{ "id": 4272827, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Allen", "decision_date": "2007-09-28", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-1943", "first_page": "511", "last_page": "527", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 511" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "786 F.2d 1308", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1556406 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1312", "parenthetical": "\"This court accepts the modern conclusion that the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications is proper, and we have no prior contrary authority which binds us. We cannot say such scientific data is inadequate or contradictory\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/786/1308-01" ] }, { "cite": "753 F.2d 1224", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 292480 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1242" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/753/1224-01" ] }, { "cite": "847 P.2d 228", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "case_ids": [ 10353260 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/p2d/847/0228-01" ] }, { "cite": "135 Ariz. 281", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ariz.", "case_ids": [ 737525 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ariz/135/0281-01" ] }, { "cite": "939 F. Supp. 1132", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7655858 ], "year": 1996, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/939/1132-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 F. Supp. 2d 602", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp. 2d", "case_ids": [ 9135997 ], "year": 2003, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp-2d/254/0602-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 F.3d 306", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1747620 ], "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/212/0306-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 F.3d 131", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 5560740 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "144" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/454/0131-01" ] }, { "cite": "8 N.Y.3d 449", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.Y.3d", "case_ids": [ 5689076 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "457" }, { "page": "528" }, { "page": "376" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ny3d/8/0449-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 F.3d 1095", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 11781406 ], "year": 1999, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/165/1095-01" ] }, { "cite": "410 N.E.2d 252", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court properly excluded expert testimony concerning unreliability of cross-racial identifications, reasoning trustworthiness of eyewitness observation is not generally beyond the common knowledge and experience of average juror" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "87 Ill. App. 3d 814", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3179482 ], "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court properly excluded expert testimony concerning unreliability of cross-racial identifications, reasoning trustworthiness of eyewitness observation is not generally beyond the common knowledge and experience of average juror" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/87/0814-01" ] }, { "cite": "423 N.E.2d 1206", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 1055", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3106966 ], "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/1055-01" ] }, { "cite": "426 N.E.2d 575", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "factors such as stress, opportunity to observe, distortion of memory, and problems of cross-racial identification are within realm of common experience and can be evaluated by jury without expert assistance" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "100 Ill. App. 3d 57", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5498131 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "factors such as stress, opportunity to observe, distortion of memory, and problems of cross-racial identification are within realm of common experience and can be evaluated by jury without expert assistance" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/100/0057-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 1051", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court properly excluded expert testimony regarding effect of stress upon a victim's recall of events where a weapon is used" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 339", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5660533 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "trial court properly excluded expert testimony regarding effect of stress upon a victim's recall of events where a weapon is used" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0339-01" ] }, { "cite": "775 N.E.2d 921", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Tisdel I" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 210", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477006 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Tisdel I" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0210-01" ] }, { "cite": "739 N.E.2d 31", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1143", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096650 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1158" }, { "page": "1157" }, { "page": "1158" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1143-01" ] }, { "cite": "788 N.E.2d 1149", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Tisdel II" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 465", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25348 ], "weight": 7, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "Tisdel II" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "468" }, { "page": "467" }, { "page": "468" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0465-01" ] }, { "cite": "685 N.E.2d 956", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "the expert must not invade the province of the fact finder, while aiding the fact finder in reaching its decision" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "292 Ill. App. 3d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1725075 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "511", "parenthetical": "the expert must not invade the province of the fact finder, while aiding the fact finder in reaching its decision" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/292/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "469 N.E.2d 569", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "103 Ill. 2d 192", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3152614 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/103/0192-01" ] }, { "cite": "564 N.E.2d 1155", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1990, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "139 Ill. 2d 264", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5574337 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" }, { "page": "289" }, { "page": "286" }, { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/139/0264-01" ] }, { "cite": "767 N.E.2d 879", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "329 Ill. App. 3d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1472387 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "250" }, { "page": "250" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/329/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "287 N.E.2d 688", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1972, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "52 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5395587 ], "year": 1972, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "253" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/52/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "813 N.E.2d 93", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "parenthetical": "\"This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451664 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512", "parenthetical": "\"This deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses' demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0502-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 N.E.2d 152", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "42 Ill. 2d 508", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2848428 ], "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/42/0508-01" ] }, { "cite": "220 Ill. App. 3d 848", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5274830 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "860" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/220/0848-01" ] }, { "cite": "635 N.E.2d 860", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1994, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "262 Ill. App. 3d 876", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2850326 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "882" }, { "page": "882" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/262/0876-01" ] }, { "cite": "453 U.S. 454", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11722898 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "459", "parenthetical": "Supreme Court extended Robinson to all containers within the defendant's immediate control" }, { "page": "774", "parenthetical": "Supreme Court extended Robinson to all containers within the defendant's immediate control" }, { "page": "2863", "parenthetical": "Supreme Court extended Robinson to all containers within the defendant's immediate control" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/453/0454-01" ] }, { "cite": "461 N.E.2d 941", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "101 Ill. 2d 209", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3160338 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "216" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" }, { "page": "217" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/101/0209-01" ] }, { "cite": "170 N.E.2d 546", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1960, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "20 Ill. 2d 624", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2738918 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1960, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "625-26" }, { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/20/0624-01" ] }, { "cite": "395 U.S. 752", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1772077 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/395/0752-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 N.E.2d 450", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1969, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "44 Ill. 2d 222", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2890960 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224" }, { "page": "224-25" }, { "page": "225" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/44/0222-01" ] }, { "cite": "499 F.2d 179", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1171056 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1974, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" }, { "page": "184" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/499/0179-01" ] }, { "cite": "388 F.2d 842", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2094266 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "845", "parenthetical": "examination of the defendant's hands for evidence of incriminating fluorescein powder held not to be a search within Schmerber" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/388/0842-01" ] }, { "cite": "408 F.2d 331", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 2203618 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1969, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "332" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333" }, { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/408/0331-01" ] }, { "cite": "384 U.S. 757", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12047531 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1966, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "768" }, { "page": "918" }, { "page": "1834" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/384/0757-01" ] }, { "cite": "416 N.E.2d 1070", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1981, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3046308 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "414 U.S. 218", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 11715586 ], "weight": 21, "year": 1973, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "224-26" }, { "page": "434-36" }, { "page": "471-73" }, { "page": "224" }, { "page": "434" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": 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"source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE WOLFSON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nSocial scientists have been conducting research into the ability of one human being to identify another. Whether such an expert should be allowed to testify in a criminal case is a matter of broad discretion for the trial court. In light of the specific circumstances of this case, we hold reversible error was committed when the trial court refused to allow an expert to testify. We reverse the defendant\u2019s conviction and remand for a new trial.\nThis was a jury trial. The defendant, Walter Allen, was convicted of attempted murder, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated battery with a firearm. He was sentenced to a total of 43 years in prison.\nIn addition to the rejection of his expert witness, defendant raises fourth amendment and due process issues that must be resolved before we reach the matter of the expert witness.\nFACTS\nOn March 22, 2001, two black males entered Four Star Dry Cleaners, showed a gun, and demanded money. During the robbery, one of the men \u201cpistol-whipped\u201d Che Shin, an employee at the cleaners. No money was taken. Defendant was identified as a suspect in the attempted robbery after two witnesses, Phil Jones and Calvin Smith, told police they saw defendant run past them near the cleaners shortly after the robbery occurred. Sometime before April 10, 2001, Shin identified defendant from a photo array as one of the people who robbed him. That is not the case before us, but it plays a role in the case we do decide.\nOn April 17, 2001, a second attempted armed robbery was committed at the same cleaners. Miye Goodson, an employee at the cleaners, was standing at the counter when two men entered the store. One of the men wore a dark hooded sweatshirt. The other man wore a yellow hooded sweatshirt with the hood up, and he stood and looked out the window. After one of the men approached the counter, Goodson asked if she could help him. The man did not respond. When Goodson asked again, the man reached into his pocket, pulled out a silver handgun, and said: \u201cThis is a stick-up. Give money.\u201d When Goodson turned around to get money from the cash register, she was shot in the back.\nBefore trial, defendant filed several pretrial motions, including a motion to suppress Goodson\u2019s identification, a motion to quash defendant\u2019s arrest, and a motion to exclude gunshot residue evidence. The State filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. Steven Penrod, an expert in eyewitness identification.\nDuring the December 21, 2004, hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to suppress identification, Goodson testified the police visited her in the hospital two days after she was shot and asked her if she was willing to look at photographs. She identified the defendant. Goodson could not recall how many photos the police showed her. Goodson said her husband had told her the police had caught the man who shot her before she identified defendant and signed his photo. Goodson admitted that when Mort Smith, an investigator hired by the defense, asked her how many pictures the police officers showed her, she responded \u201cjust the one.\u201d At trial she explained what she meant by that. She did not change her testimony. Goodson was not asked to make an in-person identification of the defendant until the preliminary hearing on December 21, 2004, when he was sitting at counsel table in a jail uniform.\nDetective John O\u2019Shea testified that on the morning of April 17, 2001, he was scheduled to go to defendant\u2019s probation officer\u2019s office to arrest defendant for the March 22 attempted robbery. During roll call on that same morning, he learned a woman was shot during a robbery that morning at the cleaners. When defendant arrived at his probation officer\u2019s office, Detective O\u2019Shea arrested him for the March 22 attempted robbery. Detective O\u2019Shea did not have an arrest warrant. Shortly after defendant\u2019s arrest, Detective O\u2019Shea transported him to the police station and requested an atomic absorption gunshot residue (GSR) test be performed on defendant\u2019s hands.\nOn April 19, 2001, Detective O\u2019Shea went to Mount Sinai Hospital to interview Goodson regarding the second attempted robbery. He generated a black and white photo array on the ICAM system that included a photo of defendant. Detective O\u2019Shea ended up using five photos that he thought were the most similar looking. When Detective O\u2019Shea asked Goodson how she was feeling, she said she was \u201cin pain\u201d and \u201cnot feeling the best.\u201d Goodson agreed to look at some pictures. After viewing the photo array, Goodson identified defendant as the shooter. Goodson described the shooter to Detective O\u2019Shea as a \u201cmale black in his 30s\u201d and \u201cbald, no hair.\u201d Detective O\u2019Shea admitted telling Goodson the police had some suspects before showing her the photo array. He did not tell her the suspect was in custody. Detective O\u2019Shea testified substantially the same at the hearing on defendant\u2019s motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.\nFollowing arguments, the trial court denied each of defendant\u2019s motions. The court granted the State\u2019s motion in limine to exclude the testimony of Dr. Penrod.\nAt defendant\u2019s jury trial, Goodson testified that on April 19, 2001, two detectives visited her at Mount Sinai Hospital. After Goodson said she could identify the shooter, a detective showed her five pictures. She identified defendant as the person who shot her and signed the bottom of his photograph. Goodson also identified defendant in open court.\nGoodson admitted that when Mort Smith, a private investigator for the defense, asked her how many photos the police had shown her at the hospital, she answered \u201cjust the one.\u201d Goodson explained she said \u201cjust the one\u201d because she was only shown one picture of the man who shot her and four other pictures. During cross-examination, Goodson said she could not tell in what hand defendant was holding the gun because she panicked when she saw it.\nDetective O\u2019Shea testified substantially the same as he had at the suppression hearing.\nOfficer Rivera, a forensic services unit investigator with the Chicago police department, testified that defendant did not want to participate in the GSR test. Several detectives physically restrained defendant and positioned his hands so the test could be administered. The detectives were not wearing gloves, and Officer Rivera admitted he and his partner had handled their guns on the day the test was administered.\nOfficer Robert Berk of the Illinois State Police Forensic Science Center testified that the GSR test showed elevated levels of barium, antimony, and lead on defendant\u2019s left palm. The elements are consistent with having handled, fired, or been in close proximity to a discharged firearm. He conceded, however, that these particles can be transferred from one surface to another. He noted there is only a six-hour window of time for the administration of an atomic absorption GSR test after a gun has been fired. He admitted a positive test result does not necessarily prove an individual discharged a firearm. He believed, however, that the sources of lead, barium, and antimony he detected on defendant\u2019s hand were from gunshot residue. A \u201cscanning electron microscopy\u201d (SEM) test did not confirm the presence of gunshot residue on defendant\u2019s clothing. Officer Berk admitted the SEM test is a more sensitive, selective, and specific test than the atomic absorption test he used.\nDr. Samuel Palenik, a forensic analytical microscopist, testified for the defense. He said the atomic absorption GSR test is an unreliable means of identifying whether GSR is present on a surface. He noted the elements detected by an atomic absorption test are found in the environment and many household items. According to Dr. Palenik, most law enforcement agencies, including the Chicago police department, have moved away from the test in light of the significant problems associated with it.\nMort Smith, a private investigator, testified that he visited Good-son at her home on May 8, 2004. Goodson told him the police showed her two or three photographs when they visited the hospital in 2001. On September 22, 2004, Smith visited Goodson at her home and taped the interview. Goodson told Smith the police showed her only one photograph when she was at the hospital.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of first-degree attempted murder, attempted armed robbery, and aggravated battery with a firearm. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to a 29-year sentence for the Class X felony of attempted first-degree murder. Defendant was also sentenced to a consecutive 14-year sentence for attempted armed robbery. Defendant appeals.\nDECISION\nI. Motion to Suppress Evidence\nDefendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, defendant contends the atomic absorption GSR test administered by the police was nonroutine and completely unrelated to the March 22 attempted robbery crime he was lawfully arrested for, thus violating his fourth amendment rights.\nWhen reviewing a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, the court\u2019s factual findings are reviewed for manifest error while the court\u2019s ultimate ruling is reviewed de novo. People v. Steham, 203 Ill. 2d 26, 33 (2002).\nBoth the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, \u00a76. A warrantless search and seizure is per se unreasonable unless it comes within one of a few recognized and limited exceptions. Steham, 203 Ill. 2d at 34. \u201cOne such exception, which has been found reasonable under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution, is a search incident to a lawful arrest.\u201d Steham, 203 Ill. 2d at 34, citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224-26, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427, 434-36, 94 S. Ct. 467, 471-73 (1973).\nDefendant does not contend the police lacked probable cause to arrest him for the March 22 attempted armed robbery. Instead, he contends that because he was neither under arrest for, nor a suspect in, the April 17 attempted robbery, the police had no reasonable basis or justification for performing a GSR test on him. Defendant contends the police must provide a rational justification for conducting a search unrelated to the crime for which a defendant is arrested, which they have failed to do in this case. Since the police were authorized to detain defendant, the question becomes to what extent he could be searched. See People v. Seymour, 84 Ill. 2d 24, 33, 416 N.E.2d 1070 (1981).\nWhile no Illinois court has specifically addressed this issue, similar issues have been addressed at length in the federal courts.\nIn Schmerber v. State of California, 384 U.S. 757, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908, 86 S. Ct. 1826 (1966), a case cited by defendant, the Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to a blood test after he was arrested while receiving treatment in a hospital following a car accident. The Court explained that the fourth amendment\u2019s proper function is \u201cto constrain, not against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper manner.\u201d Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 918, 86 S. Ct. at 1834.\nThe court noted that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops. Because the officer might reasonably have believed he was confronted with an emergency in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of the evidence, the court held the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content was lawful under the fourth amendment.\nIn United States v. D\u2019Amico, 408 F.2d 331 (2d Cir. 1969), the court was asked whether a defendant\u2019s fourth amendment rights were violated when a federal agent, without a search warrant or the defendant\u2019s consent, clipped several strands of hair from the defendant\u2019s head while he was in custody. The court held the clipping of the few strands of hair unquestionably constituted a seizure that might conceivably be subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment. D\u2019Amico, 408 F.2d at 332.\nHowever, because the clipping by the officer of a few strands of hair was so minor an imposition that the defendant suffered no true humiliation or affront to his dignity, the court held a search warrant was not required to justify the officer\u2019s act. D\u2019Amico, 408 F.2d at 333. The taking of several strands of hair while the defendant was in custody was no more prejudicial than taking his fingerprints or his photograph. D\u2019Amico, 408 F.2d at 333. See also United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968) (examination of the defendant\u2019s hands for evidence of incriminating fluorescein powder held not to be a search within Schmerber).\nSimilarly, in United States v. Bridges, 499 F.2d 179 (7th Cir. 1974), the court was asked to consider whether a hand swab test conducted on the defendant without his consent during an interrogation violated his fourth amendment rights. Following the defendant\u2019s refusal to answer questions concerning his handling of explosives during an interrogation, federal agents swabbed his hand without his consent. Based on the chemical analysis of the swabs, the agents obtained a warrant to search defendant\u2019s car and house. Bridges, 499 F.2d at 184. The court found the swabbing was not an unreasonable search because it was \u201cno more offensive to [the defendant\u2019s] person than fingerprinting or photographing him.\u201d Bridges, 499 F.2d at 184.\nDefendant relies on People v. Machroli, 44 Ill. 2d 222, 224, 254 N.E.2d 450 (1969), to support his contention that the GSR test constituted an unreasonable search and seizure in light of the facts of this case.\nIn Machroli, the defendant was arrested by a police officer who responded to a domestic disturbance call. Prior to the defendant\u2019s arrest, an officer saw him remove a small white box from his pant\u2019s pocket and place it on a dresser. After the defendant left the bedroom, the officer entered, picked up the box, opened it, and discovered three white tablets. The pills were identified as an illegal narcotic. In rejecting the State\u2019s justification for the search, the court held \u201c[a] search incident to an arrest is authorized when it is reasonably necessary to protect the arresting officer from attack, to prevent escape, or to discover the fruits of the crime.\u201d Machroli, 44 Ill. 2d at 224-25, citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 89 S. Ct. 2034 (1969). The court noted the box and its contents were in no way related to the offense for which the defendant was arrested. The court held there was no justification other than curiosity for the officer\u2019s conduct in entering the bedroom and taking possession of the box. Machroli, 44 Ill. 2d at 225.\nSimilarly, in People v. Burnett, 20 Ill. 2d 624, 170 N.E.2d 546 (1960), our supreme court was asked to consider whether the search of defendant\u2019s apartment was incidental to his arrest. After defendant was arrested for operating a \u201clewd and lascivious\u201d show, the police searched his apartment and found a locked tin box in the bedroom closet. The police opened the box and found obscene photographs. The supreme court held there was nothing in the record to indicate a search of the box was reasonably necessary to protect the officers or prevent the defendant\u2019s escape. Burnett, 20 Ill. 2d at 625-26. Additionally, the police had already gathered all of the evidence necessary to prove or connect defendant to the crime he was arrested for. The court held the search of the box was not incidental to the arrest. The evidence was suppressed. Burnett, 20 Ill. 2d at 626.\nIn Robinson, however, the Supreme Court noted the search incident to a lawful arrest exception to the fourth amendment\u2019s warrant requirement has historically been formulated into two distinct positions. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 434, 94 S. Ct. at 471. \u201cThe first is that a search may be made of the person of the arrestee by virtue of the lawful arrest. The second is that a search may be made of the area within control of the arrestee.\u201d (Emphasis in orginal and added.) Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 434, 94 S. Ct. at 471. The Court noted that throughout its series of cases discussing the permissible area beyond the person of an arrestee that may be searched, \u201cno doubt has been expressed as to the unqualified authority of the arresting authority to search the person of the arrestee.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Robinson, 414 U.S. at 225, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 435, 94 S. Ct. at 472.\nThe Supreme Court was asked to consider whether a police officer\u2019s inspection of a crumpled cigarette package found on the defendant\u2019s person and seizure of heroin capsules found inside the package without a warrant were permissible after the defendant was lawfully arrested for operating a motor vehicle with a revoked license. The Court held a search of a defendant\u2019s person incident to a lawful arrest required \u201cno additional justification.\u201d Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441, 94 S. Ct. at 477. \u201cIt is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search, and we hold that in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a \u2018reasonable\u2019 search under that Amendment.\u201d Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441, 94 S. Ct. at 477.\nOur supreme court relied on Robinson in People v. Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d 209, 216, 461 N.E.2d 941 (1984). In Hoskins, the defendant approached an unmarked police car and offered to perform a sexual act for money. When she was told she was under arrest for prostitution, defendant ran from the officers and dropped her purse. After defendant was caught, the police searched her purse. The officers found a hypodermic needle and a metal cap with cocaine adhering to it. The State argued the search was valid as incident to a lawful arrest. The supreme court held the search was proper under Robinson, which \u201cauthorizes a warrantless search of the defendant\u2019s purse, which is immediately associated with defendant\u2019s person, simply on the lawful, custodial arrest.\u201d Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d at 217. The court noted the Robinson holding is \u201c \u2018a straightforward rule, easily applied, and predictably enforced.\u2019 \u201d Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d at 217, quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 459, 69 L. Ed. 2d 768, 774, 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863 (1981) (Supreme Court extended Robinson to all containers within the defendant\u2019s immediate control).\nBecause Machroli and Hoskins involved instances where the police searched the area in the vicinity of the defendant\u2019s control, not the defendant\u2019s person, we find they are distinguishable from the present case. See Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235, 38 L. Ed. 2d at 441, 94 S. Ct. at 477; Hoskins, 101 Ill. 2d at 217.\nThe hand swab performed on the defendant was a minor intrusion, no more offensive than fingerprinting or photographing. See Bridges, 499 F.2d at 184. Because the hand swabbing was so \u201cminor an imposition that the defendant suffered no true humiliation or affront to his dignity,\u201d we find a search warrant was not required to justify the GSR test after defendant was in custody and while the arresting officers were assigned to investigate the April 17 attempted robbery. See Bridges, 499 F.2d at 184; D\u2019Amico, 408 F.2d at 333. In light of the circumstances in this case, we find the hand swabbing was not an unreasonable search and seizure.\nII. Identification Testimony\nDefendant contends the trial court\u2019s denial of his motion to suppress Goodson\u2019s identification was manifestly erroneous. Specifically, defendant contends the photo array used by the police was unduly suggestive. Defendant also contends the admission of Good-son\u2019s in-court identification deprived him of his right to due process because the identification was not sufficiently independent from the highly suggestive photo array.\nOn a motion to suppress identification, the defendant bears the initial burden of establishing the pretrial identification was \u201c \u2018so unnecessarily suggestive that it gave rise to a substantial likelihood of irreparable mistaken identification.\u2019 \u201d People v. Curtis, 262 Ill. App. 3d 876, 882, 635 N.E.2d 860 (1994), quoting People v. Harris, 220 Ill. App. 3d 848, 860 (1991). A trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion to suppress identification will not be set aside unless manifestly erroneous. Curtis, 262 Ill. App. 3d at 882.\nDefendant contends the photograph display was impermissibly suggestive because Goodson\u2019s contradictory testimony indicates she may have been shown only a single photo of defendant and no other suspects. We disagree.\nOur supreme court has recognized \u201cshow-up\u201d identifications, or identification procedures that include only a single defendant without any other suspects, carry \u201ca dangerous degree of improper suggestion\u201d (People v. Blumenshine, 42 Ill. 2d 508, 512, 250 N.E.2d 152 (1969)), but the trial court here found Detective O\u2019Shea showed Goodson \u201ca number of photographs\u201d in the hospital. While we recognize Goodson\u2019s testimony at the suppression hearing and at defendant\u2019s trial wavered regarding exactly how many pictures she was shown in the hospital, she consistently said she was shown more than one photo in the array. Detective O\u2019Shea also testified that he showed Goodson five pictures at the hospital, which included one picture of the defendant. Those photos are part of the record.\nThe issue of witness credibility was for the court to resolve. See People v. Pitman, 211 Ill. 2d 502, 512, 813 N.E.2d 93 (2004) (\u201cThis deferential standard of review is grounded in the reality that the circuit court is in a superior position to determine and weigh the credibility of the witnesses, observe the witnesses\u2019 demeanor, and resolve conflicts in their testimony\u201d). After reviewing the record, we see no reason to disturb the trial court\u2019s finding that Goodson was shown multiple photographs.\nAlternatively, defendant contends that even if Goodson was shown a five-photo lineup, the lineup was still unconstitutionally suggestive due to the differences in appearance between defendant and the other alleged individuals in the photo array.\nInitially, the State contends defendant waived this issue by failing to raise it in his motion to suppress. See People v. McAdrian, 52 Ill. 2d 250, 253, 287 N.E.2d 688 (1972). Waiver aside, we reject defendant\u2019s contention.\n\u201cIndividuals selected for a photo array lineup need not be physically identical.\u201d People v. Denton, 329 Ill. App. 3d 246, 250, 767 N.E.2d 879 (2002). \u201cDifferences in their appearance go to the weight of the identification, not to its admissibility.\u201d Denton, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 250.\nBased on a careful review of the photographs presented as part of the record, we find the photo array was not impermissibly suggestive. All individuals displayed in the photo array had similar general physical characteristics. While defendant contends he was the only person who was actually bald in the photo array, we note all of the individuals had very closely cropped hair in the pictures, which appeared similar to defendant\u2019s hairstyle in the picture shown to Goodson.\nWe find the photo array was not unduly suggestive. In light of our determination, we need not address defendant\u2019s contention that the suggestive photo array tainted Goodson\u2019s in-court identification.\nIII. Eyewitness Expert Testimony\nDefendant contends the trial court\u2019s exclusion of Dr. Steven Pen-rod\u2019s eyewitness identification testimony deprived him of his right to due process and his right to present a defense.\nGenerally, an expert will be permitted to testify if his experience and qualifications afford him knowledge that is not common to laypersons and where such testimony will aid the trier of fact in reaching its conclusion. People v. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d 264, 288, 564 N.E.2d 1155 (1990), citing People v. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d 192, 208, 469 N.E.2d 569 (1984). See also People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill. App. 3d 508, 685 N.E.2d 956 (1997). Trial courts are given broad discretion when determining the admissibility of an expert witness. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 290. The question here is whether the trial court abused its discretion.\nWhen considering the reliability of expert testimony, the court should balance its probative value against its unfairly prejudicial effect. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 290. \u201cIn the exercise of his discretion, the trial judge should also carefully consider the necessity and relevance of the expert testimony in light of the facts in the case before him prior to admitting it for the jury\u2019s consideration.\u201d Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 290.\nIn Enis, our supreme court considered whether the defendant was entitled to introduce testimony of an expert witness regarding reliability of eyewitness testimony. The defense, in an offer of proof, claimed the expert would testify that: the relationship between confidence and accuracy is insignificant; the higher the stress level, the less accurate the memory; the identification is usually worse if a weapon is present; and jurors give too much weight to time estimates.\nThe supreme court found the expert\u2019s testimony was not necessary because none of the witnesses was in a high stress situation, only one witness saw a weapon, and testimony regarding time estimates was not relevant to the case. Further, the court found that while the witnesses\u2019 confidence may have been at issue in the case, that factor alone did not warrant a new trial. Concluding the expert testimony would not have aided the jury in reaching its conclusion, the court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the testimony. Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 289.\nOther Illinois cases have uniformly upheld a trial court\u2019s refusal to allow expert eyewitness testimony. See People v. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d 465, 788 N.E.2d 1149 (2003) (Tisdel II); People v. Tisdel, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1143, 1158, 739 N.E.2d 31 (2000), rev\u2019d on other grounds, 201 Ill. 2d 210, 775 N.E.2d 921 (2002) (Tisdel I); People v. Perruquet, 118 Ill. App. 3d 339, 454 N.E.2d 1051 (1983) (trial court properly excluded expert testimony regarding effect of stress upon a victim\u2019s recall of events where a weapon is used); People v. Brown, 100 Ill. App. 3d 57, 426 N.E.2d 575 (1981) (factors such as stress, opportunity to observe, distortion of memory, and problems of cross-racial identification are within realm of common experience and can be evaluated by jury without expert assistance); People v. Johnson, 97 Ill. App. 3d 1055, 423 N.E.2d 1206 (1981); People v. Dixon, 87 Ill. App. 3d 814, 410 N.E.2d 252 (1980) (trial court properly excluded expert testimony concerning unreliability of cross-racial identifications, reasoning trustworthiness of eyewitness observation is not generally beyond the common knowledge and experience of average juror). The Seventh Circuit also disfavors expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness identification on the grounds that it does not assist the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095 (7th Cir. 1999).\nIn Tisdel II, we noted that numerous studies in the area of eyewitness psychology indicate there is significant potential for eyewitness error and that jurors have misconceptions about the abilities of eyewitnesses. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 467. We held that a trial court should\n\u201ccarefully scrutinize the proffered testimony to determine its relevance \u2014 that is, whether there is a logical connection between the testimony and the facts of the case. Normally, expert testimony that is probative and relevant should be allowed.\u201d Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 468, citing People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill. App. 3d 508, 685 N.E.2d 956 (1997).\nThe defendant in Tisdel II contended the expert\u2019s testimony should have been admitted because it would have aided the jury in reaching a more informed decision as to the credibility of the eyewitness testimony. Because the record showed the trial judge considered the reliability and potential helpfulness of the testimony, balanced the proffered testimony against cases in which courts have upheld the exclusion of such evidence, and found the testimony would not assist the jury, we found the trial court properly exercised its discretion under Enis. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 468. However, we noted the trial court would not have abused its discretion had it allowed the testimony, given the facts of the case. Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 468.\nSeveral other jurisdictions have found the exclusion of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification is an abuse of discretion in certain cases. See People v. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d 449, 835 N.Y.S.2d 523, 867 N.E.2d 374 (2007); United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3rd Cir. 2006); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lester, 254 F. Supp. 2d 602 (E.D. Va. 2003); United States v. Norwood, 939 F. Supp. 1132 (D. N.J. 1996); State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. Campbell, 847 P.2d 228 (Colo. App. 1992).\nIn LeGrand, the defendant moved to introduce eyewitness expert testimony. According to a supporting memorandum of law, the expert would have testified to research findings regarding several factors that may influence the perception and memory of a witness and affect the reliability of eyewitness identifications. The expert would not, however, opine on the accuracy of any specific eyewitness identification. After conducting a Frye hearing, the trial court precluded the testimony on the ground that the expert\u2019s conclusions were not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.\nThe New York Court of Appeals held where there was no corroborating evidence connecting the defendant to the commission of the crime, and it was clear the case turned solely on the accuracy of the single witness\u2019s identification, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to prohibit the expert\u2019s testimony. LeGrand, 8 N.Y.3d at 457, 835 N.Y.S.2d at 528, 867 N.E.2d at 376. The court held the testimony of the defendant\u2019s expert would have benefitted the jury in evaluating the accuracy of the eyewitness identification. A new trial was ordered.\nIn Brownlee, the court held the primary issue before the jury was the reliability of the government\u2019s four eyewitnesses. The court noted:\n\u201cBoth [eyewitnesses] expressed high confidence in their identifications of [the defendant] as the perpetrator. To rebut the natural assumption that such a strong expression of confidence indicates an unusually reliable identification, [the defendant] sought to admit [expert] testimony that there is a low correlation between confidence and accuracy. We believe that [the expert\u2019s] proposed testimony \u2018is sufficiently tied to the facts of the case that it will aid the jury in resolving a factual dispute.\u2019 \u201d Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 144, quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1242 (3d Cir. 1985).\nThe conviction was reversed and the case sent back for a new trial.\nIn the case before us, the defense submitted an offer of proof in the form of a report prepared by Dr. Steven Penrod, an experienced and highly credentialed psychologist. We have examined the report in the context of the factual posture of the case \u2014 little or no corroboration of the testimony of a single identification witness who was not asked to identify the defendant in person until she saw him at counsel table, in jail uniform, at a hearing conducted 44 months after the attempted robbery.\nSome of the data and conclusions referred to in the report do not fit the facts of the case. For example, data supporting the unreliability of cross-racial identifications would not fit because there is no indication Dr. Penrod considered the Korean eyewitness had been married to an African-American. Nor do we see the need in this case for expert testimony concerning the conduct of the photo array.\nOther portions of the report are relevant and refer to commonly accepted misconceptions. For instance, studies have shown a witness\u2019s focus on a weapon indicates less attention is paid to encoding the perpetrator\u2019s characteristics. Other studies show jurors tend to rely on a witness\u2019s confidence in her identification as a guide to accuracy, but that there are low correlations between the witness\u2019s confidence and the accuracy of her identification.\nIn final argument, the prosecutor presented conclusions that would have been challenged by Dr. Penrod\u2019s data concerning weapon focus, stress, and the relationship between witness confidence and witness accuracy. The State\u2019s comments: \u201c[t]here is no higher degree of attention than someone pointing a gun at you\u201d; \u201c[defendant\u2019s] face is burned in her memory forever\u201d; \u201c[t]here is no doubt she was certain\u201d; and \u201cif she is so certain, there is no reason and no doubt that you should be certain.\u201d\nNeither at trial nor in this appeal does the State challenge the reliability of the research cited by Dr. Penrod. Nor did the trial court when it rejected the proposed testimony. The court merely said it did not believe\n\u201cexperts in this particular case will assist the jury in determining the identification in this case. I believe it would probably confuse them more and I believe that the instruction that\u2019s provided by the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions is sufficient.\u201d\nAlmost always, when a reviewing court upholds the trial court\u2019s discretion to reject the eyewitness identification expert\u2019s testimony it does so on the grounds that the testimony will not assist the jury. That is, jurors can use their own common sense and experience in life. See Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 286. Reliability of the studies rarely is questioned. See United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308, 1312 (5th Cir. 1986) (\u201cThis court accepts the modern conclusion that the admission of expert testimony regarding eyewitness identifications is proper, and we have no prior contrary authority which binds us. We cannot say such scientific data is inadequate or contradictory\u201d). In Brownlee, the court referred to the research that demonstrates \u201cthe science of eyewitness perception has achieved the level of exactness, methodology and reliability of any psychological research.\u201d Brownlee, 454 F.3d at 143.\nThe research challenges the claim that the jury does not require expert assistance. As the prosecutor understood, reasonable people well might believe an eyewitness will be more accurate when faced with a weapon and when the witness shows confidence in the accuracy of her identification. The expert testimony \u201cdispels myths or attacks commonsense misconceptions about eyewitness identifications, such as the effects of stress and weapon focus on the accuracy of identifications.\u201d Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 467. In Tisdel I we said:\n\u201cNumerous studies in the area of eyewitness psychology indicate there is a significant potential for eyewitness error and that jurors have misconceptions about the abilities of eyewitnesses.\u201d Tisdel, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1157.\nHere, unlike the witnesses in Enis, Goodson was in a high stress situation, faced with a gun and an obvious threat to her life. She was the only eyewitness. Her apparent confidence on the witness stand was reflected in the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal argument.\nIn Tisdel I the trial court considered the reliability and \u201cpotential helpfulness of the testimony,\u201d and \u201cbalanced the proffered testimony against cases in which this court has upheld the exclusion of such evidence.\u201d Tisdel, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 1158.\nIt is not our purpose to lower the bar for the exercise of broad discretion trial judges have when it comes to expert testimony on eyewitness identification. But present here is the failure to address the obligation we set out in Tisdel II.\n\u201cTrial courts should carefully scrutinize the proffered testimony to determine its relevance \u2014 that is, whether there is a logical connection between the testimony and the facts of the case.\u201d Tisdel, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 468.\nNo careful scrutiny took place in this case. Relevance of the different parts of Dr. Penrod\u2019s proposed testimony was not seriously considered. Nor their weight. The conclusion that the proposed testimony would confuse the jury had no considered basis. The balancing test requires a weighing of \u201cprobative value against its prejudicial effect.\u201d Enis, 139 Ill. 2d at 290. The test cannot be accomplished without an inquiry into the probative value of the proposed testimony and its relevance to the issues in the case. It is then that the inquiry shifts to the risk of unfair prejudice, which includes potential confusion.\nBecause of the trial court\u2019s failure to conduct a meaningful inquiry into Dr. Penrod\u2019s proposed testimony, under the specific circumstances of this case, we reverse the defendant\u2019s convictions and remand this cause for a new trial. We remand because we find the evidence sufficient to support a guilty verdict.\nWe express no opinion on whether the trial court on remand should allow any part of Dr. Penrod\u2019s offer of proof to be heard by the jury. We simply hold the offer of proof must be given serious consideration. If any of it is admitted, the witness should not be allowed to directly comment on Goodson\u2019s credibility or on the weight that should be given to her testimony. The expert might supply relevant data, but it is for the jury to decide what weight, if any, to give the research offered by the expert. See People v. Sargeant, 292 Ill. App. 3d 508, 511, 685 N.E.2d 956 (1997) (the expert must not invade the province of the fact finder, while aiding the fact finder in reaching its decision).\nIV Other Claimed Errors\nDefendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion to exclude the results of the GSR test, refused to permit counsel to publish the tape of Smith\u2019s interview with Goodson, and admitted Goodson\u2019s bloody clothing into evidence. In addition, the defendant contends his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the photo array used in this case was highly suggestive. We have examined these issues and find they have no merit. Defendant also raises issues concerning his sentencing. We see no need to discuss them.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we reverse defendant\u2019s convictions and sentences and remand this cause for a new trial.\nReversed and remanded.\nGARCIA and R. GORDON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE WOLFSON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Sean C. Herring, Shannon P. Bartlett, and John J. Hamill, all of Jenner & Block LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fischer, and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. WALTER ALLEN, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1 \u2014 06\u20141943\nOpinion filed September 28, 2007.\nSean C. Herring, Shannon P. Bartlett, and John J. Hamill, all of Jenner & Block LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Peter Fischer, and Janet C. Mahoney, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0511-01", "first_page_order": 529, "last_page_order": 545 }