{ "id": 4271156, "name": "COLLEEN ALLTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LISA HINTZSCHE, as Independent Adm'r of the Estate of Guy Blake Allton, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Allton v. Hintzsche", "decision_date": "2007-06-06", "docket_number": "No. 3-05-0771", "first_page": "708", "last_page": "714", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 708" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "390 N.E.2d 506", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "settlement agreement providing that the deceased would \"maintain\" life insurance and name his child as beneficiary required deceased to change the beneficiary of his insurance policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579413 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "settlement agreement providing that the deceased would \"maintain\" life insurance and name his child as beneficiary required deceased to change the beneficiary of his insurance policy" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0900-01" ] }, { "cite": "651 N.E.2d 751", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "754" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 258506 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/273/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "834 N.E.2d 539", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "546" }, { "page": "546" }, { "page": "546" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "359 Ill. App. 3d 706", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5594776 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" }, { "page": "714" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/359/0706-01" ] }, { "cite": "823 N.E.2d 239", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "242" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599963 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "425-26" }, { "page": "426" }, { "page": "426" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "667 F.2d 572", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 463886 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "child entitled to father's life insurance proceeds when a divorce decree required father to change beneficiaries, but he failed to do so" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/667/0572-01" ] }, { "cite": "465 N.E.2d 653", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "125 Ill. App. 3d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3633562 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/125/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "550 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "193 Ill. App. 3d 941", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2499646 ], "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/193/0941-01" ] }, { "cite": "299 N.E.2d 392", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "12 Ill. App. 3d 995", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2851856 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1973, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/12/0995-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 N.E.2d 1319", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542866 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 N.E.2d 1002", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1006" }, { "page": "1007" }, { "page": "1005" }, { "page": "1007" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 1165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268283 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1169" }, { "page": "1169" }, { "page": "1168" }, { "page": "1169" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/1165-01" ] }, { "cite": "708 N.E.2d 559", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 2 }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 578", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511364 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0578-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 Ill. App. 3d 900", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5579413 ], "year": 1979, "opinion_index": 2, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/71/0900-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 572, "char_count": 13767, "ocr_confidence": 0.705, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.168668855370785e-08, "percentile": 0.4293325595430467 }, "sha256": "fb6acd2a617dcc94f5db7d38e774177284eca02447855dc31f5d1039600b5332", "simhash": "1:30be71cece419cc4", "word_count": 2224 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T16:22:18.400209+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "COLLEEN ALLTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LISA HINTZSCHE, as Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Guy Blake Allton, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe defendant, Lisa Hintzsche, the independent administrator of the estate of Guy Blake Allton, appeals from the circuit court\u2019s order directing an insurance company to pay the proceeds of a life insurance policy to the plaintiff, Colleen Allton. Hintzsche argues that Guy and Colleen\u2019s children were entitled to the life insurance proceeds because the marital settlement agreement required Guy to change the policy\u2019s beneficiary from Colleen to the children. We reverse and remand.\nFACTS\nColleen and Guy married on August 8, 2000. They had two children together. On August 10, 2000, Guy obtained a life insurance policy for $100,000. He named Colleen as the primary beneficiary and his father as the successor beneficiary.\nColleen filed for divorce on December 12, 2003. The circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage on May 19, 2004. In its order, the court adopted a marital settlement agreement (Agreement) into which the parties entered. The Agreement contained the following property settlement provision regarding life insurance benefits:\n\u201cEach party shall maintain a life insurance policy upon his or her life, such that upon the death of said party, each child of the parties shall be entitled to receive death benefits, in an amount of not less than $50,000.00 per child. Each party shall be obligated to maintain said policies so long as the parties have an obligation to support the children or contribute to their post-secondary education. Neither party shall cause hens to be secured against said benefits, which would diminish the aforesaid proceeds to a child of the parties. Following the execution hereto, each party agrees to obtain and keep said policies in full force and effect and to designate the children of the parties as the sole irrevocable beneficiaries under said policies. Each party shall provide the other with proof of the existence, terms and provisions of said policies within 30 days of the entry of a Judgment herein and thereafter annually provide proof that said policies have been maintained.\u201d\nThe Agreement also contained the following provision in its \u201cMiscellaneous Provisions\u201d section:\n\u201cEach of the parties, his or her heirs, executors and administrators, in accordance with the terms hereof, upon the demand of the other party, will execute any and all instruments and documents as may be designated herein or as may be reasonably necessary to make effective the provisions of this agreement and release his or her respective interests in any property, real or personal belonging to or awarded to the other. It is the intention of the parties that this Agreement shall constitute a complete adjustment of the property rights of the parties hereto and that each party will perform all subsidiary acts to accomplish same.\u201d\nThe Agreement did not specifically mention Guy\u2019s existing life insurance policy.\nOn November 23, 2004, Guy died in a car accident. Hintzsche, the administrator of Guy\u2019s estate, filed a \u201cPetition to Enforce Divorce Decree and Reform Beneficiary Designation\u201d on June 30, 2005. In the petition, Hintzsche stated that State Farm Insurance Company requested a court order directing the payment of the proceeds of Guy\u2019s life insurance policy because Colleen was claiming that the proceeds should be paid to her despite the Agreement\u2019s provisions. Hintzsche alleged that the life insurance proceeds should be paid to the children, rather than to Colleen.\nAt the hearing on the petition, the court found:\n\u201cThere is nothing in this judgment that required the specific policy that he had at the time of his death or at the time of the judgment to name the children. It specifically says, \u2018following the execution hereto, each party agrees to obtain and keep in full force.\u2019 Well, it says that the parties agree to obtain. That doesn\u2019t mean that the parties agree to change the beneficiaries on the policies as they existed prior to the judgment for dissolution of marriage.\u201d\nThe court denied Hintzsche\u2019s petition and ordered State Farm to pay the policy\u2019s proceeds to Colleen.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Hintzsche argues that the circuit court erred when it ordered State Farm to pay the policy\u2019s proceeds to Colleen. Specifically, Hintzsche argues that the fact that Guy did not change beneficiaries on the life insurance policy does not affect the rights of the children, who were the intended beneficiaries, as evidenced by the Agreement\u2019s language. Colleen contends that the trial court correctly found that the Agreement did not require Guy to make the children the beneficiaries of his existing life insurance policy because the Agreement did not specifically refer to that policy.\nIn Illinois, a divorce decree does not affect the rights of the divorced wife as beneficiary of the husband\u2019s life insurance policy. O\u2019Toole v. Central Laborers\u2019 Pension & Welfare Funds, 12 Ill. App. 3d 995, 299 N.E.2d 392 (1973). However, the rights of the divorced wife could be affected if a property settlement agreement specifically includes a termination of the beneficiary\u2019s interest. See O\u2019Toole, 12 Ill. App. 3d 995, 299 N.E.2d 392. If, pursuant to a divorce decree, the parties agree to change beneficiaries on a life insurance policy but do not do so, equity requires that the proceeds be paid to the persons who should have been named as beneficiaries. Home Insurance Co. v. Hortega, 193 Ill. App. 3d 941, 550 N.E.2d 688 (1990); In re Estate of Comiskey, 125 Ill. App. 3d 30, 465 N.E.2d 653 (1984); Travelers Insurance Co. v. Daniels, 667 F.2d 572 (7th Cir. 1981) (child entitled to father\u2019s life insurance proceeds when a divorce decree required father to change beneficiaries, but he failed to do so).\nWhen interpreting a marital settlement, courts seek to give effect to the parties\u2019 intent. In re Marriage of Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d 423, 425-26, 823 N.E.2d 239, 241 (2005). \u201cThe language used in the marital agreement generally is the best indication of the parties\u2019 intent.\u201d Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 426, 823 N.E.2d at 241. When the terms of the agreement are unambiguous, we determine the parties\u2019 intent solely from the language of the instrument. In re Marriage of Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 706, 714, 834 N.E.2d 539, 546 (2005). An ambiguity exists when an agreement contains language that is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation. Ford v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 240, 244, 651 N.E.2d 751, 754 (1995). \u201cWhere the language is ambiguous, parol evidence may be used to decide what the parties intended.\u201d Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 714, 834 N.E.2d at 546. \u201cWe review de novo an interpretation of a marital settlement agreement and a determination of whether the agreement\u2019s terms are ambiguous.\u201d Dundas, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 426, 823 N.E.2d at 242.\nThe Agreement\u2019s provision on life insurance benefits requires the parties to \u201cmaintain\u201d a life insurance policy for the benefit of the children so long as the parties have an obligation to support the children or contribute to their postsecondary education. The same provision also requires the parties to \u201cobtain and keep said policies in full force and effect and to designate the children of the parties as the sole irrevocable beneficiaries under said policies.\u201d\nWe find that the Agreement\u2019s language is ambiguous because it is susceptible to two different, yet equally plausible, interpretations. On the one hand, the provision can be read to require Guy to maintain the insurance policy he possessed at the time of the divorce and name the children as the beneficiaries of that policy. See Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson, 71 Ill. App. 3d 900, 390 N.E.2d 506 (1979) (settlement agreement providing that the deceased would \u201cmaintain\u201d life insurance and name his child as beneficiary required deceased to change the beneficiary of his insurance policy). Alternatively, the provision can be read to require Guy to obtain an entirely new insurance policy for the benefit of his children. Because the terms of the Agreement are susceptible to two different reasonable interpretations, parol evidence should be introduced to determine the intent of the parties. See Michaelson, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 714, 834 N.E.2d at 546.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed and remanded.\nReversed and remanded.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE LYTTON" }, { "text": "JUSTICE CARTER,\nspecially concurring:\nI agree with the majority opinion that the divorce settlement agreement\u2019s language is ambiguous and susceptible to different interpretations regarding the entitlement to insurance proceeds. Thus, the matter should be reversed and remanded to determine the intent of the parties. I specially concur because I believe, on remand, the trial court should consider whether to impose a constructive trust.\nThe appellant in this case had filed a petition to enforce the judgment and reform the beneficiary designation of a certain life insurance policy on the father. In the brief the appellant also argues that the children had a right to the proceeds of the insurance upon the death of the insured. A vested equitable right to the proceeds of insurance in Illinois can be enforced through the imposition of a constructive trust, if appropriate. See In re Estate of Beckhart, 371 Ill. App. 3d 1165, 1169, 864 N.E.2d 1002, 1006 (2007).\nWhen a settlement agreement requires a parent to name his children as beneficiaries of a life insurance policy and the parent fails to do so, a constructive trust may be imposed on the life insurance proceeds to protect the children\u2019s interests. See Beckhart, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1169, 864 N.E.2d at 1007. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy that may be imposed to redress unjust enrichment caused by one party\u2019s conduct. Charles Hester Enterprises, Inc. v. Illinois Founders Insurance Co., 114 Ill. 2d 278, 499 N.E.2d 1319 (1986).\nThe purpose of a life insurance provision in a settlement agreement is to ensure that the children are adequately supported following the death of a parent. See Beckhart, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1168, 864 N.E.2d at 1005. According to the Agreement, Guy and Colleen were required to perform all necessary acts to accomplish that purpose. Guy was required to make his children beneficiaries of an insurance policy, and Colleen had a responsibility to make sure that Guy fulfilled his obligations to the children by enforcing the obligation to obtain insurance and providing proof of that coverage. It appears that both Guy and Colleen failed to fulfill their duties under the Agreement to ensure that their children were properly named as beneficiaries of insurance following the death of a parent.\nOn remand, I would have the trial court consider whether equity allows Colleen to benefit from her nonfeasance and to divest her children of the interest she and Guy intended under the Agreement. If the trial court finds that Colleen would be unjustly enriched by retaining the insurance proceeds, the court should impose a constructive trust to hold the proceeds solely for the benefit of the children. See Beckhart, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 1169, 864 N.E.2d at 1007.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE CARTER," }, { "text": "HOLDRIDGE, J.,\ndissenting:\nI respectfully dissent. This case presents us with the sole issue of whether the Agreement required Guy to change beneficiaries on his life insurance policy. When construing a contract, courts give the contractual terms their plain and ordinary meaning. Reaver v. Rubloff-Sterling, L.P., 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559 (1999). If the contract\u2019s language is unambiguous, courts must determine the parties\u2019 intent solely from the words of the contract. Reaver, 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559. We review the circuit court\u2019s determination of a contract de novo. Reaver, 303 Ill. App. 3d 578, 708 N.E.2d 559.\nHere, the Agreement reveals that the provision on life insurance benefits does not specifically mention Guy\u2019s life insurance policy. Furthermore, the provision\u2019s plain language requires the parties to obtain life insurance policies, not change an already-existing policy. The two uses of the word \u201cmaintain\u201d are not dispositive and refer to the requirement that the parties keep the policies in effect once they have obtained the policies. In addition, I do not believe that the generic language of the miscellaneous provision required Guy to change the beneficiary designation on his fife insurance policy. Nothing in these provisions can reasonably be construed to indicate that the parties intended the children to be the beneficiaries of Guy\u2019s life insurance policy.\nLincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Watson, 71 Ill. App. 3d 900 (1979), cited by the majority, does not support the disposition. In Lincoln National, the court ordered that the child receive the proceeds of the father\u2019s life insurance policy, even though the father did not change beneficiaries as was required by a previous court order. However, in Lincoln National, unlike the instant matter, the divorce decree specifically required the father to name his children as beneficiaries of his existing life insurance policy. The same cannot be said for this case. I would hold that, under the plain language of the Agreement, Guy was not required to change the beneficiary designation on his life insurance policy, and thus the circuit court properly ordered State Farm to pay the policy\u2019s proceeds to Colleen. I dissent on that basis.", "type": "dissent", "author": "HOLDRIDGE, J.," } ], "attorneys": [ "Richard E Egan, of Costello, McMahon & Burke, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Robert F. Kramer, of Plainfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COLLEEN ALLTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LISA HINTZSCHE, as Independent Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Guy Blake Allton, Deceased, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3-05-0771\nOpinion filed June 6, 2007.\nCARTER, J., specially concurring.\nHOLDRIDGE, J., dissenting.\nRichard E Egan, of Costello, McMahon & Burke, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellant.\nRobert F. Kramer, of Plainfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0708-01", "first_page_order": 726, "last_page_order": 732 }