our analysis. At issue was whether either the Act or the Code obligated D.D.\u2019s resident school district to reimburse the State for the educational portion of his out-of-state residential placement. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 419.\nThe court began by setting forth the State\u2019s obligation under the Code to arrange placement for special education students like D.D. Article 14 of the Code, entitled \u201cChildren With Disabilities,\u201d provides that the State Board of Education must promulgate rules to insure that children with disabilities are provided a \u201cfree and appropriate public education\u201d (FAPE) as mandated by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. \u00a71400 et seq. (2000)). 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 8.02(a) (West 1998); D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 420. To that end, section 14 \u2014 1.02 of the Code provides that \u201can individualized education program\u201d must be written and agreed upon by appropriate school personnel and guardians for any child receiving special education. 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 1.02 (West 1998); D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 420. \u201cSection 14\u2014 8.03 of the School Code provides a framework for school districts to implement the individualized education plan (IEP) for eligible students. 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 8.03 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 420. \u201c[A] school district shall consider and develop \u2018the transition goals and supports for eligible students with disabilities\u2019 at the IEP meeting and provide services as identified in the student\u2019s individualized education plan. 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 8.03 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 420-21. Mindful of the outcome-oriented statutory goals, \u201cthe school district\u2019s responsibilities to deliver specific educational services, including vocational training and community living skills instruction, are clarified. 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 8.03 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 421. \u201cEvery year, a summary of the \u2018student\u2019s transition goals and needed supports,\u2019 resulting from the IEP) is submitted to the appropriate local \u2018Transition Planning Committee.\u2019 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 8.03 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 421.\n\u201cWhen a student\u2019s resident school district is unable to meet the student\u2019s disability needs, the student is eligible to receive educational services elsewhere.\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 421, citing 105 ILCS 5/14\u2014 7.01, 14 \u2014 7.02 (West 1998). In cases where the student receives those services by attending a private school, public out-of-state school, public-school residential facility, or private special education facility, the school or facility is entitled to reimbursement from the student\u2019s resident district, but any educational or related services provided \u201c \u2018shall be at no cost to the parent or guardian of the child.\u2019 \u201d D.D., 212 lb. 2d at 421-22, quoting 105 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 7.02 (West 1998).\nThe D.D. court also set forth the analogous provisions for placing delinquent minors pursuant to the Act. \u201cIf the [juvenile] court finds that the minor is guilty of an offense, the court sets \u2018a time for a sentencing hearing to be conducted under section 5 \u2014 705 at which hearing the court *** determine[s] whether it is in the best interests of the minor and the public that he or she be made a ward of the court.\u2019 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 620 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 423. \u201c \u2018[I]f [the minor] is *** made a ward of the court, the court *** determine^] the proper disposition best serving the interests of the minor and the public.\u2019 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 705 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 423. \u201cAs part of a minor\u2019s sentence, the court may (1) place the minor on probation (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 715 (West 1998)); or (2) place the minor with another guardian or commit the minor to an appropriate facility or institution in accordance with section 5 \u2014 740 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 740 (West 1998)), with or without being placed on probation or court supervision. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 710 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 423.\n\u201cSection 5 \u2014 715 addresses what requirements may be placed upon a sentenced minor as a condition of probation. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 715 (West 1998). Among others, the court may require that the minor attend or reside in a facility established for the instruction or residence of persons on probation. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 715 (West 1998). Section 5 \u2014 740 of the Act likewise authorizes the court to place the delinquent minor in an appropriate facility. 705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 740 (West 1998).\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 423.\nThe supreme court found that D.D.\u2019s out-of-state residential placement was initiated not under the Code, but rather as a result of D.D.\u2019s probation violation pursuant to section 5 \u2014 715 of the Act. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 425. The court emphasized that the adequacy of D.D.\u2019s resident district \u201cwas not considered at all\u201d in ordering D.D. to an out-of-state facility and that, therefore, the noncompliance with section 14 \u2014 8.03 of the Code barred the State from reimbursement under section 14 \u2014 7.02. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 426. The court further noted that the juvenile court did not order D.D.\u2019s placement for an educational purpose. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 429. The D.D. court held that \u201c[wjhile the State attempts to reach outside the parameters of the Juvenile Court Act to the School Code, relying on provisions for reimbursement from resident school districts, it ignores the School Code provisions requiring resident school districts to be involved in special education placements.\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 426. The court unambiguously stated, \u201cwe hold fast to our conclusion that, because the placement was not accomplished under the School Code, but rather exclusively under the Juvenile Court Act, no provision of the School Code operates to compel school district reimbursement in this case.\u201d D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 427.\nAntioch argues that D.D. does not apply here because in D.D. the State sought reimbursement for special education services from D.D.\u2019s resident school district pursuant to section 14 \u2014 7.02b of the Code, whereas in this case Antioch seeks reimbursement from Proviso pursuant to section 10 \u2014 20.12a of the Code. We view this distinction as one without a difference. D.D. teaches that reimbursement from a resident school district is appropriate only if it is prescribed by the statutory scheme under which the minor was placed. In other words, if a minor is placed in a facility pursuant to the Act, reimbursement is proper only as provided under the Act. Similarly, if a minor is placed pursuant to the Code, reimbursement is proper only as provided under the Code. D.D. was not placed pursuant to the Code, and therefore reimbursement under the Code was not appropriate. D.D. compels a similar result in this case because we conclude that Carlos was placed at Gateway not under the Code but exclusively under the Act.\nThe parties agree that Carlos was adjudicated delinquent by the juvenile division of the Cook County circuit court and that Carlos\u2019s placement at Gateway was a condition of his probation under section 5 \u2014 715 of the Act. Furthermore, nothing suggests that Carlos\u2019s placement was for an educational purpose or otherwise related to the Code. Carlos was not placed at Gateway as a special education student like D.D., and Antioch cites no section of the Code under which he might have been placed as a regular education student.\nAntioch argues that Carlos was placed as a regular education student and that D.D. does not apply because it is limited to cases involving placements of special education students. However, a brief overview of section 10 \u2014 20.12b(c) of the Code illustrates that a regular education student\u2019s placement under the Code is not made in a vacuum; the person who placed the student is entitled to a hearing to determine the student\u2019s residency status.\nSection 10 \u2014 20.12b of the Code provides the framework for determining residency and reimbursement obligations of resident school districts. Section 10 \u2014 20.12b(c) provides as follows:\n\u201cIf a school board in a school district with a population of less than 500,000 determines that a pupil who is attending school in the district on a tuition free basis is a nonresident of the district for whom tuition is required to be charged under Section 10 \u2014 20.12a, the board shall notify the person who enrolled the pupil of the amount of the tuition charged under Section 10 \u2014 20.12a that is due to the district for the nonresident pupil\u2019s attendance in the district\u2019s schools. The notice shall be given by certified mail, return receipt requested. Within 10 days after receipt of the notice, the person who enrolled the pupil may request a hearing to review the determination of the school board. The request shall be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the district superintendent. Within 10 days after receipt of the request, the board shall notify, by certified mail, return receipt requested, the person requesting the hearing of the time and place of the hearing, which shall be held not less than 10 nor more than 20 days after the notice of hearing is given. The board or a hearing officer designated by the board shall conduct the hearing. The board and the person who enrolled the pupil may be represented at the hearing by representatives of their choice. At the hearing, the person who enrolled the pupil shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence concerning the pupil\u2019s residency. If the hearing is conducted by a hearing officer, the hearing officer, within 5 days after the conclusion of the hearing, shall send a written report of his or her findings by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the school board and to the person who enrolled the pupil. The person who enrolled the pupil may, within 5 days after receiving the findings, file written objections to the findings with the school board by sending the objections by certified mail, return receipt requested, addressed to the district superintendent. Whether the hearing is conducted by the school hoard or a hearing officer, the school board shall, within 15 days after the conclusion of the hearing, decide whether or not the pupil is a resident of the district and the amount of any tuition required to be charged under Section 10 \u2014 20.12a as a result of the pupil\u2019s attendance in the schools of the district. The school board shall send a copy of its decision to the person who enrolled the pupil, and the decision of the school board shall be final.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 105 ILCS 5/10 \u2014 20.12b(c) (West 2004).\nIf Carlos had indeed been placed at Gateway pursuant to the Code, section 10 \u2014 20.12b(c) would have required Antioch to notify \u201cthe person who enrolled\u201d Carlos of the cost of his nonresident tuition and then to afford that person the opportunity to challenge the determination of nonresidency. In this case, the juvenile court directed Carlos to be enrolled, and neither his mother nor Proviso would have been entitled to any input in the proceedings for determining Proviso\u2019s reimbursement obligation under section 10 \u2014 20.12b(c). If we were to adopt Antioch\u2019s position, section 10 \u2014 20.12b(c) would have triggered the juvenile court\u2019s involvement as a party in school board proceedings to determine whether Carlos was a resident of Proviso or Antioch. The interest in avoiding such an absurd result supports our conclusion that Carlos\u2019s placement was not accomplished under the Code. See Shively v. Belleville Township High School District No. 201, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1156, 1165-66 (2002) (the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent and meaning of the legislature, and a statute should not be construed to produce an absurd, unjust, or unreasonable result).\nThe parties agree that Carlos was placed at Gateway as a condition of his probation under section 5 \u2014 715 of the Act, and Antioch argues at length about the differences between independent placements under section 5 \u2014 740 and placements made as conditions of probation. However, the D.D. court declared it irrelevant whether a student\u2019s placement was ordered as a condition of probation (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 715 (West 1998)) or as an independent placement (705 ILCS 405/5 \u2014 740 (West 1998)); the operative fact is that the student is placed not under the Code but exclusively under the Act. D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 425-26.\nWe reject Antioch\u2019s assertion that Carbondale Community High School District No. 165 v. Herrin Community Unit School District No. 4, 303 Ill. App. 3d 656 (1999), compels us to reverse the entry of summary judgment for Proviso. In that case, Carbondale, the serving district, sought reimbursement from Herrin under section 10 \u2014 20.12a for educational services provided to a minor who resided within Herrin. Carbondale, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 657. Pursuant to section 2 \u2014 3.13a of the Code (105 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 3.13a (West 1996)), the minor had been expelled from Herrin\u2019s schools for a drug-related offense, and that section barred him from attending a \u201cpublic school.\u201d Carbon-dale, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 658-59. During the one-year period of expulsion, the minor was enrolled for eight days at a Gateway facility in Carbondale. Carbondale, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 657. The appellate court reconciled the expulsion section and the reimbursement section of the Code. The court held that reimbursement was proper because the expulsion section did not bar an expelled student from obtaining educational services at a facility other than a public school. Carbondale, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 660. The court emphasized that \u201c[w]hen a youth *** is expelled from one school district and, while being enrolled in a residential treatment facility, receives educational services from another district, that youth is not attending a public school [which would he barred by the expulsion section]; he is receiving education services\u201d which would be allowed by the expulsion section and reimbursable under section 10 \u2014 20.12a. Carbondale, 303 Ill. App. 3d at 660.\nAntioch cites Carbondale for the proposition that section 10\u2014 20.12a \u201callows for reimbursement to the serving district regardless of whether the resident district was involved in the placement.\u201d However, the opinion does not make clear whether the placement was accomplished through the Act or the Code. According to D.D., the method of placing the minor is the operative fact in determining whether reimbursement is allowed under section 10 \u2014 20.12a of the Code. Because we do not know whether the minor in Carbondale was placed (1) as a term of probation or an independent placement under the Act or (2) under the Code, the case provides little guidance in light of D.D. Carbondale is an appellate court disposition that predates the supreme court\u2019s decision in D.D., and therefore, to the extent that Carbondale conflicts with D.D., D.D. takes precedence and we need not follow Car-bondale.\nBecause Carlos\u2019s placement was accomplished not under the Code but exclusively under the Act, \u201cno provision of the School Code operates to compel school district reimbursement in this case.\u201d See D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 427. Instead, the Act governs any reimbursement that might be available to Antioch. For Antioch\u2019s benefit, we note that section 6 \u2014 7 of the Act provides that \u201c[e]ach county board shall provide in its annual appropriation ordinance or annual budget, as the case may be, a reasonable sum for payments for the care and support of minors, and for payments for court appointed counsel in accordance with orders entered under this Act in an amount which in the judgment of the county board may be needed for that purpose.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/6 \u2014 7(1) (West 2004). Furthermore, \u201c[n]o county may be charged with the care and support of any minor who is not a resident of the county unless his parents or guardian are unknown or the minor\u2019s place of residence cannot be determined.\u201d 705 ILCS 405/6 \u2014 7(2) (West 2004). This disposition does not limit any remedy that might be available to Antioch under the Act.\nFor the preceding reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nHUTCHINSON and CALLUM, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Neal A. Takiff, Jennifer L. Hansen, and Brooke R. Whitted, all of Whit-ted, Cleary & Takiff LLC, of Northbrook, for appellant.", "David E. Neumeister, Jennifer L. Medenwald, and Ellen E. Gibson, all of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANTIOCH COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 17, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, PROVISO TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT 209, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-06-0430\nOpinion filed May 4, 2007.\nRehearing denied June 29, 2007.\nNeal A. Takiff, Jennifer L. Hansen, and Brooke R. Whitted, all of Whit-ted, Cleary & Takiff LLC, of Northbrook, for appellant.\nDavid E. Neumeister, Jennifer L. Medenwald, and Ellen E. Gibson, all of Querrey & Harrow, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0544-01", "first_page_order": 562, "last_page_order": 572 }