{ "id": 4272765, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLETUS CRAIG BROWN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Brown", "decision_date": "2007-09-24", "docket_number": "No. 4-06-0694", "first_page": "1116", "last_page": "1119", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 1116" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "816 N.E.2d 322", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335-36" }, { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 107", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444442 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0107-01" ] }, { "cite": "839 N.E.2d 492", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "514" }, { "page": "517" }, { "page": "518", "parenthetical": "indicating that the \"cross-comparison challenge and the 'cruel or degrading' challenge are separate types of proportionate[Ipenalties challenges and that the latter requires only that the penalty be examined in relation to the offense for which it is applied\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 481", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828618 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "517" }, { "page": "521" }, { "page": "524" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0481-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 370, "char_count": 7317, "ocr_confidence": 0.781, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3279395825779804 }, "sha256": "b1a886caacb503a88130f292b59c4034aa39d54a2aa31f1ccf39f5cc967d4877", "simhash": "1:4b0e945c3cbc7ffa", "word_count": 1101 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T20:53:12.225665+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLETUS CRAIG BROWN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing a June 2006 bench trial, the trial court convicted defendant, Cletus Craig Brown, of unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor (pseudoephedrine) with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/20(a)(l) (West Supp. 2005)). The court later sentenced him to an extended term of eight years in prison.\nDefendant appeals, arguing only that the statute under which he was sentenced violates the proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711). We disagree and affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nIn January 2006, the State charged defendant with unlawful possession of methamphetamine manufacturing chemicals under section 401(d \u2014 5) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (720 ILCS 570/ 401(d \u2014 5) (West 2004)). In March 2006, the State moved to amend the indictment to charge defendant instead with unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor under section 20(a)(1) of the Methamphetamine Control and Community Protection Act (Methamphetamine Act) (720 ILCS 646/20(a)(1) (West Supp. 2005)). Defendant did not object, and the trial court granted the State\u2019s motion.\nIn May 2006, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, arguing that section 20(a) of the Methamphetamine Act is unconstitutional because it provides a greater sentence for the possession of methamphetamine precursors than for the possession of an equivalent amount of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60 (West Supp. 2005)). At a June 2006 hearing, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, upon finding the statute\u2019s provisions were rationally related to the purpose of the Methamphetamine Act. Defendant\u2019s bench trial immediately followed, and the parties stipulated that defendant possessed 14.9 grams of methamphetamine precursor, which he intended to use to manufacture methamphetamine. Based on this evidence, the court found defendant guilty of unlawful possession of a methamphetamine precursor. Following a July 2006 hearing, the court sentenced him as previously stated.\nThis appeal followed.\nII. PROPORTIONATE-PENALTIES CLAUSE CHALLENGE\nDefendant argues that section 20(a) of the Methamphetamine Act violates the proportionate-penalties clause because it provides the same sentence for possession of methamphetamine precursors as section 60 of the Methamphetamine Act provides for possession of the equivalent weight of actual methamphetamine. We disagree.\nThe proportionate-penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution provides that \u201c[a]ll penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a711. Prior to our supreme court\u2019s decision in People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 839 N.E.2d 492 (2005), a claim that a sentence violated the proportionate-penalties clause was evaluated under three separate and distinct tests: (1) whether the penalty was cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community; (2) whether the offense, when compared to a similar offense comprised of different elements, resulted in a greater penalty although the charged offense created a less serious threat to public health and safety (the cross-comparison test); or (3) whether offenses with identical elements resulted in different penalties. People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d 107, 130, 816 N.E.2d 322, 335-36 (2004). However, in Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 517, 839 N.E.2d at 514, the supreme court abandoned the cross-comparison test. Thus, to succeed on his proportionate-penalties claim, defendant must show that either the penalty imposed (1) is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense that it shocks the moral sense of the community (the cruel or degrading test) or (2) differs from one imposed for an offense containing the same elements. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 521, 839 N.E.2d at 517.\nSection 20(a) of the Methamphetamine Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(1) It is unlawful to possess, procure, transport, store, or deliver any methamphetamine precursor or substance containing any methamphetamine precursor in standard dosage form with the intent that it be used to manufacture methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine.\n(A) A person who possesses, procures, transports, stores, or delivers less than 15 grams of methamphetamine precursor or substance containing any methamphetamine precursor is guilty of a Class 2 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 646/20(a)(l), (a)(2)(A) (West Supp. 2005).\nSection 60(a) of the Methamphetamine Act provides, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201c(a) It is unlawful knowingly to possess methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine.\n* *\n(2) A person who possesses 5 or more grams but less than 15 grams of methamphetamine or a substance containing methamphetamine is guilty of a Class 2 felony.\u201d 720 ILCS 646/60(a), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2005).\nDefendant bases his disproportionate-penalties claim on the following assertion: imposing the same level of punishment for possession of a methamphetamine precursor and possession of actual methamphetamine is shocking to the moral sense of the community. However, by so asserting, defendant misapplies the \u201ccruel or degrading\u201d test and actually relies on a cross-comparison analysis, which the supreme court abolished in Sharpe.\nUnder the \u201ccruel or degrading\u201d test, a disproportionate-penalties claim must show that the penalty imposed is so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed that it shocks the moral sense of the community. Huddleston, 212 Ill. 2d at 130, 816 N.E.2d at 335. The test does not rely at all on whether the penalty imposed was disproportionate to the penalty available for another offense. Moreover, defendant does not offer any argument or provide any evidence that his sentence under section 20(a)(1) of the Methamphetamine Act was cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. See Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 524, 839 N.E.2d at 518 (indicating that the \u201ccross-comparison challenge and the \u2018cruel or degrading\u2019 challenge are separate types of proportionate[Ipenalties challenges and that the latter requires only that the penalty be examined in relation to the offense for which it is applied\u201d (emphasis in original)). Thus, because defendant\u2019s claim is based solely on a cross-comparison argument that the supreme court has repudiated, we reject defendant\u2019s claim that his eight-year sentence is unconstitutional under the proportionate-penalties clause.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgment.\nAffirmed.\nAPPLETON and McCULLOUGH, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel M. Kirwan and Lawrence J. O\u2019Neill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.", "William A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kendra S. Peterson, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CLETUS CRAIG BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4-06-0694\nOpinion filed September 24, 2007.\nRehearing denied October 16, 2007.\nDaniel M. Kirwan and Lawrence J. O\u2019Neill, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Mt. Vernon, for appellant.\nWilliam A. Yoder, State\u2019s Attorney, of Bloomington (Norbert J. Goetten, Stephen E. Norris, and Kendra S. Peterson, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1116-01", "first_page_order": 1132, "last_page_order": 1135 }