{ "id": 7328653, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS DUFF, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Duff", "decision_date": "2007-06-26", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20142110", "first_page": "599", "last_page": "608", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 599" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "861 N.E.2d 967", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "592" }, { "page": "605" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "826 N.E.2d 1274", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 284", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749114 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "292-93" }, { "page": "293" }, { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0284-01" ] }, { "cite": "609 N.E.2d 740", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "242 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5121532 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "658" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "436 N.E.2d 667", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "106 Ill. App. 3d 993", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3030849 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1002" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/106/0993-01" ] }, { "cite": "444 N.E.2d 576", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1982, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "111 Ill. App. 3d 741", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5437934 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "744" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/111/0741-01" ] }, { "cite": "607 N.E.2d 1189", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820581 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "69" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "643 N.E.2d 1295", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "268 Ill. App. 3d 224", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 381804 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/268/0224-01" ] }, { "cite": "429 N.E.2d 526", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. 2d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3030946 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "157" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/87/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "853 N.E.2d 754", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 770", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264566 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" }, { "page": "785" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0770-01" ] }, { "cite": "386 U.S. 18", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6168882 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1967, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/386/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "841 N.E.2d 889", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875001 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" }, { "page": "428", "parenthetical": "\"we conclude that Crawford violations are subject to harmless-error analysis\"" }, { "page": "428" }, { "page": "437" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "730 N.E.2d 1166", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186535 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "471 U.S. 409", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6203741 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "414" }, { "page": "431" }, { "page": "2082" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/471/0409-01" ] }, { "cite": "842 N.E.2d 1141", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 838", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5767075 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "850" }, { "page": "850" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0838-01" ] }, { "cite": "772 N.E.2d 380", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A judicial confession is a voluntary acknowledgment of guilt during a judicial proceeding, such as a plea of guilty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209165 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025", "parenthetical": "\"A judicial confession is a voluntary acknowledgment of guilt during a judicial proceeding, such as a plea of guilty\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 516", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436132 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594" }, { "page": "593" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "702 N.E.2d 249", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"[Wlaiver is a bar upon the parties and not upon the court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "299 Ill. App. 3d 926", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 221443 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "931", "parenthetical": "\"[Wlaiver is a bar upon the parties and not upon the court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/299/0926-01" ] }, { "cite": "659 N.E.2d 922", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"A general objection results in a waiver of the claim of error unless (1) the grounds for the objection were clear from the record, (2) trial counsel's assistance was ineffective [citation], or (3) there was plain error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "168 Ill. 2d 176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 307273 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193", "parenthetical": "\"A general objection results in a waiver of the claim of error unless (1) the grounds for the objection were clear from the record, (2) trial counsel's assistance was ineffective [citation], or (3) there was plain error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/168/0176-01" ] }, { "cite": "606 N.E.2d 279", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 260", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5156491 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "275" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0260-01" ] }, { "cite": "377 N.E.2d 17", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"Also inadmissible for purposes of proving the guilt of the defendant on trial, but admissible for purposes of impeaching the co-defendant or accomplice, is evidence that a co-defendant or accomplice has pleaded guilty or has been convicted of the same offense\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "72 Ill. 2d 36", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5443247 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "42", "parenthetical": "\"Also inadmissible for purposes of proving the guilt of the defendant on trial, but admissible for purposes of impeaching the co-defendant or accomplice, is evidence that a co-defendant or accomplice has pleaded guilty or has been convicted of the same offense\"" }, { "page": "42" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/72/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 21, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "1374" }, { "page": "63-64" }, { "page": "200" }, { "page": "1371-72" }, { "page": "51-52" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "51-52" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "1364" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 953, "char_count": 19923, "ocr_confidence": 0.807, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.186438258869652e-08, "percentile": 0.4301382049687067 }, "sha256": "f8a5b50250c9b1db424a7a121bf91ceee28bb039b4aabe79789eb6a9d872cac2", "simhash": "1:2bfe5d2a36591cfc", "word_count": 3235 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:59.295026+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "HOFFMAN and HALL, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS DUFF, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case requires us to measure the harm caused by a violation of the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront witnesses against him.\nFollowing a bench trial, defendant Travis Duff was convicted of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment.\nDefendant contends: (1) he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when the court allowed the prosecution to elicit evidence regarding the codefendant\u2019s guilty plea; (2) the court erred by failing to allow defense counsel to elicit the reason for the guilty plea; (3) the statute mandating a $5 fee for deposit in the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust is unconstitutional; (4) he is entitled to a $295 credit against his mandatory drug assessment for the time he spent in custody; and (5) the trial court erred in imposing a $20 penalty for the Violent Crimes Assistance Fund.\nWhile we agree testimony about the codefendant\u2019s guilty plea violated the defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confrontation, we find the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We see no other error that would seriously question the conviction. We affirm the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence, although we grant him some relief from the mandatory drug assessment and the penalty for the Violent Crimes Assistance Fund.\nFACTS\nOn July 16, 2004, at 10:50 p.m., Chicago police officer Edward May was conducting surveillance in the vicinity of 201 South Kil-patrick Street. He saw three different people approach defendant and Samuel Taylor. Defendant and Taylor were standing within 10 feet of each other. After each person handed defendant an amount of money, defendant would turn around and hold his index finger in the air to signal Taylor. Taylor would then walk to a flower pot near the corner, pick up a brown vial, remove an object, and hand the object to the person who handed defendant the money.\nAfter the third transaction, Officer May radioed his partners. Officers Bora and McGenya stopped defendant and Taylor and recovered a brown vial from the flower pot with 26 plastic packets inside, each containing an amount of \u201cwhite rocky substance.\u201d A custodial search of defendant revealed $25. The parties stipulated that an expert in forensic science tested 15 of the 26 packets found within the vial. The 15 packets tested positive for the presence of cocaine.\nJohn Armstead, defendant\u2019s uncle, testified on his behalf. Arm-stead testified he paid defendant $25 earlier in the day for helping him fix up an apartment. Armstead was not present when defendant and Taylor were arrested. On cross-examination, the State asked Arm-stead the following questions:\n\u201cQ. You talk about Samuel Taylor. He was your nephew as well?\nA. Yes, he was.\nQ. He was arrested with your nephew here, right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And that nephew pled guilty. Are you aware of that?\nMS. MINER [defense counsel]: Objection, your Honor.\nTHE COURT: Overruled.\nTHE WITNESS: I am aware that he pled guilty.\nQ. But they were both arrested at the same time. Were you aware of that? Were you told that?\nA. I was told that, too.\u201d\nOn redirect, Armstead said Taylor did not appear in court on March 24 because his car broke down during his drive from St. Louis. After his mother and sister picked him up, Taylor appeared in court the next day and was immediately arrested. When defense counsel asked whether Taylor was to be held in custody until his trial, Arm-stead responded: \u201cHe plead [sic] guilty because he told me that he had got another job.\u201d The trial court sustained the State\u2019s hearsay objection to Armstead\u2019s response.\nThe defendant testified he spent the morning on the day of his arrest helping Armstead with landscaping and diywall in exchange for $25. After helping their aunt prepare for a block party, defendant and Taylor went to a liquor store with defendant\u2019s brother and his brother\u2019s girlfriend in Taylor\u2019s car. While defendant and Taylor were parked on the corner of Adams and Kilpatrick, the police came up through an alley and stopped them. The officers told them to get on their knees. Defendant heard the officers but remained standing. Defendant denied ever receiving money from people on the corner and denied seeing Taylor go over to the flower pot to retrieve drugs. The parties stipulated to defendant\u2019s four prior felony convictions.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Defendant was found Class X eligible and sentenced to six years\u2019 imprisonment. Defendant appeals.\nDECISION\nI. Right to Confrontation\nDefendant contends he was denied his constitutional right to confrontation when the trial court allowed the State to elicit evidence regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea, in violation of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004). Defendant also contends the admission of the guilty plea violated Illinois evidentiary principles. See People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 42, 377 N.E.2d 17 (1978) (\u201cAlso inadmissible for purposes of proving the guilt of the defendant on trial, but admissible for purposes of impeaching the co-defendant or accomplice, is evidence that a co-defendant or accomplice has pleaded guilty or has been convicted of the same offense\u201d). The defendant does not specify which \u201cevidentiary principles\u201d he is referring to. For that reason, we focus on his constitutional claim.\nInitially, we note defense counsel made only a general objection to the State\u2019s question regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea. A general objection raises only the question of relevance. People v. Buie, 238 Ill. App. 3d 260, 275, 606 N.E.2d 279 (1992). Because defense counsel did not specifically object on sixth amendment grounds, we could find the general objection resulted in the forfeiture of the Crawford issue. See People v. Simms, 168 Ill. 2d 176, 193, 659 N.E.2d 922 (1995) (\u201cA general objection results in a waiver of the claim of error unless (1) the grounds for the objection were clear from the record, (2) trial counsel\u2019s assistance was ineffective [citation], or (3) there was plain error\u201d). However, we choose to consider the merits of defendant\u2019s contention. See People v. Roberts, 299 Ill. App. 3d 926, 931, 702 N.E.2d 249 (1998) (\u201c[Wlaiver is a bar upon the parties and not upon the court\u201d). We also observe the State does not contend in its brief that defendant\u2019s general objection waived the confrontation issue.\nThe sixth amendment\u2019s confrontation clause provides that, \u201c[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. VI. In Crawford, the Supreme Court held the confrontation clause bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.\nThe Court declined to specifically define what constitutes a \u201ctestimonial\u201d statement. However, it gave some examples of testimonial statements \u2014 testimony at preliminary hearings, testimony before a grand jury or at a prior trial, in-court guilty plea statements of coconspirators to show existence of a conspiracy, and statements made during police questioning, including accomplice statements and statements against penal interest. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374; People v. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594, 812 N.E.2d 516 (2004).\nNo Illinois case has directly addressed whether a codefendant\u2019s guilty plea should be considered a testimonial statement under Crawford. Illinois courts have noted, however, that a guilty plea is tantamount to a confession. See People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1025, 772 N.E.2d 380 (2002) (\u201cA judicial confession is a voluntary acknowledgment of guilt during a judicial proceeding, such as a plea of guilty\u201d). The Crawford court specifically condemned admitting an accomplice\u2019s or codefendant\u2019s confession into evidence. People v. Brown, 363 Ill. App. 3d 838, 850, 842 N.E.2d 1141 (2005), citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 63-64, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 200, 124 S. Ct. at 1371-72. Because a codefendant\u2019s confession is clearly considered \u201ctestimonial,\u201d we find a codefendant\u2019s guilty plea should also be considered \u201ctestimonial\u201d within the meaning of Crawford. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193, 124 S. Ct. at 1364; Brown, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 850. Defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine Taylor.\nNotwithstanding, the State contends Crawford does not apply here because the guilty plea was used merely to impeach Armstead\u2019s testimony, not for its truth and not as substantive evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. The State contends the confrontation clause \u201cdoes not bar the use of testimonial statements for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 198 n.9, 124 S. Ct. at 1370 n.9, citing Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414, 85 L. Ed. 2d 425, 431, 105 S. Ct. 2078, 2082 (1985). The State notes circumstances \u201cmay. be developed on cross-examination that lie \u2018 \u201cwithin the knowledge of the witness which explain, qualify, discredit or destroy\u201d \u2019 the direct testimony of the witness. [Citations.]\u201d People v. Hernandez, 313 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786, 730 N.E.2d 1166 (2000).\nThe State\u2019s position in this case borders on the frivolous. The constant repetition of the impeachment theory in the State\u2019s brief does little to improve its merit. Taylor\u2019s guilty plea did not impeach Armstead or render his testimony implausible. Armstead testified he paid defendant $25 to help him remodel an apartment. He admitted he was not actually present when the alleged drug transactions took place. Taylor\u2019s guilty plea had absolutely no bearing on Armstead\u2019s limited testimony. Testimony regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea had no probative value as impeachment of Armstead.\nContrary to the State\u2019s contention, the codefendant\u2019s guilty plea was clearly admitted to establish the truth of the matter asserted, namely, that the codefendant had admitted guilt to the same crime defendant was charged with. The guilty plea served as direct evidence of defendant\u2019s guilt. As our supreme court noted in Sullivan, \u201c[a] defendant who is separately tried is entitled to have his guilt or innocence determined upon the evidence against him without being prejudged according to what has happened to another.\u201d Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d at 42.\nUnder Crawford, the admission of the testimony regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea violated the confrontation clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193, 124 S. Ct. at 1364; People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 423, 841 N.E.2d 889 (2005); Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 593.\nOur analysis does not end here, however. We must now determine whether the admission of testimony regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967); Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d at 428 (\u201cwe conclude that Crawford violations are subject to harmless-error analysis\u201d); People v. Sullivan, 366 Ill. App. 3d 770, 785, 853 N.E.2d 754 (2006).\nIn Patterson, the supreme court recognized \u201cthree different approaches for measuring error under this harmless-constitutional-error test: (1) focusing on the error to determine whether it might have contributed to the conviction, (2) examining the other evidence in the case to see if overwhelming evidence supports the conviction, and (3) determining whether the improperly admitted evidence is merely cumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.\u201d Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d at 428, citing People v. Wilkerson, 87 Ill. 2d 151, 157, 429 N.E.2d 526 (1981).\n\u201e Here, Officer May testified he saw three different people approach defendant and Samuel Taylor. After each person handed defendant an amount of money, defendant would turn around and hold his index finger in the air to signal Taylor. Taylor would then walk to a flower pot near the corner, pick up a brown vial, remove an object, and hand the object to the person who handed defendant the money. The officers recovered a brown vial from the flower pot with 26 plastic packets inside, each containing an amount of \u201cwhite rocky substance.\u201d The 15 packets tested for narcotics indicated the presence of cocaine. Even without Armstead\u2019s testimony regarding Taylor\u2019s guilty plea, Officer May\u2019s testimony was more than sufficient to support the conviction. We find the State\u2019s evidence in this case was overwhelming. See Sullivan, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 785.\nWe also note the State never mentioned Taylor\u2019s guilty plea during opening statement or closing argument. Moreover, nothing in the record indicates the trial court actually considered the guilty plea in determining defendant\u2019s guilt. At a bench trial, \u201cthe [trial] judge is presumed to know the law and to consider only proper evidence in rendering judgment.\u201d People v. Gonzalez, 268 Ill. App. 3d 224, 231, 643 N.E.2d 1295 (1994); People v. Todd, 154 Ill. 2d 57, 69, 607 N.E.2d 1189 (1992).\nThe defendant contends the trial judge must have considered the guilty plea evidence because he overruled the defense objection to its admissibility.\nIn People v. Alford, 111 Ill. App. 3d 741, 444 N.E.2d 576 (1982), relied on by defendant, the trial court overruled an objection to uncharged other crimes evidence offered in a bench trial. This court determined the evidence was improperly admitted. We held reversal was required for two reasons: first, overruling the objection meant the trial judge must have thought the evidence had some probative value; second, the trial court made comments that indicated it was considering the improper evidence. Alford, 111 Ill. App. 3d at 744.\nIn People v. Barbour, 106 Ill. App. 3d 993, 436 N.E.2d 667 (1982), cited in Alford, the trial court overruled the defense objections to other crimes evidence and made comments that indicated it considered highly prejudicial propensity evidence when reaching its guilty verdict. Barbour, 106 Ill. App. 3d at 1002. In both Alford and Barbour it was the combination of ruling and comment that rebutted the presumption only admissible evidence was used to convict the defendants. Muddying the waters in this case is defense counsel\u2019s failure to raise the confrontation clause in its objection. We cannot know why the trial court overruled the objection.\nIn this case, the trial court never suggested it was considering the guilty plea evidence. It analyzed other, persuasive, admissible evidence when reaching its verdict.\nWe find the State\u2019s single, isolated reference to Taylor\u2019s guilty plea was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d at 437; Sullivan, 366 Ill. App. 3d at 785.\nII. Redirect Testimony\nDefendant contends the trial court erred by failing to allow defense counsel to elicit the reason for Taylor\u2019s guilty plea during Armstead\u2019s redirect, violating his right to a fair trial.\n\u201cThe scope of redirect examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling will not be disturbed *** [absent] a clear abuse of discretion resulting in manifest prejudice to the defendant.\u201d People v. Crisp, 242 Ill. App. 3d 652, 658, 609 N.E.2d 740 (1992).\nIn this case, when defense counsel asked whether Taylor was to be held in custody until his trial, Armstead responded: \u201cHe plead [sic] guilty because he told me that he had got another job.\u201d The trial court sustained the State\u2019s hearsay objection. Although defendant admits the question posed elicited a hearsay response, he argues the court should have permitted it under the doctrine of curative admissibility. We disagree.\nUnder the doctrine of curative admissibility, a party may present inadmissible evidence where necessary to cure undue prejudice resulting from an opponent\u2019s introduction of similar evidence. People v. Liner, 356 Ill. App. 3d 284, 292-93, 826 N.E.2d 1274 (2005). \u201cThe doctrine is limited in scope, is merely protective, and goes only as far as necessary to shield a party from unduly prejudicial inferences raised by the other side.\u201d Liner, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 293.\nHere, the defendant was allowed to question Armstead concerning the circumstances leading to Taylor\u2019s guilty plea. Armstead testified Taylor did not appear in court on March 24 because his car broke down during his drive from St. Louis.. After his mother and sister picked him up, Taylor appeared in court the next day and was immediately arrested. Taylor pled guilty soon after. The trial court barred defense counsel from eliciting a purely hearsay statement from Arm-stead. Defense counsel chose not to rephrase the question or pursue the issue further. Even without Armstead\u2019s hearsay response, we find the gist of defense counsel\u2019s questioning remained clear. Armstead\u2019s response was not necessary to shield defendant from any prejudice stemming from the admission of Taylor\u2019s guilty plea. See Liner, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 293. Besides, we have held there is no indication Taylor\u2019s guilty plea was used by the trial court when it convicted the defendant.\nAccordingly, in light of the record before us, we find the trial court did not err in sustaining the State\u2019s hearsay objection.\nIII. Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund\nDefendant contends the trial court erred in imposing a $20 fine for the Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund. 725 ILCS 240/10(e)(2) (West 2004). According to the section imposing the fine, the fine may be assessed only when no other fines have been imposed. 725 ILCS 240/10(c)(2) (West 2004). The State agrees that this court should vacate the fine because other fines, such as the drug assessment fine and Trauma Fund Fine, were assessed on the defendant. We agree. Accordingly, we vacate the $20 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine.\nIV Credit Against Mandatory Drug Assessment\nThe defendant and the State agree he is entitled to a $295 credit against his controlled substance assessment fine for the time he spent in custody prior to sentencing. Defendant was assessed a $1,000 drug assessment fine. 720 ILCS 570/411.2(i) (West 2004). Pursuant to section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, defendant should receive a credit of $5 per day for the 30 days he spent in custody prior to sentencing, as long as that amount does not exceed the amount of fines imposed. 725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14(a) (West 2004). The credit applies to the drug assessment fine. People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569, 592, 861 N.E.2d 967 (2006). Accordingly, we order that the fees and costs order be modified to reflect a $295 credit toward defendant\u2019s drug assessment fine.\nV Spinal Cord Fund Fee\nDefendant has abandoned his constitutional challenge to the $5 charge payable to the Spinal Cord Injury Paralysis Cure Research Trust Fund (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141.1(c) (West 2004)) following the supreme court\u2019s decision in Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 605, finding the statute constitutional. We do not disturb the trial court\u2019s imposition of the $5 charge.\nCONCLUSION\nWe affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment. We vacate the $20 Violent Crime Victims Assistance Fund fine, and we modify the fees and costs order to reflect a $295 credit toward defendant\u2019s drug assessment fine.\nAffirmed in part, vacated in part, and modified.\nHOFFMAN and HALL, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier, Jessica Mann, and Jessica Wynne Arizo, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Sasha J. Wiesen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TRAVIS DUFF, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20142110\nOpinion filed June 26, 2007.\nMichael J. Pelletier, Jessica Mann, and Jessica Wynne Arizo, all of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon Malavia, and Sasha J. Wiesen, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0599-01", "first_page_order": 617, "last_page_order": 626 }