{ "id": 4273122, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD M. MIZAUR, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Mizaur", "decision_date": "2007-10-25", "docket_number": "No. 2-06-1134", "first_page": "1066", "last_page": "1070", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 1066" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "222 Ill. App. 3d 1089", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5262967 ], "year": 1991, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/222/1089-01" ] }, { "cite": "251 Ill. App. 3d 521", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2958065 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523", "parenthetical": "section 114 - 4(e) applies only to indictments and informations, not to criminal complaints and uniform traffic tickets" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/251/0521-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 250", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820207 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0250-01" ] }, { "cite": "181 Ill. App. 3d 981", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 8499540 ], "weight": 8, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "982" }, { "page": "982-83" }, { "page": "983" }, { "page": "984-85" }, { "page": "985" }, { "page": "985" }, { "page": "986" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/181/0981-01" ] }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 171", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4265024 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "174-75" }, { "page": "175" }, { "page": "174-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/367/0171-01" ] }, { "cite": "373 Ill. App. 3d 78", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4270108 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/373/0078-01" ] }, { "cite": "164 Ill. App. 3d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3583373 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "56" }, { "page": "56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/164/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "41 Ill. 2d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2851370 ], "year": 1968, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "313" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/41/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 375", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735943 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0375-01" ] }, { "cite": "223 Ill. 2d 477", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3604812 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481-82" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/223/0477-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 496, "char_count": 9974, "ocr_confidence": 0.792, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.40576461183852e-08, "percentile": 0.44302640810332955 }, "sha256": "4a792b6f7ab56358c4347c6861147fb9635fc1018264fe0025b4fbeaa1228821", "simhash": "1:85b4b5836562f427", "word_count": 1664 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:29.545992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD M. MIZAUR, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue raised in this appeal is whether the hearing date delineated on a bail bond is considered the same as \u201cthe first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket,\u201d for purposes of section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1(b) (West 2006)). We determine that the date listed on a bail bond is synonymous with \u201cthe first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket.\u201d\nOn September 27, 2006, defendant, Ronald M. Mizaur, was charged by complaint with driving while under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501(a)(2) (West 2006)). Defendant was also ticketed for speeding (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 601(b) (West 2006)) and improper lane usage (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 709 (West 2006)). The tickets provided that the clerk of the circuit court would notify defendant about his court date. The bail bond issued to defendant for all of the violations indicated that defendant was required to appear in court on November 1, 2006, and answer the charges against him.\nBecause defendant refused to submit to chemical testing to determine his blood alcohol concentration, his driving privileges were summarily suspended (625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1(d), (e) (West 2006)). Defendant petitioned to rescind his summary suspension on September 28, 2006. A hearing on defendant\u2019s petition was not conducted within the next 30 days. Rather, on November 1, 2006, 34 days after defendant filed his petition to rescind, defendant orally moved to rescind his summary suspension because he was not afforded a hearing within 30 days after he filed his petition to rescind. The trial court denied the motion, finding that the November 1, 2006, hearing date was timely pursuant to section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code, because November 1, 2006, was the first appearance date. After a hearing on the merits, the trial court denied defendant\u2019s petition to rescind his summary suspension, and defendant timely appealed.\nResolving the issue raised on appeal necessarily begins with examining section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code. Section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code provides:\n\u201cWithin 90 days after the notice of statutory summary suspension served under Section 11 \u2014 501.1 [625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501.1 (West 2006)], the person may make a written request for a judicial hearing in the circuit court of venue. The request to the circuit court shall state the grounds upon which the person seeks to have the statutory summary suspension rescinded. Within 30 days after receipt of the written request or the first appearance date on the Uniform Traffic Ticket issued pursuant to a violation of Section 11 \u2014 501 [625 ILCS 5/11 \u2014 501 (West 2006)], or a similar provision of a local ordinance, the hearing shall be conducted by the circuit court having jurisdiction. This judicial hearing, request, or process shall not stay or delay the statutory summary suspension. The hearings shall proceed in the court in the same manner as in other civil proceedings.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 118.1(b) (West 2006).\nIn interpreting section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. People v. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d 477, 481 (2006). The best indication of the legislature\u2019s intent is the language used in the statute, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. McClure, 218 Ill. 2d 375, 382 (2006). Ordinarily, when the statutory language is unambiguous, courts must construe the statute as written, without resorting to other aids of construction. By water, 223 Ill. 2d at 481. However, \u201cthe courts must construe the acts to reflect the obvious intent of the legislature even if the words of a particular section must be read as modified or altered so as to comport with the legislative intent.\u201d People v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 313 (1968). Courts must construe the statute as a whole, bearing in mind the subject that the statute addresses and the legislature\u2019s apparent objective in enacting it. Bywater, 223 Ill. 2d at 481-82.\n\u201cThe overall purpose of the legislature in enacting the summary suspension scheme was to protect those who travel on our highways and assist in the determination [of] whether motor vehicle drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol.\u201d People v. Doty, 164 Ill. App. 3d 53, 56 (1987). In order to meet that purpose, \u201cIllinois courts have consistently held that section 11 \u2014 501.1 [and related provisions] should be liberally construed.\u201d Doty, 164 Ill. App. 3d at 56. We review the construction of a statute de novo. People v. Montoya, 373 Ill. App. 3d 78, 81 (2007).\nHere, although the plain language of section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code specifically provides that a defendant is afforded a timely hearing if he is given a hearing on the first appearance date listed on the Uniform Traffic Ticket, we cannot conclude that the first appearance date may appear only on the traffic ticket. As noted, the legislature enacted section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code to promote highway safety. People v. Dominguez, 367 Ill. App. 3d 171, 174-75 (2006). That objective would be thwarted if we were to construe section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) as providing that the first appearance date may appear only on the defendant\u2019s traffic ticket. Indeed, a defendant could escape responsibility for drunk driving merely because his first appearance date appears only on his bail bond. See Dominguez, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 175. Courts have repeatedly criticized rescissions based on such technicalities, especially because courts are to liberally construe section 2 \u2014 118.1(b). See Dominguez, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 174-75.\nWe addressed the same issue in People v. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d 981 (1989), overruled on other grounds by People v. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d 250 (1993). In Grange, the defendant was arrested for DUI on January 28, 1988, and charged by verified complaint. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 982. The defendant\u2019s driving privileges were subsequently suspended, and he petitioned to rescind the suspension on February 3, 1988. In his petition, the defendant requested a hearing date of March 4, 1988, which the defendant believed was his arraignment date. In actuality, the defendant\u2019s arraignment date was March 7, 1988. On March 7, 1988, the defendant moved to dismiss his suspension, claiming that he was not given a hearing within 30 days of filing his petition. The trial court granted the defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss, and the State appealed. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 982-83.\nWe reversed. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 983. We determined that, because the State was ready to proceed on the defendant\u2019s petition to rescind on the first appearance date \u2014 the March 7, 1988, arraignment date \u2014 the defendant was afforded a timely hearing, as a hearing on a petition to rescind must take place within 30 days of either the filing of a petition or the first appearance date. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 984-85. In reaching that conclusion, we observed that the defendant\u2019s first appearance date did not appear on any of the traffic tickets that the defendant was issued. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 985. Rather, the first appearance date was listed on the defendant\u2019s bail bond. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 985. That fact did not change our holding, because the issuance of a traffic ticket is discretionary, not mandatory, and the mere reference to a \u201cUniform Traffic Ticket\u201d in section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code does not \u201crequire that the first appearance date appear on a uniform traffic ticket before the [trial] court is allowed the discretion to conduct a rescission hearing on the first appearance date.\u201d Grange, 181IU. App. 3d at 985.\nDefendant argues that Grange is not controlling because our supreme court overruled Grange in Schaefer. However, as the State observes, Schaefer overruled Grange on a point irrelevant to this appeal. In Grange, we exercised our discretion to address an issue that the State did not raise and concluded that, as an additional ground to reverse the trial court, requesting a hearing on a petition to rescind requires the defendant to do more than just file the petition. Grange, 181 Ill. App. 3d at 986. Our supreme court overruled on this ground in Schaefer, holding that, to request a hearing on a petition to rescind, a defendant need not do anything more than file the petition with the clerk of the circuit court and serve notice of the petition on the State. Schaefer, 154 Ill. 2d at 264.\nCiting People v. Rodriguez, 251 Ill. App. 3d 521 (1993), and People v. Harris, 222 Ill. App. 3d 1089 (1991), defendant also contends that Grange should not be followed because \u201c[cjourts should not read a statute as to encompass other forms of charging instruments which are specifically excluded.\u201d To be sure, the statute at issue in Rodriguez and Harris, section 114 \u2014 4(e) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 114 \u2014 4(e)), mentions only indictments and informations, and courts have determined that the statute excludes other charging instruments. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 251 Ill. App. 3d at 523 (section 114 \u2014 4(e) applies only to indictments and informations, not to criminal complaints and uniform traffic tickets). Here, however, section 2 \u2014 118.1(b) of the Code cannot be construed so technically. In light of the liberal construction that we must give to that section, we deem irrelevant any construction of section 114 \u2014 4(e).\nFor these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Christopher B. Klis, of Ramsell, Armamentos & Klis, LLC, of Wheaton, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RONALD M. MIZAUR, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2 \u2014 06\u20141134\nOpinion filed October 25, 2007.\nChristopher B. Klis, of Ramsell, Armamentos & Klis, LLC, of Wheaton, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lawrence M. Bauer and Terry A. Mertel, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1066-01", "first_page_order": 1084, "last_page_order": 1088 }