{ "id": 7328556, "name": "MARJORIE O'CASEK, as Special Adm'x of the Estate of Carla Thompson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHILDREN'S HOME AND AID SOCIETY OF ILLINOIS, a/k/a The Children's Foundation, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "O'Casek v. Children's Home & Aid Society of Illinois", "decision_date": "2007-06-25", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201406\u20140344", "first_page": "507", "last_page": "515", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 507" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "781 N.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257", "parenthetical": "\"[o]nly if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "426", "parenthetical": "\"[o]nly if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "641 N.E.2d 525", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "529" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "161 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 783174 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "510" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/161/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "676 N.E.2d 1374", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1377", "parenthetical": "Fourth District" }, { "page": "1377" }, { "page": "1377" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 920", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544496 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "924", "parenthetical": "Fourth District" }, { "page": "924" }, { "page": "925" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0920-01" ] }, { "cite": "806 N.E.2d 632", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "634" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "209 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5461847 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/209/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "839 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "516" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828618 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "519" }, { "page": "519" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0481-01" ] }, { "cite": "849 N.E.2d 366", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "403", "parenthetical": "waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the courts" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 30", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5703903 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "96-97", "parenthetical": "waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the courts" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0030-01" ] }, { "cite": "837 N.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "930" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828469 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "664" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "815 N.E.2d 994", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "996", "parenthetical": "\"a circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1016", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083889 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1020", "parenthetical": "\"a circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/1016-01" ] }, { "cite": "545 N.E.2d 689", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "695" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569745 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "837 N.E.2d 74", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "86" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3827828 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "354" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 N.E.2d 465", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "61 Ill. 2d 277", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2966304 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/61/0277-01" ] }, { "cite": "553 N.E.2d 281", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "283", "parenthetical": "when a statute is declared unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ah initio" }, { "page": "283" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "135 Ill. 2d 384", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3256710 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "390", "parenthetical": "when a statute is declared unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ah initio" }, { "page": "390" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/135/0384-01" ] }, { "cite": "1995 Ill. Laws 284", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "2005 Ill. Laws 4964", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "689 N.E.2d 1057", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 367", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801349 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0367-01" ] }, { "cite": "1998 Ill. Laws 48", "category": "laws:leg_session", "reporter": "Ill. Laws", "weight": 3, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fourth District" }, { "page": "901" }, { "page": "902" }, { "page": "904-05" }, { "page": "904-05" }, { "page": "905" }, { "page": "906" }, { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3363320 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Fourth District" }, { "page": "656" }, { "page": "658" }, { "page": "660-61" }, { "page": "659-60" }, { "page": "661" }, { "page": "663" }, { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0654-01" ] }, { "cite": "830 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 528", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 898", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 654", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3363320 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0654-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 893, "char_count": 22053, "ocr_confidence": 0.801, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.450847642454685e-08, "percentile": 0.4442923120228245 }, "sha256": "bd405ab9c2a7b7e3b24477ea17eeef1fda241599b7cc62851799d14115af53b9", "simhash": "1:633f57b0a321ade6", "word_count": 3575 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:59.295026+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "MYERSCOUGH, J., concurs." ], "parties": [ "MARJORIE O\u2019CASEK, as Special Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Carla Thompson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHILDREN\u2019S HOME AND AID SOCIETY OF ILLINOIS, a/k/a The Children\u2019s Foundation, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arises out of medical treatment given to the 17-year-old decedent, Carla Thompson, in August 2000. Plaintiff, Marjorie O\u2019Casek, the special administratrix of Thompson\u2019s estate, filed a medical-malpractice claim in August 2002 against defendants, the Children\u2019s Home and Aid Society of Illinois (CHASI), OSF St. Joseph Healthcare Systems (OSF), and treating physicians Dr. Susan G. Em-merson and Dr. Richard D. Castillo.\nPlaintiff originally filed her complaint in August 2002. She voluntarily dismissed the complaint in February 2003 and refiled in February 2004. Plaintiff\u2019s refiled complaint did not contain the physician\u2019s report as required by section 2 \u2014 622(a)(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(1) (West 2004)), and instead plaintiff attached an affidavit under subsection (a)(2), requesting an additional 90 days to file a physician\u2019s report.\nDefendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to this court\u2019s decision in Cargill v. Czelatdko, 353 Ill. App. 3d 654, 818 N.E.2d 898 (2004) (Fourth District), appeal denied, 214 Ill. 2d 528, 830 N.E.2d 1 (2005). Cargill held that Public Act 90 \u2014 579 (Pub. Act 90 \u2014 579, \u00a75, eff. May 1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48, 48)) resurrected language held unconstitutional in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (1997). This \u201cresurrected\u201d language required an affiant requesting a 90-day extension under subsection (a)(2) to state that she had not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same acts. On April 18, 2005, the trial court, relying on Cargill, dismissed plaintiff\u2019s complaint with prejudice, reasoning that because plaintiff would never be able to state that she had not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same acts, she would never be able to comply with the statute.\nOn May 17, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider and, on September 23, 2005, a supplement thereto, alleging for the first time that Cargill was wrongly decided. The trial court denied plaintiffs motion to reconsider.\nAfter this court decided Cargill, the legislature amended section 2 \u2014 622 by Public Act 94 \u2014 677 (Pub. Act 94 \u2014 677, \u00a7330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4995-98)). As section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) stands at the time of this opinion, there is no language concerning voluntary dismissals. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West Supp. 2005). In fact, Public Act 94 \u2014 677\u2019s prefatory language to the newly amended version of section 2 \u2014 622 essentially disowned the voluntary-dismissal language that had been declared unconstitutional in Best, stating the \u201c[t]ext of [sjection [2 \u2014 622] [is] WITHOUT the changes [held unconstitutional in Best].\u201d (Capitalization in original.) Pub. Act 94 \u2014 677, \u00a7330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws at 4964, 4995). According to the 2005 legislature, the voluntary-dismissal language disappeared with Best and was never reenacted. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn August 29, 2000, decedent Thompson underwent an elective tonsillectomy procedure at OSF. Thompson was a 17-year-old, mentally retarded ward of the state who resided at CHASI. Thompson was sent back to CHASI on the day of her surgery and apparently fell into cardiac and respiratoiy failure the next day. Thompson returned to OSF, where she died of bronchopneumonia. Plaintiff alleges that defendants did not properly respond to Thompson\u2019s complaints and symptoms of bronchopneumonia, that they did not properly administer antibiotics, and that the medical defendants negligently nicked or stabbed Thompson\u2019s uvula (the small, mucus-covered muscle that hangs down in the back of the throat), which led to infection. .\nOn August 30, 2002, plaintiff filed an amended complaint and attached an affidavit under section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2), requesting an additional 90 days to obtain a physician\u2019s report as required by section 2 \u2014 622(a)(1). 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 2002). On December 23, 2002, after more than 90 days had passed, Dr. Emmer-son filed a section 2 \u2014 619 motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that plaintiff had not complied with section 2 \u2014 622(a)(1). 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 619, 2 \u2014 622(g) (West 2002). On February 18, 2003, before the trial court had ruled on Dr. Emmerson\u2019s motion, plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the complaint without prejudice, which the trial court granted.\nOn February 23, 2004, plaintiff refiled her complaint. Again plaintiff attached an affidavit stating that plaintiff had been unable to file the written report as required by section 2 \u2014 622(a)(1) and requested a 90-day extension to file the same. On May 21, 2004, within 90 days of refiling, plaintiff filed a physician\u2019s report authored by Dr. James Bryant.\nBetween February and April 2005, defendants each filed motions to dismiss the complaint on the ground that, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2), in order to benefit from the 90-day extension period, plaintiff\u2019s affidavit must indicate that plaintiff had not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same or substantially the same acts. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West 2004). Defendants argued that because plaintiff would never be able to truthfully state that she had not previously voluntarily dismissed the action, plaintiff could never comply with the requirements of section 2 \u2014 622.\nOn April 18, 2005, the trial court held a hearing on defendants\u2019 motions to dismiss. Plaintiff did not dispute the precedential legitimacy of Cargill at the motion-to-dismiss hearing. The trial court found that section \u201c[2 \u2014 ]622 says what it says, which is that on a refiling after a voluntary dismissal, *** you don\u2019t get a second [chance to refile the] certificate within 90 days.\u201d\nOn May 17, 2005, plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider, and on September 23, 2005, plaintiff filed a supplement to said motion. Plaintiff basically argued that Cargill, which held that Public Act 90\u2014 579 reenacted language prohibiting 90-day extensions upon refiling after a voluntary dismissal, was wrongly decided. Plaintiff argued that, when she refiled her complaint in February 2004, the statute did not prohibit 90-day extensions for plaintiffs who had previously voluntarily dismissed.\nIn November 2005, defendants filed motions to strike plaintiff\u2019s motion to reconsider and supplement thereto on the ground that plaintiff inappropriately raised new arguments that could have been raised at the motion-to-dismiss hearing. On February 28, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on plaintiffs motion to reconsider and supplement thereto. Defendants\u2019 primary argument was that the trial court should not even reach the merits of plaintiffs new Cargill argument because it was not timely made. On the merits, defendants argued that Cargill was correctly decided. The trial court stated that it would take the matter under advisement.\nOn March 22, 2006, the trial court denied plaintiffs motion to reconsider in a docket entry. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nThe issue in this case involves the relationship between Public Act 89 \u2014 7, addressed by this court in our 2004 Cargill decision, and the legislature\u2019s subsequent amendment, Public Act 94 \u2014 677, effective August 25, 2005.\nA. The Cargill Decision and the Legislative History of Section 2 \u2014 622 Through the Release of Cargill\nIn Cargill, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their complaint because they were unable to obtain a physician\u2019s report as required by section 2 \u2014 622(a)(1). The plaintiffs then refiled their complaint and asked for a 90-day extension to obtain the physician\u2019s report. In sum, the defendants argued that the version of section 2 \u2014 622 in effect at the time the plaintiffs refiled their complaint did not allow 90-day extensions for plaintiffs who had previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same acts. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 656, 818 N.E.2d at 901. This court agreed.\nIn 1995, the legislature passed the sweeping Civil Justice Reform Amendments and, through Public Act 89 \u2014 7, amended section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) to prohibit 90-day extensions for those plaintiffs who had previously voluntarily dismissed their complaints. Pub. Act 89 \u2014 7, \u00a715, eff. March 9, 1995 (1995 Ill. Laws 284, 291 (amending 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622 (West 1994))). Pursuant to Public Act 89 \u2014 7, subsection (a)(2) contained the following underlined additions:\n\u201c[Plaintiffs attorney shall attach an affidavit that states] [t]hat the plaintiff has not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based upon the same or substantially the same acts, omissions, or occurrences and that the affiant was unable to obtain a consultation required by paragraph 1 because a statute of limitations would impair the action.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 622(a)(2) (West 1996) (hereinafter referred to as the \u201ccivil-reform\u201d version of section 2 \u2014 622).\nIn 1997, the Illinois Supreme Court in Best, 179 Ill. 2d 367, 689 N.E.2d 1057, found \u201ccore provisions\u201d of Public Act 89 \u2014 7 unconstitutional and voided the entire act on the principle of inseverability. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 818 N.E.2d at 902. The effect of Best was to make the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622 void ah initio. See, for example, People v. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d 384, 390, 553 N.E.2d 281, 283 (1990) (when a statute is declared unconstitutional in its entirety, it is void ah initio). The law is returned to its state prior to the adoption of the unconstitutional statute. Gersch, 135 Ill. 2d at 390, 553 N.E.2d at 283. As applied here, this means that the pre-1995 version of section 2 \u2014 622 once again became effective. The pre-1995 version of section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) did not contain any language regarding voluntary dismissals or any other qualifications on the 90-day extension period.\nOn February 4, 1998, less than two months after the Best decision was released, the legislature passed Public Act 90 \u2014 579 (Pub. Act 90\u2014 579, eff. May 1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48)). Section 5 of Public Act 90\u2014 579 added the following underlined language to subsection (a)(1):\n\u201cIf the affidavit is filed as to a defendant who is a physician licensed to treat human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery, a dentist, a podiatrist, a psychologist, or a naprapath, the written report must be from a health professional licensed in the same profession.\u201d Pub. Act 90 \u2014 579, \u00a75, eff. May 1, 1998 (1998 Ill. Laws 48, 49) (hereinafter referred to as the \u201cnaprapath\u201d amendment to section 2 \u2014 622).\nPublic Act 90 \u2014 579 then repeated the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2), which prohibited a 90-day extension upon refiling after a voluntary dismissal, showing no additions or deletions were made by Public Act 90 \u2014 579. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 660-61, 818 N.E.2d at 904-05.\nAs stated above, we held in Cargill that Public Act 90 \u2014 579, which contained the naprapath amendment, resurrected the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 659-60, 818 N.E.2d at 904-05. We went on to hold that the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2) plainly stated that if a physician\u2019s report is not attached to the complaint, the plaintiff must attach an affidavit indicating she has not previously dismissed an action based on the same or substantially the same acts. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 661, 818 N.E.2d at 905. Further, we held that because the plaintiffs would never be able to truthfully state that they had not voluntarily dismissed their complaint, the plaintiffs\u2019 complaint was rightfully dismissed with prejudice. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 663, 818 N.E.2d at 906.\nIn holding that Public Act 90 \u2014 579 resurrected the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622(a)(2), this court relied on the presumption that where statutes are enacted after judicial opinions are published, the legislature acted with the knowledge of prevailing case law. Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 658, 818 N.E.2d at 903. In other words, any repetition of the language contained in the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622 must have been a purposeful reenactment of said version because the legislature was presumably aware that the civil-reform version had been declared unconstitutional in Best.\nB. Legislative Actions Subsequent to Cargill\nIn 2005, in amending section 2 \u2014 622 through Public Act 94 \u2014 677, the legislature explicitly rejected the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622, stating the \u201c[t]ext of [s]ection [2 \u2014 622] [is] WITHOUT the changes made by PA. 89 \u2014 7, which has been held unconstitutional.\u201d (Capitalization in original.) Pub. Act 94 \u2014 677, \u00a7330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4995). Public Act 94 \u2014 677 repeated the pre-1995 version of section 2 \u2014 622 as a source or template (with the exception that the \u201cnaprapath\u201d amendment made by Public Act 90 \u2014 579 was inserted into the pre-1995 version of subsection (a)(1)), and made the following underlined additions to subsection (a)(2):\n\u201c2. That the affiant was unable to obtain a consultation [as] required by paragraph 1 because a statute of limitations would impair the action and the consultation required could not be obtained before the expiration of the statute of limitations. If an affidavit is executed pursuant to this paragraph, the affidavit and written report required by paragraph 1 shall be filed within 90 days after the filing of the complaint. No additional 90-day extensions pursuant to this paragraph shall be granted, except where there has been a withdrawal of plaintiff\u2019s counsel.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 622(a)(2) (West Supp. 2005) (as enacted by Pub. Act 94 \u2014 677, \u00a7330, eff. August 25, 2005 (2005 Ill. Laws 4964, 4997)).\nIn repeating the pre-1995 version of section 2 \u2014 622 as a source to surround the amendments made by Public Act 94 \u2014 677, the legislature was fulfilling its requirements under section 8(d) of the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I\\\u00a3 \u00a78(d). Section 8(d) requires that a bill amending a law shall set forth completely the section amended. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IY \u00a78(d). Generally, portions of the old law that are repeated either literally or in substance should not be taken as a \u201cnew enactment\u201d but rather as a \u201ccontinuation\u201d of the old law. People v. Bullard, 61 Ill. 2d 277, 281, 335 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1975); U.S. Bank National Ass\u2019n v. Clark, 216 Ill. 2d 334, 354, 837 N.E.2d 74, 86 (2005); 5 ILCS 70/2 (West 1998).\nGiven the 2005 passage of Public Act 94 \u2014 677 and its accompanying amendments to section 2 \u2014 622, the question now becomes \u201cwhen did the civil-reform language, including the voluntary-dismissal language, disappear from the statute\u201d? According to Public Act 94\u2014 677, the civil-reform language disappeared with Best and was never reenacted. This is clear from the fact that the legislature specifically rejected the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622 as a source for its 2005 amendments and instead \u201ccontinued\u201d the pre-1995 version of the statute (with the exception of the naprapath amendment). The legislature recognized Public Act 90 \u2014 579 for its naprapath amendment, but not, in contradiction to Cargill\u2019s assessment of Public Act 90 \u2014 579\u2019s effect, for any reenactment of the civil-reform language.\nC. Remaining Arguments\nThough not dispositive of our ruling, we address defendants\u2019 remaining arguments. Defendants argue that the principles of waiver, stare decisis, and statutory interpretation should have prevented us from reexamining Cargill.\nWhere new issues are raised for the first time in a motion to reconsider or supplement thereto, and where there is a reasonable explanation for why the additional issues were not raised at the original hearing, the trial court has the discretion to address them. Delgatto v. Brandon Associates, Ltd., 131 Ill. 2d 183, 195, 545 N.E.2d 689, 695 (1989). Defendants argue that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in dismissing plaintiffs motion to reconsider pursuant to Delgatto. However, the record here does not indicate that the trial court denied the motion to reconsider based on untimeliness \u2014 the trial court might just have likely denied the motion because the doctrine of stare decisis would have prevented the trial court from overruling Cargill in order to find for plaintiff on the merits. See, for example, Schramer v. Tiger Athletic Ass\u2019n of Aurora, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1020, 815 N.E.2d 994, 996 (2004) (\u201ca circuit court must follow the precedent of the appellate court of its district\u201d).\nOn a related note, the doctrine of waiver does not prevent us from addressing the merits of plaintiff\u2019s argument, especially where plaintiffs argument on appeal invokes this court\u2019s duty to maintain a sound body of precedent. See Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill. 2d 653, 664, 837 N.E.2d 922, 930 (2005); see also In re Estate of Funk, 221 Ill. 2d 30, 96-97, 849 N.E.2d 366, 403 (2006) (waiver is a limitation on the parties and not on the courts).\nLikewise, the doctrine of stare decisis does not prevent us from reexamining Cargill. \u201c \u2018The doctrine of stare decisis \u201cexpresses the policy of the courts to stand by precedents and not to disturb settled points.\u201d [Citations.]\u2019 \u201d People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 519, 839 N.E.2d 492, 516 (2005), quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 81, 806 N.E.2d 632, 634 (2004). Typically, stare decisis considerations are to be given great weight in the area of statutory construction. People v. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d 920, 924, 676 N.E.2d 1374, 1377 (1997) (Fourth District). This is because departure from the precedent amounts to an amendment to the statute itself. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 924, 676 N.E.2d at 1377. Further, because the legislature is presumed to know of judicial interpretation of statutes, the legislature\u2019s inaction suggests agreement with the judicial interpretation. Antoine, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 925, 676 N.E.2d at 1377.\nStare decisis is not an \u201cinexorable command.\u201d Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 519, 839 N.E.2d at 516. Prior decisions may only be overturned for good cause, compelling and articulable reason, or to bring the court\u2019s prior ruling on the issue into agreement with experience and newly ascertainable facts. Chicago Bar Ass\u2019n v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 161 Ill. 2d 502, 510, 641 N.E.2d 525, 529 (1994). Here, as discussed above, Public Act 94 \u2014 677, not in existence when this court decided Cargill, constitutes \u201cnewly ascertainable information\u201d that is sufficiently compelling to break from the doctrine of stare decisis in order to reexamine Cargill.\nFinally, the rules of statutory construction do not prevent this court from examining the legislative history of section 2 \u2014 622. Defendant Emmerson argues that it is not proper for this court to examine the legislative history of section 2 \u2014 622 where the language of section 2 \u2014 622 as set forth in Public Act 90 \u2014 579 is clear and unambiguous. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 426, 781 N.E.2d 249, 257 (2002) (\u201c[o]nly if the statutory language is ambiguous may we consider extrinsic aids for construction, such as legislative history, to determine legislative intent\u201d). Defendant Emmerson\u2019s argument misunderstands the issue. The question is not whether the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622, if validly resurrected, plainly prohibits a 90-day extension where a plaintiff has previously voluntarily dismissed. The question is whether Public Act 90 \u2014 579 did in fact resurrect the civil-reform version of section 2 \u2014 622. We now conclude it did not.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nBecause Public Act 90 \u2014 579 did not reenact the civil-reform language regarding voluntary dismissals, plaintiff in the instant case was not statutorily prohibited from receiving a 90-day extension to file the medical report. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court.\nReversed and remanded.\nMYERSCOUGH, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" }, { "text": "JUSTICE KNECHT,\ndissenting:\nSimply put, Cargill, 353 Ill. App. 3d 654, 818 N.E.2d 898, appeal denied, 214 Ill. 2d 528, 830 N.E.2d 1 (2005), was correctly decided, and we should affirm.\nThe majority uses a flawed approach to the issue. The legislative correction encompassed by Public Act 94 \u2014 677 was a response to what may have been a mistake in Public Act 90 \u2014 579. Public Act 90 \u2014 579 resurrected the voluntary-dismissal language at issue in this case by printing it in the Act. That may not have been the legislature\u2019s intent. Perhaps no one recognized Public Act 90 \u2014 579 would be interpreted to resurrect the voluntary-dismissal language. If this was a legislative miscue, the chalk was reapplied by the enactment of Public Act 94\u2014 677. However, during the time period between the miscue in Public Act 90 \u2014 579 and the correction in Public Act 94 \u2014 677, the law required an affiant requesting a 90-day extension to file a physician\u2019s report to state she had not previously voluntarily dismissed an action based on the same acts.\nThe trial court properly relied on our precedent established in Cargill to dismiss plaintiffs complaint with prejudice. The majority proposes to reverse that careful adherence to precedent by deferring to a later legislative enactment that attempts to say that is not what the law was because that is not what we wanted it to be. The legislature does not interpret its enactments \u2014 the courts do. We have done so, and we should adhere to precedent.", "type": "dissent", "author": "JUSTICE KNECHT," } ], "attorneys": [ "Nicola A. Tancredi (argued), of Oakbrook Terrace, for appellant.", "Paid C. Estes and Nancy G. Lischer (argued), both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLF\u00a1 of Chicago, for appellees OSF St. Joseph Healthcare Systems and Richard D. Castillo.", "Christopher L. Nyweide (argued), of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, for appellee Susan G. Emmerson." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MARJORIE O\u2019CASEK, as Special Adm\u2019x of the Estate of Carla Thompson, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE CHILDREN\u2019S HOME AND AID SOCIETY OF ILLINOIS, a/k/a The Children\u2019s Foundation, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201406\u20140344\nArgued February 22, 2007.\nOpinion filed June 25, 2007.\nRehearing denied July 26, 2007.\nNicola A. Tancredi (argued), of Oakbrook Terrace, for appellant.\nPaid C. Estes and Nancy G. Lischer (argued), both of Hinshaw & Culbertson, LLF\u00a1 of Chicago, for appellees OSF St. Joseph Healthcare Systems and Richard D. Castillo.\nChristopher L. Nyweide (argued), of Livingston, Barger, Brandt & Schroeder, of Bloomington, for appellee Susan G. Emmerson." }, "file_name": "0507-01", "first_page_order": 525, "last_page_order": 533 }