{ "id": 4276436, "name": "In re MARRIAGE OF KATHLEEN M. JAMIESON, Petitioner-Appellee, and EDWARD S. JAMIESON, Respondent-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "In re Marriage of Jamieson", "decision_date": "2008-02-06", "docket_number": "No. 1-07-0417", "first_page": "100", "last_page": "105", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 100" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "720 N.E.2d 645", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" }, { "page": "654" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "308 Ill. App. 3d 605", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 261394 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615" }, { "page": "615" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/308/0605-01" ] }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71056", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "(d)(1)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)(A)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)(C)" }, { "page": "(d)(3)(D)(i)" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "29 U.S.C. \u00a71001", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 493, "char_count": 12785, "ocr_confidence": 0.744, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.947487136851577e-08, "percentile": 0.3111351279553364 }, "sha256": "d5ccc695701ce89949babc8dafc2975c7bb599b1498770d3eeb10be5ca76da08", "simhash": "1:0aa86db8ea98551d", "word_count": 2067 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:11.340315+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re MARRIAGE OF KATHLEEN M. JAMIESON, Petitioner-Appellee, and EDWARD S. JAMIESON, Respondent-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE THEIS\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nFollowing the entry of a judgment for dissolution of marriage, respondent, Edward S. Jamieson, sought review of a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) entered by the circuit court of Cook County, awarding a share of Edward\u2019s profit-sharing benefits to petitioner, Kathleen M. Jamieson. Edward contends on appeal that the QDRO violates the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C. \u00a71001 et seq. (2000)) and is contrary to the parties\u2019 marital settlement agreement because it grants Kathleen increased benefits not otherwise provided for under Edward\u2019s profit-sharing plan. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nBACKGROUND\nOn June 30, 2006, the circuit court entered a judgment for dissolution of marriage incorporating the terms of the parties\u2019 marital settlement agreement. Article X of the agreement addressed the division of property and the allocation of assets. Specifically relevant to this appeal, the agreement provided as follows:\n\u201ca. Name of Plan. It is intended that the Wife shall receive an interest in the Husband\u2019s benefits in the Jamieson and Associates Money Purchase Pension Trust, and the Husband shall cooperate in entering a Qualfied Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) to effectuate this intent. Said [QDRO] shall include the following information and provisions:\n\u2756 \u2756 \u2756\niii. Description of Benefit to be Transferred to Alternate Payee. 55% of the marital portion of the total benefits accrued by the Participant under the Plan, as of the date of entry of Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, shall be segregated into a separate account established in the Alternate Payee\u2019s name and invested in accordance with the Plan provisions.\u201d\nThereafter, the parties submitted separate draft QDROs for the court\u2019s approval. The QDRO submitted by Edward provided in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cAmount of Alternate Payee\u2019s Benefit:\nAmount of Assignment: This Order assigns to Alternate Payee *** 55% of the money purchase account of the Participant\u2019s Total Account Balances, of said above accounts as determined by the Plan on or before June 30, 2006.\nPost-Divorce Contributions Attributable to Periods Before Divorce: In the event that the Plan made any contributions to the Participant\u2019s aceount(s) after June 30, 2006, but that are attributable to periods before this date, then such Total Account Balance shall further include such contributed amounts.\u201d\nThe draft QDRO submitted by Kathleen provided, in pertinent part:\n\u201cAmount of Alternate Payee\u2019s Benefit:\nAmount of assignment: This Order assigns to Alternate Payee *** 55% of the money purchase account of the Participant\u2019s Total Account Balances, of said above accounts as determined by the plan for Plan Year ending September 30, 2005.\nPost-Divorce Contributions Attributable to Periods Before Divorce: In the event that the Plan made any contributions to the Participant\u2019s account(s) for Plan Year ending September 30, 2006, then the Alternate Payee shall receive 41.25% (which is 55% of 75% of the Plan Year) of such contributions as of September 30, 2006.\u201d\nAdditionally, in October 2006, the circuit court heard testimony from Sandor Goldstein, Edward\u2019s consulting actuary, and Larry Shippee, the plan administrator, with regard to the nature of the plan and the way it is funded and valued. These experts explained that the Jamie-son & Associates, Ltd., 401(k) plan at issue, as it relates to Edward, is a profit-sharing plan. The plan is made up of a pooled set of assets in a trust for the benefit of all participants in the plan. These assets are valued annually on September 30. At that time, the earnings that have accrued in the plan since the prior September, along with any discretionary contributions made by the employer, are allocated among the participants to their individual accounts.\nThe earnings are allocated based on a participant\u2019s individual account balance for the prior year. Therefore, for example, if a participant\u2019s balance represented 25% of the total assets in the trust, he would be entitled to 25% of the earnings that have accrued throughout the year on September 30. The contributions are generally allocated based on a participant\u2019s salary. The earnings and contributions are only allocated to participants employed on September 30 and are credited to participants\u2019 individual accounts as of September 30 for that fiscal year. If a participant is terminated or withdraws from employment prior to September 30, he would only be entitled to the balance in his account as of the previous year end. He would not be entitled to earnings or contributions for that fiscal year. Those benefits would then be allocated among the remaining participants. Thus, any growth in the profit-sharing plan enures to the benefit of those who are employed at the end of the fiscal year.\nThe parties stipulated that it was possible to value the plan as of a date different than September 30 and that Edward was a participant in the plan throughout the entire fiscal year 2005-06. Mr. Shippee also indicated that if the domestic relations order provided Kathleen with a percentage of Edward\u2019s benefits based on the length of the marriage during the plan year valued as of September 30, 2006, as the plan administrator, he had the authority to award that benefit to Kathleen as long as it was not payable until after September 30, 2006.\nAfter the hearing, on January 16, 2007, the circuit court ruled as follows:\n\u201cThe QDRO proposed by Kathleen Jamieson takes into account what occurred between the last valuation date and the dissolution judgment date and provides for a calculable distribution that is consistent with the parties\u2019 agreement and the judgment incorporating their agreement. Edward Jamieson presented insufficient evidence of an impact on other Plan participants to support a conclusion that entry of the QDRO proposed by Kathleen Jamieson is impermissible.\u201d\nAccordingly, the circuit court entered an order consistent with the QDRO presented on behalf of Kathleen. Edward filed a timely appeal.\nANALYSIS\nEdward contends that the QDRO entered by the circuit court erroneously awarded Kathleen an interest in the value of the plan after September 30, 2005, and provides her with an increased benefit not available to other participants in the plan in violation of ERISA and the marital settlement agreement. He asserts that she was only entitled to \u201c55% of the marital estate in the Jamieson Plan as of September 30, 2005.\u201d\nThe resolution of this issue involves the interplay between ERISA and state domestic relations laws. Generally, ERISA restricts the alienation of certain retirement benefits. 29 U.S.C. \u00a71056(d)(1) (2000). However, under an important exception to this principle, in a divorce or dissolution of marriage proceeding, ERISA permits a state court to enter a QDRO which recognizes the existence of an alternate payee\u2019s right to receive a portion of the participant\u2019s retirement benefits as marital property. 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71056(d)(3)(A), (d)(3)(B)(i) (2000). To be a valid QDRO, the domestic relations order must comply with specific requirements set forth in ERISA. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71056(d)(3)(C), (d)(3)(D) (2000). Specifically related to this appeal, the domestic relations order meets those requirements only if the order \u201c(i) does not require a plan to provide any type or form of benefit, or any option, not otherwise provided under the plan\u201d; and \u201c(ii) does not require the plan to provide increased benefits (determined on the basis of actuarial value).\u201d 29 U.S.C. \u00a7\u00a71056(d)(3)(D)(i), (d)(3)(D)(ii) (2000).\nInitially, Edward argues that by awarding Kathleen a share of Edward\u2019s interest in the plan for a period of time after the September 2005 valuation date until June 30, 2006, the date of dissolution, Kathleen was provided with a benefit not otherwise provided for under the plan. Edward does not identify with any particularity any specific provision of the plan that is violated by the QDRO. Rather, he generally asserts that Kathleen should be treated as if the participant terminated or left the company. Under the plan, if an employee terminates or leaves the company, the plan provides that the participant\u2019s interest in the plan is determined as of the preceding valuation date and all contributions and earnings occurring after that date would remain in the plan for the benefit of the remaining participants.\nHowever, as the plan administrator explained during the hearing, a judgment for dissolution does not act as a terminating event as it relates to Edward\u2019s interest in the plan. Additionally, Shippee specifically indicated that the alternate payee is \u201cnot treated identical to a terminated employee\u201d under the plan. Edward has not presented any evidence in the adoption agreement of the plan that would conflict with that interpretation. Furthermore, the QDRO entered by the court recognized that Kathleen\u2019s entitlement to any contributions was indeed contingent on the plan making a contribution to his account, and also recognized that Edward had not terminated employment. Moreover, Shippee testified that he was authorized to award the benefit to Kathleen under the plan \u201c[a]s long as it wasn\u2019t payable until after September 30, 2006.\u201d Accordingly, we find no merit to Edward\u2019s contention that Kathleen received a benefit not otherwise provided for under the plan.\nEdward additionally argues that by awarding Kathleen a share of his interest in the plan for periods after the September 30, 2005, valuation date until the date of dissolution, the court erroneously awarded her increased benefits. Edward has presented no evidence to the circuit court or to this court that under the QDRO the plan was actually required to award her any more than Edward was entitled to under the plan. Edward had earned benefits that were valued on September 30, 2005. Additionally, he earned benefits for the plan year ending September 30, 2006. The parties were married during a percentage of that plan year. Kathleen is simply receiving a percentage of the marital portion of those benefits to which Edward was entitled under the plan.\nThe award to Kathleen is not an \u201cincreased benefit\u201d but, rather, is consistent with Illinois law and the parties\u2019 marital settlement agreement. Pension benefits earned during the course of the marriage are considered marital property despite the fact that they may not actually be distributed until after the marriage. In re Marriage of Abma, 308 Ill. App. 3d 605, 615, 720 N.E.2d 645, 654 (1999). Those benefits have been described as a form of deferred compensation earned by an employee for his service to an employer. Abma, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 615, 720 N.E.2d at 654. As such, they are treated as earnings, and to the extent that a spouse earned those benefits during the marriage, they are considered marital property. Abma, 308 Ill. App. 3d at 615, 720 N.E.2d at 654.\nThe domestic relations order entered by the circuit court takes into account what occurred between the last valuation date of September 30, 2005, and the date of dissolution by merely supplying a method to calculate the percent of his contribution to which she was entitled during the nine months of the fiscal year in which the parties were married. The court found that to be a reasonable method to value Edward\u2019s interest in the plan as of the date of dissolution, which is what the parties agreed to under the marital settlement agreement. The circuit court additionally found that Edward failed to show how any other participant in the plan would be impacted by implementing that method. We find that method to be a reasonable way of calculating Kathleen\u2019s share of Edward\u2019s interest in the Plan up to the date of dissolution and not contrary to their agreement.\nIndeed, Edward acknowledged in his own draft QDRO submitted to the circuit court that Kathleen would be entitled not only to 55% his account balance as of September 30, 2005, but, also, to postdivorce contributions made after the divorce but attributable to periods before the divorce. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the circuit court entered a proper QDRO which is consistent with ERISA and the parties\u2019 marital settlement agreement. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nQUINN, PJ., and GREIMAN, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE THEIS" } ], "attorneys": [ "Barry H. Greenburg and Jewel N. Klein, both of Law Firm of Barry H. Greenburg, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Anne M. Coladarci and John A. Coladarci, both of Coladarci & Coladarci, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re MARRIAGE OF KATHLEEN M. JAMIESON, Petitioner-Appellee, and EDWARD S. JAMIESON, Respondent-Appellant.\nFirst District (3rd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20140417\nOpinion filed February 6, 2008.\nRehearing denied March 7, 2008.\nBarry H. Greenburg and Jewel N. Klein, both of Law Firm of Barry H. Greenburg, of Chicago, for appellant.\nAnne M. Coladarci and John A. Coladarci, both of Coladarci & Coladarci, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0100-01", "first_page_order": 116, "last_page_order": 121 }