{ "id": 4276683, "name": "GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RPS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellant (The Holmes Group, Inc., Defendant)", "name_abbreviation": "Greenwich Insurance v. RPS Products, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-02-04", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-0760", "first_page": "78", "last_page": "90", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 78" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "870 F.2d 1176", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 11647670 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1182", "parenthetical": "\"[a] product's trade dress is the overall image used to present it to its purchasers ***. [Citation.] A trademark is thought of as something more specific, such as a logo\" (emphasis in original)" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/870/1176-01" ] }, { "cite": "532 U.S. 23", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 9300578 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "28" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "1259" }, { "page": "28" }, { "page": "172" }, { "page": "1259" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/532/0023-01" ] }, { "cite": "711 F.2d 966", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 1870441 ], "year": 1983, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "980" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/711/0966-01" ] }, { "cite": "864 F.2d 1253", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 10536161 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/864/1253-01" ] }, { "cite": "285 Ill. App. 3d 536", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1295638 ], "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "539-40" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/285/0536-01" ] }, { "cite": "67 Ill. App. 3d 869", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3311035 ], "year": 1978, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "877" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/67/0869-01" ] }, { "cite": "327 Ill. App. 3d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 79391 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "137" }, { "page": "135-36" }, { "page": "140" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" }, { "page": "139" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/327/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "857 F. Supp. 1258", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 7405858 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1262-63" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/857/1258-01" ] }, { "cite": "991 F. Supp. 1024", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F. Supp.", "case_ids": [ 243112 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1032-33" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f-supp/991/1024-01" ] }, { "cite": "326 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1281476 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "880" }, { "page": "880" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/326/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "05 C 6753", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Cow.", "year": 2007, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "507 U.S. 546", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6234238 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" }, { "page": "300" }, { "page": "1676" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/507/0546-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 459", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272565 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "465" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/0459-01" ] }, { "cite": "368 Ill. App. 3d 1007", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4266912 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1019" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/368/1007-01" ] }, { "cite": "250 Ill. App. 3d 333", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2917491 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "336" }, { "page": "337" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/250/0333-01" ] }, { "cite": "144 Ill. 2d 64", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5592135 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "73" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/144/0064-01" ] }, { "cite": "154 Ill. 2d 90", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4820940 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "107-08" }, { "page": "108" }, { "page": "108" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/154/0090-01" ] }, { "cite": "168 Ill. App. 3d 361", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3511702 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" }, { "page": "367" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/168/0361-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 38", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3749788 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" }, { "page": "41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0038-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a71125", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" }, { "page": "(a)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 998, "char_count": 27578, "ocr_confidence": 0.743, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.328787383559145e-08, "percentile": 0.4400239164522719 }, "sha256": "a2c2f4359f09cb0fa7a0da8574e44dee76f79db1234e9c8707984d1dd3a3b0a9", "simhash": "1:36efe78a3902f847", "word_count": 4362 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:11.340315+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RPS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellant (The Holmes Group, Inc., Defendant)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe issue presented in this case is whether plaintiff Greenwich Insurance Company (Greenwich) had a duty to defend its insured, defendant RPS Products, Inc. (RPS), in an underlying suit filed by The Holmes Group, Inc. (Holmes), alleging, among other things, patent infringement, trademark infringement, and unfair competition. On August 4, 2004, RPS tendered its defense of the Holmes suit to Greenwich, which refused the tender of the defense and denied coverage on August 17, 2004. On June 2, 2005, Greenwich filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the chancery division of the circuit court of Cook County seeking, among other things, a declaration that it had no duty to defend RPS in the Holmes suit. On October 31, 2006, the trial court granted Greenwich\u2019s motion for summary judgment finding that the Holmes suit was not covered under the Greenwich insurance policy and therefore Greenwich had no duty to defend.\n1. The Underlying Lawsuit\nRPS is an Illinois corporation that manufactures, markets, distributes, and sells replacement filters for use in air cleaners and humidifiers. One of RPS\u2019 replacement filters, the RPS model H600 filter, was marketed as a filter that \u201cfit Holmes\u00ae\u201d \u201cHarmony\u00ae Air Purifier Models: HAP 615, 626, 650, 675, 675RC.\u201d\nOn November 27, 2002, Holmes notified RPS that it was making a claim against it based on RPS\u2019 alleged infringement of Holmes\u2019 patent for its \u201cHAPG 600 Harmony Air Filter.\u201d On July 3, 2003, Holmes filed its original complaint against RPS in the United States District Court for the Worchester District of Massachusetts.\nOn July 28, 2003, RPS provided Greenwich with Holmes\u2019 original complaint. On the same date, Greenwich informed RPS that there was no coverage under the Greenwich insurance policy for patent infringement, and Greenwich issued a formal denial of coverage shortly thereafter. RPS did not dispute Greenwich\u2019s denial of coverage at that point in time.\nOn February 19, 2004, Holmes provided RPS with its proposed amended complaint. On March 3, 2004, Holmes filed its amended complaint. The amended complaint includes the following relevant allegations as to all three counts contained in the complaint:\n\u201c8. RPS manufactures, markets, distributes and/or sells replacement filters for use in air cleaners and humidifiers. One of those replacement filters is designated as the RPS model H600 filter (the \u2018H600 Replacement Filter\u2019).\n9. The H600 Replacement Filter is marketed and advertised by RPS as a replacement filter for certain Holmes air cleaner models. The label on the H600 Replacement Filter box prominently displays the claim that it \u2018Fits Holmes\u00ae,\u2019 and lists the following Holmes\u00ae Harmony\u00ae Air Purifier Models: HAP 615, 625, 650, 675, 675RC. This designation is literally false because the RPS Replacement Filters do not meet Holmes performance standards, a high proportion of the RPS Replacement Filters are defectively manufactured and, when the RPS Replacement Filters are placed in one of the Holmes machines that they purportedly \u2018fit\u2019, the RPS filter will not allow the door to close.\nsH * *\n13. When the RPS H600 Replacement Filters are substituted for the genuine Holmes\u00ae filters in those Holmes\u00ae Harmony\u00ae Air Purifier models which RPS claims that the RPS H600 Replacement Filter \u2018Fits,\u2019 each of the Holmes\u00ae models substantially and materially underperforms ***.\n14. As a result, consumers who purchase a RPS H600 Replacement Filter believing that it \u2018Fits Holmes\u2019 are misled into thinking that the H600 Replacement Filter is a suitable replacement for the proper Holmes\u00ae filter when it is not ***.\n19. RPS misrepresents the RPS H600 Replacement Filter on its Web site as a \u2018Holmes air filter for HEPA models HAP615, 625, 650, 675, 675 RC, (HAP-600).\u2019 \u201d\nCount I further alleges that RPS infringed Holmes\u2019 patent by \u201cmaking, using, offering to sell, selling, and/or importing and/or inducing and/or contributing to others\u2019 making, using, offering to sell, selling and/or importing products that embody or use the inventions claimed in the patent.\u201d Count II of the amended complaint, entitled \u201cUnfair Competition,\u201d alleges RPS advertises and sells its H600 replacement filter as \u201cFits Holmes\u00ae HEPA Air Cleaners Models: HAP 615, 625, 650, 675, 675RC,\u201d the replacement filters \u201care not acceptable *** for use with Holmes air cleaners,\u201d and RPS replacement filter packaging and nationwide advertising contain false and misleading statements and descriptions concerning replacement air filter applications, contain misrepresentations of fact, and constitute unfair competition in violation of section 1125 of the United States Trademarks Act (15 U.S.C. \u00a71125(a) (2000)), and the laws of Massachusetts. Count III of the amended complaint, entitled \u201cTrademark Infringement\u201d alleges RPS\u2019 use of the mark \u201cHolmes\u00ae\u201d in commerce and in connection with the marketing and advertisement of RPS\u2019 own replacement filters constitutes trademark infringement.\n2. The Greenwich Policy\nRPS solicited A.F. Crissie & Company, Ltd., an insurance brokerage firm, to procure, on its behalf, commercial liability insurance coverage. Ray Szydlo of A.F. Crissie caused RPS to be placed with Greenwich for purposes of obtaining a commercial liability insurance policy. Greenwich issued to RPS three consecutive one-year commercial general liability policies covering the December 31, 2001, through December 31, 2004, time period. The policy at issue in this case, policy No. GEC001084802, covered the December 31, 2003, through December 31, 2004, time period. The policy provided in pertinent part:\n\u201cSECTION I \u2014 COVERAGES\nCOVERAGE A BODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY\n1. Insuring Agreement\na. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against any \u2018suit\u2019 seeking those damages ***.\nCOVERAGE B PERSONAL AND ADVERTISING LIABILITY\n1. Insuring Agreement\na. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018personal and advertising injury\u2019 to which this insurance applies.\n^ ^ ^\nc. This insurance applies to \u2018personal and advertising injury\u2019 caused by an offense arising out of your business ***.\nHi Hi Hi\n2. Exclusions\nThis insurance does not apply to:\na. Knowing Violation of Rights Of Another\n\u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 caused by or at the direction of the insured with the knowledge that the act would violate the rights of another and would inflict \u2018personal and advertising injury\u2019.\nb. Material Published With Knowledge Of Falsity\n\u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 arising out of oral and written publication of material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its falsity.\nHi H\u00ab *\ng. Quality Or Performance Of Goods \u2014 Failure To Conform To Statements\n\u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 arising out of the failure of goods, products or services to conform with any statements of quality of performance made in your \u2018advertisement\u2019.\nH> Hi\ni. Infringement Of Copyright, Patent, Trademark Or Trade Secret\n\u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 arising out of the infringement of copyright, patent, trademark, trade secret or other intellectual property rights.\nHowever, this exclusion does not apply to infringement, in your \u2018advertisement\u2019, of copyright, trade dress or slogan.\nHi Hi \u2756\nSECTION IV \u2014 COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY CONDITIONS\nHi Hi Hi\n2. Duties In The Event Of Occurrence, Offense, Claim Or Suit a. You must see to it that we are notified as soon as practicable of an \u2018occurrence\u2019 or an offense which may result in a claim. To the extent possible, notice should include:\n(1) How, when and where the \u2018occurrence\u2019 or offense took place;\n(2) The names and addresses of any injured persons and witnesses; and\n(3) The nature and location of any injury or damage arising out of the \u2018occurrence\u2019 or offense,\na. If a claim is made or \u2018suit\u2019 is brought against any insured, you must:\n(1) Immediately record the specifics of the claim or \u2018suit\u2019 and the date received; and\n(2) Notify us as soon as practicable.\nYou must see to it that we receive written notice of the claim or \u2018suit\u2019 as soon as practicable,\na. You and any other involved insured must:\n(1) Immediately send us copies of any demands, notices, summonses, or legal papers received in connection with the claim or \u2018suit\u2019; [and]\n$ $ $\n(3) Cooperate with us in the investigation or settlement of the claim or defense against the \u2018suit\u2019 ***.\nSECTION V \u2014 DEFINITIONS\n1. \u2018Advertisement\u2019 means a notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For the purpose of this definition:\na. Notices that are published include material placed on the Internet or on similar electronic means of communication; and\nb. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site that is about your goods, products or services for the purposes of attracting customers or supporters is considered advertisement.\njj\u00ed\n13. \u2018Occurrence\u2019 means an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.\n14. \u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 means injury, including consequential \u2018bodily injury\u2019, arising out of one or more of the following offenses\n$ ^ $\na. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person\u2019s or organization\u2019s goods, products or services;\nJji V\nb. The use of another\u2019s advertising idea in your \u2018advertisement\u2019; or\nc. Infringing upon another\u2019s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your \u2018advertisement\u2019.\n2. \u2018Property damage\u2019 means:\na. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use to that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the physical injury that caused j-j- *** \u201d\n3. Notice and Tender of Defense\nRPS was served with the amended complaint on February 19, 2004. It provided Holmes\u2019 amended complaint to Greenwich on August 4, 2004.\n4. The Declaratory Judgment Action\nGreenwich filed the instant action, seeking a declaration that its policy provided no coverage to RPS for the Holmes action. Greenwich argued that Holmes\u2019 amended complaint did not come within the coverage provided by the policy and that RPS did not comply with the policy\u2019s notice terms. RPS answered Greenwich\u2019s complaint and filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted Greenwich\u2019s motion for summary judgment on October 31, 2006, and denied RPS\u2019 motion. This timely appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nAs previously noted, this appeal was taken from the trial court\u2019s grant of summary judgment in favor of Greenwich and against RPS. \u201cSummary judgment is appropriate where the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when taken together in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.\u201d Gawryk v. Firemen\u2019s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 356 Ill. App. 3d 38, 41 (2005). Where, as here, \u201cthe parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, they agree that no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and that only a question of law is involved, and they invite the court to decide the issue based on the record.\u201d Gawryk, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 41. We review a trial court\u2019s ruling on a motion for summary judgment de novo. Gawryk, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 41.\nRPS claims that the trial court erred by granting Greenwich\u2019s motion for summary judgment where the insurance policy in question establishes that Greenwich had a duty to defend RPS in the Holmes suit.\nInitially, we note that in Illinois, the duties to defend and to indemnify are not coextensive, the obligation to defend being broader than the obligation to pay. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 168 Ill. App. 3d 361 (1988). In determining whether an insurer has a duty to defend its insured, a court looks to the allegations in the underlying complaint and compares them to the relevant provisions of the insurance policy. Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 154 Ill. 2d 90, 107-08 (1992). \u201cIf the facts alleged in the underlying complaint fall within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, the insurer\u2019s duty to defend arises.\u201d Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108. However, if it is clear from the face of the complaint that the allegations fail to state facts that bring the case within, or potentially within, the policy\u2019s coverage, an insurer may properly refuse to defend. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Wilkin Insulation Co., 144 Ill. 2d 64, 73 (1991), quoted in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Hatherley, 250 Ill. App. 3d 333, 336 (1993). \u201c[W]here an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, its applicability must he clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured.\u201d International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d at 367. \u201c[W]here the language of an insurance policy is clear and unambiguous, it will be applied as written.\u201d Hatherley, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 337. The construction of an insurance policy presents a question of law that is reviewed de novo. Outboard Marine, 154 Ill. 2d at 108.\nRPS firstly argues that the Greenwich policy provided coverage for count I of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint, which alleges patent infringement. On appeal, RPS argues that coverage extends by virtue of the policy\u2019s \u201cBODILY INJURY AND PROPERTY DAMAGE LIABILITY\u201d clause, which reads: \u201cWe will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to pay as damages because of \u2018bodily injury\u2019 or \u2018property damage\u2019 to which this insurance applies ***.\u201d RPS argues that a patent is \u201cproperty\u201d and that infringement of a patent is \u201cdamage,\u201d leading RPS to the conclusion that coverage extends for Holmes\u2019 underlying patent infringement cause of action. \u201cProperty damage\u201d is defined in the Greenwich policy as: \u201cPhysical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of use to that property r\u00a1C 5^ ? 5\nRPS did not raise this argument at the trial level and has thus waived the argument for appellate review. Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1019 (2006). Furthermore, RPS cites no authority for the proposition that infringing upon a patent constitutes \u201cproperty damage.\u201d The failure to cite authority also constitutes waiver of an argument. Universal Casualty Co. v. Lopez, 376 Ill. App. 3d 459, 465 (2007), citing 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7) (arguments presented without citation to authority are waived).\nEven had RPS not waived the argument, it still fails. The policy specifically defines \u201cproperty damage\u201d as \u201cphysical injury to tangible property.\u201d It is black letter law that patent rights encompass intangible, incorporeal rights. See Newark Morning Ledger Co. v. United States, 507 U.S. 546, 556, 123 L. Ed. 2d 288, 300, 113 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (1993). As a patent is not tangible property subject to physical damage, patent infringement cannot fall within the definition of \u201cproperty damage\u201d under the Greenwich policy.\nRPS then argues that count I of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint, alleging patent infringement, comes within the policy\u2019s \u201cPERSONAL AND ADVERTISING LIABILITY\u201d clause. RPS contends that its act of advertising infringing products falls within the definition of advertising injury as contained in the Greenwich policy. The recent case of Global Computing, Inc. v. Hartford Casualty Insurance Co., No. 05 C 6753 (N.D. Ill. March 14, 2007), is instructive. In Global Computing, Judge William J. Hibbler of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois noted that one Illinois appellate court and two federal district courts for the Northern District of Illinois have held that something more than the mere advertisement of an infringing product is required to bring such action within the scope of coverage. Global Computing, Inc., slip op. at 8, citing Konami (America), Inc. v. Hartford Insurance Co., 326 Ill. App. 3d 874, 880 (2002); Winklevoss Consultants, Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co., 991 F. Supp. 1024, 1032-33 (N.D. Ill. 1998); Davila v. Arlasky, 857 F. Supp. 1258, 1262-63 (N.D. Ill. 1994). The advertisement must instruct or explain to the purchaser exactly how to recreate or reassemble the product into one that infringes a patent. Konami (America), Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d at 880. Count I of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint (that RPS manufactured and sold allegedly infringing products) does not allege that RPS provided any detailed instructions to its customer on how to infringe the patent. RPS\u2019 argument is, therefore, unpersuasive.\nFurthermore, patent infringement is specifically excluded from the definition of \u201cPersonal and advertising injury\u201d under the \u201cPERSONAL AND ADVERTISING LIABILITY\u201d clause in the Greenwich policy. As noted, \u201cwhere an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured.\u201d International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d at 367. Comparing the language of count I of the underlying complaint at issue in this declaratory action, it is clear that the patent infringement exclusion applies and that Greenwich had no duty to defend RPS by virtue of count I of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint.\nRPS then contends that counts II and III of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint come within the \u201cPERSONAL AND ADVERTISING LIABILITY\u201d clause in the Greenwich policy. The parties agree on how advertising injury coverage can be triggered. There are three elements: (1) RPS must have been engaged in advertising activity during the policy period when the injury occurred; (2) Holmes\u2019 allegations must raise a potential for liability under one of the offenses listed in the policies; and (3) there must be a causal connection between the alleged injury and the advertising activity. Lexmark International, Inc. v. Transportation Insurance Co., 327 Ill. App. 3d 128, 137 (2001). As noted, count II of the amended complaint, entitled \u201cUnfair Competition,\u201d alleges RPS advertises and sells its H600 replacement filter as \u201cFits Holmes\u00ae HEPA Air Cleaners Models: HAP 615, 625, 650, 675, 675RC,\u201d the replacement filters \u201care not acceptable *** for use with Holmes air cleaners,\u201d and RPS replacement filter packaging and nationwide advertising contain false and misleading statements and descriptions concerning replacement air filter applications, contain misrepresentations of fact, and constitute unfair competition in violation of section 1125 (15 U.S.C. \u00a71125(a) (2000)) and the laws of Massachusetts. Count III of the amended complaint, entitled \u201cTrademark Infringement,\u201d alleges RPS\u2019 use of the mark \u201cHolmes\u00ae\u201d in commerce and in connection with the marketing and advertisement of RPS\u2019 own replacement filters constitutes trademark infringement. Before we begin our analysis, we note that this court has previously stated that \u201c[w]e give little weight to the legal label that characterizes the underlying allegations. Instead, we determine whether the alleged conduct arguably falls within at least one of the categories of wrongdoing listed in the policy.\u201d Lexmark International, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 135-36. For ease of discussion, we consider Holmes\u2019 counts II and III together where applicable, and separately when not.\nTo satisfy the advertising activity requirement for counts II and III, RPS points to the allegation that it advertised the RPS H600 replacement filter on its website. The definition of \u201cAdvertisement\u201d in the Greenwich policy includes the following:\n\u201ca notice that is broadcast or published to the general public or specific market segments about your goods, products or services for the purpose of attracting customers or supporters. For purpose of this definition:\na. Notices that are published include material placed on the Internet or on similar electronic means of communication; and\nb. Regarding web-sites, only that part of a web-site that is about your goods, products or services for the purposes of attracting customers or supporters is considered advertisement.\u201d\nWe find that the allegation contained in Holmes\u2019 amended complaint, that RPS advertised its products for sale on its website, falls within the definition of \u201cAdvertisement\u201d contained in the Greenwich policy.\nAt this point in our opinion, the analysis of whether counts II and III fall within the policy\u2019s coverage must be considered separately. We begin with count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint, entitled \u201cUnfair Competition.\u201d\nAs noted, in addition to showing that it was engaged in advertising activity during the policy period, RPS must show that (1) Holmes\u2019 allegations raise a potential for liability under one of the offenses listed in the policy, and (2) there is a causal connection between the alleged injury and the advertising activity, in order to succeed in its claim.\nIn support of its argument, RPS cites the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (Act) (815 ILCS 510/2 (West 2006)). We note, however, that any citation to this Illinois Act is inapposite as the underlying complaint alleges that RPS engaged in unfair competition in violation of section 1125 (15 U.S.C. \u00a71125(a) (2000)) and the laws of Massachusetts.\nIn any event, we find that the allegations of count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint do not come within one of the offenses listed in the Greenwich policy. \u201cPersonal and advertising injury\u201d is defined in the Greenwich policy as follows:\n\u201c14. \u2018Personal and advertising injury\u2019 means injury, including consequential \u2018bodily injury\u2019, arising out of one or more of the following offenses\n# * #\na. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person\u2019s or organization\u2019s goods, products or services;\n* * *\nb. The use of another\u2019s advertising idea in your \u2018advertisement\u2019; or\nc. Infringing upon another\u2019s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your \u2018advertisement.\u2019 \u201d\nNowhere in the definition of \u201cPersonal and advertising injury\u201d contained in the Greenwich policy is \u201cunfair competition\u201d found. Therefore, to succeed on its claim, RPS must show that Holmes\u2019 allegations contained in count II fit into one of the aforementioned offenses listed in the policy.\nThe allegations contained in count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint do not disparage Holmes\u2019 products for purposes of \u201cadvertising injury.\u201d \u201cDisparagement has been defined as \u2018words which criticize the quality of one\u2019s goods or services.\u2019 \u201d Lexmark International, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 140, .quoting Crinkley v. Dow Jones & Co., 67 Ill. App. 3d 869, 877 (1978). Nowhere in the underlying complaint does Holmes claim that RPS criticized the quality of Holmes\u2019 air filters.\nWe also find that count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint does not allege that RPS used Holmes\u2019 \u201cadvertising idea.\u201d \u201c \u2018Misappropriation of advertising ideas or style of doing business\u2019 encompasses trade dress infringement claims.\u201d Lexmark International, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 139, citing B.H. Smith, Inc. v. Zurich Insurance Co., 285 Ill. App. 3d 536, 539-40 (1996).\n\u201cThe trade dress of a product is essentially \u2018its total image and overall appearance.\u2019 \u201d Lexmark International, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 139, quoting Blue-Bell Bio-Medical v. Cin-Bad, Inc., 864 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1989). \u201cThe total image of a product \u2018may include features such as size, shape, color or other combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.\u2019 \u201d Lexmark International, Inc., 327 Ill. App. 3d at 139, quoting John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983). Trade dress recognizes that the \u201cdesign or packaging of a product may acquire a distinctiveness which serves to identify the product [by the consumer] with its manufacturer or source.\u201d Traffix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 28, 149 L. Ed. 2d 164, 172, 121 S. Ct. 1255, 1259 (2001). \u201c[A] design or package which acquires this secondary meaning, assuming other requisites are met, is a trade dress which may not be used in a manner likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the goods.\u201d Traffix Devices, Inc., 532 U.S. at 28, 149 L. Ed. 2d at 172, 121 S. Ct. at 1259. Holmes alleges no trade dress infringement in its complaint.\nWe also find that count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint does not allege that RPS infringed upon Holmes\u2019 \u201ccopyright, trade dress or slogan\u201d in its advertisement.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we find that count II of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint does not come within the coverage provided by the Greenwich policy.\nWe now consider whether count III of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint comes within the definition of \u201cadvertising injury\u201d contained in the Greenwich policy. As noted, count III alleges that RPS infringed upon Holmes\u2019 trademark by use of the mark \u201cHolmes\u00ae\u201d in its advertisement.\nNot only does trademark infringement not come within the enumerated offenses listed by the policy at issue, trademark infringement is specifically excluded from coverage under the Greenwich policy. As noted, \u201cwhere an exclusionary clause is relied upon to deny coverage, its applicability must be clear and free from doubt because any doubts as to coverage will be resolved in favor of the insured.\u201d International Minerals & Chemical Corp., 168 Ill. App. 3d at 367. Comparing the language of count III of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint, it is clear that the trademark exclusion operates to bar coverage in the case at bar.\nNevertheless, RPS argues that coverage under the Greenwich policy extends to count III of Holmes\u2019 amended complaint by positing the following question to this court: \u201c[H]ow could a policy cover \u2018trade dress\u2019 advertising injuries and not, at the same time, cover \u2018trademark\u2019 advertising injuries?\u201d The answer to RPS\u2019 inquiry lies in the fact that trade dress infringement and trademark infringement are two different causes of action. See Schwinn Bicycle Co. v. Ross Bicycles, Inc., 870 F.2d 1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1989) (\u201c[a] product\u2019s trade dress is the overall image used to present it to its purchasers ***. [Citation.] A trademark is thought of as something more specific, such as a logo\u201d (emphasis in original)). We therefore find RPS\u2019 argument unpersuasive.\nHaving already determined that Holmes\u2019 amended complaint does not come within the terms of the Greenwich insurance policy for coverage, we need not consider the question of whether RPS\u2019 tender of defense was untimely under the policy.\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.\nAffirmed.\nWOLFSON and GARCIA, JJ., concur.\nBecause it does not argue the point in its brief to this court, RPS also necessarily concedes that the cause of action of fraudulent misrepresentation does not come within coverage of the Greenwich policy.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Law Office of Michael G. Cortina, Ltd., of Crystal Lake (Michael G. Cortina, of counsel), for appellant.", "Cray, Huber, Horstman, Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago (James K. Horstman and Mark A. Hooper, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GREENWICH INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RPS PRODUCTS, INC., Defendant-Appellant (The Holmes Group, Inc., Defendant).\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20140760\nOpinion filed February 4, 2008.\nLaw Office of Michael G. Cortina, Ltd., of Crystal Lake (Michael G. Cortina, of counsel), for appellant.\nCray, Huber, Horstman, Heil & VanAusdal LLC, of Chicago (James K. Horstman and Mark A. Hooper, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0078-01", "first_page_order": 94, "last_page_order": 106 }