{ "id": 4274893, "name": "CIRCLE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY OLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Circle Management, LLC v. Olivier", "decision_date": "2007-12-28", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20140621", "first_page": "601", "last_page": "614", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 601" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "396", "parenthetical": "recognizing that a court should consider constitutional questions only when \"the case cannot be determined on other grounds\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610490 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "352 Ill. App. 3d 934", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2976612 ], "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "623-24" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/46/0622-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 178", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045625 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "182" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0178-01" ] }, { "cite": "37 Ill. 2d 133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2864277 ], "year": 1967, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137-38" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/37/0133-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 249", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898164 ], "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "255" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0249-01" ] }, { "cite": "64 Ill. App. 3d 417", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3330674 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "435" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/64/0417-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 955", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208060 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "963" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0955-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. App. 3d 959", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3439496 ], "year": 1985, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "961" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/131/0959-01" ] }, { "cite": "274 Ill. App. 3d 175", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 291514 ], "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "180" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/274/0175-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 784", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3511733 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "791" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0784-01" ] }, { "cite": "163 Ill. App. 3d 561", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3545830 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564-65", "parenthetical": "recognizing that the Act provides the sole means of settling disputes between landlords and tenants" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/163/0561-01" ] }, { "cite": "366 Ill. App. 3d 315", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4264502 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "325" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/366/0315-01" ] }, { "cite": "92 Ill. App. 3d 820", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5536940 ], "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/92/0820-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 413", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4261022 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0413-01" ] }, { "cite": "208 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2462860 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "156" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/208/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 348", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875396 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "358-59" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0348-01" ] }, { "cite": "127 Ill. 2d 247", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5564516 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "257" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/127/0247-01" ] }, { "cite": "165 Ill. App. 3d 793", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3614508 ], "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "798", "parenthetical": "declining to exercise jurisdiction over a forcible entry and detainer appeal because \"the defendants can no longer be placed in possession of the premises\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/165/0793-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. App. 3d 880", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2609663 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "886" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/179/0880-01" ] }, { "cite": "265 Ill. App. 3d 1012", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 872466 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1015" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/265/1012-01" ] }, { "cite": "179 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 801344 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/179/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "197 Ill. 2d 514", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 259086 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/197/0514-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 146", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3598960 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "149" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0146-01" ] }, { "cite": "374 Ill. App. 3d 974", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 7328938 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" }, { "page": "977" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/374/0974-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1143, "char_count": 30686, "ocr_confidence": 0.764, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.551576997986947e-08, "percentile": 0.40154850726818436 }, "sha256": "a56aa677b0cd7270e0bfd56a387f82863abdff8d4037e1d450d2684d3666594e", "simhash": "1:dfb9dda6738cd4f4", "word_count": 5023 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:56.542688+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "CIRCLE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY OLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GREIMAN\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Beverly Olivier appeals a trial court order granting possession of her apartment to plaintiff Circle Management, LLC (Circle Management), as a sanction for her failure to pay use and occupancy charges during the pendency of Circle Management\u2019s forcible entry and detainer action brought under the Illinois Forcible Entry and Detainer Act (Act) (735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2004)). On appeal, Beverly asserts that the trial court lacked both the statutory and inherent authority to grant Circle Management possession under the Act as a sanction for her inability to make use and occupancy payments absent any consideration of the underlying merits of Circle Management\u2019s possession claim. We reverse.\nOn November 11, 2005, Beverly and her husband Collins Olivier executed a lease for apartment 801 located at 5718 N. Winthrop in Chicago. The lease required the Oliviers to pay $800 per month in rent on the first day of every month. On September 20, 2006, Circle Management, lessor of the Oliviers\u2019 apartment, filed a complaint against Beverly and Collins. The complaint alleged that starting August 1, 2006, Beverly and Collins failed to make their monthly rental payments and that Circle Management was owed $2,450 in back rent. Accordingly, the complaint sought possession of, and back rent for, the Oliviers\u2019 apartment. Beverly responded with a general appearance and a jury demand. She continued residing there with her two children during the pendency of Circle Management\u2019s forcible entry and detainer action.\nOn October 11, 2006, the court entered an agreed order establishing a pretrial filing schedule. In pertinent part, the agreed order granted Circle Management \u201cfourteen (14) days, to and including October 25, 2006, to file a Motion for Use and Occupancy.\u201d On October 26, 2006, one day after the deadline set forth in the agreed order, Circle Management filed a motion for a use and occupancy award. In the motion, Circle Management asserted its belief that \u201c[defendants plan on asserting a counterclaim against Plaintiff which will delay a speedy resolution to this matter and prevent Plaintiff from regaining possession of the premises in time to rent the premises for the winter to new tenants\u201d and sought a court order requiring Beverly to make regular use and occupancy payments during the pendency of the case.\nOn November 30, 2006, the trial court entered an agreed order reached by the parties, which called for Beverly to pay Circle Management $800 a month beginning December 14, 2006, for use and occupancy of the apartment. Beverly, however, failed to make her first use and occupancy payment. Accordingly, on December 20, 2006, Circle Management filed a motion for immediate possession, asserting that it was entitled to possession of Beverly\u2019s apartment as a result of her failure to comply with the agreed use and occupancy order.\nBeverly filed a response objecting to the propriety of Circle Management\u2019s motion, stating: \u201cWhile [Circle Management] identifies no statute, regulation, ordinance or rule of court upon which it bases this request, defendant presumes that [Circle Management] is seeking a finding that Mrs. Olivier is in contempt of court, and asking this Court to award possession as a sanction for Mrs. Olivier\u2019s alleged contempt. *** [Circle Management] has not provided defendant with adequate notice of the type of contempt it seeks, nor is a finding of contempt warranted, as it is impossible for Mrs. Olivier to comply with this Court\u2019s order.\u201d Accordingly, Beverly requested the court to deny Circle Management\u2019s motion.\nThereafter, on January 5, 2006, the trial court conducted a hearing on Circle Management\u2019s motion for immediate possession. Beverly informed the court that she had not paid the use and occupancy charges ordered by the court because she did not have the funds to comply with the order. She explained that her husband had left her in September or August of 2006 and had not provided her with any income or child support following his departure. Moreover, Beverly testified that she was currently unemployed, but that she was actively seeking employment. When asked by the trial court why she entered into the November 30, 2006, agreed order to make monthly use and occupancy payments, Beverly explained that she had believed she would be able to receive revenue from various charities, but that the money had not been forthcoming. The parties stipulated that Beverly\u2019s failure to comply with the use and occupancy order was not wilful.\nThereafter, Beverly\u2019s counsel addressed the court and challenged the validity of the practice of granting possession under the Act to a lessor as a sanction for a lessee\u2019s inability to pay use and occupancy charges. Counsel argued that the sanction Circle Management urged the court to impose did not constitute a valid contempt sanction. Specifically, counsel maintained that the sanction was not a valid criminal contempt sanction because Beverly did not act wilfully; moreover, counsel asserted, the sanction could not be classified as a valid civil contempt sanction because Beverly\u2019s ability to purge the contempt order was limited. The court responded, \u201cSomebody should take it up to the courts and get us some guidelines,\u201d and granted Circle Management\u2019s motion for immediate possession \u201cas a sanction\u201d for Beverly\u2019s nonpayment of use and occupancy charges. The court further stated that the possession order could be \u201cpurged by paying the use and occupancy\u201d by January 31, 2006, and stayed the proceedings until that date. The trial court then set a trial date for February 26, 2007, \u201cin the event it becomes necessary.\u201d The trial court did not hear any evidence concerning the merit of Circle Management\u2019s underlying possession claim. Moreover, the trial court did not specify the authority on which it relied in imposing the sanction.\nOn January 29, 2006, Beverly filed a motion to clarify the court\u2019s January 5, 2006, possession order. The motion sought clarification as to \u201cwhether [the order] was a final judgment as to the disputed issue of possession, or a temporary order pending the disposition of the matter, at which time possession could revert to [Beverly] if she is successful at the trial stage.\u201d In her motion to clarify, Beverly also indicated that she sought \u201cto appeal the Order at this time, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), so that further guidance on the issues surrounding an award of immediate possession from failure to pay use and occupancy may be sought from the Illinois Appellate Court.\u201d\nOn February 14, 2007, the trial court entered an order in response to Beverly\u2019s motion, confirming that the possession order \u201cwas entered as a sanction pursuant to Plaintiffs request for failure to pay use and occupancy.\u201d The court also amended the order \u201cto include a finding pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal or both.\u201d Beverly filed a timely notice of appeal.\nOn appeal, Beverly asserts that the possession order was entered contrary to law, because the trial court lacks the statutory authority to award a landlord possession of a residence under the Act when a tenant is unable to comply with a use and occupancy order without considering the underlying merits of the landlord\u2019s possession claim. Moreover, she asserts that this practice cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of the trial court\u2019s inherent authority to sanction.\nThe Legal Assistance Foundation of Metropolitan Chicago (LAF), the Lawyers\u2019 Committee for Better Housing (LCBH), Cabrini-Green Legal Aid (CGLA) and the Northwestern University School of Law Bluhm Legal Clinic (Bluhm Clinic) (collectively amici), each of which provides free legal services to low-income tenants facing evictions, have filed an amici curiae brief in support of Beverly. In their brief, the amici assert that the practice of awarding possession to landlords when tenants fail to comply with use and occupancy orders without hearing evidence concerning the merits of the underlying possession claim is \u201cprevalent\u201d at the Daley Center. Specifically, the amici state in their brief that the trial court \u201cholds approximately five hearings a week on motions for sanctions for the tenant\u2019s failure to make [use and occupancy] payments. Approximately one tenant a week is evicted as a result of these sanction hearings.\u201d The amici dispute the propriety of this prevalent practice because it relieves landlords of their statutory obligation to prove their right to possession under the Act.\nInitially, we must determine whether we have jurisdiction to entertain Beverly\u2019s appeal or whether her appeal should be dismissed as moot. Following the entry of the possession order, Beverly moved out of the apartment. Thereafter, at oral argument, Circle Management\u2019s counsel informed the court that the apartment had subsequently been leased to another tenant.\nAlthough neither party challenged our jurisdiction, a reviewing court has a duty to consider its jurisdiction sua sponte. Emery v. Northeast Illinois Regional Transportation Co., 374 Ill. App. 3d 974, 977 (2007). As a rule, \u201c[t]he existence of an actual controversy is an essential requisite to appellate jurisdiction, and courts of review will generally not decide abstract, hypothetical, or moot questions.\u201d In re Marriage of Nienhouse, 355 Ill. App. 3d 146, 149 (2004), citing Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 523 (2001). A case becomes moot where it is impossible to render effective relief to the appealing party. Berlin v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 179 Ill. 2d 1, 7 (1997). For example, \u201c \u2018an appeal is moot if a specific property, possession or ownership of which is the relief sought on appeal, has been conveyed to third parties.\u2019 \u201d Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago v. Nunez, 265 Ill. App. 3d 1012, 1015 (1994), quoting Town of Libertyville v. Moran, 179 Ill. App. 3d 880, 886 (1989); Poulos v. Reda, 165 Ill. App. 3d 793, 798 (1987) (declining to exercise jurisdiction over a forcible entry and detainer appeal because \u201cthe defendants can no longer be placed in possession of the premises\u201d).\nHowever, pursuant to the \u201cpublic interest\u201d or \u201cpublic policy\u201d exception to the mootness doctrine, a reviewing court may address an otherwise moot issue \u201cif it involves a question of great public interest.\u201d In re A Minor, 127 Ill. 2d 247, 257 (1989); see also In re Christopher K., 217 Ill. 2d 348, 358-59 (2005). To determine whether the exception applies, a reviewing court must evaluate three factors, including: \u201c(1) the public nature of the question; (2) the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purpose of guiding public officers; and (3) the likelihood that the question will recur.\u201d In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 156 (2003). In order for an issue to fall within the confines of the public interest exception, \u201c[a]Il three factors must be clearly shown.\u201d Brown v. Johnson, 362 Ill. App. 3d 413, 417 (2005).\nIn this case, we find that the public interest exception applies. First, the question of whether a trial court may award a landlord possession under the Act as a sanction for the tenant\u2019s inability to comply with a use and occupancy order is one of public importance, affecting the rights of countless landlords and tenants in Illinois. Moreover, there is a need for an authoritative determination on this issue. At oral argument, both parties confirmed the accuracy of the statistics cited in the amici curiae brief submitted in this case, which reveal that this particular practice is \u201cprevalent.\u201d In addition, the trial court\u2019s instruction to Beverly\u2019s trial counsel to \u201ctake it up to the courts and get us some guidelines\u201d when he challenged this practice indicates a need for an authoritative determination as to the propriety of this practice. Finally, because this current practice is so prevalent, it is likely to continue to recur absent any authority to the contrary. Accordingly, based on a review of these factors, we find that the public interest exception to the mootness doctrine applies, and we will address the merits of Beverly\u2019s appeal.\nWe turn first to Beverly\u2019s argument that the trial court\u2019s sanction was not authorized by the Act.\nThe Act sets forth a mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of possession rights in the trial court (Perry v. Evanston Young Men\u2019s Christian Ass\u2019n, 92 Ill. App. 3d 820, 823 (1981)) and \u201cprovide[s] the complete remedy for settling disputes about real property\u201d (Chicago Transit Authority v. Clear Channel Outdoor, Inc., 366 Ill. App. 3d 315, 325 (2006); see also People v. Evans, 163 Ill. App. 3d 561, 564-65 (1987) (recognizing that the Act provides the sole means of settling disputes between landlords and tenants)). Because the Act is a derogation of common law, courts must strictly comply with the procedure outlined in the statute. First National Bank of Evergreen Park v. Chrysler Realty Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d 784, 791 (1988).\nAlthough not acknowledged by either party, section 9 \u2014 201 of the Act permits a party who brings a forcible entry and detainer action to recover use and occupancy charges pending resolution of the possession claim. 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 201 (West 2004). Use and occupancy awards are authorized under the Act because \u201c[a] lessee\u2019s obligation to pay rent continues as a matter of law, even though the lessee may ultimately establish a right to rescind the lease, vacate the premises, or obtain other relief.\u201d People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Cook Development Co., 274 Ill. App. 3d 175, 180 (1995). There is no language in section 9 \u2014 201, however, that expressly permits a trial court to award a landlord possession following a lessee\u2019s failure to pay the statutorily authorized use and occupancy charges. Moreover, Beverly is correct that there is \u201cno *** provision [anywhere in the Act] that authorizes sanctions for non-payment of rent pending trial.\u201d\nIn addition to the absence of statutory authority explicitly providing for such a sanction, Beverly maintains that the sanction imposed in her case was impermissible because it \u201cdefie[d] the well-considered procedural framework of the [Act].\u201d Specifically, Beverly asserts that the Act places the burden on the plaintiff to establish its right to possession and permits the defendant named in the plaintiff s forcible entry and detainer action to present any germane defenses and have the case tried by a jury. Accordingly, she maintains that the trial court\u2019s order defied the Act\u2019s statutory scheme because it relieved Circle Management of its statutory obligation to establish its right to possession and deprived her of her statutory rights to present defenses and have the case tried and decided on the merits.\n\u201cThe distinct purpose of the forcible entry and detainer proceeding is to determine only who should be in rightful possession.\u201d Miller v. Daley, 131 Ill. App. 3d 959, 961 (1985). Under the Act, it is the party asserting its right to possession who bears the burden of proof (Harper Square Housing Corp. v. Hayes, 305 Ill. App. 3d 955, 963 (1999); City of Chicago v. Airline Canteen Service, Inc., 64 Ill. App. 3d 417, 435 (1978)) and must establish its right to possession by a preponderance of the evidence. 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 109.5 (West 2004). If the plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the Act provides that \u201cjudgment for costs shall be entered in favor of the defendant.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 114 (West 2004). The defendant in a forcible detainer action has the right to assert any germane defenses in response to the plaintiffs possession claim. 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 106 (West 2004) (\u201cThe defendant may under a general denial of the allegations of the complaint offer in evidence any matter in defense of the action\u201d); Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, 255 (1970). Moreover, the Act recognizes that both parties have the right to have the dispute tried by a jury. 735 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 108 (West 2004) (\u201cIn any case relating to premises used for residence purposes, either party may demand a trial by jury\u201d); Twin-City Inn, Inc. v. Hahne Enterprises, Inc., 37 Ill. 2d 133, 137-38 (1967).\nCircle Management does not dispute that the trial court entered the possession order in this case without hearing any evidence concerning any affirmative defense Beverly may have had in response to its forcible entry and detainer action. However, Circle Management denies that Beverly was \u201cdeprive[d] *** of her right to present any germane defenses\u201d because she waived her right to do so when she \u201cmade no attempt to file an answer to the complaint let alone raise any affirmative defenses or any counterclaims\u201d at any time in the circuit court. Circle Management\u2019s argument, however, is not well taken because Illinois Supreme Court Rule 181(b)(2) provides that \u201c[i]n actions for forcible detainer *** the defendant must appear at the time and place specified in the summons. If the defendant appears, he or she need not file an answer unless ordered by the court; and when no answer is ordered, the allegations of the complaint will be deemed denied, and any defense may be proved as if it were specifically pleaded.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 181(b)(2).\nIn this case, Beverly filed a general appearance, but did not file an answer or assert any affirmative defense. However, Beverly was never ordered to do so. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 181(b)(2), her appearance acted as a denial to the claims raised in Circle Management\u2019s complaint, and she was permitted to raise any defenses thereafter. 210 Ill. 2d R. 181(b)(2). Moreover, it appears that Beverly intended to raise an affirmative defense at trial. Specifically, in response to Circle Management\u2019s interrogatory questions, Beverly indicated that she believed she was wrongfully evicted because \u201c[t]he landlord breached the implied warranty of habitability,\u201d which is a germane affirmative defense to a landlord\u2019s possession claim. See, e.g., Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrells, 84 Ill. 2d 178, 182 (1981); Richardson v. Wilson, 46 Ill. App. 3d 622, 623-24 (1977).\nCircle Management also does not dispute that the trial court entered the order without hearing any evidence concerning the underlying merits of its possession claim. Accordingly, Beverly maintains that the trial court\u2019s failure to abide by the provisions of the Act invalidates the sanction. In support, she cites our previous holding in Eckel v. MacNeal, 256 Ill. App. 3d 292 (1993), where we reversed a trial court order granting a landlord possession of an apartment because the trial court never considered the merits of the possession claim. She contends that Eckel \u201cdealt with the very issue presented in this case\u201d and necessarily \u201ccompels reversal.\u201d\nIn Eckel, a landlord brought an action under the Act against its tenant due to the tenant\u2019s failure to pay rent, and in response, the tenant filed a number of affirmative defenses and counterclaims. Thereafter, the trial court entered an order requiring the tenant to pay use and occupancy charges and informed the tenant that failure to comply with the order would result in immediate possession in favor of the landlord. The tenant failed to comply, and accordingly, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the landlord. Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 293-95. On appeal, the tenant challenged the possession order, arguing that it deprived her of her right to a trial. Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 296. Initially, we noted that forcible entry and detainer actions could be resolved without conducting a trial if the trial court considered the merits of the underlying possession claim and entered judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment. Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 297-98. However, we found that the record revealed that the trial court failed to abide by any of these procedures. Accordingly, we held that its failure to do so resulted in a void judgment, stating:\n\u201cThis court is fully aware that forcible detainer and entry claims are adjudicated in a high volume court. (See Pecoraro v. Kesner, 217 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1043 (1991).) However, this fact does not alter plaintiffs burden of proof. In this case, plaintiff was able to obtain a judgment against defendant without following the most basic procedural requirements of a trial, summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings. The proceedings presented in the record here cannot be called due process. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, this court is forced to conclude that the judgment entered against defendant is void.\u201d Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 298.\nSimilarly, in this case, the trial court granted Circle Management possession without considering the underlying merits of its possession claim. Accordingly, as in Eckel, the order was entered \u201cwithout following the most basic procedural requirements of a trial, summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings.\u201d Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Although the trial court did provide Beverly with the opportunity to purge the order by paying the requisite use and occupancy charges and set a trial date \u201cin the event it [became] necessary,\u201d Beverly was unable to make the payments, and possession was awarded to Circle Management. Accordingly, the result of the sanction was that Circle Management was able to obtain possession of the apartment without establishing its right to possession. Clearly, the process utilized in this case to resolve Circle Management\u2019s forcible entry and detainer action did not comply with the express procedural protections set forth in the Act or with due process.\nIn so finding, we are sensitive to the plight faced by landlords in Circle Management\u2019s situation that have filed a complaint pursuant to the Act following a tenant\u2019s nonpayment of rent and are unable to collect use and occupancy payments during the pendency of their actions due to the tenant\u2019s inability to pay. We realize that landlords depend upon rental payments to satisfy their mortgage payments and other monetary obligations. These valid concerns notwithstanding, it is incumbent upon a landlord that brings an action under the Act to prove that it is entitled to possession. The trial court may not grant possession under the Act merely because a tenant is unable to comply with a use and occupancy order. As we explained in Eckel, due process requires that the underlying possession claim be resolved in conformance with the procedural requirements of trial, summary judgment, or judgment on the pleadings. Eckel, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 298. Accordingly, at the very least, when the trial court held a hearing and determined that Beverly failed to comply with the use and occupancy order, she was entitled to a hearing on the underlying possession claim before possession was granted to Circle Management.\nCircle Management makes no express attempt to distinguish Eckel, but insists that the order entered in this case was proper because a trial court has the inherent authority to sanction. While Beverly agrees that courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions to punish for contempt or in response to a party\u2019s failure to abide by its orders as a means to control its docket, she maintains that the sanction imposed in this case exceeded any inherent authority the trial court may have had. Specifically, Beverly first maintains that the order exceeded the trial court\u2019s inherent authority to impose a contempt sanction because the sanction imposed in this case does not constitute a valid judgment of criminal or civil contempt.\nCourts have inherent authority to punish a party for contempt. See People v. Warren, 173 Ill. 2d 348, 370 (1996) (\u201cThe power to punish for contempt does not depend on constitutional or legislative grant\u201d); see also Del Dotto v. Olsen, 257 Ill. App. 3d 463, 464 (1993); In re Estate of Miller, 197 Ill. App. 3d 67, 73 (1990). \u201c \u2018Contempt of court has been defined as any act that is calculated to embarrass, hinder, or obstruct a court in the administration of justice, or that is calculated to lessen its authority or dignity.\u2019 \u201d Levaccare v. Levaccare, 376 Ill. App. 3d 503, 508 (2007), quoting People v. Budzynski, 333 Ill. App. 3d 433, 438 (2002). Contempt can either be criminal or civil (Emery v. Northeast Illinois Regional Transportation Co., 374 Ill. App. 3d 974, 977 (2007)), as well as indirect or direct (Levaccare, 376 Ill. App. 3d at 508; Eden v. Eden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 382, 388 (1975)).\nCriminal contempt sanctions are punitive in nature and require a finding that the contemptuous conduct was wilful. People v. Minor, 281 Ill. App. 3d 568, 574 (1996); People v. Ernest, 141 Ill. 2d 412, 422 (1990). In contrast, civil contempt is prospective in nature and is \u201c \u2018designed to compel future compliance with a court order.\u2019 \u201d Emery, 374 Ill. App. 3d at 977, quoting In re Marriage of Sharp, 369 Ill. App. 3d 271, 279 (2006). Although a court may enforce an order to pay money through contempt, this power is \u201climited to cases of wilful refusal to obey the court\u2019s order.\u201d In re Marriage of Logston, 103 Ill. 2d 266, 285 (1984). Accordingly, \u201c \u2018[i]t is not a contempt of court to fail to pay money which one neither has nor can obtain and which [s]he has not causelessly either put out of [her] hands or failed to receive.\u2019 \u201d Shapiro v. Shapiro, 113 Ill. App. 2d 374, 388 (1969), quoting White v. Adolph, 305 Ill. App. 76, 79 (1940).\nIn this case, Beverly\u2019s failure to comply with the use and occupancy order stemmed from her insolvency and inability to pay rather than wilful defiance of the agreed order. Indeed, the parties stipulated, and the court found, that Beverly\u2019s actions were not wilful. Accordingly, Beverly\u2019s lack of wilfulness precludes a finding that the court\u2019s order constitutes a valid contempt order. Logston, 103 Ill. 2d at 287.\nCircle Management agrees that \u201cnone of the procedures for any kind of contempt were followed in this case,\u201d but maintains that \u201cthe possession order is not a contempt order.\u201d Instead, Circle Management asserts that the sanction entered in this case was a valid exercise of the trial court\u2019s inherent authority to sanction a party who fails to abide by its orders. Beverly concedes that courts have such inherent authority but asserts that the sanction imposed in this case, which essentially resulted in a default judgment against her, cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of this inherent authority.\nIt is well recognized that trial courts have inherent authority to impose sanctions against a party that fails to abide by valid court orders. Sander v. Dow Chemical Co., 166 Ill. 2d 48, 67 (1995); Smith v. City of Chicago, 299 Ill. App. 3d 1048, 1054 (1988). A sanction imposed for violation of a trial court order, however, must be reasonable and responsive to the facts and circumstances of each case. Smith, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 1054. \u201c[S]auctions which result in a default judgment are drastic sanctions and should only be employed when it appears that all other enforcement efforts of the court have failed to advance the litigation.\u201d Sander, 166 Ill. 2d at 67-68. Moreover, such sanctions are only appropriate \u201cwhere the party\u2019s actions show a deliberate, contumacious or unwarranted disregard of the court\u2019s authority.\u201d Shimanovsky v. General Motors Corp., 181 Ill. 2d 112, 123 (1998).\nIn this case, the sanction imposed by the trial court as a result of Beverly\u2019s failure to comply with the use and occupancy order essentially resulted in a default judgment against her. We cannot say that Beverly\u2019s failure to pay the use and occupancy charges constituted a deliberate or contumacious disregard of authority. Moreover, we do not find that the sanction imposed was reasonable and responsive to the facts in the case at bar. Here, due to Beverly\u2019s inability to make payments and comply with the use and occupancy order, Circle Management was given possession of the apartment in which she resided, without satisfying its statutory obligation to prove its right to possession under the Act. Accordingly, we do not find that the sanction imposed in this case can be upheld as a valid exercise of a trial court\u2019s inherent authority to sanction.\nCircle Management, however, also argues that the possession order in this case was lawful because it stemmed from the trial court\u2019s inherent authority to act sua sponte.\nCircle Management, citing People v. Anderson, 352 Ill. App. 3d 934, 943 (2004), asserts that the trial court has the inherent power to act sua sponte as long as it provides the parties notice and an opportunity to respond. Accordingly, Circle Management argues that the trial court acted within its inherent power to act sua sponte because Beverly was provided with \u201cnotice and opportunity to respond to the court\u2019s motion\u201d and she attended the hearing on the motion.\nWe find this argument unpersuasive. While courts do have the inherent authority to act sua sponte (see People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2007)), the motion for immediate possession was filed by Circle Management and not initiated by the court. Accordingly, the order was not imposed pursuant to the trial court\u2019s inherent authority to act sua sponte.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court erred when it granted possession of the property to Circle Management pursuant to the Act as a sanction for Beverly\u2019s inability to comply with the use and occupancy order absent any consideration of the merits of Circle Management\u2019s possession claim. The trial court\u2019s order defied the procedural framework and due process guarantees of the Act and cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of a court\u2019s inherent authority to sanction.\nBecause we can resolve Beverly\u2019s appeal on these grounds, we need not address her argument that the sanction entered in this case violated the due process and separation of powers provisions set forth in the Illinois Constitution. See Bonaguro v. County Officers Election Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 396 (1994) (recognizing that a court should consider constitutional questions only when \u201cthe case cannot be determined on other grounds\u201d).\nAccordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.\nReversed.\nQUINN, P.J., and CUNNINGHAM, J., concur.\nAlthough Beverly\u2019s husband was named a defendant in Circle Management\u2019s complaint, he was not involved in litigation in the trial court and is not a party to this appeal.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GREIMAN" } ], "attorneys": [ "Cara A. Roecker, Jonathan K. Baum, Jeffrey E. Jamison, and Brian J. Poronsky, all of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Zoe G. Biel, of Klise & Biel, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "CIRCLE MANAGEMENT, LLC, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BEVERLY OLIVIER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20140621\nOpinion filed December 28, 2007.\nCara A. Roecker, Jonathan K. Baum, Jeffrey E. Jamison, and Brian J. Poronsky, all of Katten Muchin Rosenman LLP, of Chicago, for appellant.\nZoe G. Biel, of Klise & Biel, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0601-01", "first_page_order": 617, "last_page_order": 630 }