{ "id": 4269800, "name": "THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 204, County of Will, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, LINCOLN WAY COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 210, County of Will, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Board of Education, Joliet Township High School District No. 204 v. Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210", "decision_date": "2007-04-19", "docket_number": "No. 3-06-0278", "first_page": "563", "last_page": "574", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 563" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "98 L. Ed. 873", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "L. Ed.", "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "881" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 U.S. 483", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11301409 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1954, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" }, { "page": "692" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/347/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 U.S. 52", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 359179 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1941, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "67-68" }, { "page": "587" }, { "page": "404" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/312/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "20 U.S.C. \u00a71701", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "619 N.E.2d 137", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "140" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "156 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 777560 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/156/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 N.E.2d 290", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "15 Ill. 2d 182", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2767203 ], "year": 1993, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/15/0182-01" ] }, { "cite": "458 U.S. 141", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 636558 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "153" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "3022" }, { "page": "153" }, { "page": "675" }, { "page": "3022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/458/0141-01" ] }, { "cite": "430 U.S. 519", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12125732 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "525" }, { "page": "614" }, { "page": "1309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/430/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "505 U.S. 504", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1481129 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "422" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "422-23" }, { "page": "2617" }, { "page": "516" }, { "page": "423" }, { "page": "2617" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/505/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "175 N.E.2d 556", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "557" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "22 Ill. 2d 331", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2787298 ], "year": 1961, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "334" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/22/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "475 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "885" }, { "page": "885" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "105 Ill. 2d 501", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3141089 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513" }, { "page": "513" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/105/0501-01" ] }, { "cite": "724 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "966" }, { "page": "966" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 478", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415305 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "490" }, { "page": "490" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0478-01" ] }, { "cite": "496 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "146 Ill. App. 3d 340", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3571551 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "352" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/146/0340-01" ] }, { "cite": "655 N.E.2d 930", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "932" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 446", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d 352", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4136154 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "361" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/357/0352-01" ] }, { "cite": "810 N.E.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "233" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 554", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, LINCOLN WAY COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 210, County of Will, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE McDADE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent, the Joliet Township Board of Education, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Will County, which affirmed a decision of the Illinois State Board of Education granting a petition to detach certain property from the Joliet Township district and annex it to the Lincoln Way district pursuant to section 7 \u2014 2b of the Illinois School Code (Code) (105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998)). Respondent\u2019s appeal from the circuit court\u2019s order challenges the State Board\u2019s decision on the grounds that: (1) the State Board of Education lacked jurisdiction to hear petitioners\u2019 petition; (2) petitioners failed to comply with the procedures set forth under section 7 \u2014 6 of the Code (105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 6 (West 1998)); and (3) section 7 \u2014 2b violates the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (20 U.S.C. \u00a71703 (2000)). For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the portion of the circuit court\u2019s judgment entitled \u201cConstitutional Issues,\u201d we affirm the findings of the Illinois State Board of Education on those issues that it considered, and remand the matter to the Illinois State Board of Education for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nFACTS\nOn July 17, 1998, petitioners Judy Jacobs, Terry Jacobs, Wilbur Brookman, and Maryann Brookman filed a petition pursuant to section 7 \u2014 2b of the Illinois School Code (105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998)), seeking to detach 320 acres of property from Joliet Township High School District No. 204 and annex it to Lincoln Way Community High School District No. 210. In its 1998 version, section 7 \u2014 2b carves out a pro forma proceeding for proposed detachments that involve 10% or less of the (1) equalized assessed value and (2) the territory of the district from which the property is sought to be detached. The hearing body considering the petition can only address whether the specific criteria for detachment under this section have been met. It is expressly forbidden \u201cto hear any evidence or consider any issues\u201d (105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998)) other than those criteria. At the time the petition was filed, the hearing body for such petitions under section 7 \u2014 2b was the state Board of Education.\nOn June 30, 1999, while the petition was still pending, the General Assembly enacted Public Act 91 \u2014 46 (Pub. Act 91 \u2014 46, eff. June 30, 1999). This legislation made several amendments to section 7 \u2014 2b, one of which changed the hearing body on detachment petitions from the State Board of Education to the Regional Board of School Trustees. See Pub. Act 91 \u2014 46, eff. June 30, 1999. At the same time, it added an entirely new section to the law, which declared:\n\u201c[S]ection 7 \u2014 6 of this Code shall apply to petitions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly.\nThe changes made by this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly shall not apply to petitions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act of the 91st General Assembly.\u201d Pub. Act 91 \u2014 46, eff. June 30, 1999.\nOn December 6, 1999, a hearing was conducted on petitioners\u2019 petition by State Board hearing officer Harry Blackburn. During the hearing, respondent raised three objections: first, that the State Board of Education lacked jurisdiction because under the newly amended section 7 \u2014 2b, only the Regional Board of School Trustees could hear the petition; second, that the detachment petition must be denied because petitioners failed to comply with the procedural requirements of section 7 \u2014 6 of the Code; and, third, that the petition violates the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 (EEOA) (20 U.S.C. \u00a71703 (2000)), which prohibits the transfer of students from one school district to another if the effect is to increase segregation on the basis of race.\nOn April 21, 2003, the hearing officer issued his proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The hearing officer found petitioners met the requirements of section 7 \u2014 2b by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, he found that two-thirds of the school zone\u2019s residents approved the detachment, the tract contained 10% or less of the valuation and territory of the ceding district, and the resulting district would be contiguous. It was therefore recommended that the State Superintendent of Education grant the detachment petition. In recommending detachment, the proposed order rejected respondent\u2019s jurisdictional and section 7 \u2014 6 objections, and also specifically found respondent\u2019s argument that section 7 \u2014 2b violates the provisions of the EEOA to be outside the scope of its statutory and regulatory authority. On February 25, 2005, the State Superintendent adopted the proposed order as his own and granted petitioners\u2019 petition.\nOn March 28, 2005, respondent filed an administrative review complaint, asking the circuit court to reverse the order of the State Superintendent. On December 29, 2005, a hearing was held in the Will County circuit court on respondent\u2019s complaint. No court reporter was present at this hearing. Upon taking the matter under advisement, the circuit court affirmed the decision of the State Board of Education and dismissed the respondent\u2019s complaint. The circuit court also made an independent finding that the Board\u2019s actions did not \u201ccreate a Constitutional impediment or a violation of Federal law.\u201d The instant appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nDecision on Administrative Review\nWhen reviewing a final decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 1998)), the appellate court reviews the administrative agency\u2019s decision and not the circuit court\u2019s determination. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Bower, 348 Ill. App. 3d 944, 948-49, 809 N.E.2d 792, 797 (2004). Interpretation of a statute is a question of law. Branson v. Department of Revenue, 168 Ill. 2d 247, 254, 659 N.E.2d 961, 965 (1995). Questions of law decided by an administrative agency are not entitled to deference and are reviewed de novo. Anderson v. Department of Professional Regulation, 348 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560, 810 N.E.2d 228, 233 (2004); Department of Revenue v. Civil Service Comm\u2019n, 357 Ill. App. 3d 352, 361, 827 N.E.2d 960, 968 (2005).\nA. Jurisdictional challenge\nWe first address respondent\u2019s claim that the State Board of Education lacked jurisdiction to grant the detachment petition. Specifically, respondent claims that because Public Act 91 \u2014 46 changed the hearing body from the State Board of Education (Board) to the Regional Board of School Trustees, the order of the State Superintendent was entered without jurisdiction. While respondent acknowledges the savings clause contained in Public Act 91 \u2014 46, it argues that such clause does not apply to the law\u2019s jurisdictional change. We disagree.\nRespondent cites two Illinois decisions which it claims support the interpretation that because the jurisdictional change is procedural in nature, it must be applied retroactively. We have reviewed both cases and find them distinguishable on their facts. Neither of respondent\u2019s cited cases, Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and People v. Nitz, 173 Ill. 2d 151, 670 N.E.2d 672 (1996), involve amended statutes containing a savings clause. Instead, respondent\u2019s cases concern situations where the courts were left to determine the retrospective effect of a change in the law due to the lack of any specific directive by the legislature. The legislature here, however, has specifically stated that \u201c[t]he changes made by this amendatory Act *** shall not apply to petitions pending on the effective date of this amendatory Act.\u201d Pub. Act 91 \u2014 46, eff. June 30, 1999. Our primary objective when interpreting a statute is to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. The best indication of legislative intent is the statutory-language, given its plain and ordinary meaning. \u201cThus, when the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation.\u201d Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d 102, 112, 849 N.E.2d 334, 339 (2006). The petition here was filed with the State Board of Education in July of 1998 and was therefore \u201cpending\u201d prior to the effective date of Public Act 91 \u2014 46. Because the statutory language of Public Act 91 \u2014 46 is clear, we are bound to give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. We therefore find that the State Board of Education had jurisdiction to hear petitioners\u2019 detachment petition.\nB. Challenge of noncompliance with section 7 \u2014 6\nRespondent\u2019s second claim on appeal asserts that the earlier version of section 7 \u2014 2b, upon which the Board based its decision, is deficient in that it failed to provide a mechanism for hearing or implementing petitioners\u2019 petition. Respondent argues that section 7 \u2014 2b, as amended by Public Act 91 \u2014 46, addresses this deficiency by making the procedural aspects of section 7 \u2014 6 applicable to all detachment proceedings. Respondent admits that section 7 \u2014 6 did not previously apply to section 7 \u2014 2b petitions and that its application is a change made by the amendatory act. We therefore find that the plain language of the savings clause contained in Public Act 91 \u2014 46 compels our rejection of this argument also.\nC. Decision of the State Board of Education\nUpon determining that the Board had jurisdiction to hear petitioners\u2019 detachment petition we turn to the merits of its decision. Section 7 \u2014 2b of the Illinois School Code states that the Board \u201cshall have no authority or discretion to hear any evidence or consider any issues\u201d except that necessary to determine whether the conditions stated in that section have been met. 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998). Those conditions are limited to determining whether: (1) the requisite number of registered voters have joined in the petition, (2) the property to be detached/annexed falls within the statistical impact restrictions, and (3) the territory proposed to be annexed is within the geographical boundaries permitted by the section. See 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998). Petitioners presented sufficient evidence satisfying each of the requirements of section 7 \u2014 2b. Accordingly, we find the Board did not err in finding these conditions met.\nWe also find that the Board acted in accord with its mandate when it refused to determine whether section 7 \u2014 2b or the proposed detachment/annexation violated the Equal Education Opportunities Act of 1974. Through section 7 \u2014 2b, the legislature has provided voters with a mechanism for adjusting school districts so that children who attend elementary school together may also attend the same high school. Rogers v. Desiderio, 274 Ill. App. 3d 446, 450, 655 N.E.2d 930, 932 (1995). The State Board of Education, being the designated body to hear such petitions, is an administrative agency for that purpose. As such, it can only carry out the mandate of the legislature. By statutory definition, it had no authority to hear evidence or consider issues other than those stated above. \u201cAn administrative agency is analogous to a court of limited jurisdiction and can act only pursuant to the authority conferred on it by statute.\u201d Pickering v. Human Rights Comm\u2019n, 146 Ill. App. 3d 340, 352, 496 N.E.2d 746, 754 (1986). In acting upon that authority it must accept as constitutional the statute through which it has jurisdiction. Board of Education of Rich Township High School District No. 227 v. Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d 478, 490, 724 N.E.2d 956, 966 (1999). \u201cAn agency lacks the authority to invalidate a statute on constitutional grounds or even to question its validity.\u201d Brown, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 490, 724 N.E.2d at 966. Accordingly, we find the Board did not err in refusing to determine whether section 7 \u2014 2(b) violated the EEOA.\nD. Propriety of circuit court\u2019s decision on constitutional issue\nAs part of its administrative review order, the circuit court made a substantive finding that the Board\u2019s actions did not create \u201ca Constitutional impediment or a violation of Federal law.\u201d Upon review, we find the circuit court lacked both the jurisdiction and the evidence to make such an independent finding.\nSection 9 of article VI of the 1970 Illinois Constitution states that \u201c[cjircuit courts shall have such power to review administrative action as provided by law.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, \u00a79. A circuit court\u2019s scope of review of an administrative agency\u2019s decision is set forth in section 3 \u2014 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2004)). It states:\n\u201cEvery action to review any final administrative decision shall be heard and determined by the court with all convenient speed. The hearing and determination shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. No new or additional evidence in support of or in opposition to any finding, order, determination or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court. The findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2004).\nA reviewing court cannot reweigh the evidence, make independent determinations of facts or substitute its judgment for that of the agency even if it believes that the opposite conclusion might be reasonable. Jackson v. Board of Review of Department of Labor, 105 Ill. 2d 501, 513, 475 N.E.2d 879, 885 (1985). Its function is limited to ascertaining whether the administrative agency\u2019s findings and decision are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Jackson, 105 Ill. 2d at 513, 475 N.E.2d at 885. Because the Board\u2019s authority was limited to determining whether defendants had complied with the procedural requirements of section 7 \u2014 2b, the circuit court\u2019s authority was thereby limited to determining whether the Board erred in finding those requirements met.\nHere, the Board properly found consideration of respondent\u2019s EEOA argument to be outside the scope of its statutory and regulatory authority. As a result, the circuit court\u2019s review of this issue was limited to determining whether the issue was in fact beyond the scope of the Board\u2019s authority. While we recognize that constitutional issues can be raised in a complaint for administrative review, we note that the record is devoid of any cognizable evidence concerning respondent\u2019s constitutional claims. This absence of evidence is due to the fact that the Board did not have jurisdiction to even develop a record which the circuit court could then rely upon in formulating any constitutional decision. See 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998). The scope of review under the Administrative Review Law only extends to questions of law and fact presented by the record. Howard v. Lawton, 22 Ill. 2d 331, 334, 175 N.E.2d 556, 557 (1961). We therefore find the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in making the independent finding that the Board\u2019s decision did not violate any federal or constitutional law. Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the circuit court\u2019s order entitled \u201cConstitutional Issues.\u201d\nE. Constitutionality of section 7 \u2014 2b\nWhile we have determined that the Board acted in accord with its legislative mandate and also that the circuit court exceeded its jurisdiction in making the independent finding that the Board\u2019s decision did not violate any federal or constitutional law, we are still left with the question of the facial constitutionality of section 7 \u2014 2b. Specifically, section 7 \u2014 2b provides that the Board \u201cshall have no authority or discretion to hear any evidence or consider any issues except those that may be necessary to determine whether the limitations and conditions of this Section have been met.\u201d 105 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 2b (West 1998). Respondent\u2019s final argument on appeal asserts that this provision violates the EEOA (20 U.S.C. \u00a71703(c) (2000)), which provides in pertinent part:\n\u201cNo State shall deny equal educational opportunity to an individual on account of his or her race, color, sex, or national origin, by\u2014\n%\n(c) the assignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence within the school district of such agency providing the appropriate grade level and type of education for such student.\u201d\nThe merits of respondent\u2019s constitutional claim rest in the determination as to whether the statutory provision of section 7 \u2014 2b, which restricts a party from raising the issue of segregation in a detachment proceeding, conflicts with the EEOA to render the provision constitutionally infirm under the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution. The federal preemption doctrine stems from the constitutional provision that the laws of the United States are the supreme law of the land, \u201cany Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.\u201d U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. \u201cConsideration of issues arising under the Supremacy Clause \u00a3start[s] with the assumption that the historic police powers of the State [are] not to be superceded by ... Federal Act unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407, 422, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 2617 (1992). Accordingly, the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of a court\u2019s review under the preemption doctrine.\nCongress\u2019s intent may be \u201c \u2018explicitly stated in the statute\u2019s language or implicitly contained in its structure and purpose.\u2019 \u201d Cipol-lone, 505 U.S. at 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 422-23, 112 S. Ct. at 2617, quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525, 51 L. Ed. 2d 604, 614, 97 S. Ct. 1305, 1309 (1977). \u201cIn the absence of an express congressional command, state law is pre-empted if that law actually conflicts with federal law, [citation], or if federal law so thoroughly occupies a legislative field \u2018 \u201cas to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 516, 120 L. Ed. 2d at 423, 112 S. Ct. at 2617. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated:\n\u201cAbsent explicit pre-emptive language, Congress\u2019 intent to supersede state law altogether may be inferred because \u2018[t]he scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,\u2019 because \u2018the Act of Congress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,\u2019 or because \u2018the object sought to be obtained by federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it may reveal the same purpose.\u2019 [Citation.]\nEven where Congress has not completely displaced state regulation in a specific area, state law is nullified to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. Such a conflict arises when \u2018compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility,\u2019 [citation] or when state law \u2018stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress\u2019 [citation].\u201d Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153, 73 L. Ed. 2d 664, 675, 102 S. Ct. 3014, 3022 (1982).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has defined the meaning of \u201cnullification\u201d where there are conflicting laws, explaining:\n\u201cThe doctrine of preemption, on the other hand, is applied where enactments of two unequal legislative bodies {e.g., Federal and State) are inconsistent. Where a statute is preempted, there is no repeal of that statute. Rather, the subordinate legislative body\u2019s enactment is suspended and rendered unenforceable by the existence of the superior legislative body\u2019s enactment. This being so, the repeal of the preempting statute revives or reinstates the preempted statute without express reenactment by the legislature. [Citation]; Kinsey Distilling Sales Co. v. Foremost Liquor Stores, Inc. (1958), 15 Ill. 2d 182[, 154 N.E.2d 290.]\u201d Lilly Lake Road Defenders v. County of McHenry, 156 Ill. 2d 1, 8, 619 N.E.2d 137, 140 (1993).\nWith these principles in mind, we turn now to an analysis of respondent\u2019s contention that the restriction barring a party from raising an issue of segregation on the basis of race, color, sex or national origin is preempted by the provisions of the EEOA. Through the EEOA, Congress has expressly provided that the assignment of a student to a school be determined on a geographic basis and not on the basis of race. See 20 U.S.C. \u00a71701(a) (2000). Under the supremacy clause, this right cannot be nullified by state action. Section 7 \u2014 2b, however, in restricting the Board\u2019s ability to hear claims of racial segregation, \u201c \u2018stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of [the EEOA.]\u2019 \u201d Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass\u2019n, 458 U.S. at 153, 73 L. Ed. 2d at 675, 102 S. Ct. at 3022, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68, 85 L. Ed. 581, 587, 61 S. Ct. 399, 404 (1941). We therefore find the provision which states that the Board \u201cshall have no authority or discretion to hear any evidence or consider any issues except those that may be necessary to determine whether the limitations and conditions of this Section have been met\u201d is inconsistent with the express directive of the EEOA.\nHere, respondent claims that the Joliet school district has a 60% population of individuals from traditionally underrepresented groups. Respondent also claims that the Lincoln Way school district is \u201calmost completely\u201d Caucasian. Respondent concludes that allowing the petitioners\u2019 land to be detached under section 7 \u2014 2b from a school district whose majority is made up of individuals from traditionally underrepresented groups and annexed to an \u201calmost completely\u201d Caucasian school district promotes racial segregation. While it would be inappropriate to speak as to the substantive merits of this claim due to the lack of any developed record on the issue, we do believe that such a claim must he heard in light of the EEOA\u2019s express language prohibiting the \u201cassignment by an educational agency of a student to a school, other than the one closest to his or her place of residence within the school district in which he or she resides, if the assignment results in a greater degree of segregation of students on the basis of race, color, sex, or national origin among the schools of such agency than would result if such student were assigned to the school closest to his or her place of residence.\u201d 20 U.S.C. \u00a71703(c) (2000).\nEducation segregation is in itself an evil which tends to frustrate students in the school and to cause antisocial attitudes and behavior. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 98 L. Ed. 873, 881, 74 S. Ct. 686, 692 (1954). Where the creation or expansion of such segregation exists, the issue must be confronted and addressed as mandated by the EEOA. As drafted, section 7 \u2014 2b, however, denies the Board any opportunity to examine the issue, thereby affording a legal loophole through which the issue can be avoided under the guise of procedural compliance. We do not believe the supremacy clause allows for such an unlawful procedure. Nor do we believe the legislature intended by its language to avoid the reach of the EEOA or to violate its terms. Instead, we hold that the prohibition against hearing any evidence or considering any issue other than compliance with the statutory criteria must be suspended by preemption and that a requirement must be read into the statute that every action taken by an educational agency that involves the assignment of a student to a school district other than the one closest to his or her place of residence must comply with the policy announced in the EEOA pursuant to the supremacy clause. Accordingly, we remand this cause to the Board of Education for the sole purpose of holding a hearing on respondent\u2019s EEOA claim.\nFor the reasons stated above, we vacate the portion of the circuit court\u2019s judgment entitled \u201cConstitutional Issues,\u201d we affirm the findings of the Illinois State Board of Education on those issues that it considered, and remand the matter to the Illinois State Board of Education for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded in part.\nLYTTON, P.J., and CARTER, J., concur.\nFor purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the appellant, the Joliet Township Board of Education, as respondent, which represents its original party classification throughout the proceedings before the Illinois State Board of Education.\nThe current statute has reduced the allowable detachment from 10% to 5%.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE McDADE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Timothy J. Rathbun (argued) and Lisa G. Chastain, both of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, LLC, of Joliet, for appellant.", "Thomas P. Polacek (argued), of McNamara & Phelan, of Joliet, for appellees Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District, Judy J. Jacobs, Wilbur H. Brookman, Maryann L. Brookman, Terry L. Jacobs, and Prairie Bank and Trust Company.", "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, JOLIET TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 204, County of Will, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE BOARD OF EDUCATION, LINCOLN WAY COMMUNITY HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 210, County of Will, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nThird District\nNo. 3-06-0278\nOpinion filed April 19, 2007.\nRehearing denied June 20, 2007.\nTimothy J. Rathbun (argued) and Lisa G. Chastain, both of Rathbun, Cservenyak & Kozol, LLC, of Joliet, for appellant.\nThomas P. Polacek (argued), of McNamara & Phelan, of Joliet, for appellees Board of Education, Lincoln Way Community High School District, Judy J. Jacobs, Wilbur H. Brookman, Maryann L. Brookman, Terry L. Jacobs, and Prairie Bank and Trust Company.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Richard S. Huszagh, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0563-01", "first_page_order": 581, "last_page_order": 592 }