{ "id": 4272533, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEISHA E. COLLIER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Collier", "decision_date": "2007-11-06", "docket_number": "No. 4-06-0981", "first_page": "1107", "last_page": "1115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 1107" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "384 N.E.2d 420", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "423" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "66 Ill. App. 3d 601", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3316210 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "604" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/66/0601-01" ] }, { "cite": "513 N.E.2d 68", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "71" }, { "page": "72" }, { "page": "70" }, { "page": "72" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "159 Ill. App. 3d 1048", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3612281 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1053" }, { "page": "1054" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/159/1048-01" ] }, { "cite": "763 N.E.2d 858", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "861" }, { "page": "861" }, { "page": "860" }, { "page": "861" }, { "page": "859" }, { "page": "861" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 243", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79387 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "246" }, { "page": "247" }, { "page": "245" }, { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0243-01" ] }, { "cite": "468 N.E.2d 1328", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1335" }, { "page": "1335" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "127 Ill. App. 3d 916", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3563237 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "926-27" }, { "page": "926-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/127/0916-01" ] }, { "cite": "679 N.E.2d 1260", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1263", "parenthetical": "regarding trial court's role in admonishing the defendant that it is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "288 Ill. App. 3d 120", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1596905 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "124", "parenthetical": "regarding trial court's role in admonishing the defendant that it is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/288/0120-01" ] }, { "cite": "722 N.E.2d 1216", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1222", "parenthetical": "regarding trial court's role in concurring or conditionally concurring" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" }, { "page": "1222" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "309 Ill. App. 3d 662", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 349555 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668", "parenthetical": "regarding trial court's role in concurring or conditionally concurring" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "669" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" }, { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/309/0662-01" ] }, { "cite": "673 N.E.2d 244", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "174 Ill. 2d 320", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 223611 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "326" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/174/0320-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 796, "char_count": 20614, "ocr_confidence": 0.756, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.2240919645422112e-07, "percentile": 0.6021959195304437 }, "sha256": "9769492c7e627455cd7ab338973b06a5688bd4b13a177b6c1a25c7feca1c9c43", "simhash": "1:3b7abb0c77470c54", "word_count": 3446 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:29.545992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEISHA E. COLLIER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE COOK\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant, Neisha E. Collier, pleaded guilty to obstructing justice (720 ILCS 5/31 \u2014 4(a) (West 2006)), a Class 4 felony. The State agreed to recommend no more than two years\u2019 imprisonment. When Collier failed to attend her sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Collier to an extended term of four years\u2019 imprisonment. Collier appeals, arguing that the trial court did not adequately admonish Collier of the conditions on its concurrence with the plea agreement. We vacate Collier\u2019s sentence and remand with directions.\nI. BACKGROUND\nA. Underlying Offense\nThis case arises out of a minor vehicle collision involving Collier\u2019s boyfriend, Allen Davis, and Nancy Seward. Because the factual basis was exceptionally brief, we take our facts concerning the underlying offense from the police report.\nDavis was driving a Lincoln Town Car with the permission of the owner, Moesha Hilson. Collier was the only passenger in the Lincoln Town Car. Seward had no passengers. Davis approached a stop sign. Davis was unable to stop the car due to snow and ice and collided with Nancy Seward\u2019s car. No one was injured. Davis, who had a suspended license, immediately fled the scene. Collier then called Moesha Hilson and asked Moesha to report the Lincoln Town Car stolen.\nWhen the police arrived, Collier lied, telling them that she did not know the driver, but only knew his nickname to be \u201cLil T.\u201d Collier stated that \u201cLil T.\u201d had pulled up alongside her as she was walking to the convenience store and had agreed to give her a ride. Collier described \u201cLil T.\u201d as a 16-year-old black youth, when in fact Davis was 21. Collier told the police she did not know who owned the Lincoln Town Car.\nWhile still at the scene of the accident, the police learned that Moesha Hilson had reported the Lincoln Town Car stolen. The police began to doubt Collier\u2019s truthfulness and told Collier that she could be sent to jail for obstructing justice. Collier continued to tell police she only knew the driver as \u201cLil T.,\u201d that she did not know Moesha Hilson, and that she had no reason to lie.\nMoesha, however, soon told the police that Collier had asked Moesha to report the car stolen. The police decided to give Collier one more chance to tell the truth, but Collier continued to deny knowing \u201cLil T.\u201d or Moesha. The police then arrested and handcuffed Collier. As the police placed Collier in the squad car, she told them Davis\u2019s true name, this time without prompting. However, Collier continued to deny knowing Moesha.\nThe information charging Collier stated that Collier, with the intent to obstruct the prosecution of Davis, knowingly furnished false information in that she told police that she only knew Davis as \u201cLil T.\u201d after Davis fled the scene of the accident on foot, at a time when Davis\u2019s driver\u2019s license was suspended. The information did not allege anything concerning the false stolen-vehicle report.\nB. The Plea Hearing\nAt the April 21, 2006, plea hearing, the trial court first informed Collier that the charged offense, obstructing justice, was a Class 4 felony, which typically carried a sentencing range of one to three years\u2019 imprisonment. However, due to Collier\u2019s criminal history, Collier was eligible for an extended sentence totaling six years\u2019 imprisonment. The following exchange then took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Is your plea of guilty today voluntary? Is this of your own free will?\nCOLLIER: Yes, it is.\nTHE COURT: The agreements, please.\nTHE STATE: Judge, this is an open plea for later sentencing. The only agreement is the State would cap its recommendation at two years [in the] Department of Corrections.\nTHE COURT: [Defense counsel], is this the agreement?\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: That\u2019s the agreement, Judge.\nTHE COURT: Miss Collier, as I understand the situation, we\u2019re going to continue this matter for a sentencing hearing, and at that sentencing hearing your penalty range will be anything from possibly some form of probation up to a maximum of two years in the Department of Corrections as opposed to some form of probation up to six years. Your penalty range will be confined to probation up to two years. Is that your understanding of where we are right now?\nCOLLIER: Yes, it is.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nAfter the State read the factual basis for the plea, which centered solely around Collier\u2019s denial of Davis\u2019s identity, the court accepted Collier\u2019s guilty plea:\n\u201cTHE COURT: Miss Collier, do you now then plead guilty to that charge of obstructing justice?\nCOLLIER: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Show the defendant pleads guilty to that charge. That plea of guilty is accepted by the court. Judgment is entered on the plea.\u201d\nThe trial court then proceeded to take care of some technical matters, such as ordering a Treatment Alternatives for Safer Communities (TASC) report and setting a date for the sentencing hearing, and the following exchange took place:\n\u201cTHE COURT: All right. We will continue this matter to Thursday, June 1 at 1:30 back in this courtroom. Court services will prepare a presentence report ***. [Defense counsel and State], is part of the plea agreement that the defendant appears for sentencing?\nDEFENSE COUNSEL: Yes, Your Honor, it is.\nTHE STATE: Yes.\nTHE COURT: Miss Collier, what that means is, you have to appear at your sentencing hearing on June 1. *** If you don\u2019t show up here June 1, then I will have that sentencing hearing without you, and we could go over the two[-]year cap. There is no agreement if you don\u2019t show up, so it is very, very important that you show up for your sentencing hearing. Again, if you don\u2019t show up, there is no agreement, and a sentencing hearing will be held without you.\u201d\nCollier did not respond to the trial court\u2019s admonishment. Nothing further of substance was said by anyone and the plea hearing concluded.\nC. The Sentencing Hearing\nCollier initially arrived to the courtroom for sentencing. However, before the trial judge entered the courtroom, Collier left. When the judge entered the courtroom, he immediately asked where Collier was. Collier\u2019s attorney answered that Collier had been present but left the courtroom about three minutes prior to meet a family member who she believed would be testifying on her behalf. The judge stated that he had warned Collier that she needed to be present and began the hearing without her. According to Collier\u2019s subsequent explanation of the incident, before the judge entered the courtroom, Collier learned that her father provided the State with aggravating evidence against her. Collier burst into tears and fled the courthouse. An hour and a half later, Collier called the police and told them she felt suicidal. Collier was hospitalized for the next 12 hours.\nBack at the sentencing hearing, the State called police officer Rusty Wike. Wike testified that he investigated an incident wherein Collier stole a lawn mower from her father and sold it to a neighbor for $20. The State then called police officer Gregory Manzana. Manzana investigated a domestic incident involving Collier and Collier\u2019s 13-year-old daughter, A.C. A.C. told Manzana that Collier arrived at A.C.\u2019s grandparents\u2019 home to steal some shoes. A.C. told Collier to leave. According to A.C., Collier then grabbed a telephone and attempted to hit A.C. on the head with it. Collier smothered A.C. with her body and injured A.C.\u2019s arm in the struggle. Collier denied this. The police did not believe they had probable cause to arrest Collier for this incident because A.C. showed no sign of physical injury.\nThe State then requested a minimum of two years\u2019 imprisonment. The State noted that Collier\u2019s involvement with the criminal justice system went back 18 years and that Collier was not cooperative in the preparation of the presentence report, missing several appointments with the Court Services Department. In turn, the defense counsel requested a more lenient, 18-month term.\nThe trial court acknowledged that a prison sentence was not necessary to protect the public and that Collier did not appear to be dangerous. However, the court felt that a lengthy sentence was necessary to further the ends of justice. Collier had 10 criminal convictions over the last 18 years. The court mentioned Collier\u2019s long-standing struggle with drug addiction and stated that Collier\u2019s convictions were in line with what a person might expect from a \u201cjunkie\u201d: property crimes, unlawful use of a weapon, aggravated battery (1989), resisting a peace officer, and possession with intent to deliver. The trial court then stated:\n\u201cThe court admonished the defendant that should she fail to appear for her sentencing hearing, the court would not concur with the State\u2019s cap, the court could sentence her to more than two years ***. I\u2019m not sentencing her to any specific number of years in the Department of Corrections because she didn\u2019t show up; however, she sure did blow a good deal by not showing up.\u201d (Emphasis added.)\nThe trial court then sentenced Collier to four years\u2019 imprisonment. The trial court denied Collier\u2019s motion to reconsider. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nCollier argues that the trial court improperly added a condition to its concurrence with the plea agreement after it accepted the plea. We agree.\nPlea agreements are to some extent governed by contract-law principles. People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320, 326, 673 N.E.2d 244, 247 (1996). Once counsel informs the trial court of the terms of the plea agreement and before the trial court accepts the plea, the court must (1) state its (a) concurrence with the plea agreement or (b) conditional concurrence with the plea agreement or (2) admonish the defendant that it is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement and that if the defendant persists in her plea, the disposition may be different from that contemplated by the plea agreement. 177 Ill. 2d Rs. 402(d)(2), (d)(3); see also People v. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d 662, 668, 722 N.E.2d 1216, 1222 (2000) (regarding trial court\u2019s role in concurring or conditionally concurring); People v. Butcher, 288 Ill. App. 3d 120, 124, 679 N.E.2d 1260, 1263 (1997) (regarding trial court\u2019s role in admonishing the defendant that it is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement). If the trial court opts to conditionally concur with the terms of the plea agreement and reserves unto itself various sentencing options, the court must specifically state on the record those options that it intends to reserve and ascertain on the record that the defendant understands the limits of the concurrence, and every sentencing option thereby reserved, prior to the entry of the guilty plea. People v. Culp, 127 Ill. App. 3d 916, 926-27, 468 N.E.2d 1328, 1335 (1984); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. If the defendant enters a plea of guilty following the trial court\u2019s concurrence or conditional concurrence, and the trial court subsequently withdraws its concurrence or conditional concurrence, it must advise the defendant of this and allow the defendant the opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(2); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. If the defendant chooses to withdraw her guilty plea, the case is then transferred to a new judge. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(2); People v. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d 243, 247, 763 N.E.2d 858, 861 (2002).\nThe requirement that Collier appear for sentencing did not constitute a properly communicated condition on the trial court\u2019s concurrence with the plea agreement. As stated above, the court must specifically state the terms of its conditional concurrence and the sentencing options that it intends to reserve for itself, and ascertain on the record that the defendant understands the limits of the concurrence and every sentencing option thereby reserved, prior to the entry of the guilty plea. Culp, 127 Ill. App. 3d at 926-27, 468 N.E.2d at 1335; Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 669, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. Here, the trial court concurred with the terms of the plea agreement when, upon hearing the terms of the plea agreement, it told Collier: \u201cYour penalty will be confined to probation up to two years.\u201d The trial court then ascertained that Collier understood these to be the terms of the agreement and accepted her guilty plea. The trial court did not tell Collier that its concurrence with the State\u2019s recommended two-year cap depended on Collier\u2019s attendance at the sentencing hearing until after it had already accepted her plea. Further, the court did not ascertain whether Collier understood the conditions of the court\u2019s concurrence.\nWe note that the trial court in the instant case had every right to withdraw its concurrence when Collier did not appear for sentencing. However, under Rule 402(d)(2), the trial court was obligated to notify Collier that it was going to withdraw its concurrence and allow Collier the opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(2); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222; see also Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 247, 763 N.E.2d at 861. Hence, when Collier did not appear at sentencing, the trial court cohid either have sentenced Collier to a term within the range contemplated by the plea agreement or it could have continued the hearing \u00a1to allow Collier to affirm or withdraw her guilty plea. Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. Though the trial court was not authorized to sentence Collier to a lengthier sentence than that contemplated by the plea agreement with which it had concurred, the trial court was not without additional recourse. As we stated in Rossman, the trial court could order Collier\u2019s plea vacated, sending the parties back to the drawing board; order a bail-bond violation (720 ILCS 5/32 \u2014 10(a) (West 2006)); and/or order Collier to be in contempt of court (720 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 3 (West 2006)). Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. Though our ruling on the conditional-concurrence issue is dispositive, we nevertheless consider two of the State\u2019s remaining arguments.\nThe State argues that we should not have considered whether the trial court adequately communicated its conditional concurrence because the requirement that Collier attend her sentencing hearing was not a condition on the trial court\u2019s concurrence at all, but rather the requirement was part of the plea agreement itself. The State\u2019s argument is without merit. A plea agreement is between the State and the defendant. People v. Hayes, 159 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1053, 513 N.E.2d 68, 71 (1987), citing People v. Robinson, 66 Ill. App. 3d 601, 604, 384 N.E.2d 420, 423 (1978). The trial court is not a party to the plea agreement; its only role is to indicate, at the time the agreement is stated, whether it will concur or conditionally concur with the plea agreement. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d); Rossman, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 668, 722 N.E.2d at 1222. In some instances, the conditions stated by the trial court may become part of the plea agreement, but that is not the case here. See Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 246, 763 N.E.2d at 860, citing Hayes, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 1053, 513 N.E.2d at 72.\nFor example, in Hayes, prior to the trial court\u2019s acceptance of the defendant\u2019s guilty plea, the State requested that the court admonish the defendant that if he failed to appear at his sentencing hearing, he would be eligible for a more severe sentence. Defense counsel then told the court that he had informed the defendant of the consequences should the defendant fail to appear at sentencing. The court then admonished the defendant in open court that if he failed to appear at sentencing he could be sentenced in excess of the sentence contemplated by the plea agreement. The court asked the defendant if he understood these terms, and the defendant answered, \u201cYes, I do.\u201d The court then accepted the defendant\u2019s guilty plea and set the date for the sentencing hearing. Hayes, 159 Ill. 2d at 1050, 513 N.E.2d at 70. The appellate court held that the requirement that the defendant attend his sentencing hearing became an integral part of the plea agreement where the requirement was clearly communicated to and understood by the defendant at the time of the plea and came about by agreement of the attorneys. Hayes, 159 Ill. App. 3d at 1054, 513 N.E.2d at 72.\nHere, unlike in Hayes, there was no clear communication to the defendant regarding the change in the plea agreement. As stated above, the trial court concurred with the plea agreement when it told Collier that her sentence would not exceed two years. Collier entered her guilty plea based on the assurance of receiving a sentence under that cap. After the trial court accepted Collier\u2019s plea, it asked the parties whether it was \u201cpart of\u2019 the plea agreement that Collier appear for sentencing. Counsel for both parties answered \u201cyes.\u201d However, merely labeling a requirement part of the plea agreement does not make it so. The requirement was not brought about by the attorneys, but rather by the trial court. Most critically, the court first brought the requirement to the parties\u2019 attention after the court had already accepted Collier\u2019s guilty plea and the court never ascertained whether Collier understood the requirement.\nThe instant case is similar to Bouie, where the appellate court also rejected the State\u2019s argument that the requirement that the defendant appear at his sentencing hearing was \u201cpart of\u2019 the plea agreement. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 247, 763 N.E.2d at 861. In Bouie, after the trial court acknowledged the parties\u2019 plea agreement, the court stated that it would leave its \u201coptions open\u201d as to punishment in the event that the defendant did not appear at his sentencing hearing. The trial court then asked if that created \u201ca problem for anyone.\u201d Both the State and defense counsel answered that it did not. The defendant did not comment. The court then accepted the defendant\u2019s guilty plea. After accepting the plea, the court admonished the defendant that if he did not appear for sentencing, the court would sentence the defendant in excess of the sentence contemplated by the plea agreement. The defendant acknowledged the requirement. Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 245, 763 N.E.2d at 859. The appellate court held that nothing in the series of communications exchanged at the plea hearing \u201cshow[ed] unequivocally that the defendant was advised that appearing at the sentencing hearing was part of his plea agreement.\u201d Bouie, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 247, 763 N.E.2d at 861.\nHere, the argument against the State on appeal is even stronger than in Bouie because the trial court in the instant case made no mention of the requirement that Collier appear at sentencing before it accepted the guilty plea. Also, unlike the defendant in Bouie, Collier never personally acknowledged the trial court\u2019s admonishment of the requirement, even after the guilty plea was accepted.\nFinally, the State argues that we should not have reached the merits of Collier\u2019s claim because the trial court was never bound by the State\u2019s recommended two-year cap, thus nullifying the issue of whether the court improperly added a condition to its concurrence with the plea agreement. This argument is not persuasive. If a trial court chooses not to concur with a plea agreement, it must admonish the defendant in open court that it is not bound by the terms of the plea agreement and it must tell the defendant that if she persists in her plea, she may be sentenced in excess of the sentence contemplated by the plea agreement. 177 Ill. 2d R. 402(d)(3). Here, the trial court made no such admonishment. To the contrary, upon hearing the terms of the plea agreement, the court expressly told Collier: \u201cYour penalty will be confined to probation up to two years.\u201d\nAccordingly, we vacate Collier\u2019s sentence and remand this case to the trial court to either impose a sentence contemplated by the plea agreement or to proceed in keeping with the requirements of Rule 402(d)(2).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the aforementioned reasons, we vacate Collier\u2019s sentence and remand with directions consistent with this opinion.\nVacated and remanded with directions.\nAPPLETON and KNECHT, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE COOK" } ], "attorneys": [ "Daniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.", "Julia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Ewick, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. NEISHA E. COLLIER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4 \u2014 06\u20140981\nOpinion filed November 6, 2007.\nDaniel D. Yuhas and Susan M. Wilham, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Springfield, for appellant.\nJulia Rietz, State\u2019s Attorney, of Urbana (Norbert J. Goetten, Robert J. Biderman, and Thomas R. Ewick, all of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "1107-01", "first_page_order": 1125, "last_page_order": 1133 }