{ "id": 4272621, "name": "PELETON, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McGIVERN'S, INC., d/b/a Great Godfrey Daniels, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Peleton, Inc. v. McGivern's, Inc.", "decision_date": "2007-08-06", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-0538", "first_page": "222", "last_page": "229", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 222" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352952 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78", "parenthetical": "\"it is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\" by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 317", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4059981 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332", "parenthetical": "\"A point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0317-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 559", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265503 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "568", "parenthetical": "this court held that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0559-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3435464 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "84" }, { "page": "84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "282 Ill. App. 3d 423", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 159541 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "430" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/282/0423-01" ] }, { "cite": "195 Ill. 2d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 725351 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "432" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/195/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "369 Ill. App. 3d 271", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4267003 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "274" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/369/0271-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2716167 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "260-61" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/37/0259-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 752", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766830 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" }, { "page": "757-58" }, { "page": "757-58" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. App. 3d 830", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5290250 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838", "parenthetical": "\"As attorney fees were specifically authorized by the contract, it was error for the trial court to fail to provide for them\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/216/0830-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 59", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291657 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "70", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0059-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 276", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570906 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "281" }, { "page": "280" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0276-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 129", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448393 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0129-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 511", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281463 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "516" }, { "page": "515" }, { "page": "515" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0511-01" ] }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 483", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261396 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "normally an award of attorney fees \"will not be reversed on review unless the court abused its discretion\"" }, { "page": "485", "parenthetical": "attorney fees award was reviewed de novo \"[w]here facts are uncontroverted and the issue is the circuit court's application of the law\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0483-01" ] }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 1043", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472337 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1046" }, { "page": "1046" }, { "page": "1047", "parenthetical": "\"Because the plaintiff here is not disputing the trial court's calculations [of attorney fees], but is contending only that the trial court misapplied the law, *** the standard of review is de novo\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/1043-01" ] }, { "cite": "334 Ill. App. 3d 259", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 521911 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "262" }, { "page": "262-63" }, { "page": "263" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/334/0259-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 736, "char_count": 19278, "ocr_confidence": 0.778, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.5821885507640197e-07, "percentile": 0.6805871693677894 }, "sha256": "2f67bc55723962bfe7c2f6020d69dcdba4fdc943790ea2f26d29ec330b219192", "simhash": "1:9b2f166a420d7df6", "word_count": 3142 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:12.225665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "PELETON, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McGIVERN\u2019S, INC., d/b/a Great Godfrey Daniels, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is about attorney fees. After a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found for plaintiff on two of the seven counts in its complaint. Defendants have not appealed that finding and thus the issues of the underlying lessor-lessee dispute are not at issue in this appeal.\nOn November 22, 2005, the trial court denied plaintiffs petition for attorney fees and ordered plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s, Inc., to each pay half of the attorney fees of defendant Chicago Title and Trust Company. On January 24, 2006, the trial court determined that the amount of the attorney fees award to the trust company was a total of $23,013.04 and ordered plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s to each pay half.\nOnly plaintiff has appealed the attorney fees award. On appeal, plaintiff does not dispute the reasonableness of the amount of the awarded fees, but contests only the trial court\u2019s decision to award them and to deny them to plaintiff. For the reasons discussed below, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.\nBACKGROUND\nIn a lease dated September 1, 1987, defendant Chicago Title and Trust Company, as trustee under trust No. 33969, leased the subject property known as 10027 Skokie Boulevard, Skokie, Illinois, to defendant McGivern\u2019s, Inc. On May 20, 1996, defendant McGivern\u2019s, Inc., subleased the subject property to plaintiff, Peleton, Inc. Both defendant McGivern\u2019s and plaintiff are Illinois corporations. Defendant Timothy McGivern is the president of McGivern\u2019s and negotiated and executed the sublease on behalf of defendant McGivern\u2019s.\nIn the sublease, plaintiff agreed to pay attorney fees under the following conditions:\n\u201cSublesee agrees to indemnify, defend and hold harmless Lessor and its beneficiaries, Sublessor and each of their respective partners, agents and employees, from and against any and all claims, demands, costs and expenses of every kind and nature, including attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation expenses, arising from Sublessee\u2019s occupancy of the Premises during the term of this Sublease or from its breach or default on the part of the Sublessee in the performance of any agreement or any covenant of Sublessee to be performed or performed under the Lease or this Sublease or pursuant to the terms of the Lease or this Sublease, or from any act or neglect of Sublessee or its agents, officers, employees, guests, servants, invitees or customers in or about the Premises.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn the sublease, defendant McGivern\u2019s agreed to pay attorney fees under the following conditions:\n\u201cSublessor agrees to indemnify and hold harmless Sublessee and its agents, partners, officers, directors, shareholders and employees from any and all claims, liabilities, demands, causes of action, costs and expenses of every kind and nature, including attorneys\u2019 fees and litigation expenses arising from or attributable to Sublessor\u2019s occupancy of the Premises through the date of Closing or from any breach by Sublessor of any of its warranties, representations or covenants contained herein or from any act or neglect of Sublessor or its agents, officers, employees, guests, servants, invitees or customers.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nIn addition, both defendant McGivern\u2019s and plaintiff agreed in the sublease:\n\u201cAll costs and expenses incurred by a non-defaulting party in enforcing the terms and provisions of the Lease or this Sublease shall be paid by non-prevailing party immediately upon demand therefor.\u201d\nOn August 30, 2000, plaintiff sued defendants McGivern\u2019s and Chicago Title and Trust Company seeking a declaratory judgment to enforce the terms of the sublease and other equitable relief. On February 7, 2003, plaintiff amended its complaint to add Timothy McGivern, president of defendant McGivern\u2019s, as a defendant. The amended complaint contained seven counts. The first three counts sought a declaratory judgement that plaintiff had a right to remain in the subject property because: (1) the sublease would not expire until August 31, 2005; (2) Peleton exercised its option to extend the sublease; and (3) \u201cMcGivern waived his right to take possession of the property and to written notice.\u201d Counts IY V and VI were for unjust enrichment, equitable estoppel and reformation of contract. Count VII was against defendant Timothy McGivern alone and sought $1 million in damages for tortious interference with contract. In its answer, defendant McGivern\u2019s included a counterclaim that sought immediate possession of the subject property, double the rent since September 23, 2000, and attorney fees and costs.\nAfter a bench trial, the trial court issued an oral ruling on July 7, 2005, which was later embodied in an order dated August 23, 2005. The trial court declared that plaintiff had the right to remain in the subject premises until August 31, 2005. The court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff on counts II and III and on defendant\u2019s counterclaim; dismissed as moot counts I, IY V and VI; and entered judgment in favor of defendant Timothy McGivern on count VII.\nOn July 7, 2005, the trial court orally granted the oral motion of defendant Chicago Title and Trust Company to file a petition for attorney fees under the lease. In its August 23 order, the trial court permitted any party wishing to file a petition for attorney fees to do so and set a hearing on fee petitions for October 26, 2005. In an order dated November 22, 2005, the trial court held, \u201cfor the reasons stated in open court,\u201d that plaintiffs fee petition was denied and defendant Chicago Title and Trust Company\u2019s petition was granted. Although the orders of August 23 and November 22, 2005, indicate that the court held a hearing concerning the fee petitions and stated in open court the reasons for its fee rulings, the record on appeal does not include a copy of the hearing transcript.\nIn the November 22, 2005, order, the trial court ordered the parties to submit additional briefings on the issue of the reasonableness of the attorney fees sought by the defendant trust company. On January 24, 2006, the trial court awarded the trust company $23,013.04 in attorney fees and ordered plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s each to pay half the amount. In ordering plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s each to pay half, the trial court noted: \u201cNeither is entirely free from fault here; neither is entirely to blame.\u201d\nANALYSIS\nStandard of Review\n\u201cGenerally, a trial court\u2019s decision to award attorney fees is not reversed absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d Guerrant v. Roth, 334 Ill. App. 3d 259, 262 (2002), citing Pietrzyk v. Oak Lawn Pavilion, Inc., 329 Ill. App. 3d 1043, 1046 (2002); Mirar Development, Inc. v. Kroner, 308 Ill. App. 3d 483, 485 (1999) (normally an award of attorney fees \u201cwill not be reversed on review unless the court abused its discretion\u201d). \u201cThe rationale for this standard is that a party challenging a trial court\u2019s decision regarding attorney fees is actually challenging the trial court\u2019s discretion in determining what is reasonable.\u201d Guerrant, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 262-63, citing Pietrzyk, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1046.\nHowever, the parties on appeal do not contest the reasonableness of the trial court\u2019s decision concerning the amount of the attorney fees. Instead, plaintiff contests the trial court\u2019s conclusion that the lease and sublease gave the trial court the authority either to award defendant Chicago Trust and Title Company attorney fees or to deny them to plaintiff. Thus the normal rationale does not apply.\nOur standard of review in the case at bar is twofold. First, to the extent that the trial court interpreted the terms of the lease and sublease, our review is de novo. This court has held that \u201c[w]here the trial court [has] determined the construction of the *** agreement as a matter of law, we construe the contract unrestrained by the trial court\u2019s judgment, and our standard of review is de novo.\u201d Guerrant, 334 Ill. App. 3d at 263; Pietrzyk, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1047 (\u201cBecause the plaintiff here is not disputing the trial court\u2019s calculations [of attorney fees], but is contending only that the trial court misapplied the law, *** the standard of review is de novo\u201d)-, Mirar, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 485 (attorney fees award was reviewed de novo \u201c[w]here facts are uncontroverted and the issue is the circuit court\u2019s application of the law\u201d).\nSecond, to the extent that the trial court applied the terms of the contract to the facts, our review is based on an abuse of discretion standard. At issue in this case is whether the defendant qualified as a \u201cnon-prevailing party,\u201d a finding that the sublease required before the court could award attorney fees. This court reviewed almost the exact same issue in Powers v. Rockford Stop-N-Go, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 511 (2001). In Powers, the term \u201cprevailing party\u201d was in a lease as a prerequisite to the award of attorney fees. With respect to the appropriate standard of review, this court in Powers held:\n\u201cWhether either party prevailed or compelled the other to obey the lease in the trial court below involves an application of the facts to this principle of law. Therefore, it remains a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court [citation], and the question before us is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that plaintiff was the prevailing party.\u201d Powers, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 516.\nDefendant McGivern\u2019s failed to file an appellee\u2019s brief and defendant Chicago Title and Trust Company filed an appellee\u2019s brief without citation to cases or statute. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that when a reviewing court lacks an appellee\u2019s brief, it may still decide the issues, if they are clear from the record. In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d 129, 135 (2004). In the instant case, the issues are clear, and we can decide them easily \u201cwithout the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief.\u201d In re Marriage of Rogers, 213 Ill. 2d at 135.\nDenial of Attorney Fees to Plaintiff\n\u201cContractual provisions for an award of attorney fees must be strictly construed, and the court must determine the intention of the parties regarding the payment of fees.\u201d J.B. Esker & Sons, Inc. v. ClePa\u2019s Partnership, 325 Ill. App. 3d 276, 281 (2001); Jackson v. Hammer, 274 Ill. App. 3d 59, 70 (1995) (same); Myers v. Popp Enterprises; Inc., 216 Ill. App. 3d 830, 838 (1991) (\u201cAs attorney fees were specifically authorized by the contract, it was error for the trial court to fail to provide for them\u201d).\nIn the sublease, defendant McGivern\u2019s and plaintiff agreed that: \u201cAll costs and expenses incurred by a non-defaulting party in enforcing the terms and provisions of the Lease or this Sublease shall be paid by non-prevailing party immediately upon demand therefor\u201d (paragraph 15 (d)). Thus, to award attorney fees to plaintiff, the trial court had to find that defendant McGivern\u2019s was \u201cthe non-prevailing party.\u201d\nIn its brief to the trial court on the issue of attorney fees, defendant McGivern\u2019s claimed that plaintiff was not a prevailing party because it \u201cprevailed on only two of its seven claims (Counts II and III), lost on one of its claims (Count VII) and had its remaining four claims (Counts I, 1V( V, and VI) dismissed as moot.\u201d Defendant Mc-Givern\u2019s claimed that it had \u201cactually prevailed on the highest-stakes claim in the case \u2014 Pelleton\u2019s pursuit of compensatory damages for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage, damages that Pelleton alleged to exceed one million dollars.\u201d\nIn a written order dated November 22, 2005, the trial court denied plaintiff\u2019s fee petition \u201cfor the reasons stated in open court.\u201d Unfortunately, the record on appeal does not include a copy of the hearing transcript. Thus, this court does not know the trial court\u2019s reasons and specifically whether it accepted defendant McGivern\u2019s arguments on the \u201cprevailing party\u201d issue.\n\u201cThe law is well settled that appellants bear the duty to \u2018present a record *** which fairly and fully presents all matters necessary and material for a decision of the question raised.\u2019 \u201d Smolinski v. Vojta, 363 Ill. App. 3d 752, 757 (2006), quoting LaPlaca v. Gilbert & Wolf, Inc., 37 Ill. App. 3d 259, 260-61 (1976); In re Marriage of Sharp, 369 Ill. App. 3d 271, 274 (2006); Webster v. Hartman, 195 Ill. 2d 426, 432 (2001). \u201cHowever, even if the record on appeal is incomplete, courts have held that appellate review is not precluded where the record contains that which is necessary to dispose of the issues in the case.\u201d In re Marriage of Ward, 282 Ill. App. 3d 423, 430 (1996). \u201c[W]hen the record on appeal is incomplete, a reviewing court should actually \u2018indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable to the judgment ***.\u2019 \u201d Smolinski, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 757-58, quoting People v. Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d 80, 84 (1985). In the case at bar, the record is sufficient for this court to dispose of the issues.\nThis court has held that a \u201cprevailing party, for purposes of awarding attorney fees, is one that is successful on a significant issue and achieves some benefit in bringing suit.\u201d Esker, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 280; Jackson, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 70 (same). This case is complicated by the fact that although plaintiff succeeded on a significant issue, so did defendants.\nOn the one hand, a litigant does not have to succeed on all its claims to be considered a prevailing party. Powers, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 515. On the other hand, \u201cwhen the dispute involves multiple claims and both parties have won and lost on different claims, it may be inappropriate to find that either party is the prevailing party.\u201d Powers, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 515.\nPlaintiff prevailed on both counts II and III of its complaint; however, the trial court found that these counts raised \u201cessentially *** the same point.\u201d In its order dated August 23, 2005, the trial court found that both counts \u201cseek essentially the same core relief: a declaration that Peleton has the \u2018right to remain as sublesee until at least August 31, 2005.\u2019 \u201d In addition, plaintiff prevailed on defendant\u2019s counterclaim, which had sought immediate possession of the subject premises and double the rent after September 23, 2000. Thus, plaintiff prevailed on two claims.\nDefendants prevailed on count VII, and the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant Timothy McGivern. In count VII, plaintiff had sought $1 million in compensatory damages against defendant Timothy McGivern, who as president had negotiated and executed the sublease on behalf of defendant McGivern\u2019s. Thus, defendants also prevailed on a significant issue, namely, defendants\u2019 alleged tortious interference with contract.\nIn essence, the trial court\u2019s decision gave each side something: plaintiff could remain on the subject premises; and defendants did not have to pay for alleged interference with contract. In its order dated January 24, 2006, the trial court stated: \u201cNeither is entirely free from fault here; neither is entirely to blame.\u201d With each side prevailing on a significant issue, this court cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees to plaintiff.\nAward of Attorney Fees to Defendant Chicago Title and Trust\nPlaintiff claimed that it should not have to pay half of defendant trust company\u2019s legal fees. However, since plaintiff failed to cite a case, statute or other legal authority in its appellate brief to support this claim, plaintiff waived consideration of this claim on appeal. Roiser v. Cascade Mountain, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 559, 568 (2006) (this court held that, by failing to offer any supporting legal authority or reasoning, plaintiffs waived consideration of their theory for asserting personal jurisdiction over defendants); People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 332 (2005) (\u201cA point raised in a brief but not supported by citation to relevant authority *** is therefore forfeited\u201d); Ferguson v. Bill Berger Associates, Inc., 302 Ill. App. 3d 61, 78 (1998) (\u201cit is not necessary to decide this question since the defendant has waived the issue\u201d by failing to offer case citation or other support as Supreme Court Rule 341 requires); 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (argument in appellate brief must be supported by citation).\nIn addition, plaintiff failed to present a complete record on this issue. In its order dated November 22, 2005, the trial court granted defendant trust company\u2019s petition for attorney fees \u201cfor the reasons stated in open court.\u201d As previously noted, the record on appeal does not include a copy of the hearing transcript. Since the record on appeal is incomplete, we will \u201c \u2018indulge in every reasonable presumption favorable to the judgment.\u2019 \u201d Smolinski, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 757-58, quoting Majer, 131 Ill. App. 3d at 84.\nIn the order dated January 24, 2006, finding defendant trust company\u2019s attorney fees to be reasonable, the court noted its authority to award fees under article 7 of the lease and paragraphs 7 and 15 of the sublease. Article 7 provided that the lessee, defendant McGivern\u2019s, shall pay \u201call costs and reasonable attorney fees\u201d if : (1) \u201cthe Lessor [defendant trust company] shall without any default on its part, be made party to any litigation commenced by or against the Lessee, and arising out of or by virtue of this lease\u201d; or (2) if the Lessor incurred the attorney fees and costs \u201cin enforcing the covenants and agreements of the lease.\u201d Defendant trust company was entitled to attorney fees under the express terms of article 7 because \u201cwithout any default on its part\u201d it was \u201cmade party to *** litigation commenced *** against the lessee.\u201d None of the parties alleged a default by defendant trust company; it was almost a bystander to the dispute between plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s.\nParagraph 7 of the sublease bound plaintiff to the terms of the lease including article 7. Paragraph 7 provided that \u201cSublessee [plaintiff] hereby assumes and shall be bound by the Lease with the same rights, powers, privileges, duties and responsibilities which Sublessor has under the Lease, except as expressly set forth in this Sublease.\u201d Paragraph 15(d), as noted before, gave the court the authority to award litigation costs and expenses against a \u201cnon-prevailing party.\u201d Both plaintiff and defendant McGivern\u2019s were \u201cnon-prevailing\u201d parties with respect to defendant trust company. As noted before, a \u201cprevailing party, for purposes of awarding attorney fees, is one that is successful on a significant issue and achieves some benefit in bringing suit.\u201d Esker, 325 Ill. App. 3d at 280; Jackson, 274 Ill. App. 3d at 70 (same). Neither plaintiff nor defendant McGivern\u2019s prevailed on \u201ca significant issue\u201d against defendant trust company or achieved \u201csome benefit\u201d from suing it.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.\nAffirmed.\nMcBRIDE, PJ., and CAHILL, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Quinlan & Carroll, Ltd., of Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Brian J. Alesia, and J. Christopher Madden, of counsel), for appellant.", "Morgan, Lanoff, Denniston & Jackson, Ltd., of Chicago (John H. Jackson, of counsel), for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "PELETON, INC., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McGIVERN\u2019S, INC., d/b/a Great Godfrey Daniels, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1-06-0538\nOpinion filed August 6, 2007.\nQuinlan & Carroll, Ltd., of Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Brian J. Alesia, and J. Christopher Madden, of counsel), for appellant.\nMorgan, Lanoff, Denniston & Jackson, Ltd., of Chicago (John H. Jackson, of counsel), for appellees." }, "file_name": "0222-01", "first_page_order": 238, "last_page_order": 245 }