{ "id": 4274470, "name": "In re ESTATE OF AGNES H. WRIGHT, Deceased (Peter J. Wright, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellant; The Northern Trust Company, as Successor Trustee of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellee; The Northern Trust Company, as Independent Executor of the Will and Estate of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Respondent; Linda Lee Bordigon, Respondent; and John R. Wright, Petitioner)", "name_abbreviation": "In re Estate of Wright", "decision_date": "2007-12-03", "docket_number": "No. 2-07-0541", "first_page": "800", "last_page": "809", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "377 Ill. App. 3d 800" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 300", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3364602 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "307" }, { "page": "309", "parenthetical": "Bowman, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "Bowman, J., dissenting" }, { "page": "310", "parenthetical": "Bowman, J., dissenting" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0300-01" ] }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 26", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 3340313 ], "year": 1906, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "35-36" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/222/0026-01" ] }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 219", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777565 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "231" }, { "page": "230-31" }, { "page": "231" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0219-01" ] }, { "cite": "89 Ill. 2d 103", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5493252 ], "year": 1982, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "117-18", "parenthetical": "\" 'The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage and promote full and frank consultation between a client and legal advisor by removing the fear of compelled disclosure of information' \"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/89/0103-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592553 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "190" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Mich. L. Rev.", "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1633" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "671 A.2d 1023", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "A.2d", "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1030" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "140 N.H. 359", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.H.", "case_ids": [ 2290857 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "370" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nh/140/0359-01" ] }, { "cite": "129 N.M. 487", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "N.M.", "case_ids": [ 1217144 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "492" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/nm/129/0487-01" ] }, { "cite": "98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450", "category": "journals:journal", "reporter": "Harv. L. Rev.", "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1640-42" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "114 Wash. 2d 198", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1169892 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207-08" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/114/0198-01" ] }, { "cite": "32 F.3d 851", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.3d", "case_ids": [ 1844427 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "863", "parenthetical": "\"Advice is not in issue merely because it is relevant, and does not necessarily become in issue merely because the attorney's advice might affect the client's state of mind in a relevant matter\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f3d/32/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 F.R.D. 574", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 3709548 ], "year": 1975, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "580" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/68/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "176 F.R.D. 269", "category": "reporters:specialty", "reporter": "F.R.D.", "case_ids": [ 103524 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "272" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/frd/176/0269-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 373", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5766198 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "376" }, { "page": "377" }, { "page": "383" }, { "page": "382" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0373-01" ] }, { "cite": "246 Ill. App. 3d 979", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5389643 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989" }, { "page": "989-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/246/0979-01" ] }, { "cite": "147 Ill. App. 3d 456", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3605657 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "464" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/147/0456-01" ] }, { "cite": "703 F.2d 252", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1851502 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/703/0252-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 166", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317129 ], "weight": 13, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "178" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "176" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" }, { "page": "178" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0166-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1020, "char_count": 22009, "ocr_confidence": 0.783, "pagerank": { "raw": 8.427197246887279e-08, "percentile": 0.4837982832203731 }, "sha256": "4cf11ca9f92e5a6ba6e6cd99e8d1f37bd0db8a6b127f00dd754bac5cb355d04f", "simhash": "1:bb07b79d7d489688", "word_count": 3549 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T17:30:19.728803+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF AGNES H. WRIGHT, Deceased (Peter J. Wright, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellant; The Northern Trust Company, as Successor Trustee of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellee; The Northern Trust Company, as Independent Executor of the Will and Estate of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Respondent; Linda Lee Bordigon, Respondent; and John R. Wright, Petitioner)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPeter J. Wright filed a petition for leave to appeal to this court (see 210 111. 2d R. 306) following the trial court\u2019s partial grant of a motion to disqualify his counsel brought by The Northern Trust Company, in its capacity as trustee of the Agnes H. Wright Trust (dated December 17, 1981, as amended and restated). Peter contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion. We disagree and therefore affirm.\nThere are actually three separate proceedings below that have been consolidated by the trial court. First, there is a probate action involving the estate of Agnes Wright. In the course of this action, Peter filed a petition to invalidate an amendment to a trust because of the alleged undue influence of his sister, Linda Bordignon, upon his mother, Agnes Wright. John Wright, Peter\u2019s brother, filed an independent action seeking to invalidate an amendment to the trust on the same basis. Additionally, Northern filed an action on behalf of the estate, alleging breach of contract for Peter\u2019s failure to repay a purported loan to the estate.\nThe amendment that was the subject of Peter\u2019s petition provided, inter alia, as follows:\n\u201cThis first amendment to my Trust is made in order to be sure there is no misunderstanding about a One Million, Eight Hundred Thousand Dollar ($1,800,000.00) loan I made to my son, Peter, so he could buy a second home in Lake Geneva, Wisconsin. Peter negotiated the loan with my then attorney, Raymond Olson, Jr. Peter didn\u2019t like the idea of giving me a mortgage on the property. However, he did not object to the other terms of the loan. The loan agreement, which was never signed because of the mortgage language, required Peter to repay the loan in four equal annual installments of $428,003.12 including interest at 6.46% per year commencing on February 1, 2003. Peter will hopefully make each payment as he agreed. However, if he does not, I direct my trustee to treat this debt as a trust asset and either recover the unpaid balance or, if the trustee considers it advisable, offset the unpaid balance of the loan against Peter\u2019s distributive share under this Trust. Hopefully, this will not have to happen.\u201d\nRaymond Olson \u2014 Agnes\u2019s attorney with regard to this transfer \u2014 is now deceased. Peter\u2019s petition states:\n\u201cOn or about December 16, 2002, subject to Linda\u2019s undue influence, [Agnes] signed [a] Trust Amendment ***. For the first time since the $1,800,000 was transferred to Peter[,] *** Agnes *** purports to suddenly attempt to characterize the transfer to be a \u2018loan,\u2019 notwithstanding *** that less that two (2) months earlier, Agnes \u2018reiterated\u2019 that the $1,800,000 transfer was a gift.\u201d\nThus, one of the allegations Peter relies on in arguing that Agnes was subject to Linda\u2019s undue influence is her purported recharacterization of the transfer.\nNorthern, meanwhile, had alleged in its pleading that \u201cPeter has breached the terms of his oral agreement with Agnes relating to the loan by failing to make any of the annual installments due pursuant to the terms of the Promissory Note.\u201d Northern also essentially paraphrased the above language from the amendment Peter seeks to invalidate. Peter maintains that the transfer represented a gift.\nNorthern moved to disqualify Peter\u2019s counsel. In the course of this dispute, Peter had retained two law firms, Cunningham, Meyer, and Verdine (Cunningham) as well as Kelly, Olson, Michod, DeHaan, and Richter (Olson). Northern sought to have both disqualified. Northern argued that Olson should be disqualified because of its prior representation of Agnes with regard to the $1,800,000 transfer. Northern further argued that Cunningham should be disqualified because \u201cit is reasonable to assume that the Olson Firm disclosed confidential information to the Cunningham Firm relating to Olson\u2019s prior representation of Agnes.\u201d The trial court agreed with Northern\u2019s first argument, but not its second one. Accordingly, only Olson was disqualified.\nThe parties agree on the applicable law. Rule 1.9 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provides:\n\u201cA lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter:\n(1) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person\u2019s interests are materially adverse to the interests of the former client, unless the former client consents after disclosure; or\n(2) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client, unless:\n(A) such use is permitted by Rule 1.6; or\n(B) the information has become generally known.\u201d 134 111. 2d R. 1.9.\nThe supreme court has provided the following guidance for determining whether a substantial relationship exists between a current representation and a former matter, by what has come to be known as the LaSalle inquiry:\n\u201cUnder the LaSalle inquiry, the court first must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of the former representation. Then, it must determine whether it is reasonable to infer that the confidential information allegedly given would have been given to a lawyer representing a client in those matters. Finally, the court must consider whether the information is relevant to the issues raised in the litigation pending against the former client.\u201d Schwartz v. Cortelloni, 177 Ill. 2d 166, 178 (1997), citing LaSalle National Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 256 (7th Cir. 1983).\nThe party seeking disqualification bears the burden of demonstrating that the two representations in question are substantially related. Hannan v. Watt, 147 Ill. App. 3d 456, 464 (1986).\nWhether disqualification is appropriate is a matter that lies within the discretion of the trial court. Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 176. Hence, we will disturb such a decision only where that discretion is abused. Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 176. An abuse of discretion occurs only where no reasonable person could agree with the position taken by the trial court. Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 176. Moreover, it must be remembered that, because it deprives the affected party of counsel of his or her choice, disqualification is considered a drastic remedy. SK Handtool Corp. v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 246 Ill. App. 3d 979, 989 (1993). Courts must be vigilant in ensuring that motions to disqualify are not misused as tactical weapons for the purpose of harassment. SK Handtool Corp., 246 Ill. App. 3d at 989. On the other hand, \u201c[c]ourts have vital interests in \u2018protecting the attorney-client relationship, maintaining public confidence in the legal profession and ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings.\u2019 \u201d In re Estate ofKlehm, 363 Ill. App. 3d 373, 376 (2006), quoting SK Handtool Corp., 246 Ill. App. 3d at 989. Disqualification exists to safeguard these vital interests. Klehm, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 377. Therefore, \u201cany doubts as to the existence of a conflict should be resolved in favor of disqualification.\u201d SK Handtool Corp., 246 Ill. App. 3d at 989-90. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the substance of the parties\u2019 arguments.\nTo resolve this appeal, we will apply the LaSalle inquiry, as set forth by the supreme court in Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178. First, we must make a factual reconstruction of the scope of the prior representation \u2014 that is, Olson\u2019s representation of Agnes with regard to the transfer of $1,800,000 to Peter. Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178. Peter characterizes this former representation as \u201cconsultations regarding how this transfer was to take effect, including the drafting of a Promissory Note.\u201d \u201cHow this transfer was to take effect\u201d would necessarily entail information regarding the nature of the transaction. That is, if it was a loan, the \u201chow\u201d would likely include things like interest and a payment schedule. If, on the other hand, it was a gift, such issues would be irrelevant. Hence, the \u201chow\u201d of the transaction would have been dependent to some extent on the nature of the transaction. Furthermore, the trust amendment that Peter seeks to have invalidated contains representations relevant to the transfer of funds from Agnes to Peter, such as that Peter did not want to place a mortgage on his home but did not object to other terms of the loan. It is clear that Olson represented Agnes with regard to substantially all aspects of the transfer and that acting in such a role would entail knowing the nature of the transaction, including Agnes\u2019s intent with regard thereto.\nThe next step we must take under Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178, is to determine whether any confidential information \u201cwould have been given to a lawyer representing a client in those matters.\u201d The Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit an attorney from revealing a \u201cconfidence or secret of the client known to the lawyer.\u201d 210 111. 2d R. 1.6(a). Thus, for information to fall within the scope of the rule, it must be confidential or secret. Consequently, it is not surprising that, as Peter points out, Northern only generally identifies such information in its motion as \u201cconfidential information concerning the loan, including but not limited to, communications between Agnes and Peter regarding the loan, the purpose of the loan, and whether Agnes intended the loan to be a loan or a gift, because Olson was involved with the negotiation of its terms.\u201d Obviously, if Northern could identify information with specificity, it would not be confidential. A certain amount of generality is to be expected. Peter\u2019s contention that \u201cNorthern Trust never demonstrated any such actual confidential communications existed\u201d imposes too high a burden.\nPeter, however, argues that Northern has waived any claim to the confidentiality of communications between Agnes and Olson by filing its breach-of-contract suit, and he cites Lama v. Preskill, 353 Ill. App. 3d 300 (2004), in support. In Lama, the court held that the plaintiff waived the attorney-client privilege by alleging facts designed to invoke the discovery rule when she sued after the applicable limitations period had run. Lama, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 307. This, according to the Lama court, allowed the defendant access to documents pertaining to a meeting between the plaintiffs attorney and one of her agents, as that could show when the plaintiff became aware of her claim. Insofar as the second prong of the inquiry under Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178, is concerned, waiver would mean that there is no confidential information to protect.\nLama provoked a well-reasoned dissent by Justice Bowman. Justice Bowman criticized the majority\u2019s reliance on Pyramid Controls, Inc. v. Siemens Industrial Automations, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 269, 272 (N.D. Ill. 1997), which, in turn, relied on Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 580 (E.D. Wash. 1975). Hearn has been subject to substantial criticism, notably for focusing on the need of the party seeking the information rather than the policy that the privilege serves. Lama, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 309 (Bowman, J., dissenting); see also Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc. v. Home Indemnity Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir. 1994) (\u201cAdvice is not in issue merely because it is relevant, and does not necessarily become in issue merely because the attorney\u2019s advice might affect the client\u2019s state of mind in a relevant matter\u201d); Pappas v. Holloway, 114 Wash. 2d 198, 207-08, 787 B2d 30, 36 (1990); Developments in the Law\u2014 Privileged Communications, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1450, 1640-42 (1985). Justice Bowman suggested a rule, adopted by several courts, under which waiver occurs only if \u201cthe litigant directly puts the attorney\u2019s advice at issue in the litigation.\u201d Lama, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 310 (Bowman, J., dissenting), citing Public Service Co. of New Mexico v. Lyons, 129 N.M. 487, 492, 10 E3d 166, 170-71 (App. 2000). Such jurisdictions \u201climit the extent of the at-issue waiver doctrine to circumstances in which the \u201cprivilege-holder injects the privileged material itself into the case.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Lama, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 310 (Bowman, J., dissenting), quoting Aranson v. Schroeder, 140 N.H. 359, 370, 671 A.2d 1023, 1030 (1995), quoting R. Marcus, The Perils of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1605, 1633 (1986).\nGiven the controversy surrounding the rule adopted in Lama, we are unwilling to give it an expansive reading and to apply it beyond its stated facts. In this case, or any contract case for that matter, the privilege would never apply where an attorney drafted a contract and the client later sued on the contract, particularly where extrinsic evidence of the parties\u2019 intent was relevant to construing the contract. Such a broad exception would quickly swallow the attorney-client privilege and frustrate the important policy considerations it exists to protect (see Waste Management, Inc. v. International Surplus Lines Insurance Co., 144 Ill. 2d 178, 190 (1991), quoting Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 89 Ill. 2d 103, 117-18 (1982) (\u201c \u2018The purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage and promote full and frank consultation between a client and legal advisor by removing the fear of compelled disclosure of information\u2019 \u201d)). Accordingly, we reject Peter\u2019s contention that, by filing the contract action, Northern waived the protection of the attorney-client privilege with regard to communications between Olson and Agnes.\nThus, a reasonable person could conclude that Northern has satisfied the second prong of the Schwartz test; therefore, no abuse of discretion has occurred (Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 176). This prong requires only that confidential information could have been communicated, not that such information was in fact conveyed. Gagliardo v. Caffrey, 344 Ill. App. 3d 219, 231 (2003). It is undisputed that Olson represented Agnes with regard to the transfer of $1,800,000 to Peter. This included negotiating on Agnes\u2019s behalf. It is reasonable to infer that, in the course of negotiating on her behalf, Olson could have become privy to confidential information, most notably Agnes\u2019s intent regarding the terms and nature of the transaction. Cf. Gagliardo, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 230-31 (\u201c[Attorney] Matern\u2019s involvement with the estate, albeit of limited duration, concerned the payment of legal fees for the investigation, or, in other words, financial matters. In such capacity, it would, then, be reasonable to infer that Matern was given other information concerning estate finances in addition to the fees sought by the investigating law firm. It would be reasonable to infer also that an attorney charged with estate finances would have an overview of the estate\u2019s value and the various assets it contained\u201d). Moreover, Peter\u2019s argument that, as a party to the transfer, he was \u201c \u2018in the circle\u2019 of communication\u201d and therefore any communication between Olson and Agnes was not confidential with regard to him has been previously rejected. See Gagliardo, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 231.\nThe final step we are directed to take by Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178, is to consider whether any of the information that may have been communicated is potentially relevant to the issues raised in the action pending against the former client. Peter claims that any communications between Agnes and Olson are \u201cirrelevant to the issues of fiduciary duty and undue influence in Peter\u2019s petition.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) We disagree. Quite obviously, if Agnes in fact intended the transfer to be a loan, then the amendment Peter seeks to invalidate actually reflects Agnes\u2019s intent. If the amendment embodies Agnes\u2019s intent, it is less likely that it is the product of Linda\u2019s undue influence. Waters v. Waters, 222 Ill. 26, 35-36 (1906) (\u201cIt is true that where a will is charged to have been executed through undue influence, the declarations of the testator, made before its execution, are admissible by way of rebuttal to show his intention as to the disposition of his property, upon the ground that a will, made in conformity with such declarations, is more likely to have been executed without undue influence than if its terms are contrary to such declarations\u201d). Thus, any communications between Agnes and Olson regarding the nature of the transfer (i.e., gift or loan) could be relevant to Peter\u2019s petition to invalidate the amendment to the trust. At the very least, a reasonable person could come to this conclusion, so no abuse of discretion occurred. Schwartz, 177 111. 2d at 176.\nHence, we hold that the application of the factors set forth in Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178, indicates that we must affirm the trial court\u2019s exercise of its discretion in this matter. Before closing, however, we will address a few additional points Peter raises.\nPeter argues that Klehm compels a different result. Klehm is distinguishable. Notably, in the course of ruling, the Klehm court made the following observation:\n\u201cThe issues presented in counts I and II concern allegations of conversion of estate assets and whether purported transfers of KPI stock by Mrs. Klehm during the period of 1980 through 1995 constituted valid gifts or transfers. It is undisputed that neither Cappetta or Shadle nor their respective law firms represented Mrs. Klehm or the Klehm movants in connection with the purported transfers during this period.\u201d Klehm, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 383.\nInterestingly, where the validity of certain gifts was at issue, the court found it significant that the attorneys who were the object of the disqualification motion were not involved in the transfers in question. In this case, conversely, Olson was involved in the transfer that is at issue. Further, the Klehm court found that \u201cthe nature and scope of [the attorneys\u2019] former representation of the Klehm movants in the various real estate and loan transactions [did] not entail disclosure of confidential information relevant to the citation proceedings.\u201d Klehm, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 382. As we have previously explained, knowledge regarding Agnes\u2019s intent is directly relevant to Peter\u2019s petition.\nPeter also contends that \u201c[t]he \u2018substantial relationship\u2019 test is inapplicable when the former client has no reason to believe that information given to its counsel will not be known by or shared with counsel\u2019s current client.\u201d Initially, we note that Peter cites only an unpublished order from the federal District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. See Lanigan v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 91\u2014 C \u2014 7216 (N.D. Ill. November 23, 1992). That case involved a motion to disqualify an attorney representing a company\u2019s former chief executive officer (CEO) in litigation with the company. The attorney had previously represented the company in various matters. The court reasoned that the substantial relationship test was inapplicable because, as CEO, the attorney\u2019s current client was privy to all significant secrets of the company. Whatever the wisdom of such a rule \u2014 it seems a reasonable one \u2014 we would be loath to extend it to parties to a contract. A CEO likely is aware of important information relating to his or her company; parties to a contract do not necessarily share information openly and, in some circumstances, many actively conceal material facts (such as the most that one is really willing to pay for something). The relationship of CEO-company is quite different from the relationship between parties to a contract. Thus, the rule upon which Peter seeks to rely is of dubious value here.\nFinally, Peter contends that the trial court did not give ample weight to his interest in having counsel of his own choosing. Peter points to the trial court\u2019s statement that it believed his ability to select counsel was \u201cnot a huge issue\u201d because there are numerous competent attorneys in the area who could handle the matter. Peter asserts that he retained Olson because of its recognized expertise in probate and trust matters. In support of this argument, Peter cites only Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178, for the proposition that \u201c[attorney disqualification is a drastic measure because it destroys the attorney-client relationship by prohibiting a party from representation by counsel of his or her choosing.\u201d We have no quarrel with this statement as a general proposition. That case also sets forth the specific procedure by which that interest may be overridden and counsel disqualified (Schwartz, 177 Ill. 2d at 178), and it is that analysis to which this entire order has been dedicated. Peter\u2019s right to the counsel of his choice has not been lightly disregarded; rather, it has been denied because the counsel he chose had represented an adverse party in a substantially related matter.\nAccordingly, we hold that the trial court\u2019s decision to disqualify Olson from representing Peter was not an abuse of discretion. The order of the circuit court of Du Page County to that effect is therefore affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nO\u2019MALLEY and CALLUM, JJ, concur.\ninitially, we acknowledge Peter\u2019s assertion that the detail with which he pleaded facts in his petition regarding the $1,800,000 transfer was simply for the \u201cpurpose of historical context.\u201d A reasonable person reading the petition could, however, conclude that these facts had substantive import.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE GEOMETER" } ], "attorneys": [ "William F. Cunningham and Robert L. Larsen, both of Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine, EC., of Warrenville, for appellant.", "Kathleen R. Ryding, of Huck Bouma EC., of Wheaton, for appellee John R. Wright.", "David M. Allen and Rachel T. Nguyen, both of Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner, EC., of Chicago, for other appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF AGNES H. WRIGHT, Deceased (Peter J. Wright, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellant; The Northern Trust Company, as Successor Trustee of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Petitioner and Respondent-Appellee; The Northern Trust Company, as Independent Executor of the Will and Estate of the Agnes H. Wright Trust Dated December 17, 1981, as Amended and Restated, Respondent; Linda Lee Bordigon, Respondent; and John R. Wright, Petitioner).\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140541\nOpinion filed December 3, 2007.\nWilliam F. Cunningham and Robert L. Larsen, both of Cunningham, Meyer & Vedrine, EC., of Warrenville, for appellant.\nKathleen R. Ryding, of Huck Bouma EC., of Wheaton, for appellee John R. Wright.\nDavid M. Allen and Rachel T. Nguyen, both of Schuyler, Roche & Zwirner, EC., of Chicago, for other appellees." }, "file_name": "0800-01", "first_page_order": 816, "last_page_order": 825 }