{ "id": 7328995, "name": "GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LULA STOVAL, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Stoval", "decision_date": "2007-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20141858", "first_page": "1064", "last_page": "1079", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 1064" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 563", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267643 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "572" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0563-01" ] }, { "cite": "273 Ill. App. 3d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "273 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5118696 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1045" }, { "page": "1048" }, { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/242/1042-01" ] }, { "cite": "184 Ill. App. 3d 693", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2639398 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "697", "parenthetical": "the provisions of part 5 of article 9 of the UCC govern the rights and remedies under motor vehicle security agreements" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/184/0693-01" ] }, { "cite": "271 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 249246 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "320" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/271/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828550 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "613" }, { "page": "613" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 151", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132506 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" }, { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0151-01" ] }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 855", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3950045 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0855-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1032, "char_count": 35266, "ocr_confidence": 0.796, "pagerank": { "raw": 2.245752675146177e-07, "percentile": 0.7806460917219498 }, "sha256": "f50d3b43032b5c6faaf7c6437a49dd939a8a12796c99c66fa1034b534b1396a2", "simhash": "1:a99f75aa59c96866", "word_count": 5914 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:10:59.295026+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [ "CAMPBELL and MURPHY, JJ., concur." ], "parties": [ "GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LULA STOVAL, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case arises out of a cause of action filed by plaintiff General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) against defendant Lula Stoval, seeking the entry of a replevin order to recover an automobile and damages for breach of contract. GMAC appeals from orders of the circuit court granting judgment in favor of defendant and denying GMAC\u2019s motion to stay the circuit court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence. On appeal, GMAC contends that the circuit court erred in granting judgment in favor of defendant where the court improperly applied notice provisions under section 9 \u2014 611 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) (as enacted by Illinois, 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 611 (West 2002)); the court improperly found that GMAC was required to produce a copy of a notice allegedly sent to defendant; and the court improperly held that the failure to provide such notice under section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC was an absolute bar to the entry of a deficiency judgment against defendant. GMAC also contends that the circuit court abused its discretion by denying GMAC\u2019s motion to stay the judgment and reopen evidence in this case. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.\nI. Background\nOn July 8, 2005, GMAC filed a verified complaint against defendant seeking to recover a 2002 Chevrolet Cavalier automobile and money damages. Count I of the complaint asserted a cause of action for replevin pursuant to section 19 \u2014 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 (West 2002)). Count II sought damages for breach of contract against defendant for the full amount claimed to be due to GMAC pursuant to a sales contract for the vehicle at issue and interest, attorney fees and costs incurred by GMAC.\nDefendant was served with process on August 3, 2005, and a replevin hearing was scheduled for October 11, 2005. On or about September 12, 2005, the vehicle at issue was recovered from Birdie Moore, whose address was provided by defendant. On October 11, 2005, count I of GMAC\u2019s verified complaint was voluntarily dismissed with prejudice. The vehicle was sold for $5,300 at a public auction on October 13, 2005.\nOn March 21, 2006, the circuit court held a bench trial as to count II of GMAC\u2019s complaint. The parties submitted a bystander\u2019s report of the proceedings, which showed that Mike Pappas testified for GMAC and defendant testified on her own behalf. The circuit court received into evidence: (1) a copy of the retail installment contract executed by defendant in conjunction with the purchase of the vehicle at issue; (2) a copy of the certificate of title for the vehicle at issue; and (3) a copy of the \u201cPost-sale Calculation of Surplus or Deficiency Notice\u201d (Deficiency Letter), which was sent by GMAC to defendant.\nMike Pappas testified for GMAC that he was an account collection manager and was responsible for collecting defendant\u2019s delinquent account. Pappas testified that on August 22, 2002, defendant executed a retail installment contract in conjunction with the purchase of the vehicle. Pappas testified that pursuant to the terms of the retail installment contract, GMAC was granted a security interest in the vehicle purchased and GMAC perfected its security interest by recording its lien of the vehicle\u2019s certificate of title. Pappas testified that, on or about April 6, 2005, defendant defaulted on the payments required of her pursuant to the retail installment contract and failed to cure the default at any time subsequent thereto. Pappas then testified that on July 8, 2005, GMAC filed suit to recover the vehicle and collect on the balance due to GMAC pursuant to the retail installment contract. Pappas testified that GMAC obtained possession of the vehicle on or about September 12, 2005, from Birdie Moore, whose address was provided by defendant.\nPappas testified that based upon his review of GMAC\u2019s records regarding the events in question, after recovering the vehicle GMAC sent to defendant a \u201cNotice of Our Plan to Sell Property\u201d (Notice). Pappas testified that the Notice informed defendant that GMAC had recovered possession of the vehicle due to defendant\u2019s default under the retail installment contract and would sell the vehicle at public auction on a date certain if defendant did not redeem the vehicle by making certain payments to defendant. Pappas testified that the vehicle was subsequently sold at a public auction at Milwaukee Auto Auction, in a commercially reasonable manner on or about October 13, 2005.\nPappas testified that the method of sale employed by GMAC was calculated, over the course of the many thousands of transactions that GMAC was involved in, to recover the greatest amount of money for the vehicles sold at the lowest average cost to GMAC. Pappas testified that at the time of the vehicle\u2019s sale, defendant\u2019s account had an unpaid balance of $16,153.97. Pappas testified that the vehicle was sold for $5,300. Pappas testified that prior to the sale, GMAC spent $310 to repossess the vehicle and transport it to the Milwaukee Auto Auction, spent $120 to store the vehicle at the Milwaukee Auto Auction and recondition the vehicle in preparation for sale, and spent $30 on sale costs incurred by the Milwaukee Auto Auction. Pappas testified that after the sale, defendant was entitled to, and did receive, as credits against her account the sums of $131.61 as a rebate of unearned insurance premiums and $325.78 as a refund of defendant\u2019s unearned service contract. Pappas testified that after all appropriate debits and credits were applied, defendant owed GMAC the sum of $10,856.58.\nOn cross-examination by defendant\u2019s attorney, Pappas testified that he did not have a copy of the Notice to show the court nor had he seen a copy of the Notice prior to testifying. Pappas also testified that the Notice was generated automatically by GMAC\u2019s automated billing and collection software at the time that the vehicle was voluntarily surrendered to GMAC.\nDefendant then testified on her own behalf. Defendant testified that she signed the retail installment contract admitted into evidence and that she was listed as an owner of the vehicle on the certificate of title. Defendant testified that upon being served with GMAC\u2019s lawsuit, she agreed to voluntarily surrender possession of the vehicle and assisted GMAC in the recovery thereof. Defendant testified that she did not dispute the calculation of the deficiency balance claimed by GMAC but did dispute that GMAC was entitled to collect the claimed balance. Defendant testified that she received the Deficiency Letter and stipulated to the foundation necessary for its introduction into evidence. Defendant testified that she did not receive the Notice.\nPrior to closing arguments, the circuit court asked the parties to address the following issues: (1) whether GMAC was obligated, as a matter of law, to send the Notice to defendant; (2) if GMAC was so obligated, whether GMAC satisfied its burden of proof that it had, in fact, sent the Notice to defendant; and (3) if GMAC had not satisfied its burden of proof on this issue, what was the resulting consequence thereof.\nDuring closing arguments, GMAC argued that defendant had conceded that a valid contract existed which defendant had breached and that defendant was not contesting the legality of the repossession of the vehicle, the commercial reasonableness of the vehicle\u2019s sale method or the damages claimed to be due to GMAC. GMAC argued that it was not obligated, as a matter of law, to send the Notice to defendant. GMAC argued that the requirement to send the Notice was codified in section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 611 (West 2002)), and that the terms of that statute were applicable only when a secured creditor resorted to \u201cself-help\u201d in order to recover collateral which had gone into default. GMAC argued that it did not resort to \u201cself-help\u201d in order to recover the vehicle at issue. Rather, GMAC had filed a lawsuit invoking replevin provisions under the Code (735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)), which contained no requirement to send the Notice. GMAC also argued that during the pendency of the lawsuit, defendant had voluntarily surrendered possession of the vehicle to GMAC.\nThus, GMAC argued that there were two independent reasons why there was no obligation to send the Notice. First, the requirement to send the Notice under section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/9\u2014 611 (West 2002)) was inapplicable in a lawsuit brought pursuant to the Code (735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)). Second, there was no requirement to send the Notice where GMAC did not have to resort to \u201cself-help\u201d in order to recover the collateral at issue where defendant voluntarily surrendered the vehicle to GMAC.\nIn addition, GMAC argued that it did not matter whether GMAC was required to send the Notice because the uncontroverted testimony of Mike Pappas was that the Notice had, in fact, been sent. GMAC maintained that the fact that defendant testified that she did not receive the Notice was immaterial to the question of whether GMAC sent the Notice. Further, GMAC argued that it did not matter that GMAC was unable to produce a copy of the Notice at trial because it was not a document that was central to GMAC\u2019s claim.\nDefendant argued that GMAC was required to send the Notice, whether or not GMAC was proceeding under the replevin statutes of the Code (735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002)) and whether or not defendant had voluntarily surrendered possession of the vehicle to GMAC. Defendant argued that GMAC could not meet its burden of proof on this issue without producing a copy of the Notice for the court\u2019s inspection. Defendant maintained that due to GMAC\u2019s failure to produce a copy of the Notice, defendant\u2019s liability for the deficiency balance claimed to be due after the sale of the vehicle was limited to the proceeds of the sale realized by GMAC, as set forth in section 9 \u2014 626 of the UCC (810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 626 (West 2002)). Therefore, defendant argued that GMAC was not entitled to any additional damages from defendant.\nBoth GMAC and defendant stated at trial that they were unaware of any decisions of any court of review on these issues.\nThe circuit court found that defendant had executed the retail installment contract and had defaulted on that contract. After being served with GMAC\u2019s complaint, defendant provided information regarding the location of the vehicle and GMAC obtained possession of the vehicle which secured defendant\u2019s obligations. The circuit court also found that the sale of the vehicle was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and accepted GMAC\u2019s calculations of the deficiency balance resulting from the sale of the vehicle.\nThe circuit court held that the requirement to send the Notice set forth in section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC was applicable to the present case. The circuit court further held that without a copy of the Notice, and despite the testimony of Mike Pappas that the Notice had been automatically generated and sent to defendant, GMAC was unable to meet its burden of proof that it complied with section 9 \u2014 611. Therefore, GMAC\u2019s calculation of the deficiency balance due after the sale of the vehicle was limited, as a matter of law, to the proceeds of the sale already collected by GMAC, as set forth in section 9 \u2014 626 of the UCC. Accordingly, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of defendant.\nOn April 20, 2006, 30 days after trial, GMAC filed a motion to stay the circuit court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence. In that motion, GMAC sought to introduce a copy of the Notice which GMAC claimed was sent to defendant prior to the sale of the vehicle. GMAC argued that introduction of a copy of the notice was of the utmost importance to its case because it showed that defendant was on notice of GMAC\u2019s intention to sell the vehicle and that GMAC had complied with section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC. GMAC also argued that the failure to introduce a copy of the Notice at trial was inadvertent, where GMAC\u2019s counsel requested the copy from GMAC but did not receive it prior to trial. GMAC further argued that introduction of a copy of the Notice would not cause defendant any prejudice where the Notice was discussed at trial.\nIn its response to GMAC\u2019s motion, defendant argued that the circuit court should decline to reopen the evidence and consider a copy of the Notice where GMAC was, in essence, seeking to introduce newly discovered evidence without showing, pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2002)), that it had been diligent in trying to obtain the evidence and that the evidence was unavailable at the time of trial. Defendant also argued that GMAC\u2019s failure to forward the Notice to its counsel was merely inadvertent and to allow the introduction of a copy of the Notice would prejudice defendant.\nOn June 13, 2006, the circuit court denied GMAC\u2019s motion to stay the court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence. In its order, the circuit court adopted the reasoning in defendant\u2019s response to GMAC\u2019s motion. GMAC now appeals.\nII. Analysis\nA. The Judgment in Favor of Defendant\n1. Standard of Review\nGMAC first challenges the circuit court\u2019s order granting judgment in defendant\u2019s favor. \u201c \u2018The standard of review we apply when a challenge is made to a trial court\u2019s ruling following a bench trial is whether the trial court\u2019s judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Avenaim v. Lubecke, 347 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861 (2004), quoting Judgment Services Corp. v. Sullivan, 321 Ill. App. 3d 151, 154 (2001). A judgment is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when an opposite conclusion \u201c \u2018is apparent or when findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on evidence.\u2019 \u201d Avenaim, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 861, quoting Judgment Services Corp., 321 Ill. App. 3d at 154.\n2. Applicability of Article 9 of the UCC\nGMAC argues that the circuit court\u2019s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence where it erroneously applied the notice provisions under the UCC to the present case. GMAC argues that the notice requirement in section 9 \u2014 611 and other provisions in article 9 of the UCC did not apply in this case because GMAC sought an order of replevin pursuant to section 19 \u2014 101 of the Code. GMAC maintains that there is no indication in section 19 \u2014 101 of the Code that the legislature intended a \u201cmutuality of obligation\u201d between a replevin action under the Code and the \u201cself-help repossession statutes (in which 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 611) is a part.\u201d We disagree.\nThe record shows that GMAC filed a two-count complaint against defendant. Count I was entitled \u201cReplevin\u201d and count II was labeled \u201cBreach of Contract\u201d and sought damages for defendant\u2019s breach of the retail installment sales contract. Prior to the circuit court\u2019s scheduled replevin hearing, GMAC repossessed the vehicle from Birdie Moore, whose address was provided by defendant. The replevin count was subsequently voluntarily dismissed with prejudice prior to trial. Defendant argues that due to this dismissal, GMAC could not have been proceeding under a cause of action for replevin and that article 9 of the UCC applied in this case.\nReplevin is strictly a statutory proceeding. Gunn v. Sobucki, 216 Ill. 2d 602, 613 (2005); 735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2002). To prevail, a plaintiff must recover on the strength of his or her own title or right to immediate possession. One who has no right to possession of the property cannot maintain replevin. Gunn, 216 Ill. 2d at 613. Section 19 \u2014 101 of the Code provides that \u201c[w]henever any goods or chattels have been wrongfully distrained, or otherwise wrongfully taken or are wrongfully detained, an action of replevin may be brought for the recovery of such goods or chattels, by the owner or person entitled to their possession.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101 (West 2002). Accordingly, an action of replevin seeks possession of property which has been wrongfully detained. 735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 101, 19 \u2014 104 (West 2002). If an order of replevin is issued, section 19 \u2014 109 provides that \u201c[t]he order for replevin shall require the sheriff, or other officer to whom it is directed to take the property, describing it as in the complaint, from the possession of the defendant, and deliver the same to the plaintiff unless such defendant executes a bond.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 109 (West 2002). Section 19 \u2014 123 then provides that \u201c[i]f the plaintiff in an action of replevin fails to prosecute the action with effect, or allows a voluntary or involuntary dismissal, or if the right of property is adjudged against the plaintiff, judgment shall be entered for a return of the property if such property has been delivered to the plaintiff.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/19 \u2014 123 (West 2002).\nWhile GMAC\u2019s complaint included a count for replevin, the vehicle was subsequently repossessed by GMAC and the circuit court did not issue an order for replevin under the Code in this case. GMAC also sought damages for breach of the retail installment sales contract and sold the vehicle, which was the collateral in this case. Section 20 of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act provides that: \u201cUnless otherwise limited by this Act, the parties shall have the rights and remedies provided in Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code with respect to default and disposition and redemption of collateral.\u201d 815 ILCS 375/20 (West 2002). This court has previously held that under section 20 of the Motor Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act, buyers and sellers subject to that Act have the rights and remedies provided in article 9 of the UCC. See Boulevard Bank, N.A. v. Moore, 271 Ill. App. 3d 315, 320 (1995); see also Continental Bank of Buffalo Grove, N.A. v. Krebs, 184 Ill. App. 3d 693, 697 (1989) (the provisions of part 5 of article 9 of the UCC govern the rights and remedies under motor vehicle security agreements). In addition, article 9 of the UCC \u201capplies to any transaction which is intended to create a security interest in personal properly, including goods, documents, instruments, general intangibles, chattel paper or accounts.\u201d Ryder v. Bank of Hickory Hills, 242 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1045 (1993). Accordingly, we find that the circuit court properly determined that article 9 of the UCC, which includes the section 9 \u2014 611 notice requirement, applied to this case.\nWe also note that, contrary to GMAC\u2019s assertion, nothing in article 9 of the UCC limits its application to instances where a creditor resorts to \u201cself-help.\u201d To the contrary, section 9 \u2014 609(a) of the UCC provides that after default, a secured party \u201c(1) may take possession of the collateral; and (2) without removal, may render equipment unusable and dispose of collateral on a debtor\u2019s premises under Section 9 \u2014 610.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 609(a) (West 2002). Section 9 \u2014 609(b) then provides that the secured party may proceed either \u201c(1) pursuant to judicial process; or (2) without judicial process, if it proceeds without breach of the peace.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 609(b) (West 2002). Accordingly, article 9 of the UCC is not limited to a secured party that uses \u201cself-help\u201d to obtain possession of the collateral.\n3. Proof of Notice to Defendant\nGMAC next contends that the circuit court\u2019s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court found that GMAC could not show that it complied with the notice requirement set forth in section 9 \u2014 611 of the UCC without producing a copy of the Notice sent to defendant.\nAs previously discussed, article 9 of the UCC governs the foreclosure of security interests and is applicable to the instant action. In the case of default, section 9 \u2014 610(a) of the UCC provides that a secured party \u201cmay sell, lease, license, or otherwise dispose of any or all of the collateral in its present condition or following any commercially reasonable preparation or processing\u201d in order to satisfy the indebtedness. 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 610(a) (West 2002). \u201cUnless there is an agreement to the contrary, the debtor is liable for any deficiency that results from the sale. [Citation.] Absent such an agreement, the only defenses available to a debtor against a deficiency judgment are lack of reasonable notice of the sale and commercial unreasonableness of the sale.\u201d Standard Bank & Trust Co. v. Callaghan, 177 Ill. App. 3d 973, 977 (1988) (discussing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch. 26, par. 9 \u2014 504 (now 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 611 (West 2002))).\nSection 9 \u2014 611(b) of the UCC provides that a secured party that disposes of collateral under section 9 \u2014 610 \u201cshall send\u201d to the debtor \u201ca reasonable authenticated notification of disposition.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 611(b) (West 2002). \u201cThis section does not require proof of\u2018actual receipt\u2019 by the debtor to satisfy the reasonable notice requirement. [Citation.]\u201d Ryder, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 1048. \u201cTo send a reasonable notice, the notification must be deposited in the mail with postage prepaid and properly addressed.\u201d Ryder, 242 Ill. App. 3d at 1048; 810 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 201(38) (West 2002). The burden of proving compliance with the notice requirement is on the creditor. Walczak v. Onyx Acceptance Corp., 365 Ill. App. 3d 664, 680 n.2 (2006), citing First National Bank of Decatur v. Wolfe, 137 Ill. App. 3d 929, 932 (1985); A.A. Store Fixture Co. v. Kouzoukas, 87 Ill. App. 3d 631, 634 (1980).\nSection 9 \u2014 613 provides that the contents of a notification of disposition are sufficient if the notification: \u201c(A) describes the debtor and the secured party; (B) describes the collateral that is the subject of the intended disposition; (C) states the method of intended disposition; (D) states that the debtor is entitled to an accounting of the unpaid indebtedness and states the charge, if any, for an accounting; and (E) states the time and place of a public disposition or the time after which any other disposition is to be made.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 613 (West 2002).\nGMAC argues that Pappas\u2019s testimony was sufficient to show that GMAC sent the Notice to defendant and that it was not necessary for GMAC to show that defendant received the Notice in order to sustain its burden of proof under section 9 \u2014 611(b). The record shows that defendant testified that the Notice was never received. Pappas testified that based upon his review of GMAC\u2019s records regarding the events in question, after recovering the vehicle GMAC sent the Notice to defendant. Pappas testified that the Notice informed defendant that GMAC had recovered possession of the vehicle due to defendant\u2019s default under the retail installment contract and would sell the vehicle at public auction on a date certain if defendant did not redeem the vehicle by making certain payments to defendant. However, Pappas testified that he did not have a copy of the Notice to show the court nor had he seen a copy of the Notice prior to testifying. Pappas also testified that the Notice was generated automatically by GMAC\u2019s automated billing and collection software at the time that the vehicle was voluntarily surrendered to GMAC. Furthermore, no copy of such notice or evidence of its contents was presented. Based on these facts, we find that the circuit court\u2019s conclusion that GMAC failed to prove notice was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. A.A. Store Fixture Co., 87 Ill. App. 3d at 634.\n4. Effect of Failure to Provide Notice\nGMAC next contends that the circuit court\u2019s judgment was against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court found that GMAC\u2019s failure to provide notice acted as an absolute bar to the entry of a deficiency judgment against defendant.\nSection 9 \u2014 626 explicitly states consequences that are to follow a failure to comply with the provisions of part 6, relating to default, of the UCC. This section provides in relevant part:\n\u201cIn an action in which'the amount of a deficiency or surplus is in issue, the following rules apply:\n(2) If the secured party\u2019s compliance is placed in issue, the secured party has the burden of establishing that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with this Part.\n(3) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9 \u2014 628, if a secured party fails to prove that the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance was conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance, the liability of a debtor or a secondary obligor for a deficiency is limited to an amount by which the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney\u2019s fees exceeds the greater of:\n(A) the proceeds of the collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance; or\n(B) the amount of proceeds that would have been realized had the noncomplying secured party proceeded in accordance with the provisions of this Part relating to collection, enforcement, disposition, or acceptance.\n(4) For purposes of paragraph (3)(B), the amount of proceeds that would have been realized is equal to the sum of the secured obligation, expenses, and attorney\u2019s fees unless the secured party proves that the amount is less than that sum.\u201d 810 ILCS 5/9\u2014 626 (West 2002).\nIn First Galesburg National Bank & Trust Co. v. Joannides, 103 Ill. 2d 294, 299-301 (1984), our supreme court held that the failure of a secured party to give the required prior notice of sale of collateral to the debtor under the UCC will result in a rebuttable presumption that the amount received from the sale was equal to the amount owed by the debtor. To rebut the presumption, the secured party must prove that the sale was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and that the amount received from the sale was less than the amount owed on the debt. First Galesburg, 103 Ill. 2d at 300-01; Walczak, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 680 n.2. As GMAC correctly notes, our supreme court held that none of the UCC\u2019s provisions provide that a lack of notice bars a deficiency judgment. \u201cThe court has rejected an absolute-bar view, under which a secured creditor is precluded from bringing a deficiency action against the debtor unless the debtor was given notice of the proposed sale of collateral. First Galesburg, 103 Ill. 2d at 299-301. In the court\u2019s view, the absolute-bar rule, by barring a deficiency action regardless of whether the debtor has suffered damage from the lack of notice, provides a windfall to the debtor and arbitrarily penalizes the creditor. First Galesburg, 103 Ill. 2d at 300.\u201d Walczak, 365 Ill. App. 3d at 680-81 n.2.\nIn this case, the record shows that Pappas testified to the amount that the vehicle was sold for at auction, the various costs associated with the sale of the vehicle, and credits given to defendant after the sale. The parties also agreed before this court that the vehicle was sold at an auction facility which handles thousands of vehicles and there was no reason to believe that the amount received from the auction of the vehicle in this case would have been different had the notice requirement been satisfied. The circuit court determined that the sale of the vehicle was conducted in a commercially reasonable manner and accepted GMAC\u2019s calculations of the deficiency balance resulting from the sale of the vehicle. However, the court further held that GMAC was unable to meet its burden of proof that it complied with the UCC notice requirement and GMAC\u2019s calculation of the deficiency balance due after the sale of the vehicle was limited, as a matter of law, to the proceeds of the sale already collected by GMAC. We read this as an absolute bar to a deficiency action based on GMAC\u2019s failure to comply with the notice requirement in this case. Because the circuit court applied an erroneous standard, we remand this case for the court to apply the rebuttable-presumption standard in determining the consequence of a failure of notice to the debtor, as articulated by our supreme court in First Galesburg, 103 Ill. 2d 294.\nB. GMAC\u2019S Motion to Stay and Reopen Evidence\nGMAC lastly contends that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to stay the court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence so that GMAC could introduce a copy of the Notice it claimed was sent to defendant. GMAC argues that it should have been allowed to introduce the Notice where GMAC\u2019s witness testified and was cross-examined at length regarding the Notice.\n\u201cThe denial of a motion to reopen proofs is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion.\u201d Chicago Transparent Products, Inc. v. American National Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 337 Ill. App. 3d 931, 942 (2002). \u201cIn rendering its decision, the trial court should consider whether the moving party has provided a reasonable excuse for failing to submit the additional evidence during trial, whether granting the motion would result in surprise or unfair prejudice to the opposing party, and if the evidence is of the utmost importance to the movant\u2019s case.\u201d Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 352 Ill. App. 3d 365, 389 (2004). \u201cIf evidence offered for the first time in a posttrial motion could have been produced at an earlier time, the court may deny its introduction into evidence.\u201d Chicago Transparent Products, 337 Ill. App. 3d at 942.\nIn its motion, GMAC merely alleged that upon reviewing defendant\u2019s affirmative defenses in her March 7, 2006, answer to the complaint, including defendant\u2019s statement that she did not receive the Notice, \u201ccounsel for GMAC immediately requested that GMAC transmit a copy of the notice to counsel for use at trial. Unfortunately, a copy of said notice was not received by GMAC\u2019s counsel prior to the trial [on March 21, 2006].\u201d GMAC does not allege that the copy of the Notice could not have been produced at trial and has not set forth a reasonable excuse for failing to submit the evidence at trial. We therefore find that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reopen proofs in this case.\nGMAC, nonetheless, cites A-Tech Computer Services, Inc. v. Soo Hoo, 254 Ill. App. 3d 392 (1993), and Dunahee v. Chenoa Welding & Fabrication, Inc., 273 Ill. App. 3d 201 (1995), in support of its contention that the circuit court should have reopened the evidence to allow GMAC to introduce a copy of the Notice. However, we find GMAC\u2019s reliance on these cases unavailing.\nIn A-Tech Computer Services, this court found no abuse of discretion where the circuit court reopened evidence after the plaintiff rested at a preliminary injunction hearing. The purpose of reopening the evidence was to pare down and clarify evidence already before the circuit court concerning a list of clients of the former employee. In that case, the former employee had already stipulated to the evidence of the original list of clients, had not objected to the admission of the subsequent, pared-down list, and had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness as to any client names on both lists. A-Tech Computer Services, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 402-03. Unlike A-Tech Computer Services, the copy of the Notice in this case was not already before the circuit court and GMAC was not seeking to merely clarify such evidence. In addition, GMAC was seeking to reopen the evidence not during a hearing, but after judgment was already entered in this case.\nIn Dunahee, this court found that the circuit court abused its discretion by refusing to reopen the case to receive evidence before the judgment was rendered; where the plaintiffs failure to introduce the evidence was because of inadvertence; where the admission of the evidence would not result in any prejudice or unfair surprise; and where the new evidence was of the utmost importance to the plaintiffs case. Dunahee, 273 Ill. App. 3d 210-11. Unlike Dunahee, GMAC sought to introduce the copy of the Notice after judgment was rendered in this case. GMAC also failed to offer a reasonable excuse for its failure to introduce the copy of the Notice and did not allege that the Notice was new evidence that was not available at trial.\nGMAC also argues that the circuit court erred in denying its motion to stay the court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence by adopting defendant\u2019s reasoning that GMAC\u2019s motion was essentially a motion to reconsider judgment under section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2002)).\nSection 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code provides that \u201c[i]n all cases tried without a jury, any party may, within 30 days after the entry of the judgment or within any further time the court may allow within the 30 days or any extensions thereof, file a motion for rehearing, or a retrial, or modification of the judgment or to vacate the judgment or for other relief.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1203 (West 2002). The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration lies within the discretion of the circuit court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. North River Insurance Co. v. Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., 369 Ill. App. 3d 563 (2006). The intended purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the court\u2019s attention newly discovered evidence, changes in the law, or errors in the court\u2019s previous application of existing law. North River Insurance, 369 Ill. App. 3d 563. \u201cNewly discovered\u201d evidence is evidence that was not available prior to the hearing and trial courts should not allow litigants to stand mute, lose a motion, and then frantically gather evidentiary material to show that the court erred in its ruling. North River Insurance, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 572. Here, GMAC did not bring any newly discovered evidence to the circuit court\u2019s attention. It had been aware of defendant\u2019s affirmative defense that she did not receive the Notice since at least March 7, 2006, and failed to obtain a copy of the Notice by the time the trial began on March 21, 2006. Further, GMAC did not cite to any changes in the law or errors in the court\u2019s previous application of the law in its motion. Therefore, we find that the circuit court\u2019s denial of GMAC\u2019s motion pursuant to section 2 \u2014 1203 of the Code was not an abuse of discretion.\nIII. Conclusion\nFor the above reasons, we affirm the circuit court\u2019s application of the notice provisions under the UCC to the present case and the circuit court\u2019s determination that GMAC failed to prove notice in this case. We reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment and remand for the court to apply the rebuttable-presumption standard in this case. We also affirm the circuit court\u2019s denial of GMAC\u2019s motion to stay the court\u2019s findings and reopen evidence.\nAffirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.\nCAMPBELL and MURPHY, JJ., concur.\nBirdie Moore was also named as a defendant in count I of the complaint. The record shows that she was not served with summons and apparently did not appear in this case. Count I was subsequently voluntarily dismissed with prejudice.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Offices of Gabriel B. Antman, EC., of Chicago (Gabriel B. Antman, of counsel), and Riezman Berger, EC., of St. Louis, Missouri (Nelson L. Mitten, of counsel), for appellant.", "Law Offices of Alan Rhine, of Chicago (Alan Rhine, of counsel), for appel-lee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GENERAL MOTORS ACCEPTANCE CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. LULA STOVAL, Defendant-Appellee.\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20141858\nOpinion filed June 29, 2007.\nLaw Offices of Gabriel B. Antman, EC., of Chicago (Gabriel B. Antman, of counsel), and Riezman Berger, EC., of St. Louis, Missouri (Nelson L. Mitten, of counsel), for appellant.\nLaw Offices of Alan Rhine, of Chicago (Alan Rhine, of counsel), for appel-lee." }, "file_name": "1064-01", "first_page_order": 1082, "last_page_order": 1097 }