{ "id": 4274350, "name": "FAITH BUILDERS CHURCH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Faith Builders Church, Inc. v. Department of Revenue", "decision_date": "2008-02-07", "docket_number": "No. 4\u201407\u20140199", "first_page": "1037", "last_page": "1047", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "378 Ill. App. 3d 1037" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "688 N.E.2d 721", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "726" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727" }, { "page": "727" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "293 Ill. App. 3d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 847585 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "608" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "609" }, { "page": "608" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/293/0600-01" ] }, { "cite": "186 Neb. 11", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Neb.", "case_ids": [ 2466000 ], "weight": 2, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/neb/186/0011-01" ] }, { "cite": "510 P.2d 243", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "P.2d", "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "82 Wash. 2d 295", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Wash. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1130179 ], "year": 1970, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/wash-2d/82/0295-01" ] }, { "cite": "506 N.E.2d 341", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "348" }, { "page": "348" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "343" }, { "page": "345" }, { "page": "349" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "153 Ill. App. 3d 763", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3607870 ], "weight": 6, "year": 1987, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "773" }, { "page": "773" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "767" }, { "page": "768-69" }, { "page": "774-75" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/153/0763-01" ] }, { "cite": "454 N.E.2d 836", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "839-40" }, { "page": "839-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "118 Ill. App. 3d 21", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5658775 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "26-27" }, { "page": "26-27" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/118/0021-01" ] }, { "cite": "812 N.E.2d 1", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "7" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "706 N.E.2d 1008", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1013" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "302 Ill. App. 3d 661", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1352926 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "668" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/302/0661-01" ] }, { "cite": "137 N.E. 863", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "864" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "306 Ill. 234", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5780732 ], "year": 1922, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "238" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/306/0234-01" ] }, { "cite": "94 N.E. 162", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.", "weight": 3, "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "165" }, { "page": "164" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "249 Ill. 132", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 5645925 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1911, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "136-37" }, { "page": "136-37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/249/0132-01" ] }, { "cite": "825 N.E.2d 746", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "757" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750095 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "177" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "456 N.E.2d 73", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "78" }, { "page": "79" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "98 Ill. 2d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3122965 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "98" }, { "page": "99-100" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/98/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "803 N.E.2d 524", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "528" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "345 Ill. App. 3d 753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3740034 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "758" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/345/0753-01" ] }, { "cite": "801 N.E.2d 1064", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1067-68" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "344 Ill. App. 3d 888", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3777537 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "892" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/344/0888-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 240", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "246" }, { "page": "246" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "213 Ill. 2d 273", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8448695 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "284" }, { "page": "284" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/213/0273-01" ] }, { "cite": "134 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "295" }, { "page": "295" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "8 Ill. 2d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2716397 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1956, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "290" }, { "page": "290" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/8/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "590 N.E.2d 478", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "481" }, { "page": "481" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "147 Ill. 2d 484", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3278143 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "491" }, { "page": "491" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/147/0484-01" ] }, { "cite": "785 N.E.2d 204", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "207" }, { "page": "208" }, { "page": "208" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 851", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599287 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "855" }, { "page": "856" }, { "page": "855-56" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0851-01" ] }, { "cite": "807 N.E.2d 1042", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1048" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "347 Ill. App. 3d 769", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3949731 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "775" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/347/0769-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 325", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5435266 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0325-01" ] }, { "cite": "26 U.S.C. \u00a7501", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(c)", "parenthetical": "2000" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1132, "char_count": 25837, "ocr_confidence": 0.786, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.748772143809413e-08, "percentile": 0.4088948815162583 }, "sha256": "89f89651238f8aa45074fc1eec23fb8d0afdb07888c84af7ae2379c4dfff625c", "simhash": "1:02b931ba473688cd", "word_count": 4107 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T15:01:56.542688+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "FAITH BUILDERS CHURCH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn this action for administrative review, the circuit court reversed the decision of defendant, the Illinois Department of Revenue, to deny an exemption from property taxes for Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool. The Department appeals. We conclude that the Department\u2019s findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Department could reasonably find that, in practical reality, the primary use of the child-care center and preschool was as a day care and that the religious purposes of evangelism and theological instruction were secondary. The Department could also reasonably find that the child-care center and preschool were not exempt as \u201cschools\u201d because neither of them offered an established, commonly accepted program of academic instruction. Therefore, we reverse the circuit cotirt\u2019s judgment.\nI. BACKGROUND\nAs the State stipulated in the administrative hearing, Faith Builders is a religious organization. It is a typical church, which holds services twice a week. The federal government considers it to be a nonprofit organization organized and operated exclusively for religious purposes pursuant to section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code (26 U.S.C. \u00a7501(c) (3) (2000)).\nOne of those religious purposes is to spread the teachings of Christianity. To that end, Faith Builders bought a building in Charleston, Illinois, from Building Blocks Daycare and, with the 50 children it \u201cinherited\u201d from Building Blocks, started a combined childcare center, preschool, kindergarten, and school. Soon the number of children increased to 168.\nFaith Builders has \u201cBylaws Governing the Operation of Christian Schools,\u201d and under these bylaws, all of the children, even those in day care, are to undergo religious instruction. The bylaws provide as follows:\n\u201c[T]he purpose of [Faith Builders] is to promote Christian education of high academic quality and child[-]care services *** by providing facilities for supplementing the financial needs of the Heartland [S]chools[,] comprised of Heartland Childcare Center, Heartland Preschool and Kindergarten, Heartland Academy, and Camp Heartland. The teaching of the Christian faith from God\u2019s Word is not just a separate subject in the curriculum, but is incorporated into every aspect of the total education and child[-] care program.\u201d\nHeartland Childcare Center occupies approximately half of the building. Heartland Preschool and Kindergarten and Heartland Academy occupy the other half. Camp Heartland uses some of the prekindergarten rooms, but the record does not specify which of the prekindergarten rooms the camp uses and how often it uses them.\nTo satisfy the Department of Children and Family Services, Faith Builders calls half of its building a \u201cchildcare center,\u201d but Faith Builders considers the infants, toddlers, and preschoolers to be just as much in \u201cschool\u201d as the older children. In the administrative hearing, Faith Builders called its senior pastor, Steve McCann, as a witness. He testified that Heartland Schools provides religious instruction even to the six-week-old children: \u201c[t]hey may not be able to read the scriptures; but, instead of just showing them a Sesame Street video or telling them a nice story[,] we *** use Bible stories and Bible scriptures and *** children\u2019s Christian material.\u201d Faith Builders also called Patricia Yow, the superintendent of education at Heartland Schools. She testified the school was established to fulfill the scriptural command \u201cto teach the Bible to children when they sit, when they stand, when they rise up[,] and when they lie down\u201d \u2014 \u201cchildren,\u201d in this context, meaning children of all ages.\nThe attorney for Faith Builders asked Yow to \u201celaborate on *** the teaching of these Bible stories [to children six weeks to nine months old].\u201d She answered:\n\u201cThey will *** s[i]t with the child on their lap. They will read a story from a Bible \u2014 and sometimes there are CDs that go along with it, that they hear the music and they hear the stories. Those can be played during the time when the children are doing other things. They can be takin[g] a bottle or whatever. But there\u2019s Christian music playing in the background. *** Bible stories *** are played. We also have a program called [\u2018]Baby Einstein!\u2019], which shows some videos. It has nothing to do with Christianity, but it has to do with *** the activities that are important to their development at that age.\nQ. So there\u2019s religious instruction even for infants?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nRegardless of the child\u2019s age, Faith Builders required the parent to sign a document stating, \u201cI understand that Heartland Schools will be teaching developmentally appropriate Christian principles to my child.\u201d\nIt is evident, from the direction of the testimony, that one of the major factual issues in the administrative hearing was as follows: Given the standard of \u20181 developmental [ ] appropriate [ness],\u201d how much religious instruction did infants, toddlers, and preschoolers actually receive in the course of a day, as opposed to the more mundane services of day care? According to the Parent Handbook, \u201c[t]hough much of the infant[\u2019]s and toddler[\u2019]s learning and play is self-directed and [self-]motivated, the staff interacts with and stimulates the child\u2019s learning through varied activities and experiences.\u201d The handbook thereafter lists 11 such \u201cactivities and experiences\u201d \u2014 for example, \u201clearning to sit, crawl, roll, walk, and other movement activities\u201d and \u201c[attending to the physical needs and hygiene of the children.\u201d Religion appears only once in this list: \u201c[s]imple Bible and children stories, games, fingerplays, music, songs, movements, and sounds will be incorporated into the daily routine.\u201d The administrative law judge (ALJ) concluded that although Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool had \u201creligious overtones,\u201d they were used primarily as a day care and, therefore, the portions of the building devoted to those programs should be subject to a property tax.\nThe ALJ found the day-care center and preschool to be taxable for an additional reason: they were \u201coperated with a view to profit!,] as evidenced by the fees charged, the punitive late payments, and the severe penalties for picking up a child after [6 p.m.].\u201d Faith Builders charged tuition of $75 per week, the purpose of which was to \u201creserv[e] a space\u201d for the child. The parents had to pay the same amount of tuition on the first day of the week, regardless of the child\u2019s attendance. For Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool and Kindergarten, there was a penalty of $5 for each day the tuition was late, and if the tuition and penalties were not paid by the end of the week, the child was discharged, and the \u201cspace\u201d was reserved for another child. If parents failed to pick up the child on time, there was a $5 penalty for each 15-minute period after 6 p.m. These penalties were inapplicable to Heartland Academy (consisting of grades 1 through 12).\nBecause the kindergarten and academy used curricula from Accelerated Christian Education of Texas, which corresponded to public-school curricula, the ALJ found they were used exclusively for \u201cschool and religious purposes\u201d and, accordingly, recommended that the portion of the building devoted to those programs be exempt from property taxes. The ALJ recommended that the rest of the building, housing the child-care center and preschool, be taxed. The Director adopted the ALJ\u2019s recommended decision.\nThe circuit court reversed the denial of the exemption for Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool, finding the Director\u2019s decision, in that respect, to be \u201cclearly erroneous, arbitrary[,] and capricious [,] given the undisputed facts shown in the record and based upon the law applicable to these issues.\u201d The court\u2019s order further reads as follows:\n\u201cThe [c]ourt finds based on the evidence that [p]laintiff is entitled to the tax exemption claimed because [p]laintiff\u2019s pre[ ]school it [sic] is used primarily for religious and/or school and religious purposes. Calvary Baptist Church of Tilton v. Department of Revenue, 349 Ill. App. 3d 325 (2004). The [c]ourt finds, based on the evidence, that [p]laintiff is entitled to the tax exemption claimed because [p]laintiff s pre[ ]school is a not-for-profit school. The [ALJ\u2019s] finding to the contrary being [sic] unsupported by the evidence and the [c]ourt notes that argument was not even being urged by the [defendant at the administrative hearing. The [c]ourt finds, based on the evidence, that [p]laintiff is entitled to the tax exemption claimed because [p]laintiff\u2019s pre[ ]school due to its educational purpose, the evidence being uncontradicted as to the academic program being followed, even for the youngest students, and the [p]laintiff sparing the State the expense of paying for Pre-K education which it would be required to do if the parents elected to pursue the State-sponsored Pre-K education, of which the [c]ourt takes judicial notice.\u201d\nThis appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Standards of Review\n1. Statutory Interpretation\nArticle IX, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution provides: \u201cThe General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only *** property used *** for school, religious, cemetery[,] and charitable purposes.\u201d Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, \u00a76. Thus, statutory law controls the exemption of property from taxation (subject, of course, to the categorical limitations of article IX, section 6).\nWe interpret statutes de novo (In re Application of the County Treasurer, 347 Ill. App. 3d 769, 775, 807 N.E.2d 1042, 1048 (2004)), and when interpreting statutes exempting certain property from taxation, we construe the exemptions narrowly (Swank v. Department of Revenue, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, 855, 785 N.E.2d 204, 207 (2003)). \u201c \u2018Taxation is the rule[;] tax exemption is the exception.\u2019 \u201d City of Chicago v. Illinois Department of Revenue, 147 Ill. 2d 484, 491, 590 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1992), quoting Rogers Park Post No. 108, the American Legion, Department of Illinois v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d 286, 290, 134 N.E.2d 292, 295 (1956).\n2. Pure Questions of Fact\nSection 8 \u2014 40 of the Property Tax Code (Code) provides that judicial review of the Department\u2019s decisions shall be in accordance with the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 to 3 \u2014 113 (West 2006)). 35 ILCS 200/8 \u2014 40 (West 2006). Section 3 \u2014 110 of the Administrative Review Law says: \u201cThe findings and conclusions of the administrative agency on questions of fact shall be held to be prima facie true and correct.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006). Courts interpret section 3 \u2014 110 as meaning that an agency\u2019s findings of fact will stand unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273, 284, 821 N.E.2d 240, 246 (2004). \u201cAgainst the manifest weight of the evidence\u201d means the record clearly requires the opposite finding or, in other words, the agency\u2019s finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence. Farmers Automobile Insurance Ass\u2019n v. Gitelson, 344 Ill. App. 3d 888, 892, 801 N.E.2d 1064, 1067-68 (2003).\nIn reviewing the agency\u2019s decision, we will keep in mind that the agency has a duty to resolve all debatable questions in favor of taxation, as do we. See Rogers Park Post No. 108, 8 Ill. 2d at 290, 134 N.E.2d at 295; Swank, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 856, 785 N.E.2d at 208. The party claiming the exemption has the burden of proving the entitlement thereto, and because any factual ambiguities will be resolved in favor of taxation, the proof necessarily must be clear and conclusive. Swank, 336 Ill. App. 3d at 855-56, 785 N.E.2d at 208.\n3. Applying the Law to Undisputed Facts\nThe Department cites a decision by the Second District holding that if an agency applied the law to undisputed facts, courts should use a slightly deferential standard of review, reversing the decision only in cases of clear error. The Second District said: \u201cHere, the Department\u2019s task was to apply a given legal standard to undisputed facts. Thus, the Department confronted a \u2018mixed question of law and fact,\u2019 and we must accept the Department\u2019s answer unless it is clearly erroneous.\u201d Cook Communications Ministries v. Department of Revenue, 345 Ill. App. 3d 753, 758, 803 N.E.2d 524, 528 (2004).\nThe supreme court, however, prescribes a de novo standard of review. Eleven months after the Second District decided Cook Communications, the supreme court held as follows: \u201c[T]he Department\u2019s decision as to whether [the] plaintiffs property is exempt from taxation depends solely on the application of the appropriate legal standard to the undisputed facts, which is a question of law.\u201d Eden Retirement, 213 Ill. 2d at 284, 821 N.E.2d at 246; see also City of Chicago, 147 Ill. 2d at 491, 590 N.E.2d at 481. Obviously, the supreme court\u2019s holding must prevail over that of the Second District. To the extent that this appeal requires the application of legal principles to undisputed facts, our standard of review is de novo.\nB. The Scope of the Term \u201cReligious Purposes\u201d\nFaith Builders claims an exemption under section 15 \u2014 40(a) of the Code, which provides as follows:\n\u201c(a) Property used exclusively for:\n(1) religious purposes, or\n(2) school and religious purposes, or\n(3) orphanages\nqualifies for an exemption as long as it is not used with a view to profit.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/15 \u2014 40(a) (West 2006).\nCourts interpret the term \u201cexclusively,\u201d in the above-quoted statute, as meaning \u201cprimarily\u201d {McKenzie v. Johnson, 98 Ill. 2d 87, 98, 456 N.E.2d 73, 78 (1983)); an incidental or secondary purpose, if not for profit, will not defeat the exemption {Board of Education of Glen Ellyn Community Consolidated School District No. 89 v. Department of Revenue, 356 Ill. App. 3d 165, 177, 825 N.E.2d 746, 757 (2005)).\nThe Department rejected Faith Builders\u2019 claim that the day-care center and preschool were used primarily for \u201creligious purposes.\u201d Faith Builders contends that the Department\u2019s decision is fatally flawed because the Department used too narrow a definition of \u201creligious purposes.\u201d In her recommended decision (which the Department adopted), the ALJ said: \u201cApplicant\u2019s religious argument fails because the term [\u2018]religious purpose^] *** means the use of the property by a religious society or body of persons as a place for public worship.\u201d The ALJ cited People ex rel. McCullough v. Deutsche Evangelisch Lutherische Jehovah Gemeinde Ungeaenderter Augsburgischer Confession, 249 Ill. 132, 94 N.E. 162 (1911). Actually, the supreme court said in Deutsche Evangelisch: \u201cAs applied to the uses of property, a religious purpose means a use of such property by a religious society or body of persons as a stated place for public worship, Sunday schools!,] and religious instruction.\u201d Deutsche Evangelisch, 249 Ill. at 136-37, 94 N.E. at 165. Since deciding Deutsche Evangelisch, the supreme court has explained that it did not intend the list therein to be exhaustive (People ex rel. Carson v. Muldoon, 306 Ill. 234, 238, 137 N.E. 863, 864 (1922), overruled on other grounds by McKenzie, 98 Ill. 2d at 99-100, 456 N.E.2d at 79), and courts have construed the term \u201creligious purpose\u201d more liberally (Mount Calvary Baptist Church, Inc. v. Zehnder, 302 Ill. App. 3d 661, 668, 706 N.E.2d 1008, 1013 (1998)). For example, in Calvary Baptist Church of Tilton v. Department of Revenue, 349 Ill. App. 3d 325, 333, 812 N.E.2d 1, 7 (2004), we held that the term \u201creligious purposes\u201d included \u201cfellowship and evangelism.\u201d\nEven though the ALJ stated the definition of \u201creligious purposes\u201d in a way that was more restrictive even than Deutsche Evangelisch\u2014 saying it meant only the use of property for public worship \u2014 the ALJ evidently did not apply this overly restrictive definition, for she thereafter addressed Faith Builders\u2019 argument that the child-care center and preschool were part and parcel of a \u201creligious school\u201d rather than merely a day-care center (\u201cFaith Builders uses the subject primarily as a day[-]care center for young children where fees are charged, rather than a religious school\u201d). If, in the ALJ\u2019s view, the term \u201creligious purposes\u201d were confined to public worship and did not include religious schools, there would have been no point in deciding whether Faith Builders operated the child-care center and preschool primarily as a day care as opposed to a religious school. Evidently, the ALJ assumed that \u201creligious purposes\u201d included religious instruction. See Evangelical Teacher Training Ass\u2019n v. Novak, 118 Ill. App. 3d 21, 26-27, 454 N.E.2d 836, 839-40 (1983).\nC. The Extent to Which the Child-Care Center and Preschool Were Used for \u201cReligious Purposes\u201d\nIn its bylaws and in the testimony of its witnesses, Faith Builders declared its purpose of instructing infants, toddlers, and preschoolers in the doctrines of Christianity and evangelizing them and their parents. The ALJ found no bad faith or pretense in this declaration of a religious purpose. Therefore, we accept Faith Builders\u2019 characterization of the purpose of its activities. See Fairview Haven v. Department of Revenue, 153 Ill. App. 3d 763, 773, 506 N.E.2d 341, 348 (1987). It is beyond dispute that, under the case law, religious instruction qualifies as a religious purpose. Evangelical Teacher Training Ass\u2019n, 118 Ill. App. 3d at 26-27, 454 N.E.2d at 839-40; Deutsche Lutherisch, 249 Ill. at 136-37, 94 N.E. at 164.\nIntentions, however, are not enough. We must ask whether, in actuality or practice, the building is used primarily for that religious purpose. See Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 773, 506 N.E.2d at 348. More precisely, the Department asks that question \u2014 a purely factual question \u2014 and we ask whether the Department\u2019s answer is against the manifest weight of the evidence. A reasonable trier of fact would not necessarily have to find that Faith Builders uses its childcare center and preschool for the primary purpose of religious instruction. Infants, toddlers, and preschoolers have an extremely limited capacity for assimilating theological concepts. With children so young, the supervising adults\u2019 primary purpose, from 6 a.m. to 6 p.m., will inevitably be day care \u2014 and Faith Builders\u2019 descriptive literature reflects that reality. In a list of 11 tasks and activities, religion appears once. Arguably, that is because the children are simply too young for sustained religious instruction and their primary need is day care.\nFaith Builders argues that its only reason for taking these children into its care is to spread the Gospel to them and their parents and, therefore, it uses Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool primarily for a religious purpose. A not-for-profit corporation made an analogous argument in Fairview Haven. In that case, the congregations of four Apostolic Christian churches organized Fairview Haven, consisting of independent-living apartments and intermediate-care rooms for the elderly. Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 506 N.E.2d at 343. The amended articles of incorporation stated that the purpose for which Fairview was organized was religious, charitable, and the care and keeping of elderly people. Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 767, 506 N.E.2d at 343. Fairview argued that it used its facility primarily for a religious purpose because by caring for the elderly, it \u201cimplement[ed] the church\u2019s ministry by tying preaching to action. *** Christian service work [was] mandated by scripture.\u201d Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 768-69, 506 N.E.2d at 345.\nWe held as follows:\n\u201cHere it is not contested that the operation of Fairview provided an opportunity for members of the Apostolic Christian faith to carry out Christian service work, care for the elderly, and engage in evangelization. However, operation of the nursing home was not necessary for these religious purposes, which could also have been accomplished through other means. (See generally Yakima First Baptist Homes, Inc. v. Gray (1973), 82 Wash. 2d 295, 510 P.2d 243; Christian Retirement Homes, Inc. v. Board of Equalization (1970), 186 Neb. 11, 180 N.W.2d 136.) In Yakima[,] the taxpayer argued that care of the aged was a religious purpose. The court noted that the practice of charity, kindness to other persons and in particular to the aged, and the practice of all virtues are encouraged by religious organizations; however, it cannot be stated that they are religious purposes within commonly accepted definitions of the word.\n*** It is not contested that Fairview operated as a not-for-profit business with a contract, requirements for residency, provisions for payment, and provisions for discharge. The corporate purpose included the care and keeping of the elderly. Fairview\u2019s method of operation was businesslike. The Department\u2019s determination based upon the actual method of operation that Fairview was not exempt for religious purposes was supported by the evidence.\u201d Fairview Haven, 153 Ill. App. 3d at 774-75, 506 N.E.2d at 349.\nIn a sense, everything a deeply devout person does has a religious purpose. But if that formulation determined the exemption from property taxes, religious identity would effectively be the sole criterion. A church could open a restaurant, for instance, and because waiters attempted to evangelize customers while taking their orders, the restaurant would be exempt. But the operation of a restaurant is not necessary for evangelism and religious instruction, although, like any other social activity, it can provide the occasion for those religious purposes. The same could be said of a day-care facility. Day care is simply not a \u201creligious purpose\u201d within the commonly accepted definition of that term.\nThe Department could reasonably find that the operation of Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool was businesslike and more characteristic of a commercial day care than a facility used primarily for religious purposes. Fifty of the children who were in Building Blocks stayed. Parents must pay weekly tuition to \u201creserve a space\u201d for the child, and Faith Builders does not seem to care whether the child is in attendance as long as the tuition is paid. Faith Builders charges late fees and turns away the children of nonpaying parents (\u201cyou will be asked to withdraw your child from the center\u201d). We do not question the economic or practical necessity of these measures, but they suggest a business relationship more than a religious one.\nJust because Faith Builders charges tuition and fees to keep the doors open, it does not necessarily follow that it operates the childcare center and preschool \u201cwith a view to profit.\u201d See 35 ILCS 200/ 15 \u2014 40(a) (West 2006). We do not reach the question of whether Faith Builders operates those programs \u201cwith a view to profit,\u201d for unless the property is \u201cused exclusively for *** religious purposes,\u201d the absence of the profit motive is irrelevant. 35 ILCS 200/15 \u2014 40(a) (West 2006). As we have held, the finding that the corresponding portions of the building are not used primarily for religious purposes is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.\nD. The Claimed Exemption as a Not-for-Profit School\nThe Department granted an exemption for the kindergarten and Academy. Faith Builders wants to extend the exemption to the rest of the building, i.e., the child-care center and preschool. In addition to an exemption under section 15 \u2014 40(a), Faith Builders argues the childcare center and preschool are exempt under section 15 \u2014 35 of the Code, which provides as follows: \u201cAll property donated by the United States for school purposes, and all property of schools, not sold or leased or otherwise used with a view to profit, is exempt, whether owned by a resident or non[ ]resident of this State or by a corporation incorporated in any state of the United States.\u201d 35 ILCS 200/15 \u2014 35 (West 2006).\nCourts ask two questions when deciding whether property is a \u201cschool\u201d for purposes of section 15 \u2014 35. First, does the property \u201ccontain! ] a school *** offering] an established, commonly accepted program of academic instruction\u201d? Chicago & Northeast Illinois District Council of Carpenters Apprentice & Trainee Program v. Department of Revenue, 293 Ill. App. 3d 600, 608, 688 N.E.2d 721, 726 (1997). \u201cUnder this standard, the courts have been inhospitable towards granting a school exemption to schools whose curriculum d[o] not consist of traditional subject matter common to accepted schools and institutions of learning ***.\u201d Chicago & Northeast, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 688 N.E.2d at 727. Second, does \u201cthe program in question substantially lessen! ] what would otherwise have been a governmental obligation, i.e., [would] the state [be] otherwise required to offer such a program of study in a tax-supported public school\u201d? Chicago & Northeast, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 609, 688 N.E.2d at 727. We do not reach the second question, for the record appears to contain no evidence that Heartland Childcare Center and Heartland Preschool offer curricula \u201cconsist[ing] of traditional subject matter common to accepted schools and institutions of learning.\u201d Chicago & Northeast, 293 Ill. App. 3d at 608, 688 N.E.2d at 727.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the circuit court\u2019s judgment.\nReversed.\nMcCULLOUGH and TURNER, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE APPLETON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.", "Randall A. Mead (argued), of Drake, Narup & Mead, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "FAITH BUILDERS CHURCH, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNo. 4\u201407\u20140199\nArgued November 14, 2007.\nOpinion filed February 7, 2008.\nLisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Chicago (Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, and Diane M. Potts (argued), Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for appellant.\nRandall A. Mead (argued), of Drake, Narup & Mead, P.C., of Springfield, for appellee." }, "file_name": "1037-01", "first_page_order": 1053, "last_page_order": 1063 }