{ "id": 7327889, "name": "UNILEVER BEST FOODS NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Timothy Collofello, Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Unilever Best Foods North America v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Commission", "decision_date": "2007-06-19", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20142395WC", "first_page": "314", "last_page": "319", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 314" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "563 N.E.2d 951", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2566763 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "995" }, { "page": "998" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "657 N.E.2d 1039", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927666 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "79" }, { "page": "78" }, { "page": "78-79" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "603 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "151 Ill. 2d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3291449 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "415" }, { "page": "414-16" }, { "page": "414-16" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/151/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "691 N.E.2d 134", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35450 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "689" }, { "page": "692" }, { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "689" }, { "page": "695", "parenthetical": "Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J." } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0685-01" ] }, { "cite": "399 N.E.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "78 Ill. 2d 327", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3075322 ], "year": 1980, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/78/0327-01" ] }, { "cite": "294 Ill. App. 3d 685", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 35450 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "693-94", "parenthetical": "Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J." }, { "page": "694-97", "parenthetical": "Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J." } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/294/0685-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 495, "char_count": 12799, "ocr_confidence": 0.793, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.18893862151808852 }, "sha256": "f5d68fa4624f76e46e40d4c1b09d1497140db4cf882db4e10a91d80fa55da1a7", "simhash": "1:8270c58b8ef0f2ad", "word_count": 2095 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:59.295026+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "McCullough, p.j., and GROMETER and DONOVAN, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "UNILEVER BEST FOODS NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Timothy Collofello, Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nUnilever Best Foods North America (Unilever) appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County dismissing its petition for judicial review of a decision of the Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission (Commission). We affirm.\nThe facts of this case are not in dispute. The claimant, Timothy Collofello, filed an application for adjustment of claim pursuant to the Workers\u2019 Compensation Act (Act) (820 ILCS 305/1 et seq. (West 2004)), seeking benefits for injuries he alleged that he received while in the employ of Unilever on June 14, 2004. Following a hearing held pursuant to section 19(b) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(b) (West 2004)), an arbitrator issued a decision in which he found that the claimant suffered accidental injuries on June 14, 2004, arising out of and in the course of his employment with Unilever. The arbitrator awarded the claimant temporary total disability benefits under the Act at the rate of $590.24/week for a period of ll6/7 weeks and ordered Unilever to pay $14,338.77 for medical services provided to the claimant.\nUnilever filed a petition for review of the arbitrator\u2019s decision before the Commission. In a unanimous decision, the Commission affirmed and adopted the arbitrator\u2019s decision and remanded the matter back to the arbitrator for further proceedings pursuant to Thomas v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 78 Ill. 2d 327, 399 N.E.2d 1322 (1980).\nUnilever filed a petition for judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decision in the circuit court of Cook County. When it filed its action for judicial review, Unilever filed a bond executed by one of its attorneys, Sandy Echeveste. In addition to the bond, Unilever filed a \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond\u201d pursuant to the terms of which Mark F. Slavin, its attorney, was authorized to sign the bond filed with the circuit court as principal in lieu of one of Unilever\u2019s corporate officers. The document was signed by Barry A. Patterson, Unilever\u2019s human resource manager.\nThe claimant moved to quash the summons issued by the clerk of the court and dismiss the review action for a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction by reason of Unilever\u2019s failure to file a bond in accordance with the provisions of section 19(f)(2) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2004)). Specifically, the claimant asserted both that Patterson is not one of Unilever\u2019s corporate officers and, therefore, lacked the authority to sign the \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond,\u201d and that the individual who actually signed the bond on behalf of Unilever as principal was not the person authorized to do so pursuant to the terms of the \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond.\u201d\nUnilever filed a response to the claimant\u2019s motion attached to which were the affidavits of Barry A. Patterson and Mark F. Slavin. In Patterson\u2019s affidavit he stated that he was \u201cauthorized to bind Best Foods/Unilever including as to signing a Statement of Authority in support of Bond.\u201d He also stated that he \u201cauthorized Mark F. Slavin, Slavin & Slavin, or his associate Attorneys working under his direction to sign the Statement of Authority in Support of Bond Form.\u201d Slavin stated in his affidavit that \u201cBest Foods/Unilever has extended authorization to *** Mark F. Slavin, and to Slavin & Slavin, including any Associate Attorney working under my direction and hereby ratify that Attorney Sandy Echeveste, was authorized to sign the Statement of Authority in Support of Bond and Bond Certiorari on my behalf.\u201d The response and attached affidavits were filed with the circuit court more than 20 days after Unilever\u2019s receipt of the Commission\u2019s decision.\nThe circuit court granted the claimant\u2019s motion and dismissed Unilever\u2019s action for judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decision. Thereafter, Unilever filed the instant appeal.\nIn urging reversal of the circuit court\u2019s order dismissing its action, Unilever appears to argue that the bond which it filed satisfied the provisions of section 19(f)(2) of the Act because it was signed by an associate attorney at Slavin & Slavin working under the direction of Mark F. Slavin who was authorized to sign the bond on Unilever\u2019s behalf. Unilever relies in support of its argument upon this court\u2019s decision in First Chicago v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 685, 691 N.E.2d 134 (1998).\nIn First Chicago, we held that the corporate plaintiff should have been allowed to present evidence more than 20 days after receipt of the Commission\u2019s decision, establishing that the individual who signed its bond was a corporate officer with authority to sign the bond and bind the corporation. First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 689. As a consequence, we reversed the dismissal of First Chicago\u2019s action for judicial review of a Commission decision and remanded the matter back to the circuit court with directions to allow First Chicago to present evidence as to the identity of the individual who signed its bond and, if appropriate, consider the merits of First Chicago\u2019s petition for review. First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 692. For the reasons that follow, however, we find First Chicago distinguishable and Unilever\u2019s rebanee upon its holding misplaced.\nSection 19(f)(1) of the Act (820 ILCS 305/19(f)(l) (West 2004)) sets forth the requirements for seeking a judicial review of a Commission decision. The statute provides that a proceeding for review must be commenced within 20 days of the receipt of notice of the Commission\u2019s decision. It also provides that, within that 20-day period, a written request for the issuance of a summons must be made. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(l) (West 2004). However, before a summons can be issued, a bond must be tendered to the clerk of the court. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2004). That bond must be executed by the party against whom the Commission rendered its award. 820 ILCS 305/19(f)(2) (West 2004); Deichmueller Construction Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 151 Ill. 2d 413, 414, 603 N.E.2d 516 (1992).\nIn Berryman Equipment v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 276 Ill. App. 3d 76, 79, 657 N.E.2d 1039 (1995), we held that evidence of an attorney\u2019s authority to sign a bond as principal in lieu of a corporate officer of a party to a judicial review action must be filed with the bond in order to invoke subject-matter jurisdiction under the Act. In this case, Eche-veste signed the bond as \u201cattorney for\u201d Unilever. However, the \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond\u201d which was filed with the bond authorized only Mark F. Slavin to execute a bond on behalf of Unilever. Nevertheless, Unilever, relying upon the affidavits of Patterson and Slavin and our decision in First Chicago, asserts that the bond satisfies the requirements of section 19(f)(2) of the Act.\nIn First Chicago, the bond at issue was signed \u201cFirst Chicago /s/ John A. Bradley.\u201d In response to the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss and after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period under section 19(f)(1) of the Act, First Chicago filed a pleading in which it identified Bradley as one of its vice-presidents. In reversing the trial court\u2019s dismissal of First Chicago\u2019s action for failure to comply with the bond requirements of section 19(f)(2), we held that the Act does not require an individual signing an appeal bond on behalf of a corporation to identify his or her status as an officer of the corporation on the face of the bond. First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 688-89. We also held that affidavits may be submitted after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period in order to identify the individual that signed the bond as a corporate officer with authority to bind the corporation. First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 689. In so holding, we acknowledged a line of cases in which the plaintiffs had filed affidavits after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period either ratifying their attorneys\u2019 actions in signing a bond or confirming their attorneys\u2019 authority to do so. See Deichmueller, 151 Ill. 2d at 415; Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 78; Illinois Armored Car Corp. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 993, 995, 563 N.E.2d 951 (1990). What we failed to acknowledge, however, was the fact that in each of those cases it was clearly held that a trial court may not consider evidence filed after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period in order to establish an attorney\u2019s authority to sign an appeal bond as principal on behalf of a plaintiff in a judicial review action brought pursuant to the Act. First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 695 (Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.); see also Deichmueller, 151 Ill. 2d at 414-16; Berryman Equipment, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 78-79; Illinois Armored Car, 205 Ill. App. 3d at 998.\nIn First Chicago, we sanctioned a procedure by which a corporation was able, after the expiration of the 20-day statutory review period, to identify the individual that signed an appeal bond on its behalf as an officer of the corporation. We have never authorized a plaintiff in a judicial review proceeding under the Act to submit evidence after the expiration of the review period establishing that its attorney was authorized to execute a bond on its behalf. See Deichmueller, 151 Ill. 2d at 414-16.\nEcheveste is not alleged to be an officer of Unilever authorized to sign bonds and bind the corporation. It is not his identity as a corporate officer that the affidavits submitted in support of Unilever\u2019s response to the claimant\u2019s motion to dismiss attempted to establish. Rather, the Patterson and Slavin affidavits attempted to establish Echeveste\u2019s authority as an attorney representing the corporation to execute a bond on its behalf. Consequently, this case is readily distinguishable from the circumstances in First Chicago and falls clearly within our holding in Berryman Equipment.\nThere was nothing on file in this case within the 20-day review period established pursuant to section 19(f)(1) of the Act indicating that Echeveste had the authority to execute a bond on behalf of Unilever. The \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond\u201d filed with the bond granted that authority to Mark E Slavin only. In the absence of evidence of Echeveste\u2019s authority to sign the bond filed within the statutory review period, the bond filed by Unilever failed to satisfy the requirements of section 19(f)(2) of the Act.\nThe foregoing analysis leads us to conclude that the circuit court lacked the necessary subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain Unilever\u2019s action for judicial review of the Commission\u2019s decision in this case, and the action was properly dismissed. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the circuit court and remand this cause back to the Commission for further proceedings. Our resolution of the matter makes it unnecessary for us to address the claimant\u2019s additional argument concerning Patterson\u2019s authority to execute the \u201cStatement of Authority in Support of Bond.\u201d\nAffirmed and remanded.\nMcCullough, p.j., and GROMETER and DONOVAN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HOFFMAN" }, { "text": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE,\nspecially concurring:\nI dissented from the majority opinion in First Chicago v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 294 Ill. App. 3d 685 (1998). In my view: \u201c[Ujnless the bond is signed by an officer or director, i.e., someone who customarily has authority to bind the corporation in financial matters ***, then the authority of the party signing the bond must accompany the bond. Whether that person is an employee of the corporation, a nonemployee-agent, or an attorney is without significance.\u201d First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 693-94 (Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.). In other words, regardless of who signs the bond, I would not allow evidence of their corporate authority to be submitted after the 20-day jurisdictional period. See First Chicago, 294 Ill. App. 3d at 694-97 (Rakowski, J., dissenting, joined by Holdridge, J.).\nIn the instant case, attorney Sandy Echeveste signed the bond without providing any contemporary evidence that he was authorized to bind Unilever financially. The only contemporary evidence of such authority pertained to a different attorney \u2014 Mark E Slavin. Evidence of Echeveste\u2019s authority was not submitted until after the 20-day jurisdictional period expired. For these reasons, I concur in the majority\u2019s decision that Unilever failed to vest the circuit court with subject matter jurisdiction.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE," } ], "attorneys": [ "Slavin & Slavin, of Chicago (Santiago J. Echeveste, of counsel), for appellant.", "Lannon, Lannon & Barr, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard J. Barr, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "UNILEVER BEST FOODS NORTH AMERICA, Appellant, v. ILLINOIS WORKERS\u2019 COMPENSATION COMMISSION et al. (Timothy Collofello, Appellee).\nFirst District (Illinois Workers\u2019 Compensation Commission Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142395WC\nOpinion filed June 19, 2007.\nSlavin & Slavin, of Chicago (Santiago J. Echeveste, of counsel), for appellant.\nLannon, Lannon & Barr, Ltd., of Chicago (Richard J. Barr, Jr., of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0314-01", "first_page_order": 332, "last_page_order": 337 }