{ "id": 7327272, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF SHEILA MANNIX, Petitioner-Appellant, and DANIEL SHEETZ, Respondent-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Mannix", "decision_date": "2007-03-30", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20142130", "first_page": "76", "last_page": "84", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 76" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "298 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1073694 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/298/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 386", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281415 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0386-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 208", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872448 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "212", "parenthetical": "\"The provisions of the [Parentage] Act apply to all cases to determine paternity, whether brought under that statute or not\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/0208-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. 2d 523", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 55983 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" }, { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/172/0523-01" ] }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "275 Ill. App. 3d 1074", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 906750 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1088" }, { "page": "1088" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/275/1074-01" ] }, { "cite": "93 D 2984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Dall.", "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 674, "char_count": 20017, "ocr_confidence": 0.797, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18893225049027956 }, "sha256": "804874304482d9a10c2c779cd9b7cf511fc0492d016b2b7475e2142127855713", "simhash": "1:87d3d73750cb02d4", "word_count": 3227 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:59.295026+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF SHEILA MANNIX, Petitioner-Appellant, and DANIEL SHEETZ, Respondent-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn July 2006 the circuit court of Cook County found that Brian Sheetz, a minor, was the child of the marriage of petitioner Sheila Mannix and respondent Daniel Sheetz, and declared respondent the father of the child. Petitioner appeals from the trial court\u2019s decision, arguing that the circuit court had no jurisdiction to hear this matter, and its order therefore should be vacated. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nPetitioner and respondent were married in 1989 and divorced in 1993. During their marriage, they had one child, Kevin. The judgment for dissolution of marriage, which was dated March 12, 1993, stated: \u201c[n]o children were adopted by the parties and the petitioner is not now pregnant.\u201d Seven months later (October 20, 1993), after the dissolution of the marriage, petitioner gave birth to Brian. Respondent was listed as the father on Brian\u2019s birth certificate, which was signed by both petitioner and respondent.\nAccording to an affidavit of petitioner dated July 7, 2005, she began postdivorce litigation in May 2000 to address, among other things, respondent\u2019s \u201cnon-compliance with the basic parental financial obligations of the 1993 Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage.\u201d As an apparent part of this litigation, petitioner filed a petition in the circuit court of Cook County seeking an increase in child support. On June 14, 2001, the court entered an order directing, inter alia, that respondent\u2019s child support obligation be \u201cincreased to the sum of $1000.00 monthly, commencing on July 1, 2001 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter until the younger child Brian attains the age of majority or completes high school, whichever shall last occur.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn March 2005, during a hearing before the circuit court, the attorney who had been appointed child representative informed the court that the \u201csecond child\u201d (Brian) \u201cwas not covered by the [1993] judgment [for dissolution of marriage].\u201d During a subsequent hearing, the court informed petitioner, counsel for respondent, and the child representative that a judicial determination of paternity with regard to Brian \u201cmay have to be done somewhere along the proceedings here so we can get this standing for this child.\u201d\nOn January 13, 2006, petitioner, acting pro se, filed a verified petition to determine parent-child relationship in the circuit court of Lake County. In her petition, which was brought pursuant to the Illinois Parentage Act of 1984 (Parentage Act) (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2004)), petitioner sought, inter alia, \u201c[a] judgment declaring the existence of a parent-child relationship in regard to the minor child, B.S.S. [Brian], declaring that plaintiff is the mother of B.S.S. and further declaring that defendant [Daniel Sheetz] is the father of B.S.S.\u201d Petitioner asserted in her petition that respondent was the father of Brian and that she and respondent were married to each other on the date of Brian\u2019s conception. Petitioner stated, in addition, that: (1) at the time of the (March 12, 1993) dissolution of their marriage, Brian \u201cwas not born, and not known to plaintiff to be in expectancy,\u201d and (2) the judgment for dissolution of marriage contained no findings, including custody provisions, concerning Brian. According to petitioner, the circuit court of Cook County made no subsequent determinations regarding Brian\u2019s custody or parentage. Petitioner added that, since Brian\u2019s birth in October 1993, the child had \u201cresided with and been in [petitioner\u2019s] lawful custody\u201d but that, on October 31, 2005, pursuant to an order of the circuit court of Cook County in case No. 93 D 2984 (the couple\u2019s dissolution of marriage action), temporary custody of Brian was transferred to respondent. Petitioner alleged that, absent any previous determinations regarding Brian\u2019s custody or parentage, the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to transfer custody of Brian to respondent. Petitioner asked that she be awarded temporary and permanent custody of Brian and that respondent be ordered to return Brian to her custody \u201cimmediately.\u201d\nOn March 30, 2006, the circuit court of Cook County granted respondent leave to file a petition to determine Brian\u2019s paternity. In its order, the court stated:\n\u201cLeave is granted Daniel Sheetz within 28 days to file petition for court order that sets the paternity of Brian Sheetz, the child of the parties!,] and Daniel Sheetz affirms that he is the father of child Brian Sheetz[,] and leave [is granted] to attach [petitioner\u2019s] pleading in Lake County which admits [respondent] is Brian\u2019s father. This is a ministerial act as the parties and the pending matter acknowledge said parenthood.\u201d\nIn his amended petition to establish paternity, respondent sought \u201can order making the determination that the Respondent is the natural father of BRIAN SHEETZ.\u201d Respondent pointed to section 5 of the Parentage Act, which states, in pertinent part:\n\u201cA man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:\n(1) he and the child\u2019s natural mother are or have been married to each other, even though the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during such marriage.\u201d 750 ILCS 45/5(a)(l) (West 2004).\nRespondent noted in his amended petition that he and petitioner were married at the time Brian was conceived. Respondent alleged that, \u201c[f]rom the time of the birth of BRIAN both parties have recognized that the Respondent was the father of BRIAN.\u201d Respondent added: \u201c[a]t no time during the last twelve (12) years has the Petitioner ever questioned the paternity of BRIAN.\u201d Attached to respondent\u2019s petition were, inter alia, (1) a copy of Brian\u2019s birth certificate, signed by respondent and petitioner, listing respondent as the father; (2) the June 14, 2001, circuit court order setting, according to respondent, \u201cchild support for both children\u201d; (3) a copy of petitioner\u2019s March 2005 response to a request from respondent to admit facts, in which petitioner admitted that \u201c[t]wo minor children,\u201d Kevin and Brian, were born to her and respondent; and (4) a copy of petitioner\u2019s verified petition to determine parent-child relationship, filed in Lake County, in which, according to respondent, petitioner \u201cadmits that the Respondent is the natural father of BRIAN.\u201d\nPetitioner filed a pro se motion to dismiss respondent\u2019s amended petition to establish paternity, along -with written argument in support of the motion. Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se document titled \u201cPetitioner Sheila Mannix\u2019s Affirmative Defenses To Respondent Daniel Sheetz\u2019s \u2018Amended Petition To Establish Paternity.\u2019 \u201d In these pleadings, petitioner advanced two main arguments. First, she contended that the circuit court had no subject matter jurisdiction or authority (under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Marriage Act) (750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2004))) to modify the parties\u2019 previous judgment for dissolution of marriage by determining Brian\u2019s parentage. Petitioner noted that (1) Brian was \u201cnot in existence\u201d at the time the judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered, (2) this judgment made no mention of Brian, and (3) the judgment for dissolution of marriage did not reserve jurisdiction to make any parentage determination regarding Brian. Petitioner argued further that, since the Marriage Act (according to petitioner) did not confer jurisdiction in this matter, any action to determine Brian\u2019s parentage must be brought under the Parentage Act of 1984 (750 ILCS 45/1 et seq. (West 2004)) rather than the Marriage Act. According to petitioner, respondent\u2019s amended petition to establish paternity was instead brought (under the Marriage Act) as a postjudgment motion with respect to the parties\u2019 1993 judgment for dissolution of marriage.\nPetitioner argued, in addition, that respondent\u2019s petition to establish paternity was barred by her prior petition to determine a parent-child relationship filed in Lake County. Petitioner pointed to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 2004)), which provides, in pertinent part, that a defendant may file a motion for dismissal on the ground \u201c[t]hat there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.\u201d Petitioner asserted that her Lake County petition and respondent\u2019s Cook County petition involved the same parties for the same cause. Petitioner contended that respondent\u2019s petition should be dismissed.\nOn May 19, 2006, the Cook County circuit court denied petitioner\u2019s motion to dismiss respondent\u2019s parentage action. During the proceedings just prior to this denial, the court stated that respondent\u2019s amended petition to establish paternity was not brought under the Parentage Act. According to the court, it was filed \u201cunder the petition to establish that the child born after the divorce, conceived before the divorce, is a child of this relationship.\u201d\nPrior to May 31, 2006, respondent moved in the circuit court of Lake County to transfer venue to Cook County with regard to petitioner\u2019s Lake County petition to determine a parent-child relationship. Respondent also moved to dismiss this petition. On May 31, 2006, the Lake County circuit court denied respondent\u2019s motion to dismiss, but granted his petition to transfer venue to Cook County. However, it does not appear from the record that petitioner\u2019s Lake County petition was ever docketed in Cook County, or that it was consolidated with case No. 93 D 2984, the parties\u2019 action for dissolution of marriage in Cook County.\nOn July 25, 2006, the Cook County circuit court entered an order concluding, among other things, that Brian Sheetz was \u201ca child of the [parties\u2019] marriage having been conceived during the marriage, though born after the dissolution.\u201d The court declared Brian the child of respondent Daniel Sheetz. In its order, the court incorrectly stated that petitioner\u2019s Lake County parentage case had been \u201cconsolidated herein.\u201d\nOn July 31, 2006, petitioner filed a notice of interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(5) (210 Ill. 2d R. 306(a)(5)), and a petition for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 306(a)(5). On September 7, 2006, this court granted the petition for leave to appeal.\nANALYSIS\nWe note, initially, that respondent failed to file an appellee\u2019s brief in this case. In such a circumstance, a court of review has essentially two choices. \u201cWhen the record is simple, and the claimed errors are such that this court can easily decide them on the merits without the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief, this court should decide the appeal on its merits.\u201d Plooy v. Paryani, 275 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 1088 (1995). \u201cOtherwise, if the appellant\u2019s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error and the contentions of the brief find support in the record, the judgment of the trial court may be reversed.\u201d Plooy, 275 Ill. App. 3d at 1088, citing First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).\nIn the underlying proceedings relevant to this appeal, petitioner appeared, for the most part, pro se. As a result, portions of the transcript of proceedings are somewhat confusing. Moreover, the claims at issue are not as easily decided as they might be, given the absence of an appellee\u2019s brief. Nevertheless, we conclude that the record and the issues before us are clear enough that the appeal should be decided on its merits.\nPetitioner argues that the standard of review for this interlocutoiy appeal is de novo. Petitioner acknowledges that, \u201cin an interlocutory appeal, the scope of review is normally limited to an examination of whether or not the trial court abused its discretion in granting or refusing the requested interlocutory relief.\u201d In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523, 526 (1996). However, petitioner asserts that, where the question presented is one of law, a reviewing court determines it independently of the trial court\u2019s judgment. Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d at 526. According to petitioner, the appeal at bar presents \u201ca question of law only,\u201d and the standard of review therefore is de novo. We agree.\nJurisdiction\nPetitioner argues on appeal, as she did below, that the circuit court in the case at bar lacked authority, in a proceeding under the Marriage Act, to determine the parentage of Brian (a determination which, according to petitioner, should be made under the Parentage Act). Specifically, petitioner argues: (1) \u201cthere is no statutory authority in the [Marriage Act] which grants the circuit court the power to hear parentage proceedings in post-judgment matters,\u201d and (2) \u201c[t]here is no provision in the Parentage Act which confers authority on the trial court in the instant case to make a parentage determination\u201d where, as in the case at bar, the child was \u201cnot in existence\u201d at the time the judgment for dissolution of marriage was entered, and the child was \u201cborn out-of-wedlock post judgment to [respondent\u2019s] former spouse and said parties never remarried.\u201d\nIn discussing the Parentage Act, petitioner makes no mention of section 9, which deals with jurisdiction. Section 9(a) states, in pertinent part:\n\u201cThe circuit courts shall have jurisdiction of an action brought under this Act. In any civil action not brought under this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply if parentage is at issue.\u201d 750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2004).\nThis provision contemplates that parentage issues will be raised in civil actions not brought under the Parentage Act. In such instances, section 9(a) directs, the provisions of the Parentage Act \u201cshall apply.\u201d\nIn the case at bar (if respondent\u2019s petition was not brought under the Parentage Act), this is precisely what occurred. Respondent\u2019s petition pointed to section 5(a)(1) of the Parentage Act, which provides:\n\u201c(a) A man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if:\n(1) he and the child\u2019s natural mother are or have been married to each other, even though the marriage is or could be declared invalid, and the child is born or conceived during such marriage.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 45/5(a)(l) (West 2004).\nAttached to respondent\u2019s petition was a copy of petitioner\u2019s verified petition to determine a parent-child relationship which she filed in Lake County. In her petition, petitioner stated: \u201cThe plaintiff [petitioner] and the defendant [respondent] were married to each other on the date of the conception of the minor child, B.S.S. [Brian].\u201d In this assertion, petitioner admitted that Brian was conceived during her marriage to respondent. The same assertion was made by respondent in his verified amended petition to establish paternity. Accordingly, the presumption of paternity set forth in section 5(a)(1) arose. This presumption \u201cmay be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence.\u201d 750 ILCS 45/5(b) (West 2004). Elsewhere in her Lake County parentage pleading, petitioner made another admission: \u201cDefendant Daniel Sheetz is the father of the minor child, B.S.S. [Brian].\u201d\nIn declaring respondent the father of Brian, the circuit court of Cook County applied the provisions of section 5(a)(1) of the Parentage Act. In its order of July 25, 2006, the court stated: \u201cthe court having found that [Brian] is a child of the marriage, having been conceived during the marriage, though born after the dissolution, the said child is the child of Daniel Sheetz, his father.\u201d See In re Marriage of Allen, 265 Ill. App. 3d 208, 212 (1994) (\u201cThe provisions of the [Parentage] Act apply to all cases to determine paternity, whether brought under that statute or not\u201d).\nNotwithstanding the foregoing, petitioner contends that the circuit court in the case at bar lacked authority to determine Brian\u2019s parentage. In support, petitioner points to In re Marriage of Rhodes, 326 Ill. App. 3d 386 (2001). In Rhodes, the parties (Donald and Rhonda) had two children, Ashley and Brian, during their six-year marriage, which was dissolved in 1993. In 2000, Donald executed a written consent to the adoption of Ashley. Donald subsequently moved for a declaration that this consent was invalid. The trial court granted the motion, declaring the consent void and of no effect. On appeal, Rhonda argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter this order. Rhonda noted that the instant action was initiated under the Marriage Act, which, Rhonda argued, did not authorize the trial court to invalidate a written consent to adoption. This court agreed, concluding that written consents to adoption were exclusively governed by the Adoption Act. Rhodes held that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its order, which was vacated.\nPetitioner\u2019s rebanee on Rhodes is misplaced. Rhodes discusses the Adoption Act and, tangentially, the Juvenile Court Act. However, it makes no mention of the Parentage Act, or of section 9(a) of that Act, which provides that, \u201c[i]n any civil action not brought under this Act, the provisions of this Act shall apply if parentage is at issue.\u201d 750 ILCS 45/9(a) (West 2004). Rhodes is distinguishable from the case at bar.\nWe reject petitioner\u2019s argument that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear respondent\u2019s amended petition to establish paternity. We note that, in keeping with section 9(a) of the Parentage Act, the court in the case at bar applied the provisions of section 5(a)(1) of the Parentage Act in rendering its decision.\nPrior Pending Action\nIn her brief to this court, petitioner does not argue, as she did below, that respondent\u2019s amended petition to establish paternity is barred, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) of the Code, by petitioner\u2019s prior action in Lake County to determine parentage. Section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619(a)(3) (West 2004)) provides that a defendant may move for dismissal on the ground \u201c[t]hat there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause.\u201d We note that, while section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) provides for a motion to dismiss on this ground, such dismissal is not mandatory. \u201cEven if the threshold \u2018same parties\u2019 and \u2018same cause\u2019 requirements are met, section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) relief is not mandatory.\u201d Kapoor v. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., 298 Ill. App. 3d 780, 785 (1998).\nThough petitioner does not raise this section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) argument in the instant appeal, she nevertheless points to the trial court\u2019s statement, in its order of July 25, 2006 (declaring parentage), that petitioner\u2019s parentage action in Lake County \u201cwas consolidated herein.\u201d Petitioner emphasizes that this statement indicating that her Lake County action was consolidated with the case at bar \u201cis not true.\u201d We have already noted that this statement was in error. However, given that relief under section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) is not mandatory, as well as petitioner\u2019s failure to advance the section 2 \u2014 619(a)(3) argument in this appeal, we conclude that, for purposes of our decision here, this error is de minimis and of no effect regarding our judgment.\nIn sum, the circuit court correctly declared respondent the father of Brian. Our conclusion in this regard is bolstered by the parties\u2019 admissions that Brian was conceived during their marriage (thereby invoking the section 5(a)(1) presumption of paternity) and petitioner\u2019s admissions and respondent\u2019s acknowledgment that respondent was the father of Brian.\nCONCLUSION\nThe judgment of the circuit court declaring respondent the father of Brian is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL and GARCIA, JJ., concur.\nWith no citation to authority, petitioner asserts that there is an exception where \u201ca judgment reserv[es] a parentage issue,\u201d but adds that this exception \u201cis not relevant to the present case.\u201d", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Bercos, of Mundelein, for appellant.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF SHEILA MANNIX, Petitioner-Appellant, and DANIEL SHEETZ, Respondent-Appellee.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142130\nOpinion filed March 30, 2007.\nRehearing denied June 1, 2007.\nModified opinion filed June 18, 2007.\nMichael Bercos, of Mundelein, for appellant.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "0076-01", "first_page_order": 94, "last_page_order": 102 }