{ "id": 4273192, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF CINDY MANHOFF, Petitioner-Appellee, and DEAN MANHOFF, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Manhoff", "decision_date": "2007-12-05", "docket_number": "No. 1-06-2762", "first_page": "671", "last_page": "677", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 671" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 236", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268657 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "241" }, { "page": "241" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0236-01" ] }, { "cite": "278 Ill. App. 3d 1071", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1156777 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1078" }, { "page": "1078" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/278/1071-01" ] }, { "cite": "365 Ill. App. 3d 80", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263220 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "85" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/365/0080-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 1056", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291603 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1063", "parenthetical": "certification of portion of defendant's motion to dismiss under section 2 - 619 of the Code was equivalent of affidavit for purposes of rule governing the defendant's submission of affidavits in support of his motion to dismiss" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/1056-01" ] }, { "cite": "172 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5082437 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "745" }, { "page": "745" }, { "page": "744-45", "parenthetical": "petitions to show cause for failure to pay child support were not defective because they were certified rather than verified by affidavit" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/172/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 334", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610803 ], "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0334-01" ] }, { "cite": "341 Ill. App. 3d 984", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5572492 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/341/0984-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 742, "char_count": 16399, "ocr_confidence": 0.784, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.14330256319963056 }, "sha256": "f6a7898eedb9166f96dcd1b908daab355ac69bd3d0bfa8c4f71f93178c2c7562", "simhash": "1:2c38f687298f0c75", "word_count": 2753 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:30:19.728803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF CINDY MANHOFF, Petitioner-Appellee, and DEAN MANHOFF, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nRespondent Dean Manhoff appeals from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying his motion to strike and dismiss petitioner Cindy Manhoff s emergency motion to restrict visitation with the parties\u2019 children and for a finding of visitation abuse. Respondent also appeals from an order of the circuit court denying his motion for reconsideration of a court order permitting him only supervised visitation with the parties\u2019 children. On appeal, respondent contends that: (1) the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to conduct an emergency hearing where petitioner did not attach an affidavit to her petition as required by circuit court rules; (2) the circuit court erred in finding that respondent\u2019s alleged actions constituted a substantial endangerment to the parties\u2019 children; and (3) respondent was denied his rights to a fair trial and due process where he did not have the opportunity to present a defense at the emergency hearing. For the following reasons, we affirm.\nCindy and Dean were married on October 4, 1987, and the marriage was registered in Cook County, Illinois. Three children were born to the parties during the course of their marriage, namely: Jacob, born May 1, 1998; Zachary, born February 1, 2001; and Nicole, born May 5, 2002. On April 30, 2002, Cindy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage. On September 27, 2005, the circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage, which incorporated a marital settlement agreement and a parenting agreement executed by the parties. Pursuant to the parenting agreement, Cindy was awarded sole custody of the parties\u2019 children with Dean having visitation with the children on alternating weekends and every Wednesday evening, telephone contact, and visitation on alternating holidays.\nOn June 14, 2006, Cindy filed an emergency petition to restrict visitation and for a finding of visitation abuse. In her petition, Cindy alleged that Dean engaged in misconduct relating to visitation with the parties\u2019 children. Cindy alleged, inter alia, that on June 7, 2006, Cindy, the parties\u2019 three children, Cindy\u2019s boyfriend Alfred Weltmann, and the children\u2019s nanny Joanne, were at Cindy\u2019s home waiting for Dean to pick the children up for visitation. Pursuant to the judgment, Dean was to pick up and drop off the children curbside and was not to enter Cindy\u2019s property. Cindy alleged that Dean arrived to pick up the children and Alfred heard Dean ask, \u201cWhy is he [Alfred] here? You don\u2019t want him here do you? Why is he always here? He\u2019s staring at me. He wants to hurt me. He wants to beat me up.\u201d Jacob then walked back into the house and was crying. Dean motioned through the screen door for Alfred to come outside. Alfred declined and Dean said, \u201cI just want to make sure you get it all taped. You\u2019re probably taping this.\u201d Dean then said, \u201cI need drugs, do you have some you want to sell me? Is your son selling them yet?\u201d Alfred responded by saying, \u201cThis is the reason that you and Cindy can\u2019t be together\u201d and Alfred closed the door. Dean continued speaking to Nicole and Zachary and told them, \u201cGo ask him why he\u2019s staring at me, go ask him? I want you to go ask him.\u201d Cindy alleged that Nicole then came into the house, smiled uncomfortably at Alfred, did not say anything, then went outside again. Dean then asked Nicole, \u201cDid he holler at you? I heard he hollers at you. He hollered at you right?\u201d Jacob then went outside. Shortly thereafter, Dean yelled, \u201cWhere is Joanne? Send her out here!\u201d Cindy alleged that Joanne was afraid and went into the kitchen. Dean continued to yell, \u201cSend her out here!\u201d Alfred then opened the door and told Dean that Joanne did not want anything to do with him. Dean then yelled, \u201cNo, it\u2019s you! My kids want nothing to do with you! You\u2019re a drug dealer! You don\u2019t belong there! What are you doing there!\u201d Alfred closed the door and Dean began calling the house from his cellular telephone. Dean continued to call the house for 20 minutes then left. Joanne was fearful and asked Alfred to follow her out of the house.\nIn her petition, Cindy also alleged that, later that day, Dean returned the children and engaged in further abusive behavior. Dean stood in front of Cindy\u2019s home and yelled, \u201cWhere\u2019s fat and sloppy? Your mom is going to get me in trouble again. I\u2019m sure they are up to something again. They don\u2019t want me to see you ever.\u201d Dean told Jacob that Cindy and Alfred were taping him and directed Jacob to search bushes in front of the home for a tape recorder. Once inside the house, the children asked Cindy, \u201cWhy is dad going to be in trouble? Why does Alfred make faces at dad?\u201d Cindy also alleged that on May 24, 2006, Zachary told her that Dean entered her home while she was away.\nIn response to Cindy\u2019s petition, on June 14, 2006, Dean filed a motion to strike and dismiss Cindy\u2019s emergency petition. In his motion, Dean alleged, inter alia, that because Cindy\u2019s petition was verified, rather than supported by affidavit, it violated Cook County Circuit Court Rule 13.4(d)(ii)(B) (Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 13.4(d)(ii)(B) (eff. April 8, 2002)), which requires an affidavit for emergency motions filed in the circuit court. Dean also alleged that Cindy failed to plead that he \u201cseriously endangered\u201d the children.\nLater that same day, June 14, 2006, the circuit court conducted an evidentiary hearing. The parties acknowledge that the court heard testimony from Cindy, Alfred, and Dean concerning the incident on June 7, 2006. The record does not contain a report of these proceedings. The circuit court entered an order in which the court found that Cindy and Alfred were more credible than Dean; that Dean was incredible; and that Dean made the statements alleged in Cindy\u2019s petition and Dean had his children search for a tape recorder as alleged in Cindy\u2019s petition. The court also found that Dean\u2019s behavior was \u201cnot only disturbing but egregious and warrants a modification of the Joint Parenting Agreement,\u201d and that Dean\u2019s behavior is \u201ca substantial endangerment\u201d to the well-being of the parties\u2019 three children. The court ordered that Dean shall have supervised visitation with a professional supervisor until further ordered by the court and that Dean shall be solely responsible for the cost of the supervisor. The court stated that this matter is \u201cfound to be an emergency\u201d and that portions of Cindy\u2019s pleading that related to incidents that occurred prior to the entry of the judgment for dissolution of marriage were stricken.\nOn June 30, 2006, Dean filed a motion to vacate the June 14, 2006, order or, in the alternative, a motion for retrial or modification. In his motion, Dean alleged that he had not been given sufficient notice of Cindy\u2019s petition where he received it at 5 p.m. on the evening before the emergency hearing; that there was no expert testimony at the hearing; and that the testimony from Cindy and Alfred was incredible. On July 6, 2006, Dean filed an amended motion to vacate the June 14, 2006, order, in which he alleged that Cindy\u2019s petition did not comply with Cook County Circuit Court Rule 13.4(d) (ii) and should be vacated.\nOn September 11, 2006, the circuit court entered an order which, inter alia, denied Dean\u2019s amended motion to vacate the June 14, 2006, order or, in the alternative, a motion for retrial or modification. Dean filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court\u2019s orders on June 14, 2006, and September 11, 2006.\nOn June 18, 2007, this court denied Cindy\u2019s motion to dismiss this appeal for want of appellate jurisdiction. On June 28, 2007, this court denied Cindy\u2019s motion to dismiss this appeal for two separate and independent reasons, in which Cindy alleged that this appeal is moot because the circuit court had entered a new order based upon new allegations of misconduct by Dean and Cindy alleged that this appeal should be dismissed based on Dean\u2019s failure to provide a complete record on appeal.\nOn appeal, Dean first contends that the circuit court erred in accepting Cindy\u2019s petition on an emergency basis where Cindy\u2019s petition failed to include an affidavit as required by Cook County Circuit Court Rule 13.4(d)(ii).\n\u201cA local rule has the force of a statute and is binding on the trial court as well as the parties.\u201d Moy v. Ng, 341 Ill. App. 3d 984, 989 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Vision Point of Sale, Inc. v. Haas, 226 Ill. 2d 334 (2007). However, our supreme court rules control over a local circuit court rule. Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 989. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 21(a) vests circuit courts with the power to adopt local rules governing civil and criminal cases as long as they do not conflict with supreme court rules or statutes, and so far as practical, they are uniform throughout the state. 134 Ill. 2d R. 21(a); Moy, 341 Ill. App. 3d at 989-90.\nCook County Circuit Court Rule 13.4(d)(ii), which governs domestic relations proceedings, provides:\n\u201c(ii) Emergency Matters.\nA. Emergency matters shall be heard at a time and day designated by the judge hearing same.\nB. The nature of the emergency and the reason why the matter should take precedence over other motions shall be stated with particularity in a verified petition. Affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts giving rise to the emergency shall accompany the petition.\nC. If the court does not deem the matter to be an emergency, the movant shall set the matter on the motion call, by filing the motion with the Clerk of the Circuit Court.\u201d Cook Co. Cir. R. 13.4(d)(ii) (eff. April 8, 2002).\nHere, Cindy\u2019s emergency petition to restrict visitation and for a finding of visitation abuse was verified by Cindy pursuant to section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1\u2014109 (West 2006)). However, Dean argues that Cindy\u2019s verification was insufficient where circuit court Rule 13.4(d)(ii) required the submission of an affidavit. We disagree. Effective January 1, 1984, the Code was amended to permit pleadings to be verified by certification. 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 109 (West 2006); In re Marriage of Betts, 172 Ill. App. 3d 742, 745 (1988). Via the Civil Practice Law (735 ILCS 5/2\u2014101 et seq. (West 2006)), section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code was made applicable to the provisions of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) by subsection 105(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/105(a) (West 2006)). Betts, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 745.\nSection 1 \u2014 109 of the Code specifically provides that, \u201cUnless otherwise expressly provided by rule of the Supreme Court, whenever in this Code any complaint [or] petition *** is required or permitted to be verified, or made, sworn to or verified under oath, such requirement or permission is hereby defined to include a certification of such pleading ***.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 109 (West 2006). Section 1 \u2014 109 also states that, \u201cAny pleading, affidavit or other document certified in accordance with this Section may be used in the same manner and with the same force and effect as though subscribed and sworn to under oath.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 109 (West 2006).\nHere, circuit court Rule 13.4(d)(ii) required that Cindy\u2019s emergency petition state the nature of the emergency \u201cwith particularity in a verified petition\u201d and that affidavits by persons having knowledge of the facts giving rise to the emergency accompany the petition. Cook Co. Cir. Ct. R. 13.4(d)(ii)(B) (eff. April 8, 2002). Cindy\u2019s petition included a certification under section 1 \u2014 109 of the Code, in which she certified that she believed the matters stated in the petition to be true. We find that the petition was not defective because it was certified rather than accompanied by an additional affidavit by Cindy. See Betts, 172 Ill. App. 3d at 744-45 (petitions to show cause for failure to pay child support were not defective because they were certified rather than verified by affidavit); Griffin v. Universal Casualty Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1063 (1995) (certification of portion of defendant\u2019s motion to dismiss under section 2 \u2014 619 of the Code was equivalent of affidavit for purposes of rule governing the defendant\u2019s submission of affidavits in support of his motion to dismiss); Hoxha v. LaSalle National Bank, 365 Ill. App. 3d 80, 85 (2006) (successor beneficiary\u2019s section 1 \u2014 109 certification of answer to complaint for specific performance that beneficiary had no knowledge sufficient to form belief regarding authenticity of former beneficiary\u2019s signature on sales contract was sufficient to stand as verification of truth of lack of knowledge to deny allegation that former beneficiary signed the agreement).\nDean next contends that the circuit court erred in finding that Dean\u2019s alleged actions constituted a substantial endangerment to the parties\u2019 children and restricting Dean\u2019s visitation.\n\u201cMatters of child visitation privileges rest largely in the broad discretion of the trial court, and its determinations with respect thereto should not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest injustice has been done.\u201d In re Marriage of Marshall, 278 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 1078 (1996). \u201cThe court may modify an order granting or denying visitation rights whenever modification would serve the best interest of the child; but the court shall not restrict a parent\u2019s visitation rights unless it finds that the visitation would endanger seriously the child\u2019s physical, mental, moral or emotional health.\u201d 750 ILCS 5/607(c) (West 2006); Marriage of Marshall, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1078. \u201cWhere the proceeding is by a custodial parent to restrict or deny visitation, the burden is upon the custodial parent to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the visitation then provided endangers the welfare of the children.\u201d Marriage of Marshall, 278 Ill. App. 3d at 1078.\nIn this case, the circuit court determined that Dean\u2019s behavior was \u201cnot only disturbing but egregious and warrants a modification of the Joint Parenting Agreement,\u201d and that Dean\u2019s behavior was \u201ca substantial endangerment\u201d to the well-being of the parties\u2019 three children. The court ordered that Dean shall have supervised visitation with a professional supervisor until further ordered by the court. While the parties acknowledge that a hearing was conducted in which the court heard testimony from Cindy, Alfred and Dean, the record does not contain a transcript, bystander\u2019s report, or agreed statement of facts of the circuit court hearing. In the absence of such record on appeal, we must presume that the circuit court followed the law and had a sufficient factual basis for its ruling. See In re Marriage of Thomsen, 371 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241 (2007). We therefore cannot say that the circuit court\u2019s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence or constituted an abuse of discretion.\nDean lastly contends that he was denied his rights to a fair trial and due process where the circuit court conducted an emergency hearing wherein Dean did not have the opportunity to raise a defense or properly defend himself. Dean argues if the court had determined that no emergency existed and given Cindy\u2019s petition a regular hearing date, Dean would have been given sufficient notice to prepare to defend the allegations. As previously noted, Dean has failed to provide a reporter\u2019s transcript, bystander\u2019s report, or agreed statement of facts of the circuit court proceedings in the record. We therefore presume that the circuit court followed the law and had a sufficient factual basis for its ruling that an emergency hearing was appropriate in this case. Marriage of Thomsen, 371 Ill. App. 3d at 241. In addition, the record shows that after receiving Cindy\u2019s petition, Dean prepared and submitted a motion to strike and dismiss Cindy\u2019s emergency petition. Dean also has failed to identify any arguments or defenses that he was precluded from presenting before the circuit court. Accordingly, we find that Dean\u2019s argument is without merit.\nFor the above-stated reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nGREIMAN and THEIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE QUINN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Marshal R Morris, of Buffalo Grove (Marshal P. Morris, of counsel), for appellant.", "Grand & Leavitt, P.C., of Chicago (Marvin J. Leavitt, David C. Adams, and Ruth H. Yacona, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF CINDY MANHOFF, Petitioner-Appellee, and DEAN MANHOFF, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20142762\nOpinion filed December 5, 2007.\nMarshal R Morris, of Buffalo Grove (Marshal P. Morris, of counsel), for appellant.\nGrand & Leavitt, P.C., of Chicago (Marvin J. Leavitt, David C. Adams, and Ruth H. Yacona, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0671-01", "first_page_order": 687, "last_page_order": 693 }