{ "id": 4273248, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELI CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Cunningham", "decision_date": "2007-09-21", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-1512", "first_page": "298", "last_page": "306", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 298" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 569", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604511 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "587" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0569-01" ] }, { "cite": "243 Ill. App. 3d 1026", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5107868 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1033-36", "parenthetical": "court should have inquired into ARDC complaint's factual basis before denying defense counsel's written motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest arising from defendant's ARDC complaint" }, { "page": "1035" }, { "page": "1033-36" }, { "page": "1035" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/243/1026-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 800", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794593 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "810" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0800-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592943 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "15" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 382", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268505 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "431-34" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "434" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0382-01" ] }, { "cite": "102 Ill. 2d 181", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3156888 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "188" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/102/0181-01" ] }, { "cite": "143 Ill. 2d 82", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5591083 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134-35" }, { "page": "134" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/143/0082-01" ] }, { "cite": "346 Ill. App. 3d 1065", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3833198 ], "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/346/1065-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. App. 3d 33", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2586806 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/202/0033-01" ] }, { "cite": "157 Ill. App. 3d 899", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3543977 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "903" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/157/0899-01" ] }, { "cite": "81 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5480573 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "8-9" }, { "page": "8-9" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/81/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "304 Ill. App. 3d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 564578 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "9" }, { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/304/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "264 Ill. App. 3d 712", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 680595 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "732" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/264/0712-01" ] }, { "cite": "322 Ill. App. 3d 426", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 126345 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" }, { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/322/0426-01" ] }, { "cite": "104 Ill. 2d 504", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3147214 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "526" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/104/0504-01" ] }, { "cite": "466 U.S. 668", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6204802 ], "weight": 27, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "685" }, { "page": "692" }, { "page": "2063" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "687" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "688" }, { "page": "693" }, { "page": "2064" }, { "page": "694" }, { "page": "698" }, { "page": "2068" }, { "page": "697" }, { "page": "699" }, { "page": "2069" }, { "page": "688-89" }, { "page": "693-94" }, { "page": "2064-65" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "2066" }, { "page": "690" }, { "page": "695" }, { "page": "2066" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/466/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 904, "char_count": 20605, "ocr_confidence": 0.78, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.997808300235978e-08, "percentile": 0.42284820466366957 }, "sha256": "7b524203d16fb09fcc59907843077e6cc893fa696d4ed11aeef6edc70ab17d92", "simhash": "1:2aff1d4a7e1ed59e", "word_count": 3263 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:29.545992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELI CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nAfter a bench trial, defendant, Eli Cunningham, was convicted of the attempted murder of his cousin, Sylvester Daniels. Defendant raises three issues on appeal: (1) his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not pursue a self-defense theory; (2) the trial court should have conducted an inquiry into the factual basis of a complaint that defendant lodged against his counsel with the Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission (ARDC); and (3) defendant is entitled to a $5-per-day credit toward a $4 fine. We shall address these issues seriatim.\nBACKGROUND\nOn the evening of October 24, 2003, Sylvester Daniels (Daniels) was celebrating his birthday at a bar with friends and family, including his brother, Anderson Daniels, and his cousin, Eric Cunningham (Eric). After Daniels engaged in a verbal altercation with another bar patron inside the bar, some in the party moved outside the bar. Daniels struggled with his brother and his cousin, Eric. Daniels wanted to reenter the bar to continue his argument with the patron. Daniels\u2019s brother and cousin, Eric, were trying to calm him down. Daniels pushed his brother and his cousin, Eric. At this point, Eric\u2019s son, who is the defendant, Eli Cunningham, arrived at the bar. Both defendant and Daniels had consumed large amounts of alcohol. Defendant approached Daniels and the two of them argued. Defendant told Daniels not to touch his father. Daniels hit defendant. Daniels\u2019 brother and a friend intervened and separated Daniels and defendant. Eventually, defendant returned to his car, and Daniels started walking away from the bar.\nAs Daniels walked away, he walked on the grassy area between the sidewalk and the road. The testimony was conflicting as to whether Daniels was on the grass or the curb, but in any event, he was closer to the road than to the sidewalk. Some people outside the bar began to call out Daniels\u2019 name. Daniels turned around and saw defendant driving toward him. Defendant\u2019s car struck Daniels injuring him, resulting in Daniels\u2019 right leg being amputated below the knee.\nDefendant was arrested and later indicted for attempted first degree murder and five counts of aggravated battery. After police arrested defendant, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) Douglas Harvath interviewed defendant. ASA Harvath testified that during the interview defendant told him that no guns were at the scene described above.\nOn cross-examination during the bench trial, however, defendant testified, \u201cI thought I seen [sic] a gun,\u201d upon looking back up after reaching down to pick up a \u201cblunt\u201d of marijuana, and seeing Daniels standing near a pole. Defendant\u2019s testimony that he thought he had seen a gun contradicted his earlier statements to ASA Harvath. No one else testified to seeing any guns that evening. Defendant further testified that he ducked down and thought he crashed into a pole. Without exiting his car, defendant left the scene.\nDuring trial counsel\u2019s opening statement, counsel stated that he would show that the State could not prove that defendant intended to kill Daniels when defendant struck Daniels with his car. He also said that defendant \u201cpanicked and drove the car up on to the sidewalk after he believed that he was being confronted by Mr. [Sylvester] Daniels who[m] he thought had a gun.\u201d The State objected because counsel had not filed an answer asserting a self-defense defense. Counsel responded that self-defense was not defendant\u2019s defense, but instead the defense was reasonable doubt with respect to defendant\u2019s specific intent to kill Daniels.\nThe trial court found defendant guilty and merged the aggravated battery counts into the attempted murder charge. While announcing a finding of guilt the trial judge said that he did not find defendant\u2019s testimony believable. On the original sentencing date, trial counsel informed the court that defendant had filed a complaint against him with the ARDC and requested a continuance so that new counsel could represent defendant. That new counsel was counsel\u2019s associate in the same private law firm but he was unavailable on the original sentencing date. The trial court did not conduct an inquiry into the nature of the ARDC complaint and instead granted the continuance and allowed defendant to be represented by new counsel. At sentencing, defendant was represented by the replacement counsel. Defendant was sentenced to 16 years\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court also imposed fines and fees totaling $549. Defendant now appeals.\nANALYSIS\nI. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel\nThe sixth amendment to the Constitution \u201crecognizes the right to the assistance of counsel because it envisions counsel\u2019s playing a role that is critical to the ability of the adversarial system to produce just results.\u201d Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 692, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984). An accused is entitled to \u201creasonably effective assistance,\u201d and the touchstone for judging claims of ineffective assistance is whether an attorney\u2019s conduct renders the trial results undependable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.\nThe standard for an ineffective assistance claim has two prongs. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, adopted by People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 526 (1984). First, a defendant must demonstrate that counsel\u2019s performance was deficient by showing that \u201ccounsel\u2019s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Second, a defendant must also demonstrate prejudice by showing that \u201cthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel\u2019s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.\u201d Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. In determining whether a defendant has received ineffective assistance of counsel, a reviewing court may review either prong first, and the court need not consider both prongs of the standard if a defendant fails to show one prong. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.\nUnder the first prong, counsel is afforded wide latitude when making tactical decisions and the law presumes that counsel will faithfully fulfill his or her role envisioned by the sixth amendment. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688-89, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-94, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-65. Hence, counsel\u2019s assistance must fall \u201coutside the wide range of professionally competent assistance\u201d considering all the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. Further, choices of trial strategy are virtually unchallengeable because such a choice \u201cis a matter of professional judgment to which a review of counsel\u2019s competency does not extend.\u201d People v. Cundiff, 322 Ill. App. 3d 426, 435 (2001); see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695, 104 S. Ct. at 2066. \u201cTrial strategy includes an attorney\u2019s choice of one theory of defense over another.\u201d People v. Campbell, 264 Ill. App. 3d 712, 732 (1992); accord Cundiff, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 435.\nDefendant raises three arguments to show he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. Defendant first argues that he received ineffective assistance because counsel failed to file an answer asserting a self-defense defense. Next, defendant suggests that his trial counsel abandoned a self-defense theory because counsel failed to provide adequate notice of the self-defense theory in an answer to the State. Finally, defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective because counsel\u2019s intentional choice to pursue a strategy of showing defendant lacked the specific intent to kill Daniels, rather than a self-defense strategy, was unreasonable. We shall consider each contention with respect to the first prong under Strickland.\nDefendant first suggests that simply not filing an answer violates the spirit of the discovery rules and thus falls below the objective standard of reasonable assistance, relying on People v. Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d 1 (1999). While not filing an answer containing affirmative defenses may, at times, constitute attorney neglect (see, e.g., Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 11), this is not such a case. In Burns, the defendant\u2019s counsel knew of and intended to use an alibi witness, thus constituting an affirmative defense for which an answer was required. Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 9. However, although counsel knew of the alibi and even initially listed the alibi witness as a possible witness, counsel intentionally chose to wait until the last minute to add the alibi witness as a testifying witness. Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 11. Recognizing that counsel did this to effect surprise and gain an unfair advantage, the court held that such intentional and deliberate actions clearly violated the spirit of the discovery rules. Burns, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 11. The record in the present case, however, reveals no such surprise attempt by defendant\u2019s counsel. On the contrary, the record shows that counsel freely and consistently communicated his planned strategy to the State. Moreover, as discussed below, counsel\u2019s actions remained consistent with a lack-of-speeific-intent defense strategy throughout the proceedings. Hence, counsel\u2019s failure to file an answer in this case was not objectively unreasonable.\nDefendant disagrees and next suggests that counsel intentionally abandoned a self-defense theory of defense. During his opening statement, defense counsel said that defendant thought Daniels had a gun, and the State objected because counsel had not previously identified a self-defense defense in an answer. Defendant asserts that his counsel decided to abandon a self-defense theory in response to the State\u2019s objection only to cover up the failure to file an answer. We disagree. Defendant\u2019s argument ignores the fact that a self-defense theory would have sharply contradicted defendant\u2019s pretrial statements to investigators and his trial counsel developed a strategy consistent with those statements. Moreover, defendant\u2019s accusation is belied by the record. Defense counsel\u2019s opening statement clearly lays out the strategy of attempting to show that the State could not prove that defendant possessed the specific intent to kill Daniels because defendant was confused and acted in a panic. Likewise, counsel\u2019s motion for a directed finding further shows counsel\u2019s lack-of-specific-intent strategy by, for example, drawing attention to testimony regarding Daniels\u2019 nearness to the street, as opposed to being on the sidewalk. Finally, the record is replete with counsel\u2019s attempts to elicit testimony from witnesses to show that defendant lacked the requisite mental intent, such as cross-examination of ASA Harvath where counsel questioned ASA Harvath about defendant\u2019s statements regarding his alcohol consumption prior to striking Daniels. Thus, it is evident that counsel did not \u201cabandon\u201d a self-defense theory in response to the State\u2019s objection, but instead attempted to further a strategic defense choice by asserting defendant lacked the specific intent to kill Daniels.\nFinally, defendant argues that even if his counsel\u2019s decision to present a lack-of-specific-intent defense was a strategic choice, it was an unreasonable one. However, defendant overlooks the fact that the charge against him \u2014 attempted murder \u2014 imposes a significant burden of proof on the State. The mental state required for attempted murder is well known. Conviction for attempted murder requires proof of the specific intent to kill someone. People v. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d 1, 8-9 (1979); People v. Gentry, 157 Ill. App. 3d 899, 903 (1987). Mere intent to do great bodily harm, or even knowledge that one\u2019s acts may result in great bodily harm or death, is insufficient. Jones, 81 Ill. 2d at 8-9. Thus, not only was it reasonable for defendant\u2019s counsel to choose a lack-of-specific-intent defense strategy but, also, under the facts of this case, it was the best strategic choice.\nFurther, we find meritless defendant\u2019s contention that self-defense was a sound defense strategy in this case. A successful self-defense defense requires that the evidence show that \u201cunlawful force was threatened against a defendant, he believed the danger of harm was imminent, he was not the aggressor, force was necessary to avert the danger threatened against him, and the amount of force used was necessary.\u201d People v. Peterson, 202 Ill. App. 3d 33, 40 (1990); see also People v. Wells, 346 Ill. App. 3d 1065 (2004). Indeed, pursuing a self-defense theory would have presented defendant with three significant obstacles. First, the possibility that Daniels might have had a gun directly contradicts defendant\u2019s earlier statement to ASA Harvath that defendant had not seen a gun. Second, defendant was driving a car and reasonably could have sped away from Daniels, even if Daniels had had a gun. Third, no other witness testified to having seen a gun, leaving only defendant\u2019s testimony to establish that he acted in self-defense.\nThus, after careful review of the briefs, cases and record, we are not persuaded by defendant\u2019s arguments. Instead, we agree with the State that trial counsel prepared and followed a strategy consistent with a viable defense of reasonable doubt toward the defendant\u2019s specific intent to kill Daniels. Counsel\u2019s representation and reasonable strategic choice of a defense of defendant\u2019s lack of specific intent neither fell below an objective standard of reasonableness nor fell outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. Since defendant has failed to show that the pursued trial strategy was unreasonable, we need not consider the second prong of the Strickland standard.\nII. Inquiry Into Defendant\u2019s ARDC Complaint\nDefendant urges remand for an inquiry into the factual basis of an ARDC complaint he filed against his trial counsel prior to posttrial proceedings, even though defendant was subsequently represented by different counsel and defendant did not make a pro se motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Essentially, defendant\u2019s argument likens the mere existence of an ARDC complaint to an actual claim of ineffective assistance, and it would require a trial court inquiry into the basis of every ARDC complaint by any defendant when the court becomes aware of such a complaint. We decline to announce and follow such a rule.\nThe ultimate purpose of a trial court\u2019s initial inquiry into a defendant\u2019s ineffective assistance claim is to determine whether new counsel should be appointed. See People v. Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d 82, 134-35 (1991); see generally People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984). When a defendant\u2019s actual allegations show possible attorney neglect of the case, the court should appoint new counsel to argue ineffective assistance, rather than simply having original trial counsel or a defendant argue the claim. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 188; Nitz, 143 Ill. 2d at 134. To invoke the rule announced in Krankel and its progeny, however, a defendant must at least make some allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel for the court to consider and must provide some factual specificity of the reason for the allegation. See People v. Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d 382, 431-34 (2007). Mere awareness by a trial court that a defendant has complained about his counsel\u2019s representation imposes no duty on the court to sua sponte investigate a defendant\u2019s complaint. See Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 434.\nIn addition, our supreme court has said that when a defendant retains private counsel, it is \u201cnot within the trial court\u2019s rubric of authority to advise or exercise any influence or control over the selection of counsel by defendant, who was able to, and did, choose counsel on his own accord. [Citation.] *** Defendant [can] retain[ ] other counsel to represent him prior to the hearing of his post-trial motions.\u201d People v. Pecoraro, 144 Ill. 2d 1, 15 (1991). However, at least one court has noted that it did not believe Pecoraro requires a trial court\u2019s automatic denial of pro se requests for new counsel whenever a defendant has retained private representation. People v. Johnson, 227 Ill. App. 3d 800, 810 (1992).\nIn the instant case, defendant retained private trial counsel, like the defendant in Pecoraro. However, unlike the defendant in Pecoraro, defendant here made no claim of ineffective assistance for the court to consider. Here, defendant\u2019s trial counsel told the trial court that defendant had filed an ARDC complaint against him, and counsel wanted to have another attorney, from the same firm, represent defendant during sentencing, but that replacement attorney was unavailable on the original sentencing date. The trial court immediately ordered a continuance and defendant was subsequently represented by replacement counsel during the sentencing phase.\nA trial court\u2019s mere awareness of the existence of the complaint, without more, is insufficient to effectively raise a claim of ineffective assistance. Compare Ward, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 434, with People v. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d 1026, 1033-36 (1993) (court should have inquired into ARDC complaint\u2019s factual basis before denying defense counsel\u2019s written motion to withdraw based on a conflict of interest arising from defendant\u2019s ARDC complaint). A trial court\u2019s awareness of an ARDC complaint is not equivalent to an actual claim of ineffective assistance when a continuance is ordered and defendant is subsequently represented by different private counsel. Defendant here did not request new counsel when his trial counsel orally requested a continuance so that new counsel could represent defendant. Defendant did not request different counsel during the sentencing phase when defendant was, in fact, represented by new counsel. In any event, defendant did not allege ineffective assistance before the court.\nDefendant also relies on Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 1035, for the proposition that the court\u2019s awareness of an ARDC complaint against counsel always requires an initial inquiry. In Jackson, the trial court failed to conduct an initial inquiry when it became aware of an ARDC complaint\u2019s existence and denied the public defender\u2019s request to withdraw and to have new counsel appointed. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 1033-36. Jackson is inapposite. Defendant overlooks the fact that in Jackson the trial court denied counsel\u2019s motion to appoint new counsel, so the defendant was not later represented by different counsel. Jackson, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 1035. Here, as noted earlier, the trial court allowed defendant\u2019s counsel\u2019s request for a continuance, so new counsel could represent defendant at sentencing, thus rendering moot any required inquiry into the ARDC complaint.\nIn sum, the initial inquiry\u2019s purpose is to determine whether new counsel should be appointed. Such an inquiry is irrelevant in the present case because defendant received new counsel.\nIII. $4 Charge Subject to Credit\nDefendant\u2019s third argument on appeal is that he is entitled to a $5-per-day credit for the 539 days of his incarceration prior to sentencing under section 110 \u2014 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110 \u2014 14 (West 2002)) toward the $4 charge imposed by section 5 \u2014 9\u20141(c\u20149) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 9\u20141(c\u20149) (West Supp. 2003)), the criminal/traffic conviction surcharge. We agree. After the filing of defendant\u2019s initial brief and the State\u2019s response brief, our supreme court resolved the issue in People v. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d 569 (2006). The criminal/traffic conviction surcharge of $4 is a fine that is subject to presentencing credit. Jones, 223 Ill. 2d at 587. Accordingly, we need not discuss the issue further.\nDefendant\u2019s conviction is affirmed. Defendant is entitled to a $4 credit toward the criminal/traffic conviction surcharge imposed in the order assessing fines, fees and costs, reducing defendant\u2019s total owed to $545.\nAffirmed as modified.\nO\u2019BRIEN and O\u2019HARA FROSSARD, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GALLAGHER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Laura A. Weiler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Anthony O\u2019Brien, and Michael M. Chvatal, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELI CUNNINGHAM, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (5th Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 05\u20141512\nOpinion filed September 21, 2007.\nRehearing denied August 23, 2007.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Laura A. Weiler, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Anthony O\u2019Brien, and Michael M. Chvatal, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0298-01", "first_page_order": 316, "last_page_order": 324 }