{ "id": 4271540, "name": "COMMERCIAL COIN LAUNDRY SYSTEMS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOON INVESTMENTS, LLC, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Commercial Coin Laundry Systems v. Loon Investments", "decision_date": "2007-06-29", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-3718", "first_page": "26", "last_page": "34", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 26" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "148 Ill. App. 3d 275", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3644720 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "280", "parenthetical": "\"In assessing a nonresident's contacts with this State, '[o]nly the acts of defendant can be considered in determining whether business was transacted in Illinois' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/148/0275-01" ] }, { "cite": "437 F.3d 606", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 969506 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "609", "parenthetical": "enforcing a forum-selection clause as a waiver by defendant to its objections to personal jurisdiction in Illinois" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/437/0606-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 562", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267694 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "enforcing a forum-selection clause as a basis for personal jurisdiction in Illinois over California defendant" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0562-01" ] }, { "cite": "627 F. Supp. 1302", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7861279 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1307" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/627/1302-01" ] }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 707", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215554 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "713" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0707-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 947", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267047 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "952" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0947-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 F. Supp. 2d 818", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 647230 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "821", "parenthetical": "installation in a New Jersey hotel of bathtubs manufactured in Illinois did not give an Illinois court personal jurisdiction over New Jersey hotel owners" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/74/0818-01" ] }, { "cite": "318 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 279547 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "854", "parenthetical": "\"merely entering into a contract with a resident of Illinois is not sufficient by itself to subject a nonresident to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/318/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "301 Ill. App. 3d 1041", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 257150 ], "weight": 9, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1050" }, { "page": "1048", "parenthetical": "\"Where a nonresident merely enters into a contract with a resident of the forum state, this fact is not sufficient by itself to subject the nonresident to the in personam jurisdiction of the forum state\"" }, { "page": "1048-49" }, { "page": "1048" }, { "page": "1048-49" }, { "page": "1047" }, { "page": "1047", "parenthetical": "nonresident did not transact business or perform a contract in Illinois when it leased a postage meter machine from an Illinois corporation for use in California" }, { "page": "1045", "parenthetical": "court gave little effect to a \"forum selection clause contained in 'boilerplate' language\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/301/1041-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 F. Supp. 164", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7405356 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "agent's \"jurisdiction-triggering activities can be imputed to\" principal" }, { "page": "169", "parenthetical": "\"this Court can assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent (or grandparent) corporation through the activities of its subsidiary\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/801/0164-01" ] }, { "cite": "155 Ill. App. 3d 841", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3464416 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "842" }, { "page": "846" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/155/0841-01" ] }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352952 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "\"it is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\" by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"A point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "71 F.3d 1368", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 7416282 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1371", "parenthetical": "Illinois long-arm statute was amended in 1989 to add subsection 2 - 209(c), which is \"coextensive with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/71/1368-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 49", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570864 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "53-54" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0049-01" ] }, { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132458 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "846" }, { "page": "846" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265503 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561" }, { "page": "561-62" }, { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "this court held that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants" }, { "page": "566", "parenthetical": "\"The remedy of disregarding or piercing the corporate veil in order to get to assets held by an individual will be employed where there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalties of the corporation and the individual no longer exist ***\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0559-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 919, "char_count": 21339, "ocr_confidence": 0.762, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.664269884072967e-08, "percentile": 0.4521335027640608 }, "sha256": "b8fefd4549219d4b2d8816dd08e3ceba2de61762ea1951c89921663e1a781c38", "simhash": "1:ab8f37f263e85014", "word_count": 3379 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:12.225665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "COMMERCIAL COIN LAUNDRY SYSTEMS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOON INVESTMENTS, LLC, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Commercial Coin Laundry Systems, is an Illinois general partnership engaged in the business of installing and maintaining commercial laundry equipment in multiple-unit apartment buildings. Defendant, Loon Investments, LLC, is a Wisconsin limited liability company and the current owner of the apartment building located at 1657 South 17th Street in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (the property). Plaintiff had signed an agreement with the prior owner of the property for the purpose of installing and maintaining laundry equipment there. As the result of alleged vandalism and theft of laundry equipment on the property, plaintiff sued defendant alleging breach of contract, damage to personal property and conversion. Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the circuit court of Cook County denied the motion. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.\nBACKGROUND\nOn August 4, 1988, plaintiff signed a written lease agreement with Ruth Kuehn, who was then the owner of the subject property, which has 29 apartments. Plaintiff leased the laundry areas in order to install and operate coin-operated laundry machines for use by tenants. In return for use of the laundry areas, plaintiff agreed to pay the lessor 15% of the coin receipts from the machines, and an additional $1,600 flat fee to reimburse the lessor for improvements to the laundry areas. Plaintiff alleged that it prepared and negotiated the lease from its offices in Chicago.\nThe lease stated that title of the machines remained with plaintiff and that \u201clessor does not assume any responsibility for any loss, damage or destruction of said laundry equipment by fire, theft or any other casualty beyond lessor\u2019s reasonable control or prevention.\u201d The lessor was responsible for \u201call janitorial and housekeeping services for the laundry room and equipment\u201d and warranted that \u201cthe premises have adequate utilities and proper venting and there will be no building code violations which adversely affect\u201d plaintiffs ability to run laundry machines.\nThe lease was for \u201ca term of 10 years commencing August 30, 1988.\u201d However, the lease stated that it \u201cshall continue for additional ten year terms unless terminated in writing by either lessee or lessor.\u201d The parties agree that, pursuant to this renewal provision, the lease did renew after the expiration of the first term on August 30, 1998. The second term is in effect and continues until August 30, 2008.\nThe lease provided that it was binding on future owners of the property:\n\u201cThis Lease Agreement shall be binding upon and shall inure to the benefit of the lessor and the lessee and their respective successors and assigns, including any future owners, beneficiaries or lessee of the Building, it being the intention of the parties that the interest granted to lessee herein shall run with the land and building.\u201d\nThe lease had a choic\u00e9-of-law provision, which stated: \u201cThis agreement shall be governed by the laws of the State of Illinois.\u201d The lease also provided that \u201c[t]he Lease shall not take effect until accepted by lessee at the office of lessee in Chicago, Illinois.\u201d\nOn September 1, 1999, defendant acquired the building. Plaintiff filed suit in Cook County, Illinois, against defendant alleging counts for breach of contract, damage to personal property and conversion. The complaint alleged that \u201cbeginning very shortly after defendant acquired the building and continuing up to the present time, [plaintiff] has suffered repeated acts of vandalism, break-ins, and theft of its laundry equipment.\u201d The alleged incidents included \u201ccoin boxes being broken into, washer hoses disconnected, electrical cords cut, concrete poured into the washers, and oil poured into the dryers.\u201d On February 13, 2006, plaintiff \u201cdiscovered that all of its laundry machines had been stolen from each of the laundry rooms.\u201d\nPlaintiff alleged that prior to defendant\u2019s acquisition of the building, it had experienced no incidents of vandalism or theft there. However, after defendant\u2019s acquisition, plaintiff has been forced to replace its laundry machines on four occasions. Plaintiff alleged that tenants had informed its agent that defendant\u2019s maintenance man had intentionally cut the electrical cords on all of its laundry machines.\nIn addition to the incidents of theft and vandalism, plaintiff also alleged utility problems, such as \u201cblown fuses, drainage problems in the laundry room, water shut off to the laundry room, no electricity for the equipment, no lights in a laundry room and no electricity for a laundry room.\u201d Plaintiff alleged that it had experienced no utility problems prior to defendant\u2019s acquisition and that it contacted defendant repeatedly asking defendant to provide adequate security and utilities but defendant never did so.\nIn response to the complaint, defendant filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. In support of its motion, defendant submitted the affidavit of Daryl Nirode, who stated that he was the \u201cController\u201d of defendant, which is a Wisconsin limited liability corporation with its principal place of business in Milwaukee. Nirode stated that defendant did not own or manage any property within IIlinois, that it did not conduct any business in Illinois and that it had no offices or employees in Illinois.\nIn response, plaintiff submitted the affidavit of S. Saul Silverstein, who stated that he was a general partner of plaintiff, which is an Illinois general partnership with its office in Chicago, Illinois. Silver-stein stated that plaintiff calculates and pays the rent due under the lease and administers its laundry equipment service from its offices in Chicago and that defendant has accepted rent payments from plaintiff for years.\nOn November 29, 2006, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion. The order did not make factual findings or identify the section of the jurisdictional statute pursuant to which the court was exercising jurisdiction over the defendant. On December 28, 2006, plaintiff petitioned this court for leave to appeal, which was granted. For the following reasons, we reverse.\nANALYSIS\n\u201cWhen the circuit court decides a jurisdictional question solely on the basis of documentary evidence, as it did in this case, the question is addressed de novo on appeal.\u201d Rosier v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 561 (2006); Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832, 846 (2001). \u201cThe plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a prima facie basis upon which jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident may be exercised.\u201d Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 561; Alderson, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 846; Khan v. Van Remmen, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 49, 53-54 (2001).\nSection 2 \u2014 209 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209 (West 2004)) sets forth when Illinois courts will exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant. Subsection 2 \u2014 209(a), which governs specific jurisdiction, lists 14 grounds by which a defendant may subject itself to Illinois jurisdiction. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(a)(1) through (a)(14) (West 2004). Subsection 2 \u2014 209(b), which governs general jurisdiction, lists four grounds, only two of which apply to corporations: \u201c(3) *** a corporation organized under the laws of this State; or (4) *** [a] corporation doing business within this State.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 209(b)(3), (b)(4) (West 2004). Subsection 2 \u2014 209(c) is a \u201ccatch-all provision\u201d which permits Illinois courts to \u201c \u2018exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.\u2019 \u201d Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 561, quoting 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(c) (West 2004). Subsection 2 \u2014 209(c) permits an Illinois court to exercise personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Klump v. Duffus, 71 F.3d 1368, 1371 (7th Cir. 1995) (Illinois long-arm statute was amended in 1989 to add subsection 2 \u2014 209(c), which is \u201ccoextensive with the due process requirements of the United States Constitution\u201d).\nAn exercise of jurisdiction under any of these three subsections must also comport with the due process clause. The due process clause limits a state\u2019s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant to those instances where the defendant had at least \u201cminimum contacts\u201d with the state. Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 561. This court recently described the minimum contacts standard as follows:\n\u201cThe minimum contacts standard ensures that \u2018requiring the out-of-state resident to defend in the forum does not \u201c \u2018offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 [Citation.] The minimum contacts analysis must be based on some act by which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, in order to assure that a nonresident will not be haled into a forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts with the forum or the unilateral acts of a consumer or some other third person.\u201d Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 561-62.\nIn the case at bar, plaintiff claimed that this court may exercise jurisdiction under subsection 2 \u2014 209(a) or (c) but not (b). Plaintiff did not claim, as subsection 2 \u2014 209(b) requires, that defendant was a corporation organized under the laws of or doing business within the State of Illinois. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(b)(3), (b)(4) (West 2004). Plaintiff claimed that the following three grounds of subsection (a) applied:\n\u201c(1) The transaction of any business within this State;\n* * *\n(7) The making or performance of any contract or promise substantially connected with this State;\n\u2756 * *\n(10) The acquisition of ownership, possession or control of any asset or thing of value present within this State when ownership, possession or control was acquired ***[.]\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 209(a)(1), (a)(7), (a)(10) (West 2004).\nOn appeal, plaintiff did not claim that defendant transacted business in Illinois, made or performed a contract in Illinois or acquired control over Illinois property. Instead plaintiff claimed that it was the prior owner who took these actions and that the prior owner\u2019s actions subjected the defendant to personal jurisdiction in Illinois. Plaintiff claimed that \u201cthe material acts subjecting Loon to the jurisdiction of Illinois are those acts performed by the original lessor, Kuehn,\u201d and that defendant subjected itself to jurisdiction as a \u201csuccessor in interest.\u201d Plaintiff claimed jurisdiction solely because \u201cLoon\u2019s predecessor in title, Kuhn, did these acts, thereby subjecting Loon as a successor in interest to the Real Property to the same jurisdiction.\u201d In short, plaintiff is claiming derivative personal jurisdiction. In essence, plaintiff asks us first to determine whether this court would have had jurisdiction over the prior owner and second to attribute that jurisdiction to the defendant.\nPlaintiff claims that this court may attribute the first owner\u2019s personal jurisdiction to the second owner because personal jurisdiction \u201cran with the land.\u201d The claim is: the first owner took actions with respect to a lease that allegedly subjected the first owner to personal jurisdiction, the building was then sold while the lease was still in effect, and personal jurisdiction, like the lease itself, \u201cran with the land\u201d so that this court acquired personal jurisdiction over any subsequent owner. None of the cases cited by the plaintiff support its theory of derivative personal jurisdiction or \u201cruns with the land\u201d jurisdiction, nor can this court find any. Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 568 (this court held that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (\u201cA point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\u201d); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (\u201cit is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\u201d by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation).\nOn this issue of derivative jurisdiction, defendant cited Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. Mobil Rocky Mountain, Inc., 155 Ill. App. 3d 841 (1986). In a situation similar to the facts at bar, the defendant in Natural Gas acquired an interest in a contract through an assignment from the original signatory. Natural Gas, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 842. The plaintiff in Natural Gas made a jurisdictional claim similar to the claim of the plaintiff in the case at bar. The Natural Gas plaintiff claimed that this court had personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant since the defendant had \u201cinitiated the course of dealings that resulted in a contract between the parties.\u201d Natural Gas, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 846. This court in Natural Gas held: \u201cThis argument is specious; [defendant] never dealt with [plaintiff]. [Defendant] was merely an assignee of the original contract that was negotiated and signed by [plaintiff].\u201d Natural Gas, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 846. Thus, this court has previously held that merely being a successor in interest to a contract is insufficient, without more, to confer personal jurisdiction.\nPlaintiff did not claim that the relationship between the prior owner and the defendant was one of agent and principal (Brandt v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F. Supp. 164, 169 (C.D. Ill. 1992) (agent\u2019s \u201cjurisdiction-triggering activities can be imputed to\u201d principal)); parent and subsidiary corporations (Brandt, 801 F. Supp. at 169 (\u201cthis Court can assert jurisdiction over an out-of-state parent (or grandparent) corporation through the activities of its subsidiary\u201d)); or primary stockholder and corporation (Rosier, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 566 (\u201cThe remedy of disregarding or piercing the corporate veil in order to get to assets held by an individual will be employed where there is such unity of interest and ownership that the separate personalties of the corporation and the individual no longer exist ***\u201d)). Plaintiff did not claim that this court had personal jurisdiction by means of any of these other relationships, and the record would not support such a claim.\nOn appeal, plaintiff did not claim any basis for jurisdiction except for its \u201cran with the land\u201d theory. Thus plaintiff, who bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case for jurisdiction, waived any other possible claims for jurisdiction. Supreme Court Rule 341, which governs the content of appellate briefs, provides that any \u201c[pjoints not argued are waived and shall not be raised *** on petition for rehearing.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7).\nSince we reject plaintiff\u2019s theory of derivative jurisdiction, we examine defendant\u2019s own contacts with the State of Illinois to determine if we may exercise personal jurisdiction. The documentary evidence submitted by the parties established that defendant had the following contacts with our state:\n1. Contract with an Illinois tenant;\n2. Receipt in Wisconsin of rent mailed from Illinois;\n3. Possession and control over Illinois equipment; and\n4. Illinois choice-of-law clause.\nThe above list of contacts is almost identical to the list of contacts which this court rejected as a basis for jurisdiction in Mellon First United Leasing v. Hansen, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1041 (1998). The plaintiff in Mellon claimed that the following contacts were sufficient for jurisdiction:\n1. Contract with an Illinois tenant;\n2. Receipt in Illinois of rent mailed from California;\n3. Leasing of Illinois equipment; and\n4. Illinois forum-selection clause.\nLike we did in Mellon, we reject these contacts as a sufficient basis for jurisdiction. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1050.\nWe will analyze each of these contacts in turn. First in the case at bar, defendant\u2019s purchase of the property resulted in its assumption of a contract with an Illinois resident. However, the mere fact of entering into a contract with an Illinois resident does not subject a nonresident defendant to Illinois jurisdiction. Hendry v. Ornda Health Corp., 318 Ill. App. 3d 851, 854 (2000) (\u201cmerely entering into a contract with a resident of Illinois is not sufficient by itself to subject a nonresident to in personam jurisdiction in Illinois\u201d); Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1048 (\u201cWhere a nonresident merely enters into a contract with a resident of the forum state, this fact is not sufficient by itself to subject the nonresident to the in personam jurisdiction of the forum state\u201d).\nIn Mellon, this court distinguished between a passive and an active contracting party. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1048-49. If the nonresident is a passive party who merely accepts the other party\u2019s contract terms, that passive acceptance is not enough to confer jurisdiction. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1048. By contrast, if the nonresident took an active role such as dictating or vigorously negotiating the contract terms or inspecting equipment or facilities in Illinois, then this active role in Illinois will confer jurisdiction. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1048-49. In the case at bar, plaintiff concedes that defendant did not take an active role; that is why plaintiff resorted to its derivative jurisdiction claim. Defendant passively assumed the contract through its acquisition of the building, and this passive act alone is insufficient to confer jurisdiction.\nSecond, the simple mailing of rent payments to or from Illinois is not enough to confer jurisdiction on Illinois. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1047. Third, plaintiff claims that the laundry machines were Illinois machines, that defendant thus acquired possession and control over Illinois machines, and that this control gave Illinois jurisdiction over defendant. This court has previously held that the possession and control by a nonresident of Illinois equipment for use in a foreign jurisdiction does not confer jurisdiction on Illinois. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1047 (nonresident did not transact business or perform a contract in Illinois when it leased a postage meter machine from an Illinois corporation for use in California); c.f. Jamik, Inc. v. Days Inn of Mount Carmel, 74 F. Supp. 2d 818, 821 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (installation in a New Jersey hotel of bathtubs manufactured in Illinois did not give an Illinois court personal jurisdiction over New Jersey hotel owners).\nFourth, the only factor weighing in favor of finding jurisdiction is the Illinois choice-of-law clause. Although a relevant consideration, a choice-of-law clause \u201cby itself\u2019 does not confer personal jurisdiction. Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 947, 952 (2007), quoting Morecambe Maritime, Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, S.A., 354 Ill. App. 3d 707, 713 (2004). Usually when a choice-of-law clause is noted as part of a jurisdiction finding, the clause is merely \u201cone more arrow in [plaintiff\u2019s] quiver.\u201d AM International Leasing Corp. v. National Council of Negro Women, Inc., 627 F. Supp. 1302, 1307 (N.D. Ill. 1986).\nAlthough plaintiff was the party that drafted the contract and filled it with boilerplate language conducive to its business, it chose to include only a choice-of-law clause, not a stronger and enforceable forum-selection clause. Aon Corp. v. Utley, 371 Ill. App. 3d 562, 568 (2006) (enforcing a forum-selection clause as a basis for personal jurisdiction in Illinois over California defendant); IFC Credit Corp. v. Aliano Brothers General Contractors, Inc., 437 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 2006) (enforcing a forum-selection clause as a waiver by defendant to its objections to personal jurisdiction in Illinois). Plaintiff cannot now be heard to complain about the form contract that it crafted. Cf. Mellon, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1045 (court gave little effect to a \u201cforum selection clause contained in \u2018boilerplate\u2019 language\u201d).\nLast and least, plaintiff spends a portion of its brief discussing the fact that there are signs in the laundry areas informing consumers to call plaintiff in case of problems with the laundry machines. The signs establish that plaintiff expected to have an ongoing and on-site relationship with the Wisconsin property. However, plaintiff\u2019s maintenance activities in Wisconsin cannot be used to establish personal jurisdiction in Illinois over the defendant. Gordon v. Tow, 148 Ill. App. 3d 275, 280 (1986) (\u201cIn assessing a nonresident\u2019s contacts with this State, \u2018[o]nly the acts of defendant can be considered in determining whether business was transacted in Illinois\u2019 \u201d).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the trial court\u2019s decision denying the defendant\u2019s motion and dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction.\nReversed.\nMcBRIDE, PJ., and GARCIA, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Johnson & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Kevin G. Owens, and Julie E. Benes, of counsel), for appellant.", "Russel G. Winick & Associates, EC., of Naperville (Russell G. Winick, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "COMMERCIAL COIN LAUNDRY SYSTEMS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LOON INVESTMENTS, LLC, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-06-3718\nOpinion filed June 29, 2007.\nJohnson & Bell, Ltd., of Chicago (Garrett L. Boehm, Jr., Kevin G. Owens, and Julie E. Benes, of counsel), for appellant.\nRussel G. Winick & Associates, EC., of Naperville (Russell G. Winick, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0026-01", "first_page_order": 42, "last_page_order": 50 }