{ "id": 4272800, "name": "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY KESSLER, d/b/a Kessler Auto Body, et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Madison Mutual Insurance v. Kessler", "decision_date": "2007-10-03", "docket_number": "No. 5-06-0599", "first_page": "1121", "last_page": "1130", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 1121" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 619", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3600268 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "626" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0619-01" ] }, { "cite": "202 Ill. 2d 414", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1442052 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "422" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/202/0414-01" ] }, { "cite": "153 Ill. 2d 76", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4738801 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "91" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/153/0076-01" ] }, { "cite": "343 Ill. App. 3d 122", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3718845 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "125" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/343/0122-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 173", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801347 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" }, { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0173-01" ] }, { "cite": "193 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 963718 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "466" }, { "page": "466" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/193/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2562924 ], "year": 1938, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288-89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "74 Ill. 2d 213", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2993974 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "220" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/74/0213-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5515594 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "57" }, { "page": "57" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/97/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "182 Ill. 2d 240", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 864529 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/182/0240-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 653", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828469 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "661" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0653-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 502", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4271807 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504" }, { "page": "504" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0502-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 766, "char_count": 23399, "ocr_confidence": 0.774, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.708388509139946e-08, "percentile": 0.3584251437052894 }, "sha256": "330832d7a3e9101fda71349b3c425863010dc7b6c8960623124a1b3727a301f6", "simhash": "1:a675d8263db35665", "word_count": 3880 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T14:46:29.545992+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY KESSLER, d/b/a Kessler Auto Body, et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SPOMER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Madison Mutual Insurance Company (Madison Mutual), appeals the November 1, 2006, order of the circuit court of St. Clair County that granted the cross-motion for a summary judgment filed by the defendant Jerry Kessler, doing business as Kessler Auto Body (Kessler), and denied Madison Mutual\u2019s motion for a summary judgment. The sole issue on appeal is whether the circuit court erred in its finding that, under section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 102 (West 2004)), the Madison Mutual insurance policy provided primary coverage on an Escort owned by Kessler which was involved in an accident while being driven by Sarah Galle. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the order of the circuit court and remand with directions that the circuit court enter an order granting a summary judgment in favor of Madison Mutual.\nThe facts necessary for our disposition of this appeal are as follows. On August 4, 2005, Madison Mutual filed an amended complaint for a declaratory judgment in the circuit court of St. Clair County. According to the amended complaint, Madison Mutual issued a policy of automobile insurance to Dennis Galle, who is the father of Sarah Galle (Sarah), a named defendant in the action. On or about May 26, 2004, Sarah was operating a Ford Escort owned by Kessler when she was involved in an accident. The complaint for a declaratory judgment requested the circuit court to determine whether Kessler\u2019s policy, which had been issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company, or Sarah\u2019s father\u2019s policy, which had been issued by Madison Mutual, would provide primary coverage for the accident.\nOn August 1, 2006, Madison Mutual filed a motion for a summary judgment. According to Madison Mutual\u2019s motion for a summary judgment, there was no genuine issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, primary coverage for the May 26, 2004, accident involving the Escort was to be provided by Kessler\u2019s insurance policy. \u201cExhibit A\u201d to the motion was the transcript of Sarah\u2019s deposition, which was taken on June 8, 2006. Sarah verified that she was in an automobile accident on May 26, 2004, while driving a Ford Escort owned by Kessler, who is a used-vehicle dealer. Sarah testified that, approximately a month prior to the May 26, 2004, accident, she had rear-ended another car while driving a 2000 Saturn that her father owned. Her father had purchased the Saturn from Kessler about six months prior to that accident. The Saturn was insured by Madison Mutual. The Saturn was towed from the scene, and Madison Mutual later declared it to be a total loss. Sarah testified that Kessler gave her the Escort to drive shortly after the accident while he searched for a replacement vehicle for Sarah\u2019s father to purchase. After the May 26, 2004, accident with the Escort, Sarah returned the Escort to Kessler.\nSarah further testified that her family had previously owned the Escort that Kessler gave her to drive following the accident with the Saturn. She drove it for about two years, and then her father traded it to Kessler for the Saturn. They were not considering repurchasing the Escort from Kessler. She was not evaluating the reliability or the condition of the Escort at the time she was driving it. At the time of the accident in the Escort, the Saturn was not in the process of being repaired or being evaluated by a dealer or anyone else for repair.\nThe transcript of Kessler\u2019s deposition, taken on July 24, 2006, was also attached to Madison Mutual\u2019s motion for a summary judgment, as \u201cExhibit B.\u201d Kessler testified that his business, Kessler Auto Body & Sales, repairs and sells used automobiles. Sarah\u2019s father had been Kessler\u2019s customer for at least eight years prior to Sarah\u2019s accident with the Saturn. Sarah\u2019s father purchased the Saturn from Kessler and traded in the Ford Escort Sarah was driving at the time of the May 26, 2004, accident. After Sarah\u2019s accident with the Saturn, Kessler viewed the Saturn. It was apparent to him at that time that the Saturn was a total loss. Kessler spoke with Sarah and her father and determined that they would wait to hear from the insurance company before doing anything with the Saturn. One or two days after Sarah\u2019s accident with the Saturn, Kessler let Sarah use the Escort she had previously traded in for the Saturn, as a loaner until they either repaired or replaced the Saturn.\nKessler testified that Madison Mutual declared the Saturn a total loss about five or six days after the accident with the Saturn. At that point, Kessler began searching auto auctions for another Saturn for Sarah and her father to purchase. The plan was that Sarah would return the Escort to Kessler when she picked up her new Saturn. Sarah was in the accident with the Escort on May 26, 2004. Kessler had insurance on the Escort through Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Sarah never considered purchasing or leasing the Escort from Kessler, and she was not evaluating the performance or reliability of the Escort. Kessler never considered repairing the Saturn.\nKessler\u2019s garage liability insurance policy was attached to Madison Mutual\u2019s motion for a summary judgment as \u201cExhibit E.\u201d That policy, which was issued by Auto-Owners Insurance Company, provided combined liability coverage of $1 million per accident for all vehicles owned by Kessler. Sarah\u2019s father\u2019s insurance policy, which was issued by Madison Mutual, was attached to Madison Mutual\u2019s motion for a summary judgment as \u201cExhibit E\u201d That insurance policy provided liability coverage for the Saturn as of the date of Sarah\u2019s accident with the Escort, in the amount of $100,000 per person, $300,000 per accident, and $100,000 for property damage.\nOn September 25, 2006, Madison Mutual filed a supplemental affidavit in support of its motion for a summary judgment. According to the sworn testimony of Angie Cole, a casualty claims representative for Madison Mutual, she spoke to Sarah on May 4, 2004, and advised her that Madison Mutual had declared the Saturn a total loss. In that conversation, Cole advised Sarah that Madison Mutual had evaluated the value of the Saturn at $7,100. On May 7, 2004, Cole spoke with Sarah\u2019s father and discussed the evaluation of the Saturn. Sarah\u2019s father agreed to accept Madison Mutual\u2019s offer of $7,100 less the $500 deductible. On May 10, 2004, Madison Mutual received the title to the Saturn, which had been signed by Sarah\u2019s father. However, Madison Mutual discovered that the title was listed in both Sarah\u2019s father\u2019s and Sarah\u2019s mother\u2019s names. Accordingly, Madison Mutual returned the title to Sarah\u2019s parents so that Sarah\u2019s mother could sign the title. On May 12, 2004, Madison Mutual issued a check to Sarah\u2019s father and mother in the amount of $6,600. By May 17, 2004, Madison Mutual had received the title to the Saturn, signed by both Sarah\u2019s father and Sarah\u2019s mother.\nOn September 26, 2006, Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Kessler filed a cross-motion for a summary judgment. According to the cross-motion for a summary judgment, there was no genuine issue of material fact and, as a matter of law, Sarah\u2019s father\u2019s Madison Mutual policy would provide primary coverage for the May 26, 2004, accident with the Escort.\nOn September 27, 2006, a hearing was held on the motion and cross-motion for a summary judgment. The circuit court issued an order taking the motion and cross-motion under advisement and ordering the parties to submit proposed orders within 14 days. On November 1, 2006, the circuit court issued an order granting the cross-motion for a summary judgment filed by Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Kessler, which declared Madison Mutual liable to provide primary coverage for the May 26, 2004, accident involving the Escort, and denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Madison Mutual. In its order, the circuit court found that under the terms of section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/5\u2014 102 (West 2004)), Madison Mutual\u2019s insurance policy would provide primary coverage. On November 9, 2006, Madison Mutual filed a timely notice of appeal.\nWe begin our analysis with the standard of review. \u201cWe review de novo the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment.\u201d Reppert v. Southern Illinois University, 375 Ill. App. 3d 502, 504 (2007). \u201cSummary judgment is proper if, \u2018when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u2019 \u201d Reppert, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 504, quoting Illinois State Chamber of Commerce v. Filan, 216 Ill. 2d 653, 661 (2005). In addition, the resolution of the issue on appeal requires the interpretation of section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Reppert, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 504.\nSection 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code sets forth the licensing requirements for used-vehicle dealers. One of the requirements is that a used-vehicle dealer \u201cprovide liability coverage in the minimum amounts of $100,000 for bodily injury to, or death of, any person, $300,000 for bodily injury to, or death of, two or more persons in any one accident, and $50,000 for damage to property.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 102(b)(4) (West 2004). Effective June 1, 2003, the following relevant language was added to section 5 \u2014 102(b)(4) of the Illinois Vehicle Code:\n\u201cIf the permitted user has a liability insurance policy that provides automobile liability insurance coverage of at least $100,000 for bodily injury to or the death of any person, $300,000 for bodily injury to or the death of any 2 or more persons in any one accident, and $50,000 for damage to property, then the permitted user\u2019s insurer shall be the primary insurer and the dealer\u2019s insurer shall be the secondary insurer. If the permitted user does not have a liability insurance policy that provides automobile liability insurance coverage of at least $100,000 for bodily injury to or the death of any person, $300,000 for bodily injury to or the death of any 2 or more persons in any one accident, and $50,000 for damage to property, or does not have any insurance at all, then the dealer\u2019s insurer shall be the primary insurer and the permitted user\u2019s insurer shall be the secondary insurer.\nWhen a permitted user is \u2018test driving\u2019 a used[-]vehicle dealer\u2019s automobile, the used[-]vehicle dealer\u2019s insurance shall be primary and the permitted user\u2019s insurance shall be secondary.\nAs used in this paragraph 4, a \u2018permitted user\u2019 is a person who, with the permission of the used[-]vehicle dealer or an employee of the used[-]vehicle dealer, drives a vehicle owned and held for sale or lease by the used[-]vehicle dealer which the person is considering to purchase or lease, in order to evaluate the performance, reliability, or condition of the vehicle. The term \u2018permitted user\u2019 also includes a person who, with the permission of the used[-]vehicle dealer, drives a vehicle owned or held for sale or lease by the used[-] vehicle dealer for loaner purposes while the user\u2019s vehicle is being repaired or evaluated.\nAs used in this paragraph 4, \u2018test driving\u2019 occurs when a permitted user who, with the permission of the used[-]vehicle dealer or an employee of the used[-]vehicle dealer, drives a vehicle owned and held for sale or lease by a used[-]vehicle dealer that the person is considering to purchase or lease, in order to evaluate the performance, reliability, or condition of the vehicle.\nAs used in this paragraph 4, \u2018loaner purposes\u2019 means when a person who, with the permission of the used[-]vehiele dealer, drives a vehicle owned or held for sale or lease by the used[-]vehicle dealer while the user\u2019s vehicle is being repaired or evaluated.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 102(b)(4) (West 2004).\nSubsection (b)(4) of section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is confusing as written. The statute begins by stating that a dealer\u2019s policy will provide primary coverage on the dealer\u2019s automobiles unless a \u201cpermitted user\u201d of one of the dealer\u2019s automobiles has the requisite amount of coverage. The statute then defines a \u201cpermitted user\u201d as one who is \u201ctest driving\u201d the used-vehicle dealer\u2019s vehicle or who is driving the used-vehicle dealer\u2019s vehicle for \u201cloaner purposes\u201d while the user\u2019s vehicle is being repaired or evaluated. The statute states that the used-vehicle dealer\u2019s policy will be primary if the \u201cpermitted user\u201d is \u201ctest driving.\u201d Accordingly, there is only one situation under the statute where the insurance policy of a \u201cpermitted user\u201d would be primary. That is where the \u201cpermitted user\u201d has the requisite coverage and is driving a vehicle held out for sale or lease by the used-vehicle dealer, with the used-vehicle dealer\u2019s permission, for \u201cloaner purposes,\u201d while the user\u2019s vehicle is being repaired or evaluated.\nHere, it is undisputed that Sarah had the requisite amount of coverage, that Sarah was driving the Escort with the permission of Kessler, and that the Escort was owned and held for sale or lease by Kessler. There is no question that Sarah was not \u201ctest driving\u201d the Escort, as both Sarah and Kessler testified that Sarah had previously owned the Escort and had no intention of repurchasing that vehicle. Accordingly, under the terms of the statute, Sarah\u2019s insurance coverage would be primary only if she was driving Kessler\u2019s vehicle while her Saturn was being repaired or evaluated.\nThe circuit court, in granting the cross-motion for a summary judgment filed by Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Kessler, found that, at the time of the May 26, 2004, accident involving the Escort, Sarah\u2019s Saturn was being \u201cevaluated\u201d under the terms of the statute. The circuit court concluded that the term evaluated in the statute \u201cshould be read broadly to include the evaluation of how to replace a vehicle that has been determined to be totaled.\u201d In so concluding, the circuit court primarily relied on a regulation promulgated by the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation regarding required claims practices for private passenger automobile insurance companies. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7919.80 (eff. July 22, 2002). That regulation sets forth, inter alia, a procedure insurance companies must follow when settling a total-loss vehicle claim. 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7919.80(c) (eff. July 22, 2002). Subsection (c)(2)(F) provides, \u201cIf within 30 days after the receipt of the claim draft, the insured cannot purchase a comparable vehicle in excess of such market value, the company will reopen its claim file ***.\u201d 50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7919.80(c)(2)(F) (eff. July 22, 2002). The regulation then sets forth a right-of-recourse procedure to be followed in this situation. Relying on this regulation, the circuit court found, \u201c[T]he evaluation of a vehicle and its replacement does not end for purposes of the statute at the time the damaged vehicle is determined to be a total loss by the owner or the insurer.\u201d\nPrior to the amendment of section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code, the common law provided that primary automobile liability coverage is placed on the insurer of the owner of an automobile, rather than on the insurer of the operator. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Universal Underwriters Group, 182 Ill. 2d 240, 246 (1998). Section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code is a departure from the common law to the extent it requires the operator\u2019s insurance to be primary, rather than the owner\u2019s insurance. In Illinois, the rule is that \u201cstatutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed in favor of persons sought to be subjected to their operation. Our courts will read nothing into such statutes by intendment or implication.\u201d In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d 53, 57 (1983), citing Barthel v. Illinois Central Gulf R.R. Co., 74 Ill. 2d 213, 220 (1978). \u201cMoreover, such statutes will not be extended any further than what the language of the statute absolutely requires by its express terms or by clear implication.\u201d In re W.W., 97 Ill. 2d at 57, citing Walter v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 370 Ill. 283, 288-89 (1938).\n\u201cThe cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature.\u201d Lulay v. Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d 455, 466 (2000), citing Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). \u201cThe best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning.\u201d Lulay, 193 Ill. 2d at 466, citing Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177. When determining the plain and ordinary meaning of words, a court may look to the dictionary. In re Application of the County Treasurer of Cook County, Illinois, 343 Ill. App. 3d 122, 125 (2003). The word evaluate as defined by Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary is \u201c1: to determine or fix the value of[;] 2: to determine the significance, worth, or condition of usually by careful appraisal and study.\u201d Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/evaluate. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that we should depart from the ordinary definition of evaluated and use a specialized understanding of the term.\nFurthermore, a \u201cstatute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section.\u201d Paris, 179 Ill. 2d at 177, citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 91 (1992). Earlier in section 5 \u2014 102(b)(4), test driving is defined as \u201cdriv[ing] a vehicle owned and held for sale or lease by a used[-]vehicle dealer that the person is considering to purchase or lease, in order to evaluate the performance, reliability, or condition of the vehicle.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 102(b)(4) (West 2004). It is clear that the legislature was well aware of the plain and ordinary meaning of the term evaluate based on its previous usage within subsection (b)(4). Absent any indication that the legislature intended evaluated to have two different meanings within the statute, it should be given a consistent and plain meaning.\nWe also find it instructive that the statute defines a \u201cpermitted user\u201d as a person driving the used-vehicle dealer\u2019s vehicle while the user\u2019s vehicle is being \u201crepaired or evaluated.\u201d The use of the term evaluated in the same phrase as the word repaired seems to define a situation when a vehicle is being evaluated for repair. As is the case with Kessler\u2019s business, many used-vehicle dealers have a repair business that is operated in conjunction with the sale of vehicles. It is a more ordinary occurrence than the situation in the case at bar for the dealership to give a customer a loaner vehicle while the dealership is repairing the customer\u2019s vehicle or is evaluating the customer\u2019s vehicle in the sense of determining whether the customer\u2019s vehicle is in need of repair or the cost of repairs. Because section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code defines the relationship between a used-vehicle dealer and a customer, it seems more likely that the intent of the legislature was to define a situation where the used-vehicle dealer is repairing or evaluating the customer\u2019s vehicle, rather than to define a situation where any, unnamed third party is doing the repairing or evaluating.\nMoreover, we find the circuit court\u2019s reliance on section 919.80 of Title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code (50 Ill. Adm. Code \u00a7919.80 (eff. July 22, 2002)) to define the term evaluated in the statute at issue to be misplaced. There is nothing in the statute to indicate that the term evaluated should be defined by a procedure set forth in an unrelated regulation governing insurance claims practices. Had the legislature intended the \u201cpermitted user\u2019s\u201d insurance to provide primary coverage while the user\u2019s vehicle is being replaced, it could have simply stated, \u201cwhile the user\u2019s vehicle is being repaired, replaced, or evaluated.\u201d Furthermore, if the legislature wanted to depart from the plain meaning of the term evaluated to encompass the ongoing insurance claim procedure that was taking place between the Galles and Madison Mutual under administrative regulations promulgated by the Illinois Department of Insurance, it could have easily included a reference to the regulation setting forth that procedure or at least used the term claim in conjunction with the term evaluate.\nThe circuit court essentially construed section 919.80 of Title 50 of the Illinois Administrative Code and section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code in pari materia. This principle of construction requires two legislative acts that address the same subject to be considered with reference to each other, so that they may be given harmonious effect. Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). The problem with the circuit court\u2019s in pari materia analysis, however, is that the regulation that requires an insurance company to reopen its claim file if a replacement for a total-loss vehicle cannot be found within 30 days does not address the same subject as section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code. In contrast, section 5 \u2014 102 defines the insurance requirements for a used-vehicle dealer and defines one situation in which the dealer\u2019s insurance would provide excess coverage when there is an accident involving a vehicle owned by the dealer. The two enactments are not related whatsoever. In addition, a court should only invoke the doctrine of in pari materia to resolve a statutory ambiguity. People v. Aleman, 355 Ill. App. 3d 619, 626 (2005). As explained above, no such ambiguity exists in the statute at issue.\nApplying the foregoing interpretation of section 5 \u2014 102 to the facts of the case at bar, we conclude that at the time of Sarah\u2019s May 26, 2004, accident with the Escort, no one was in the process of determining the significance, worth, or condition of Sarah\u2019s Saturn. It was not being evaluated to see whether it could be repaired, and it had already been determined that the Saturn was not going to be repaired. Sarah was driving the Escort with Kessler\u2019s permission so that Kessler could find her a replacement vehicle. This situation is outside the purview of how the plain language of section 5 \u2014 102 of the Illinois Vehicle Code defines permitted user, which should be strictly construed because that definition results in an abrogation of the common law rule that the vehicle owner\u2019s insurance coverage shall be primary.\nFor the forgoing reasons, we find the circuit court erred in granting the cross-motion for a summary judgment filed by Auto-Owners Insurance Company and Kessler and in denying the motion for a summary judgment filed by Madison Mutual. Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for the circuit court to enter an order granting a summary judgment in favor of Madison Mutual.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nSTEWART and WEXSTTEN, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SPOMER" } ], "attorneys": [ "Paul P. Waller III and Dale L. Bode, both of Walker & Williams, P.C., of Belleville, for appellant.", "Daniel R. Price, of Wham & Wham, of Centralia, for appellee Jerry Kessler.", "No briefs filed for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "MADISON MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. JERRY KESSLER, d/b/a Kessler Auto Body, et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFifth District\nNo. 5 \u2014 06\u20140599\nOpinion filed October 3, 2007.\nPaul P. Waller III and Dale L. Bode, both of Walker & Williams, P.C., of Belleville, for appellant.\nDaniel R. Price, of Wham & Wham, of Centralia, for appellee Jerry Kessler.\nNo briefs filed for other appellees." }, "file_name": "1121-01", "first_page_order": 1139, "last_page_order": 1148 }