{
  "id": 7327798,
  "name": "JACK V. RODRIQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Division of Professional Regulation, Defendant-Appellee",
  "name_abbreviation": "Rodriquez v. Department of Financial & Professional Regulation",
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    "judges": [
      "FITZGERALD SMITH, EJ., and O\u2019MALLEY, J., concur."
    ],
    "parties": [
      "JACK V. RODRIQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Division of Professional Regulation, Defendant-Appellee."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "JUSTICE McNULTY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn June 2003 the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation charged Dr. Jack Rodriquez with improper treatment of a patient and with failure to document adequately that patient\u2019s medical condition. In discovery Rodriquez sought to depose five persons the Department listed as potential witnesses. The Department refused to issue subpoenas for discovery depositions.\nRodriquez then brought this lawsuit for a judgment declaring that section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law (Department Law) (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 105 (West 2004)) gave Rodriquez a right to issuance of the subpoenas. The trial court dismissed the lawsuit. Rodriquez now appeals.\nThe Department argues that section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 150 (West 2004)) makes section 2105 \u2014 105 inapplicable to the proceedings on the charges against Rodriquez. Section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law provides:\n\u201cNotwithstanding any of the provisions of Section 2105 \u2014 5, 2105 \u2014 15, 2105 \u2014 100, 2105 \u2014 105, 2105 \u2014 110, 2105 \u2014 115, 2105\u2014 120, 2105 \u2014 125, 2105 \u2014 175, 2105 \u2014 200, or 2105 \u2014 325 of this Law, for violations of Section 22 of the Medical Practice Act of 1987 [(the Act) (225 ILCS 60/1 et seq. (West 2004))], the Department shall suspend, revoke, place on probationary status, or take other disciplinary action as it deems proper with regard to licenses issued under that Act only in accordance with Sections 7 and 36 through 46 of that Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 150 (West 2004).\nIn the underlying case the Department charges Rodriquez with violations of section 22 of the Act. Thus, section 2105 \u2014 150 applies to the charges against Rodriquez. Section 2105 \u2014 150 establishes that the Department shall take disciplinary action against Rodriquez only in accordance with the specified sections of the Act, notwithstanding any provisions of section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department Law.\nIn his brief on appeal Rodriquez suggests five reasons for finding that the Department retains the subpoena powers of section 2105\u2014 105 for the proceedings on the charges against him: (1) waiver, (2) past Department practice, (3) our decision in Sharma v. Zollar, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1022 (1994), (4) limitation of section 2105 \u2014 150 solely to disciplinary actions, and (5) a proposed harmonization of section 2105 \u2014 150 with section 2105 \u2014 105. In a motion filed a week before oral argument, Rodriquez added an argument asking us to declare section 2105 \u2014 150 invalid. We denied the untimely motion without prejudice to Rodriquez\u2019s right to raise the issue in a separate proceeding.\nFirst Rodriquez argues that the Department waived the argument concerning section 2105 \u2014 150 by failing to raise it in the trial court. We may affirm the trial court\u2019s decision on any basis that finds adequate support in the record. City of Chicago v. Holland, 206 Ill. 2d 480, 492 (2003). As the Department\u2019s argument relies solely on the interpretation of statutes, and not at all on any facts, we choose to address the argument on its merits.\nNext, Rodriquez points to the subpoenas the Department issued him in this case. He argues that sections 36 through 46 of the Act include no authorization for such pretrial subpoenas. Thus, the Department in this case (and, according to Rodriquez\u2019s counsel, in numerous past cases) exercised powers beyond those permitted under the Department\u2019s interpretation of section 2105 \u2014 150. Rodriquez\u2019s argument shows only that the Department may have misconstrued its powers in the past.\nRodriquez does not expressly argue that the Department\u2019s past practice estops it from denying his request for subpoenas. If he had made such an argument, it would have failed because he could not show detrimental reliance on the Department\u2019s past practice. See Baldwin v. Wolff, 294 Ill. App. 3d 373, 378 (1998). Rodriquez claims that he responded to a subpoena when the Department interviewed him, but the subpoena does not appear in the record. The Department answers that it interviewed Rodriquez pursuant to its investigatory powers under section 36 of the Act. 225 ILCS 60/36 (West 2004). The response to such an investigation does not show detrimental reliance on the Department\u2019s past use of its subpoena power.\nThe Department actually issued some of the subpoenas Rodriquez sought, and he benefitted from those subpoenas by gaining access to information otherwise unavailable. Without any detrimental reliance, the Department\u2019s past practice provides no grounds for ignoring the express directive of section 2105 \u2014 150.\nNext, Rodriquez contends that this court, in Sharma, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 1030-31, decided that the predecessor of section 2105 \u2014 105 applied to proceedings on alleged violations of section 22 of the Act. However, in that case neither party directed our attention to the predecessor of section 2105 \u2014 150 and we had no occasion to discuss the effect of that statute on the Department\u2019s procedures. See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 127, par. 60m.\nRodriquez suggests that section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law limits only the kinds of disciplinary dispositions the Department can make in cases under the Act and that it has no effect on the procedures for reaching those dispositions. The proposed interpretation makes most of the specifications in section 2105 \u2014 150 meaningless. The section fists several procedural sections and expressly states that those sections do not apply to cases under the Act. Sections 2105 \u2014 105, 2105 \u2014 110, 2105 \u2014 115, and 2105 \u2014 120, all specifically rendered inapplicable to cases under the Act, pertain strictly to Department procedures for attendance of witnesses, administration of oaths, and preparation of transcripts and reports. Under Rodriquez\u2019s proposed interpretation of section 2105 \u2014 150, the reference in that section to section 2105 \u2014 105, 2105 \u2014 110, 2105 \u2014 115 and 2105 \u2014 120 has no meaning. We presume that the legislature intended some consequence to follow from the express reference to section 2105 \u2014 105 in section 2105 \u2014 150. See McNamee v. Federated Equipment & Supply Co., 181 Ill. 2d 415, 423 (1998).\nSection 2105 \u2014 150 also specifies several purely procedural sections of the Act that, according to section 2105 \u2014 150, govern cases brought under the Act. See 225 ILCS 60/38, 39, 45 (West 2004). Rodriquez\u2019s proposed interpretation would read the specifications of those sections out of section 2105 \u2014 150.\nRodriquez presents the specter of a parade of horrible consequences that will follow if the Department applies section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law, and stops using, in proceedings under the Act, the sections of the Department Law enumerated in section 2105 \u2014 150. For example, he claims that without section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 105 (West 2004)), the Department will lack authority to \u201ctake evidence *** [or] administer oaths *** at hearing.\u201d Section 38 expressly provides the power to administer oaths and take evidence in proceedings on alleged violations of section 22 of the Act. 225 ILCS 60/38 (West 2004). Rodriquez claims that without section 2105 \u2014 115 of the Department Law (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 115 (West 2004)), the Department will lack \u201cauthority to use stenographers at hearing for the purpose of creating a record.\u201d Section 39 of the Act, expressly referenced in section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law, requires the Department to provide a stenographer for all proceedings for violations of the Act. 225 ILCS 60/39 (West 2004).\nRodriquez also claims that without section 2105 \u2014 120 (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 120 (West 2004)), the Disciplinary Board will lack authority to make findings and recommendations, but section 40 of the Act establishes just such authority. 225 ILCS 60/40 (West 2004). Rodriquez argues that without section 2105 \u2014 125 (20 ILCS 2105/2105 \u2014 125 (West 2004)), the Department will lack authority to restore licenses, but section 43 of the Act provides exactly that authority. 225 ILCS 60/43 (West 2004). A detailed comparison of the Act with the sections rendered inapplicable under section 2105 \u2014 150 demonstrates the legislature\u2019s intention to restrict all proceedings on complaints under section 22 of the Act to the procedures established in the Act.\nFinally, Rodriquez contends that we should harmonize section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department Law with section 2105 \u2014 150 by finding that the Department has all the subpoena powers granted by section 38 of the Act as well as all of the subpoena powers granted by section 2105 \u2014 105. The proposal does not seem to reconcile the sections as much as it nullifies the specification in section 2105 \u2014 150 that the Department shall act on these charges only in accordance with the subpoena powers granted in section 38 of the Act.\nBecause section 2105 \u2014 150 of the Department Law expressly makes section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department Law inapplicable to the proceedings under the Act against Rodriquez, the Department has for this case only the subpoena powers listed in section 38 of the Act and not the broader powers provided in section 2105 \u2014 105 of the Department Law. Section 38 of the Act does not authorize the subpoenas for discovery depositions that Rodriquez seeks in his action for a declaratory judgment. See Smith v. Department of Registration & Education, 170 Ill. App. 3d 40, 44-45 (1988). Accordingly we affirm the judgment dismissing Rodriquez\u2019s complaint.\nAffirmed.\nFITZGERALD SMITH, EJ., and O\u2019MALLEY, J., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "JUSTICE McNULTY"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Stephen Roth and Nancy Brent, both of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Paul Racette, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appel-lee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "JACK V. RODRIQUEZ, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION, Division of Professional Regulation, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20141717\nOpinion filed June 22, 2007.\nStephen Roth and Nancy Brent, both of Chicago, for appellant.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General, and Paul Racette, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appel-lee."
  },
  "file_name": "0270-01",
  "first_page_order": 288,
  "last_page_order": 292
}