{ "id": 4269956, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY BETH SINGEL, Petitioner-Appellee, and THOMAS J. SINGEL II, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Singel", "decision_date": "2007-05-16", "docket_number": "No. 2-06-0897", "first_page": "554", "last_page": "558", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 554" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 895", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3832586 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "905" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/0895-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 919", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265635 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "925" }, { "page": "921-22" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0919-01" ] }, { "cite": "358 Ill. App. 3d 667", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5731927 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/358/0667-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 642", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950492 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "649", "parenthetical": "while Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0642-01" ] }, { "cite": "199 Ill. 2d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 58932 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" }, { "page": "334" }, { "page": "335" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/199/0325-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 467, "char_count": 10652, "ocr_confidence": 0.737, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.496193100438881e-07, "percentile": 0.6639234565412887 }, "sha256": "64c779711b1df3fe9db8a302214f68ce66346dfbec749a81ef02193102ec94a6", "simhash": "1:95abf02ed38e9d67", "word_count": 1811 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:18.400209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY BETH SINGEL, Petitioner-Appellee, and THOMAS J. SINGEL II, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE CALLUM\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, Thomas J. Singel II, appeals from an order denying his motion for additional time in which to file a postjudgment motion under section 2 \u2014 1203(a) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203(a) (West 2004)) against a judgment dissolving his marriage to petitioner, Mary Beth Singel. We agree with petitioner that we lack jurisdiction, and we dismiss the appeal.\nOn April 3, 2006, the trial court entered a judgment dissolving the parties\u2019 marriage and resolving all of the issues raised by petitioner\u2019s dissolution petition. Thirty days later, on May 2, 2006, respondent filed a \u201cMotion for Extension of Time for Filing of Motion to Reconsider Judgment of April 3, 2006.\u201d The motion alleged that, on May 1, 2006, respondent retained new counsel and that, because counsel had not yet received the case file from the previous attorney or reviewed the trial transcripts, he could not file a postjudgment motion within the 30-day limit of section 2 \u2014 1203(a). Citing Supreme Court Rule 183 (134 Ill. 2d R. 183), the motion requested an extension of time in which to file a motion to reconsider the judgment. Respondent did not actually file a motion to reconsider the judgment, either within 30 days or at any time thereafter.\nOn June 8, 2006, petitioner responded to the motion. She contended first that Rule 183 did not apply to the time limit set by section 2 \u2014 1203(a) and thus could not enable respondent to obtain an extension. Petitioner observed that, under section 2 \u2014 1203(a), a post-judgment motion must be filed \u201cwithin 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203(a) (West 2004). She contended that, because respondent had neither filed a postjudgment motion nor obtained an extension within 30 days after the entry of the dissolution judgment, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the extension or any other relief.\nOn August 15, 2006, the trial court \u201cdenied\u201d respondent\u2019s motion. The court held that it had lost jurisdiction over the case because no proper postjudgment motion had been filed within 30 days of the judgment. On September 12, 2006, respondent filed a notice of appeal.\nWe must dismiss this appeal as untimely. A notice of appeal from a final judgment must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or, if a timely motion directed against the judgment is filed, within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending motion directed against the judgment. 210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1). Here, respondent filed his notice of appeal on September 12, 2006, more than 30 days after the entry of the dissolution judgment. Thus, his appeal is untimely unless there was a timely postjudgment motion that extended the time in which to appeal. There was no such motion.\nA proper postjudgment motion under section 2 \u2014 1203(a) must request a rehearing, retrial, modification or vacatur of the judgment, or similar type of relief against the judgment. County of Cook v. Illinois Fraternal Order of Police Labor Council, 358 Ill. App. 3d 667, 672 (2005). As its title indicates, respondent\u2019s \u201cMotion for Extension of Time for Filing of Motion to Reconsider Judgment\u201d did not request relief against the judgment, but merely permission to file a motion that would do so. Therefore, because respondent did not file a proper postjudgment motion, his notice of appeal was untimely. Because a timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional, his appeal must be dismissed. See Lowenthal v. McDonald, 367 Ill. App. 3d 919, 925 (2006).\nContrary to what respondent contends, it does not matter that he filed his motion for an extension of time within 30 days after the entry of the judgment. Under section 2 \u2014 1203(a), an initial extension beyond the 30-day limit must be granted within that 30-day period. Lowenthal, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 921-22.\nFinally, respondent\u2019s reliance on Rule 183 is in vain. Even if, arguendo, the rule authorized the trial court to grant an extension past the deadline set by section 2 \u2014 1203(a), the fact remains that the trial court did not do so within the 30 days required by section 2 \u2014 1203(a). In any event, however, we agree with petitioner that Rule 183 does not apply here. The rule allows the trial court to extend the time for filing a \u201cpleading\u201d or for \u201cthe doing of any act which is required by the [supreme court] rules.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 183. By its plain terms, the rule applies only to the time limits for pleadings and to time limits that have been set by the supreme court rules. Robinson v. Johnson, 346 Ill. App. 3d 895, 905 (2003). Therefore, the trial court could not have used Rule 183 to grant respondent more time to file a postjudgment motion under section 2 \u2014 1203(a).\nThe appeal from the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is dismissed.\nAppeal dismissed.\nBYRNE, J., concurs.\nThe trial court\u2019s order also granted petitioner\u2019s postdissolution petition for a rule to show cause against respondent and allowed her to file a petition for the attorney fees that she incurred in bringing the petition. The order stated that there was no just reason to delay the enforcement or appeal of the part of the order denying respondent\u2019s motion for more time in which to file a motion to reconsider the dissolution judgment. See 210 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE CALLUM" }, { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY,\nspecially concurring:\nWhile I concur in the judgment of the court, I write separately to explore the trial court\u2019s conclusion that it lost jurisdiction over the matter after 30 days had elapsed and before it had entered a judgment on respondent\u2019s motion for an extension of time to file a motion to reconsider. The trial court held that it lost jurisdiction over the case because no proper postjudgment motion had been filed within 30 days of the final order. In Belleville Toyota, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 199 Ill. 2d 325 (2002), our supreme court considered the nature of subject matter jurisdiction and the legislature\u2019s ability to limit subject matter jurisdiction by statute. The court held that \u201c \u2018subject matter jurisdiction\u2019 refers to the power of a court to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceeding in question belongs.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Our supreme court held that, other than administrative review, \u201ca circuit court\u2019s subject matter jurisdiction is conferred entirely by our state constitution,\u201d and its subject matter jurisdiction \u201cextends to all \u2018justiciable matters.\u2019 \u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 334. Our supreme court defined \u201cjusticiable matter\u201d as \u201ca controversy appropriate for review by the court, in that it is definite and concrete, as opposed to hypothetical or moot, touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335.\nThus, the question arises as to the effect of section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2004)) on the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction over the cause after the expiration of the 30-day time period. Is it in the nature of a limitations period? Or is it something else entirely?\nOne reasonable position is that it is a time limit, which may be the subject of an objection if it is not observed, but does not by itself divest the circuit court of jurisdiction. See DHR International, Inc. v. Winston & Strawn, 347 Ill. App. 3d 642, 649 (2004) (while Uniform Arbitration Act (710 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2004)) created new justiciable matter, a failure to comply with a jurisdictional limit in the Uniform Arbitration Act may be the subject of an objection but does not by itself divest the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction). In other words, if the trial court ruled (erroneously) on the motion after the 30-day time limit of section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code had elapsed, the order would be voidable, not void. The circuit court would have jurisdiction over the matter beyond the 30-day limit of section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code, but it would be error, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code, to enter an order. The situation is muddied, because the expiration of the 30-day period has immemorially been termed \u201cjurisdictional,\u201d even after Belleville Toyota.\nOn the other hand, the trial court\u2019s statement that it lost jurisdiction is also reasonable. Once the final order was entered, arguably there was no longer \u201ca controversy appropriate for review by the [trial] court, *** touching upon the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.\u201d Belleville Toyota, 199 Ill. 2d at 335. That had all been resolved by the final order. Under such a view, the 30-day limit of section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code is in fact jurisdictional, because after its expiration, the trial court cannot affect its judgment and loses all contact with the matter before it. In other words, the matter is no longer a justiciable matter over which the trial court would otherwise have jurisdiction. Thus, with the passing of the 30-day period, the trial court\u2019s jurisdiction also lapses. Of course, if a losing party were to forgo filing a motion to reconsider and instead simply file a new action raising exactly the same issues, we would not say that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule that the matter was res judicata.\nI write separately because there appear to be two reasonable ways of looking at the issue. If we were to adopt the first view, then the trial court did not lose its subject matter jurisdiction over the cause, but it would have been error under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code to grant respondent\u2019s motion for an extension. Under the second view, the trial court did in fact lose jurisdiction. The difference in the two positions is significant. In the first view, the issue is waivable and an erroneous order entered by the trial court is voidable. In the second view, the issue cannot be waived and an order entered by the trial court on the motion would be void and subject to attack at any time, even years hence. Whether the trial court lost subject matter jurisdiction or not, its decision was in accord with the Code. Hence, I concur.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Vincent J. Stark and Tania K. Gray, both of Kamerlink, Stark, McCor-mack, Powers & Zaslavsky, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Joel S. Ostrow, of Law Offices of Joel Ostrow, and Stephen H. Katz, of Katz, Goldstein & Warren, both of Bannockburn, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF MARY BETH SINGEL, Petitioner-Appellee, and THOMAS J. SINGEL II, Respondent-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2-06-0897\nOpinion filed May 16, 2007.\nO\u2019MALLEY, J., specially concurring.\nVincent J. Stark and Tania K. Gray, both of Kamerlink, Stark, McCor-mack, Powers & Zaslavsky, of Chicago, for appellant.\nJoel S. Ostrow, of Law Offices of Joel Ostrow, and Stephen H. Katz, of Katz, Goldstein & Warren, both of Bannockburn, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0554-01", "first_page_order": 572, "last_page_order": 576 }