{ "id": 4275958, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES SPICER, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Spicer", "decision_date": "2007-12-10", "docket_number": "No. 1-05-3358", "first_page": "441", "last_page": "469", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 441" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "132 Ill. 2d 86", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5588813 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/132/0086-01" ] }, { "cite": "84 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3045432 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "405" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/84/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 462", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208045 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "467-68", "parenthetical": "victim's statement was sufficient to prove sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0462-01" ] }, { "cite": "371 Ill. App. 3d 303", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4269026 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "310" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/371/0303-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 1133", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025977 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1144" }, { "page": "1136" }, { "page": "1144-45" }, { "page": "1144" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/1133-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. App. 3d 1029", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5293899 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1038" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/215/1029-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. App. 3d 574", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5797043 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "575" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/221/0574-01" ] }, { "cite": "114 Ill. 2d 61", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5542613 ], "year": 1986, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/114/0061-01" ] }, { "cite": "51 Ill. 2d 79", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5391657 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "83-84" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/51/0079-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8450979 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11-12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "254 Ill. App. 3d 85", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2980726 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "88" }, { "page": "88" }, { "page": "89" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/254/0085-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 398", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272437 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "409" }, { "page": "408" }, { "page": "409" }, { "page": "410" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0398-01" ] }, { "cite": "185 Ill. 2d 81", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 122017 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "172", "parenthetical": "noting that \"the trial judge did not cite to any of the evidence here challenged\"" }, { "page": "174" }, { "page": "171, 172", "parenthetical": "\"defendant's Chicago police department 'rap sheet' which indicated defendant's prior arrests\" was relevant to sentencing \"because it provides an insight into the defendant's character\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/185/0081-01" ] }, { "cite": "375 Ill. App. 3d 796", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4272653 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "800" }, { "page": "800" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "802" }, { "page": "800" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/375/0796-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 1", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705069 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "23", "parenthetical": "\"evidence of flight\" is generally \"admissible as proof of consciousness of guilt\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0001-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 874", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096637 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "893", "parenthetical": "\"[wjhere there are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [during closing], arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel must be reviewed in their entirety\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/0874-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. 2d 52", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1302618 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/205/0052-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 318", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451082 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "333" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0318-01" ] }, { "cite": "211 Ill. 2d 368", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451541 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "386" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/211/0368-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 490", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451441 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "513", "parenthetical": "\"[t]he law gives a prosecutor wide latitude in argument\"" }, { "page": "513" }, { "page": "519", "parenthetical": "same" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0490-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 125", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735992 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "139", "parenthetical": "\"Clearly, there can be no plain error if there is no error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0125-01" ] }, { "cite": "215 Ill. 2d 167", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 4060336 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "187" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/215/0167-01" ] }, { "cite": "370 Ill. 646", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill.", "case_ids": [ 2561592 ], "year": 1939, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "648", "parenthetical": "defendant was guilty of forgery \"by filling in the checks over the admittedly genuine signature of' the victim" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill/370/0646-01" ] }, { "cite": "255 Ill. App. 3d 742", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2989292 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "743" }, { "page": "744" }, { "page": "744" }, { "page": "747" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/255/0742-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 263", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5796829 ], "year": 1992, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0263-01" ] }, { "cite": "97 Ill. App. 3d 894", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3106441 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1981, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "895" }, { "page": "895" }, { "page": "895" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/97/0894-01" ] }, { "cite": "331 Ill. App. 3d 1017", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1209165 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1025" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/331/1017-01" ] }, { "cite": "443 U.S. 307", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 6182418 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "319" }, { "page": "573" }, { "page": "2789" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/443/0307-01" ] }, { "cite": "397 U.S. 358", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 12054393 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "364" }, { "page": "375" }, { "page": "1073" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/397/0358-01" ] }, { "cite": "212 Ill. 2d 274", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2444253 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "278" }, { "page": "278" }, { "page": "279" }, { "page": "280" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/212/0274-01" ] }, { "cite": "217 Ill. 2d 407", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3875001 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "436" }, { "page": "436" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/217/0407-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 92", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610581 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "114", "parenthetical": "due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of \"the essential elements of the crime\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0092-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. 2d 400", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3598022 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "410", "parenthetical": "error is harmless if \"the result would have been the same absent the error\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/219/0400-01" ] }, { "cite": "349 Ill. App. 3d 587", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5436132 ], "weight": 8, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "applying harmless error analysis to confrontation clause error" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "same" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "first prong of harmless error analysis requires the court to consider whether error \"might have contributed to the conviction\"" }, { "page": "594", "parenthetical": "second prong of a harmless error analysis requires the court to consider whether other evidence was \"overwhelming\"" }, { "page": "595" }, { "page": "594" }, { "page": "594-95" }, { "page": "594-95" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/349/0587-01" ] }, { "cite": "547 U.S. 813", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 3275498 ], "weight": 51, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "823" }, { "page": "237-38" }, { "page": "2273-74" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "2273-74" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "2273-74" }, { "page": "822" }, { "page": "237" }, { "page": "2273-74" }, { "page": "827" }, { "page": "240" }, { "page": "2276-77" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "2277" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "2277" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "2277" }, { "page": "828" }, { "page": "241" }, { "page": "2277" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "2275-76" }, { "page": "826" }, { "page": "239" }, { "page": "2276" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/547/0813-01" ] }, { "cite": "448 U.S. 56", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 1787607 ], "weight": 3, "year": 1980, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66" }, { "page": "608" }, { "page": "2589" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/448/0056-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 S. Ct. 1254", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "S. Ct.", "year": 2004, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 246", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5705152 ], "weight": 19, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "264" }, { "page": "264-65" }, { "page": "264" }, { "page": "266", "parenthetical": "discussing Crawford" }, { "page": "299" }, { "page": "252, 256" }, { "page": "300-01" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "304" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "302, 305" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "253" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "305" }, { "page": "309" }, { "page": "305-08" }, { "page": "252, 256" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0246-01" ] }, { "cite": "364 Ill. App. 3d 283", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4263306 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "293" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/364/0283-01" ] }, { "cite": "355 Ill. App. 3d 28", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3599340 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "37", "parenthetical": "victim's description of sexual assault to emergency room physician and nurse was within statutory exception for medical diagnosis" }, { "page": "35", "parenthetical": "statements made at hospital by sexual assault victim to police officers were testimonial for purposes of Crawford" }, { "page": "37" }, { "page": "35", "parenthetical": "\"according to Crawford, the term 'interrogation' is to be viewed in a colloquial, rather than a technical, sense\"" }, { "page": "37" }, { "page": "37" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/355/0028-01" ] }, { "cite": "192 Ill. App. 3d 444", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2505942 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "453" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/192/0444-01" ] }, { "cite": "173 Ill. 2d 220", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 147614 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1996, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "229-30" }, { "page": "222-23" }, { "page": "223" }, { "page": "229" }, { "page": "229-30" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/173/0220-01" ] }, { "cite": "337 Ill. App. 3d 977", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 894483 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "989-90" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/337/0977-01" ] }, { "cite": "259 Ill. App. 3d 1014", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2869504 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1024" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/259/1014-01" ] }, { "cite": "541 U.S. 36", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "U.S.", "case_ids": [ 5873383 ], "weight": 19, "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "51" }, { "page": "192" }, { "page": "1364" }, { "page": "68-69" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "68" }, { "page": "203" }, { "page": "52" }, { "page": "193" }, { "page": "53" }, { "page": "194" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/us/541/0036-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 24", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610786 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "34-35", "parenthetical": "vacated appellate court opinion and remanded with instructions to consider the hearsay exception first before proceeding to the sixth amendment issue" }, { "page": "34", "parenthetical": "appellate court may proceed to sixth amendment issue after first determining that the trial court's hearsay ruling was correct" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0024-01" ] }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 104", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5736047 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "where \"there was no error at all,\" there cannot be plain error" }, { "page": "121", "parenthetical": "where \"there was no error at all,\" there cannot be plain error" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "121" }, { "page": "122" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0104-01" ] }, { "cite": "225 Ill. 2d 551", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704197 ], "weight": 10, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "plain error doctrine requires \"first\" that an error occurred" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565" }, { "page": "564" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "plain error doctrine requires \"first\" that an error occurred" }, { "page": "565", "parenthetical": "plain error if evidence is \"so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant\"" }, { "page": "567" }, { "page": "565" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/225/0551-01" ] }, { "cite": "214 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 8451309 ], "weight": 6, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "470" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "470", "parenthetical": "error is not preserved for appellate review if defendant fails to \"specifically object at trial\"" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" }, { "page": "471" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/214/0455-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 2019, "char_count": 74029, "ocr_confidence": 0.761, "pagerank": { "raw": 1.672374680261385e-07, "percentile": 0.6961541001039057 }, "sha256": "f2d0860994b4554c5a35c95845e998fecbcaecdcecdd289e0efd2800efc21a89", "simhash": "1:b8a7d5066b4995bf", "word_count": 12488 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:11.340315+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES SPICER, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nDefendant Charles Spicer was convicted after a jury trial of aggravated sexual assault and forgery and sentenced to consecutive terms of 30 years and 5 years of imprisonment, respectively. On appeal, he alleges errors at both trial and sentencing. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nThe State claims that on August 8, 2001, the defendant sexually assaulted and wrongfully forced Juanita Cartman, age 75 or 76, to draw a check on her checking account, in her apartment on South Calumet Avenue in Chicago. The defendant attempted to cash the check later that day and was arrested.\nAt trial, Officer Sheila Jackson testified that on August 8, 2001, at approximately 11 a.m., Officer Jackson responded to a call concerning an elderly robbery victim. She met with the victim in her apartment, where she observed a dining room chair with duct tape on the arm and legs, as well as redness around the victim\u2019s wrists and on both arms. The victim provided a description of the offender, which Officer Jackson relayed over the radio.\nPier Thomaston testified that on August 8, 2001, at shortly before noon, she was working as a teller at the Bank One at 6700 South Stony Island when the defendant presented her with a check drawn on the victim\u2019s account. She noticed that the name of the payee was not written in the same handwriting as the rest of the check. After seeing an alert for this account on the signature verification screen on her computer, she left the defendant and went to speak with her supervisor. A bank security guard approached the defendant, who then shoved the guard and ran out the front door, with the guard giving chase.\nThe teller testified that while looking through the bank windows, she saw the defendant go over a fence at a construction site and then lost sight of him. Approximately 10 minutes later, she identified a person in the back of a police squad car as the customer who had just presented her with the victim\u2019s check. Terrence McCullough, the security guard, also identified the defendant as the man at the teller\u2019s window whom he chased before police arrived and whom he identified in the back of the police vehicle.\nOfficer Harlan Hasbrough testified that on August 8, 2001, he responded to a radio call shortly after noon and went to 1523 East 68th Street to look for a suspect who had run from the bank. He found the defendant under the porch of an apartment at that address.\nDetective Raymond Doherty testified that he and his partner, Detective Gillespie, were assigned to a robbery investigation on August 8, 2001, and met with Officer Jackson and the victim in the victim\u2019s apartment. After hearing a call on the radio, he went to the bank, where he saw the defendant in the back of a police vehicle that was parked near the bank, and recovered a check from the teller who said the defendant had tried to cash it. He then returned to the victim\u2019s apartment and took the victim to the police station where the defendant was also taken.\nDetective Doherty testified that at approximately 1 p.m. on August 8 he and his partner interviewed the victim, and at 1:30 p.m. they interviewed the defendant. Defendant told them that he had received a telephone call from a friend named John Thomas that morning; that when he later met Thomas, Thomas gave defendant a check to cash; and that a security guard at the bank tried to detain him. Detective Doherty testified that the defendant provided a vague description of John Thomas, whom Detective Doherty was unable to locate.\nDetective Doherty testified that he and his partner interviewed defendant again at 5:30 p.m. on August 8. Defendant then admitted going to the victim\u2019s apartment with Thomas and stated that the victim owed him money and that both he and Thomas left after a short conversation. Detective Doherty testified that the defendant then told him that Thomas gave the defendant some money that Thomas had taken from the victim\u2019s home and a check. The defendant also admitted to duct taping the victim to the chair after she signed the check.\nDetective Doherty then interviewed the victim again at approximately 6 p.m. When she became upset, he decided to take her to a hospital. The victim had previously refused medical attention. Before leaving for the hospital, Detective Doherty called for an evidence technician to take a buccal swab of the defendant. Then he transported the victim to the hospital and remained while she was there, transporting her home at approximately 3 a.m. the following morning. He had an evidence technician meet him at the victim\u2019s home to collect her bedding.\nDetective Doherty testified that he returned to work at approximately 9 a.m. on August 9 and spoke to the defendant several times that day. The first interview occurred at approximately 1 p.m. The detective testified that he told the defendant that he did not believe him. The defendant then told him that he was in the apartment with the victim, that he told her to sign the check and that if she did not, he would \u201cshove the pen up her ass.\u201d Approximately three hours later that day, Detective Doherty had another interview with the defendant in which the detective told the defendant that he did not believe the defendant\u2019s \u201cstory\u201d and that he thought the defendant was \u201cholding back some information.\u201d Then the defendant gave essentially the same statement that he later repeated in front of Assistant State\u2019s Attorney (ASA) James Lynch.\nDetective Doherty testified that at approximately 4:30 p.m., ASA Lynch interviewed the defendant with Detective Doherty and his partner present. The statement was written down by hand by ASA Lynch and reviewed and signed by defendant.\nASA Lynch testified that he went to the police station at approximately 1:15 p.m. and questioned the defendant twice that afternoon. At approximately 2:30 p.m., defendant gave a statement in which \u201che was denying the essentials of any sexual crimes against\u201d the victim. At approximately 4:30 p.m., ASA Lynch took an oral statement from the defendant, which was consistent with the statement that Lynch later wrote down. At 5:15 p.m., ASA Lynch began writing the statement down by hand, with the defendant sitting next to him and using a question and answer format. The written statement was signed by ASA Lynch, Detective Doherty and the defendant. ASA Lynch read the statement to the jury.\nIn the statement, the defendant stated that he was 41 years old and that he had cleaned up the victim\u2019s basement and around her house several times. On August 8, 2001, he went to the victim\u2019s apartment with his friend John Thomas to speak to her about money which he felt that she owed him for the work. He followed her into her bedroom, stating that he wanted his money. Then he went into the kitchen, where his friend John Thomas was located. John had followed them inside the apartment and the defendant did not believe that the victim had seen John.\nThe statement further claimed that defendant received a roll of duct tape from John and then went back into the bedroom and taped the victim\u2019s ankles together as she sat on the bed. He told her to lie down and he started to tape her wrists, but stopped because the victim complained that her arm hurt. The victim then told him that there was money in a beer stein in the kitchen. He went into the kitchen and John retrieved $90 from the stein. He then went back to the victim and told her that it was not enough money. He and John then removed $35 from her purse. The defendant received $60 of the money, and John received the rest and left.\nThe statement claimed that defendant then demanded more money. When the victim stated that she had no more money, defendant said that he had seen her bank statement and knew she had $10,000 in the bank, and told the victim to write him a check. He then went into the kitchen to bring the victim water and her checkbook. When he returned, the victim stated that she had to go to the bathroom. He carried her to the toilet and moved her gown aside for her. When she was done, he carried her back to the bed.\nThe statement further claimed that defendant kept ordering the victim to write him a check and the victim kept refusing. Eventually, he picked up her taped feet, placed them on the bed with her knees up and threatened to shove a pen \u201cup her ass.\u201d He then placed his penis on her thigh and placed the index finger of his left hand in her vagina up to the knuckle and then shook the bed with his knees. The victim then said that she would write the check.\nThe statement claimed that defendant retrieved the checkbook for the victim. He cut the tape from her ankles and handed her glasses to her so she could write the check. The victim went to the dresser to write the check, and defendant told her to write the check in the amount of $7,000, leaving the payee blank and writing \u201cremodeling\u201d on the memo line. The defendant then took the victim into the dining room, sat her down in a chair, and taped her hands and ankles to the arms and legs of the chair. He then gave her some water, placed a fan on her and left with the check.\nThe statement claimed that defendant first tried unsuccessfully to find someone to cash the check and then he went to the bank. After writing his name on the check as payee, he gave the check to the teller to cash. Another lady, other than the teller, told security to hold him and he broke free from security and ran. He ran to a place where he previously lived and hid under the stairs until he was found by the police.\nDr. Jeffrey Lahti testified that he was working in the emergency room at Christ Hospital on August 8, 2001. The victim was brought to the hospital at approximately 10 p.m. and examined at around 3 a.m. on August 9 \u201cfor an evaluation for a sexual assault.\u201d During his interview, the victim stated that she had been \u201ctied and raped.\u201d The pelvic examination was normal. He did observe redness on her wrists and redness and swelling of her left ankle.\nJohn Onstwedder testified as an expert in fingerprint analysis, employed in the crime laboratory of the Illinois State Police. He examined the check presented on August 8 and found two fingerprints on the check which he compared with a fingerprint standard for the defendant. One print on the check was not clear enough for analysis but the other print matched the defendant\u2019s right thumb. He was unable to retrieve prints on the duct tape that he had received from the crime scene.\nJennifer Reynolds, an employee of Cellmark, a private laboratory, was qualified as an expert in DNA analysis. She testified that she conducted the DNA testing on the vaginal swab, and there was no DNA found on the swab belonging to anyone other than the victim.\nDr. Jennifer McCritchie testified as a DNA expert with the Illinois State Police. The vaginal, oral and rectal swabs from the victim did not contain semen, and neither did the fitted bedsheet. A semen stain was found on the victim\u2019s nightgown and housecoat. Neither semen stain contained sperm cells. On the nonsperm fraction of the nightgown stain there was a match to defendant\u2019s DNA in 7 of the 13 genetic markers, but 4 of those areas contained only partial information. Statistical analysis was performed on the other three areas, and the witness testified that \u201cthe profile that I found would be expected to occur in 1 of 190,000 black; 1 in 410,000 white; or 1 in 1,000,000 Hispanic unrelated individuals.\u201d\nDr. Miguel Stubbs testified that he had been treating the victim at a nursing home in Georgia since 2002. When she was admitted, she was 75 or 76 years old. She was suffering from moderate to severe dementia and a past stroke. When he first met the victim in 2002, she was already suffering from mild to moderate dementia and that the progression of such a condition takes a number of years.\nThe State rested after presenting the above witnesses, and the defense moved for a directed verdict, which was granted for counts IV and VIII. These counts had alleged criminal sexual assault based on penetration of the vagina by the defendant\u2019s penis. The defense did not present any evidence in its case in chief.\nJury deliberations began on July 28 and lasted for eight hours. On the second day of deliberations, the foreperson stated they did not have a unanimous verdict on one of the three counts and the jury was split 11 to 1. An hour later, the jurors sent a note stating that they had stopped deliberations, believing that they would not reach a unanimous verdict. Over defendant\u2019s objection, the trial court read the jury the Prim instruction, and the jury continued deliberating. Later that day, the jury did reach unanimous verdicts, finding defendant guilty of aggravated criminal sexual assault and forgery, and finding defendant not guilty of residential burglary.\nThe trial court sentenced defendant to 30 years\u2019 imprisonment for the aggravated sexual assault count and 5 years\u2019 imprisonment for the forgery count, with the sentences to be served consecutively. This appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nDefendant appeals claiming: (1) that the doctor\u2019s testimony that the victim stated that she had been \u201ctied and raped\u201d was inadmissible hearsay and violated his sixth amendment right to confrontation; (2) that the State failed to prove forgery beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the defendant was denied a fair trial because the jury was subjected to improper closing arguments concerning the law of forgery; and (4) that the defendant was denied a fair sentencing hearing.\nDoctor\u2019s Report of Victim\u2019s Statement\nDefendant claims that it was error for the trial court to admit the doctor\u2019s testimony concerning the victim\u2019s statement that she was \u201ctied and raped\u201d because, first, the statement did not fall within the hearsay exception for statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis; and second, because the admission of the statement violated defendant\u2019s sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.\nThis court will review this claim for plain error. Although the defense filed a pretrial motion seeking to exclude the victim\u2019s statement to the doctor on confrontation clause grounds and the defense objected again at trial during the doctor\u2019s testimony, the defense failed to raise the issue in his posttrial motion. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a \u201cdefendant must both specifically object at trial and raise the specific issue again in a posttrial motion to preserve any alleged error for review.\u201d People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005); People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 564 (2007). Although defendant did object to the statement at trial, defendant\u2019s posttrial motion raised nine separate claims but none claimed a hearsay error, a sixth amendment violation or any issue with respect to the doctor\u2019s testimony. Defendant concedes in his brief to this court that he failed to raise the issue in his posttrial motion.\nHowever, even when the defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, an appellate court may still review for plain error. \u201c[T]he plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error when (1) a clear or obvious error occurs and the evidence is so closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant, regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurs and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. However, if there is no error at all, we need not reach the question of plain error. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (plain error doctrine requires \u201cfirst\u201d that an error occurred); People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2006) (where \u201cthere was no error at all,\u201d there cannot be plain error).\nThe Illinois Supreme Court has held that when reviewing the admissibility of a hearsay statement, an appellate court must determine, first, whether the statement met the statutory requirements of a hearsay exception. Only if the court determines that the statement qualifies as a hearsay exception may the court then proceed to consider the sixth amendment issue. People v. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d 24, 34-35 (2007) (vacated appellate court opinion and remanded with instructions to consider the hearsay exception first before proceeding to the sixth amendment issue).\nHearsay analysis and sixth amendment analysis are completely different. A statement may be admissible under hearsay rules but barred by the sixth amendment and vice versa. As the Supreme Court observed, \u201c[a]n off-hand, overheard remark\u201d may be excluded by hearsay rules but permitted by the confrontation clause, while \u201cex parte examinations\u201d are sometimes admissible under modern hearsay rules but not \u201ccondoned\u201d by the sixth amendment. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 192, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 1364 (2004).\nThe rule against hearsay generally prevents the introduction at trial of out-of-court statements offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. People v. Murdock, 259 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1024 (1994). However, the rule has many exceptions. Section 115 \u2014 13 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2000)) provides a statutory exception to the hearsay rule, for statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis. It states in full:\n\u201cIn a prosecution for violation of Section 12 \u2014 13, 12 \u2014 14, 12 \u2014 14.1, 12 \u2014 15 or 12 \u2014 16 of the \u2018Criminal Code of 1961\u2019, statements made by the victim to medical personnel for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment including descriptions of the cause of symptom, pain or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall.be admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule.\u201d 725 ILCS 5/115 \u2014 13 (West 2000).\nThe above exception by this statute applies only in sexual assault cases. The five statutory sections listed in the exception are for, respectively: (1) criminal sexual assault; (2) aggravated criminal sexual assault; (3) predatory criminal sexual assault of a child; (4) criminal sexual abuse; and (5) aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13, 12 \u2014 14, 12 \u2014 14.1, 12 \u2014 15, 12 \u2014 16 (West 2000)).\nA trial court is \u201cvested with discretion\u201d in determining whether a victim\u2019s statements to a physician fall within the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, this court will reverse only for an abuse of discretion of a trial court\u2019s determination that the medical diagnosis exception applies. People v. Davis, 337 Ill. App. 3d 977, 989-90 (2003).\nDefendant claims that the trial court erred in admitting the victim\u2019s statement under the medical diagnosis exception because the victim allegedly did not go to the doctor for treatment but rather for evidence collection purposes. Defendant has failed to cite a single case to support his claim. In addition, the Illinois Supreme Court has previously rejected the distinction that defendant asks this court to draw between examining and treating physicians. People v. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d 220, 229-30 (1996).\nIn Falaster, a child claimed that she had been abused by her father for years. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 222-23. After the child victim contacted the authorities, she was referred to a registered nurse who took a history from the victim, prior to a physical examination. Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 223. The defendant objected to the nurse\u2019s testimony about the victim\u2019s history on the ground that \u201cthe victim underwent the examination solely as a means of developing evidence for use in a subsequent prosecution.\u201d Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 229.\nHolding that the victim\u2019s history was \u201cwithin the scope\u201d of the statutory exception, the supreme court stated that \u201cthe diagnostic purpose of the examination\u201d was not \u201cincompatible with its investigatory function,\u201d and that \u201cthe statute does not distinguish between examining physicians and treating physicians.\u201d Falaster, 173 Ill. 2d at 229-30; People v. Rushing, 192 Ill. App. 3d 444, 453 (1989) (holding that the medical diagnosis exception \u201cdoes not provide for a distinction between examining physicians and treating physicians,\u201d this court noted that the statutory \u201creference to diagnosis or treatment evinces a legislative intent *** not to limit the testimony only to treating physicians\u201d).\nSimilarly, in the case at bar, the diagnostic purpose of the examination was not incompatible with its investigative function. After answering questions at a police station, the victim was taken by a police detective to the emergency room of a hospital. During the evaluation by the emergency room physician, the victim told the doctor that she had been \u201ctied and raped.\u201d\nAlmost all emergency room visits by sexual assault victims will have both evidence collection aspects and medical aspects. If we were to hold that an evidence collection purpose made statements from a sexual assault evaluation inadmissible, we would in effect obliterate the statute, which applies only in sexual assault cases. See People v. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d 28, 37 (2005) (victim\u2019s description of sexual assault to emergency room physician and nurse was within statutory exception for medical diagnosis).\nSince we hold that the victim\u2019s statement to the doctor falls within the medical diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule, we now proceed to the confrontation clause issue. Melchor, 226 Ill. 2d at 34 (appellate court may proceed to sixth amendment issue after first determining that the trial court\u2019s hearsay ruling was correct). The defendant claims that introduction of the victim\u2019s statement that she was \u201ctied and raped\u201d violated his sixth amendment right to confront the witnesses against him, since the victim was unavailable to testify at trial.\nThere is no dispute that the victim was unavailable to testify at trial. The parties stipulated prior to trial that a doctor currently treating the victim would testify that the victim was not available to testify at trial due to a serious medical condition unrelated to the charges against defendant. Between the time of the incident and the time of defendant\u2019s trial, the elderly victim had been admitted to a nursing home, suffering from moderate to severe dementia.\nIn People v. Purcell, 364 Ill. App. 3d 283 (2006), the appellate court discussed the appropriate standard of review for a claim that a trial court admitted a hearsay statement in violation of the sixth amendment. We held that we will defer to a trial court\u2019s evidentiary ruling \u201cunless the \u2018 \u201ctrial court\u2019s exercise of discretion has been frustrated by an erroneous rule of law.\u201d \u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Purcell, 364 Ill. App. 3d at 293.\nThe sixth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that: \u201cIn all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him ***.\u201d U.S. Const., amend. VI. This part of the sixth amendment is known as the confrontation clause and applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment. People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 264 (2007).\nIn 2004, with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1254 (2004), the United States Supreme Court \u201cfundamentally altered its approach to confrontation clause analysis.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 264-65. Prior to Crawford, the United States Supreme Court had held that the sixth amendment permitted the introduction of hearsay statements by unavailable declarants, so long as the statements had \u201c \u2018adequate \u201cindicia of reliability.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 264, discussing and quoting Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597, 608, 100 S. Ct. 2531, 2589 (1980).\nIn Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held: \u201c[w]here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicum of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually proscribes: confrontation.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. Since, in the case at bar, there was no opportunity for cross-examination, the only question is whether the victim\u2019s statement to the emergency room physician was \u201ctestimonial.\u201d\nUnfortunately, \u201cthe Crawford Court explicitly declined to define what exactly makes a statement \u2018testimonial.\u2019 \u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 266 (discussing Crawford). After noting several possible definitions of \u201ctestimonial,\u201d the Crawford Court declined to adopt one, stating \u201c[w]e leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of \u2018testimonial.\u2019 \u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374. The Court noted that \u201c[rjegardless of the precise articulation, some statements qualify under any definition.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. The Court held: \u201cWhatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 203, 124 S. Ct. at 1374.\nIn Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823, 165 L. Ed. 2d 224, 237-38, 126 S. Ct. 2266, 2273-74 (2006), the United States Supreme Court modified the part of its Crawford holding that concerned police interrogation. In Davis, the Court held that some responses to police interrogation were testimonial, while others were not. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74. The Davis Court drew the following distinction:\n\u201cStatements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.\nThus, to apply Davis, we must determine whether the questioning qualified as \u201cpolice\u201d questioning and whether the \u201cprimary purpose\u201d was \u201cto meet an ongoing emergency\u201d or to \u201cprove past events.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 237, 126 S. Ct. at 2273-74.\nThe second question is easier to answer than the first, because in Davis the Court assumed without deciding that the 911 operators at issue in Davis were police agents. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2. As a result, the Davis Court focused on the second question, providing many examples and guidelines for analyzing \u201cprimary purpose\u201d but providing little guidance for determining what constitutes \u201cpolice\u201d interrogation. The Court left open for another day the question of \u201cwhen statements made to someone other than law enforcement personnel are \u2018testimonial.\u2019 \u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2.\nPursuant to the guidelines and examples provided by the Davis Court, there is no doubt that the primary purpose in the case at bar was to \u201cprove past events\u201d rather than to \u201cmeet an ongoing emergency.\u201d In Davis, the Court listed four factors that point to an ongoing emergency: (1) the declarant \u201cwas speaking about events as they were actually happening\u201d-, (2) the statement was \u201ca call for help against a bona fide physical threat\u201d; (3) \u201cthe *** statements were necessary to be able to resolve the present emergency\u201d; and (4) the declarant was not \u201cresponding calmly\u201d and was instead giving \u201cfrantic answers.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Davis, 547 U.S. at 827, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 240, 126 S. Ct. at 2276-77.\nAll four factors support a finding that the statement at bar was to prove past events. First, when the victim told the doctor that she had been \u201ctied and raped,\u201d she was not speaking about events as they were actually happening but rather about an event that had happened the day before. Second, her statement to the doctor was not a present cry for help against an existing physical threat, since she was safe in the hospital. Third, the statement was not intended to resolve a present emergency; in fact, the victim had stated that she did not want to see a doctor and the police waited approximately seven hours before transporting her to a hospital. Fourth, although the elderly victim was upset and cried several times during the male doctor\u2019s examination of her, there is nothing in the record to suggest that she was \u201cfrantic.\u201d\nIn Davis, the Court discussed a rape case as an example. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. In the case discussed, a young girl had \u201c \u2018immediately on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury\u2019 to her mother. [Citation.]\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. The Court stated that if the statement had recounted \u201cthe girl\u2019s screams for aid as she was being chased by her assailant\u201d then the statement would have concerned an ongoing emergency. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. However, \u201cby the time the victim got home, her story was an account of past events.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 828, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 241, 126 S. Ct. at 2277. Similarly, in the case at bar, by the time the victim had been questioned at the police station and then transported by police to a hospital, her story was an account of past events.\nThus, in the instant case, if the victim had made her statement about past events to a police officer, it would have qualified as testimonial pursuant to Davis. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 35 (statements made at hospital by sexual assault victim to police officers were testimonial for purposes of Crawford). The question then is whether our holding should be different because the police officer transported her to a doctor, so that the doctor took the statement instead of the officer who was waiting in the hospital.\nThe United States Supreme Court has stated that most cases applying the confrontation clause \u201cinvolved testimonial statements of the most formal sort \u2014 sworn testimony in prior judicial proceedings or formal depositions under oath.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 239, 126 S. Ct. at 2275-76. In Crawford, the Supreme Court found that modern police interrogations were also testimonial because \u201c[p]olice interrogations bear a striking resemblance to examinations by justices of the peace in England.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 193, 124 S. Ct. at 1364. The Court found that both had \u201can essentially investigative and prosecutorial function.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194, 124 S. Ct. at 1365.\nWhile the old English magistrate and the modern American police officer had a single essential function, which was to investigate, the issue of a doctor in a rape case is more complicated because the doctor has a dual function, both to investigate the alleged crime and to treat the victim medically. For example, the doctor in the case at bar served an investigative function by completing a rape kit, which required him to comb the victim\u2019s head and pubic hair looking for other people\u2019s hair and to obtain oral, vaginal and rectal swabs to check for the presence of other people\u2019s bodily fluids. As the doctor explained on the stand, he was \u201cto look for evidence.\u201d\nIn Davis, the United States Supreme Court held that \u201cwe do not think it [is] conceivable that the protections of the Confrontation Clause can readily be evaded by having a note-taking policeman recite the unsworn hearsay testimony of the declarant, instead of having the declarant sign a deposition.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 547 U.S. at 826, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 239, 126 S. Ct. at 2276. Similarly, this court finds that the protections of the confrontation clause cannot be evaded by having the note-taking policeman simply bring the victim to a note-taking doctor.\nIn Stechly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that statements of a sexual abuse victim to a nurse in an emergency room were \u201cunquestionably\u201d testimonial under Davis and thus barred by the confrontation clause, where the victim was unavailable for cross-examination. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 299. The victim\u2019s statements to the nurse concerned both the perpetrator\u2019s identity and the nature of the abuse. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 252, 256. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the nurse in Stechly was acting as an \u201cagent[ ] *** for purposes of confrontation clause analysis\u201d because the nurse took no further action other than to pass information on to the authorities. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 300-01. Similarly, in the case at bar, the emergency room doctor testified that he took no further action after performing \u201can evaluation for sexual assault,\u201d which included completing the rape kit. Thus Stechly requires a finding in the case at bar that the statement was testimonial.\nPrior to Stechly, the appellate court in West held that a sexual assault victim\u2019s statements about the nature of her assault to an emergency room doctor were not testimonial. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 37. However, this decision was prior to both the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Stechly and the United States Supreme Court\u2019s decision in Davis.\nHaving found a confrontation clause violation, we must next determine whether the error was \u201charmless beyond a reasonable doubt.\u201d \u201cCrawford violations are subject to harmless-error analysis.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 304; People v. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d 587, 594 (2004) (applying harmless error analysis to confrontation clause error). An error is harmless if \u201cit appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the error at issue did not contribute to the verdict obtained.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 304; People v. Nitz, 219 Ill. 2d 400, 410 (2006) (error is harmless if \u201cthe result would have been the same absent the error\u201d).\nTo determine whether an error was harmless, this court must consider: (1) whether the error \u201cmight have contributed to the conviction\u201d; (2) whether other evidence is \u201coverwhelming\u201d in support of the conviction; and (3) whether the erroneously admitted evidence is \u201ccumulative or duplicates properly admitted evidence.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 304-05; Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594 (same).\nThe \u201ctied and raped\u201d statement was admitted to support the conviction for aggravated criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14 (West 2000)). A person is guilty of \u201caggravated criminal sexual assault\u201d if he commits \u201ccriminal sexual assault\u201d on a victim 60 years of age or older. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(5) (West 2000). A person is guilty of \u201ccriminal sexual assault\u201d if he \u201ccommits an act of sexual penetration by the use of force.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 13(a)(1) (West 2000). \u201cSexual penetration\u201d is defined as either: \u201cany contact *** between the sex organ or anus of one person by an object, the sex organ, mouth or anus of another person,\u201d or \u201cany intrusion, however slight, of any part of the body of one person or of any animal or object into the sex organ or anus of another person.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 12(f) (West 2000). Since the essential elements of a crime must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the State had the burden of proving penetration beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 114 (2007) (due process requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt of \u201cthe essential elements of the crime\u201d).\nThe only evidence of the element of penetration consisted of: (1) the defendant\u2019s statement, transcribed by ASA Lynch, that the defendant inserted his finger into the victim\u2019s vagina; and (2) the victim\u2019s statement to the doctor that she was \u201craped.\u201d Finger insertion falls within the statute\u2019s definition of \u201cpenetration.\u201d Penetration is defined as including \u201cany intrusion\u201d by \u201cany part of the body,\u201d such as a finger, into the victim\u2019s vagina. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 12(f) (West 2000).\nApplying the three-part harmless error analysis, we find the error to be harmless. First, it is doubtful that the victim\u2019s statement contributed to the jury\u2019s finding of penetration. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594 (first prong of harmless error analysis requires the court to consider whether error \u201cmight have contributed to the conviction\u201d). The doctor\u2019s entire report of the victim\u2019s account of the crime was a mere seven words long: \u201cShe said she was tied and raped.\u201d When those seven words are compared against the detailed, multipage and signed confession of the defendant, it is hard to believe that the victim\u2019s statement had much impact.\nSecond, the defendant\u2019s statement was \u201coverwhelming\u201d evidence in support of his conviction. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594 (second prong of a harmless error analysis requires the court to consider whether other evidence was \u201coverwhelming\u201d). Defendant\u2019s statement was never recanted and never refuted. Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress his statement on the ground that he was in pain from injuries and suffering from heroin and alcohol withdrawal. During the suppression hearing, he testified about his pain and suffering. However, he never once claimed that the statement was not the truth; and we cannot find evidence in the record which contradicts the defendant\u2019s statement.\nSince the defendant\u2019s statement was unrecanted and unrefuted, it is completely distinguishable from the statement in Thompson, which this court found was not \u201coverwhelming\u201d evidence. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 595. In Thompson, the defendant was accused of assault, and the evidence of assault consisted of: police and medical testimony concerning the physical condition of the victim and the site; the defendant\u2019s inculpatory statements; and the victim\u2019s statements. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594. After finding that admission of the victim\u2019s statements violated the defendant\u2019s right to confrontation, this court then found that the error was not harmless because the other evidence was not \u201coverwhelming.\u201d Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95. In finding that the other evidence was not overwhelming, this court noted that the defendant had testified at trial and refuted the earlier inculpatory statements attributed to him. Thompson, 349 Ill. App. 3d at 594-95. Thus unlike the defendant\u2019s admission in the case at bar, the defendant\u2019s admission in Thompson was recanted and refuted.\nThird, it is difficult to assess whether the victim\u2019s statement of being \u201craped\u201d was cumulative of other properly admitted evidence. The defendant\u2019s confession admitted only finger penetration. Without the victim on the stand, it is difficult to ascertain what she meant by the word \u201crape,\u201d whether or not in her mind the term was broad enough to include finger penetration. However, considering the overwhelming nature of the other evidence, this court finds that the confrontation clause error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Since the error was harmless, we do not have to consider whether it rose to the level of plain error.\nIn his petition for a rehearing, defendant cited the Illinois Supreme Court\u2019s opinion in People v. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d 246, 305 (2007), for the proposition that a sexual assault victim\u2019s statement about the attack will always have an impact upon the jury. In Stechly, the supreme court held that the admission of a nontestifying victim\u2019s statements violated the defendant\u2019s confrontation clause rights and was not harmless error. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 302, 305. The supreme court observed: \u201c \u2018The statements of a victim identifying her attacker and describing the attack are extremely powerful evidence of a defendant\u2019s guilt. It would be difficult to argue that such statements did not contribute to [a guilty] verdict.\u2019 \u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305, quoting dicta in People v. Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d 407, 436 (2005).\nComparing the magnitude of the error in Stechly to the error in our case is like comparing an elephant to a pin. The wrongfully admitted evidence in Stechly consisted of multiple, lengthy and detailed statements. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305. When recounting one of the child victim\u2019s statements, even the social worker noted that the statement was unusually long and comprehensive. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 253. The testimony included the child\u2019s \u201cdemonstration of the conduct at issue through the use of dolls.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305. In describing the harm done by the admission of these statements, the supreme court noted the statements were \u201cprecise,\u201d \u201cclear\u201d and \u201cconsistent with each other.\u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305. The supreme court was particularly troubled by the fact that the \u201cchild\u2019s consistent repetition of the story strongly reinforced its believability.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 309. The supreme court did not find the other evidence overwhelming because at trial the defendant recanted his prior confession and there were inconsistencies in the witnesses\u2019 testimony. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305-08.\nBy contrast, in the case at bar, there was no repetition and no demonstrations with dolls. There were no concerns about reinforcement through consistency, because there was only one statement. The one statement was neither lengthy nor detailed. In the case at bar, it was the defendant\u2019s confession that was lengthy and detailed, not the victim\u2019s statement. The victim\u2019s three-word \u201ctied and raped\u201d statement is not the sort of attack description that our supreme court was worried would become \u201c \u2018powerful evidence.\u2019 \u201d Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 305, quoting Patterson, 217 Ill. 2d at 436. In sum, the victim\u2019s three-word statement does not compare to the multiple, lengthy, detailed statements and doll demonstrations that the supreme court in Stechly found to be powerful evidence.\nForgery Conviction\nDefendant also claims that the state failed to prove him guilty of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution \u201crequires that a person may not be convicted in state court \u2018except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.\u2019 \u201d People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004), quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1073 (1970).\nWhen we review a claim that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction, \u201cthe question is \u2018whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278, quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); People v. Hunter, 331 Ill. App. 3d 1017, 1025 (2002). \u201cThe Jackson standard applies in all criminal cases, regardless of the nature of the evidence.\u201d Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 279. In applying this standard, \u201c[a] reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the record in favor of the prosecution.\u201d Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 280.\nDefendant claims on appeal that the State failed to prove forgery beyond a reasonable doubt, because the indictment alleged that the check was not written by the victim when the State\u2019s evidence showed that almost all of the check was actually written by the victim.\nCount XVI, the forgery by delivery count of the indictment, alleged that the defendant:\n\u201cwith intent to defraud, knowingly delivered a document to wit: a check- number 1602, dated August 8, 2001, in the amount of $7,000.00, on the account of Juanita Cartman, drawn on Bank One, made payable to Charles Spicer, apparently capable of defrauding another in such a manner that it purported to have been made by Juanita Cartman, knowing that it was not made by Juanita Cartman, in violation of Chapter 720 Act 5 Section 17 \u2014 3(a)(2) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes 1992 as amended.\u201d\nSection 17 \u2014 3(a)(2) states: \u201cA person commits forgery when, with intent to defraud, he knowingly: *** (2) issues or delivers such document knowing it to have been thus made or altered.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/17\u2014 3(a)(2) (West 2000). \u201c[S]uch document\u201d is defined as:\n\u201cany document apparently capable of defrauding another in such manner that it purports to have been made by another or at another time, or with different provisions, or by authority of one who did not give such authority[.]\u201d 720 ILCS 5/17 \u2014 3(a)(1) (West 2000).\nIn essence, the defendant claims that the indictment charged the first clause of the above statutory definition, that the check \u201cpurports to have been made by another,\u201d when the State\u2019s evidence proved that most of the check was not \u201cmade by another\u201d but in fact was made by the victim herself.\nThe only evidence presented at trial concerning the making of the check came from the written statement signed by defendant. The defendant stated that the victim made out the check except for the payee line, which the defendant made out to himself. The defendant\u2019s statement was corroborated by the testimony of the bank teller, who stated that \u201c[t]he payee was filled in, but it wasn\u2019t the account holder\u2019s handwriting.\u201d\nDefendant claims that the case at bar is similar to People v. Lindquist, 97 Ill. App. 3d 894 (1981). See also People v. Rennels, 227 Ill. App. 3d 263 (1992). In Lindquist, the defendant, as estate executor, had the authority to write checks on the estate account. Lindquist, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 895. The State claimed that he committed forgery when he wrote checks to withdraw funds for his own purposes. Lindquist, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 895. The appellate court stated that it was surprised that the defendant was not charged with theft, but held that he was not guilty of forgery. Lindquist, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 895.\nThe Lindquist case is completely different from the case at bar. Unlike the defendant in Lindquist, the defendant in the case at bar had no authority either to write checks or to withdraw funds from the victim\u2019s account.\nPeople v. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d 742 (1993), cited by the State, is more instructive. In Murrah, the defendant was charged with forgery in connection with an application for a corporate credit card. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 743. The defendant\u2019s supervisor testified that when he signed the application for the corporate credit card, the line for \u201cadditional cards for other employees\u201d was blank. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 744. At some point, defendant\u2019s name was typed on that line, and the defendant received a credit card. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 744. The appellate court found that the jury could have inferred that the defendant added his name after his supervisor had signed the application and that this inference was sufficient to support the charge that the defendant \u201cmade or altered a document\u201d with intent to defraud. Murrah, 255 Ill. App. 3d at 747. The Murrah defendant\u2019s adding his name to the credit card application is similar to our defendant\u2019s adding his name to the victim\u2019s check. People v. Kubanek, 370 Ill. 646, 648 (1939) (defendant was guilty of forgery \u201cby filling in the checks over the admittedly genuine signature of\u2019 the victim).\nThus, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this court finds that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime of forgery beyond a reasonable doubt.\nClosing Argument\nThe defendant claims that he was denied a fair trial because the prosecutor in closing argument allegedly suggested that duress or coercion was an element of forgery, which is not the law.\nThe defendant waived this issue by failing to object at trial. People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005) (error is not preserved for appellate review if defendant fails to \u201cspecifically object at trial\u201d); Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564. As noted above, even when the defendant has failed to preserve an error for review, an appellate court may still review for plain error. The plain error doctrine allows a reviewing court to consider an unpreserved error when either (1) the evidence is \u201cso closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,\u201d or (2) the \u201cerror was so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. \u201c \u2018In both instances, the burden of persuasion remains with the defendant.\u2019 \u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 564, quoting People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (2005).\nAs noted above, before we may examine either prong of the plain error doctrine, we must first determine whether there was any error at all. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (plain error doctrine requires \u201cfirst\u201d that an error occurred); People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2006) (where \u201cthere was no error at all,\u201d there cannot be plain error); People v. Johnson, 218 Ill. 2d 125, 139 (2005) (\u201cClearly, there can be no plain error if there is no error\u201d). For a prosecutor\u2019s closing remarks to constitute error, they must fall outside the \u201cwide latitude\u201d accorded a prosecutor in making a closing. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2006); People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 513 (2005) (\u201c[t]he law gives a prosecutor wide latitude in argument\u201d). \u201cIn closing, the prosecutor may comment on the evidence and any fair, reasonable inferences it yields.\u201d Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 121; Hart, 214 Ill. 2d at 513. \u201cA closing argument must be viewed in its entirety, and the challenged remarks must be viewed in their context.\u201d Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 122.\nThe defendant claims that the prosecutor erred in closing argument when he made the following two remarks. First, the prosecutor stated: \u201cIt\u2019s her writing [on the check]; but make no mistake about it, he\u2019s the one that made the check. He just used her hands to do it.\u201d Second, during rebuttal, the prosecutor stated that it was unreasonable for the defense to argue that \u201c[s]he wasn\u2019t forced to write out that check.\u201d\nThe defendant cannot now object to the prosecutor\u2019s remark in rebuttal when defense counsel invited the alleged error. A defendant cannot complain on appeal about an error that was \u201cprocured or invited by the defendant\u201d at trial. People v. Harvey, 211 Ill. 2d 368, 386 (2004); People v. Bush, 214 Ill. 2d 318, 333 (2005); People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 114 (2001). The prosecutor made the rebuttal remark in response to defense counsel\u2019s remarks in the defense closing that the State had failed to prove that the defendant \u201cmade her write him a check.\u201d Defense counsel argued in closing that the State had failed to prove:\n\u201cwhether it [the check] was given to him willingly or not by Juanita Cartman, whether she knew he had it, whether she wrote it out for him under force, duress, we don\u2019t know these things. They haven\u2019t been proved.\u201d\nIn closing, the defense put forth the \u201ctheory\u201d that the elderly victim was acting not out of duress but out of confusion:\n\u201cNow here is a theory *** Ms. Cartman would not be the first elderly person to lose control of a large sum of money they did not mean to lose. She would not be the first person who wrote out a check with too many zeroes on the end or wrote a check thinking they were paying for something and found out later they were never going to get it.\u201d\nDefense\u2019s repeated comments about lack of force or duress certainly invited the prosecutor\u2019s rebuttal comment to the jury that \u201cyou don\u2019t believe *** for one minute\u201d the defense assertion that \u201c[s]he wasn\u2019t forced to write out that check.\u201d People v. Sutton, 316 Ill. App. 3d 874, 893 (2000) (\u201c[wjhere there are allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [during closing], arguments of both the prosecutor and defense counsel must be reviewed in their entirety\u201d).\nAs for the first allegedly improper comment, that the defendant forced the victim to write the check, the defendant claims that this remark was a \u201cmisstatement\u201d by the prosecutor that duress or force was an element of fraud. First, the statement was factually not a \u201cmisstatement\u201d but a more than reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence presented at trial. Second, the prosecutor never told the jury that duress or force was an element of fraud; and to the extent that the jury was laboring under that misapprehension, the court properly instructed the jury about the elements of fraud. The defendant has not challenged any aspect of the jury charge on appeal. Viewing the closing in its entirety and in context, this court cannot find that the two challenged remarks constituted reversible error. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d at 122 (closing \u201cmust be viewed in its entirety\u201d and \u201cremarks must be viewed in their context\u201d).\nEven if there was error, it did not rise to the level of plain error. First, the evidence supporting the forgery charge was not closely balanced. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565 (plain error if evidence is \u201cso closely balanced that the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant\u201d); Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. On one side of the scale, the evidence of forgery included: (1) defendant\u2019s signed and detailed statement concerning the making of the check; (2) the fingerprint expert\u2019s testimony about the defendant\u2019s fingerprint on the check; (3) the teller\u2019s testimony concerning the defendant\u2019s presentation of the check at the bank, and the fact that the payee was in a different handwriting than the balance of the check; and (4) testimony by the teller, the security guard, and the police officer about the defendant\u2019s immediate flight out of the door of the bank, over a fence at a construction site and finally hiding under a porch of a nearby building. People v. Harris, 225 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2007) (\u201cevidence of flight\u201d is generally \u201cadmissible as proof of consciousness of guilt\u201d); People v. Hart, 214 Ill. 2d 490, 519 (2005) (same). On the other side of the scale, there was no evidence disputing the forgery. Far from being closely balanced, the scales tipped heavily toward the jury\u2019s verdict of forgery. In Piatkowski, the Illinois Supreme Court recently held that the evidence in the case before it was not closely balanced where the State presented \u201cno physical evidence to connect defendant\u201d to the crime and \u201cno inculpatory statements by defendant.\u201d Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 567. In contrast to Piatkowski, the case at bar included both physical evidence, such as the check with defendant\u2019s fingerprint, and the defendant\u2019s highly inculpatory statements, as well as the teller\u2019s eyewitness testimony about the check\u2019s presentation and separate handwriting for the line of the payee, and the defendant\u2019s flight.\nSecond, if there was an error in the prosecutor\u2019s closing argument, it was not so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant\u2019s trial. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 565; Woods, 214 Ill. 2d at 471. As discussed above, the first allegedly improper remark was invited by defense counsel; and the second remark was a factual assertion reasonably drawn from the evidence which did not state that duress or force was an element of forgery. Thus, even assuming there was an error, the defendant has failed to show that it rose to the level of plain error.\nSentencing Hearing\nDefendant claims that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing when he received the maximum sentence of 30 years for aggravated sexual assault. Defendant claims that the sentencing court erred: (1) by relying on a police report for the facts of defendant\u2019s prior conviction; (2) by considering the victim\u2019s age as an aggravating factor when age was already an element of the offense; and (3) by failing to consider mitigating factors, such as defendant\u2019s lack of a lengthy criminal record. In his brief to this court, the defendant concedes that he waived these issues by failing to raise them properly below and that the plain error doctrine applies.\n\u201cIt is well settled that a trial judge\u2019s sentencing decisions are entitled to great deference and will not be altered on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.\u201d People v. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d 796, 800 (2007). \u201cA sentence which falls within the statutory range is not an abuse of discretion unless it is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.\u201d Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 800. Although the sentencing court in the case at bar chose to give the maximum sentence, that sentence was still within the statutory range (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(d)(1) (West 2000)), and defendant has not claimed on appeal that his sentence was \u201cmanifestly disproportionate\u201d to the crime.\nFirst, with respect to the police report, there is no evidence that the sentencing court relied on it for purposes of sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor informed the court that the defendant had pled guilty on April 6, 1993, to attempted robbery and aggravated battery of an 88-year-old victim, for which the defendant received a sentence of three years. The defense did not dispute the fact of the conviction or the age of the victim, at sentencing or on this appeal.\nThe prosecutor then related the following facts from a detective\u2019s report about the 1993 case:\n\u201cIn a very similar manner, the facts involve the defendant talking his way into her apartment, asking for money, taking her into her bedroom. When she refused to give him money, slapping and hitting this victim who sustained injuries in that case, a small cut to the right side of the face, a bruise to the left chest area and a minor bruise to the neck area. *** The victim also related to the police that a neighbor called during this incident and the neighbor even told the police that the victim said to her, he\u2019s back again and he\u2019s hitting me. And heard the victim say ouch, stop hitting me.\u201d\nDuring the sentencing hearing, the trial court did not refer to the details contained in the police report. With respect to the 1993 case, the trial court focused primarily on the victim\u2019s age, noting that it was another aggravated battery \u201cwith another elderly woman.\u201d In announcing the sentence, the trial court stated:\n\u201cThis is two offenses for violence against women who are senior citizens. And real senior citizens. We are not talking about somebody coming home from working out at the health club who happens to be 61 or 65. That would make him a senior citizen. Those women were well beyond that age.\nI think that society requires based on facts of the case and background, on count nine will merge into count seven, on count seven I sentence you to 30 years [in the] Illinois Department of Corrections.\u201d\nThe above remarks indicate that the trial court relied primarily not on the details in the police report, but on the facts of the conviction and the prior victim\u2019s age, facts that the defense has never disputed or raised as an issue on this appeal. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 172 (1998) (noting that \u201cthe trial judge did not cite to any of the evidence here challenged\u201d). \u201c[W]hen the trial judge is the sentence^ it is presumed that the trial judge based his decision upon competent and reliable evidence.\u201d Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 174. The defendant in the case at bar has failed to rebut that presumption.\nEven if the sentencing court had relied on the police report, that fact alone would not require resentencing. The defendant objects to admission of the report as hearsay. However, a court is permitted to consider hearsay information at sentencing. People v. Harris, 375 Ill. App. 3d 398, 409 (2007). The \u201cordinary rules of evidence which govern at trial are relaxed at the sentencing hearing.\u201d Harris, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 408. At sentencing, a \u201chearsay objection affects the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence.\u201d Harris, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 409.\nIt is left to the \u201csound discretion\u201d of the trial court to determine whether hearsay is reliable enough to weigh in sentencing. Harris, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 410. The Illinois Supreme Court has held that a sentencing court may consider even uncharged conduct contained in a rap sheet. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 171, 172 (1998) (\u201cdefendant\u2019s Chicago police department \u2018rap sheet\u2019 which indicated defendant\u2019s prior arrests\u201d was relevant to sentencing \u201cbecause it provides an insight into the defendant\u2019s character\u201d).\nSecond, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly considered the victim\u2019s age as an aggravating factor in sentencing when the victim\u2019s age was already an element of the offense. Aggravated sexual assault requires, as an element of the offense, finding one factor from a list of aggravating factors. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a) (West 2000). One of these factors is that \u201cthe victim was 60 years of age or over when the offense was committed.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(5) (West 2000).\n\u201cAs a general rule, the consideration of a factor which is necessarily implicit in an offense cannot be used as an aggravating factor in sentencing.\u201d People v. Burge, 254 Ill. App. 3d 85, 88 (1993). \u201cStated differently, a single factor cannot be used both as an element of an offense and as a basis for imposing \u2018a harsher sentence than might have otherwise have been imposed.\u2019 \u201d People v. Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2004), quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1992). \u201cSuch dual use of a single factor is often referred to as a \u2018double enhancement.\u2019 \u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12, quoting Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d at 85.\nIn support of his claim that the trial court erred in sentencing him, the defendant cited People v. White, 114 Ill. 2d 61 (1986), which the supreme court called a \u201ctextbook example of double enhancement.\u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12. The supreme court explained that: \u201cIn White, this court held that *** the victim\u2019s age cannot form the basis for an extended-term sentence where the defendant is convicted of aggravated battery of a child.\u201d Phelps, 211 Ill. 2d at 12. However, White is distinguishable from the case at bar because in the case at bar, age was not used as the basis for an extended-term sentence. The trial court in the case at bar sentenced the defendant within the statutory maximum for the offense. The other two cases cited by defendant in support of his claim also involved extended-term sentences, and are similarly distinguishable.\nAlthough it is a \u201cgeneral rule\u201d that an element of the offense should not also be used as a sentencing factor, \u201cthis rule should not be applied rigidly.\u201d Burge, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 88. \u201cThe rule that a court may not consider a factor inherent in the offense is not meant to be applied rigidly, because sound public policy dictates that a sentence be varied in accordance with the circumstances of the offense.\u201d People v. Cain, 221 Ill. App. 3d 574, 575 (1991). Thus, a sentencing court may consider \u201cthe degree of harm threatened\u201d in an armed robbery although threatened harm is implicit in the offense (Burge, 254 Ill. App. 3d at 89); and the degree of harm in an aggravated criminal sexual assault, although \u201cserious harm *** [is] an element implicit in the crime.\u201d People v. Smith, 215 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1038 (1991).\nIn assessing the degree of harm, a sentencing court may consider, for example, \u201cwhether the victim is particularly young\u201d even though the victim\u2019s age is an element of the sexual assault count for which defendant was convicted. (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d 1133, 1144 (2000). In Thurmond, the sexual assault victim was only 12 years old. Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1136. The appellate court held that \u201cthe trial court did not err by recognizing that [the victim] was particularly young at the time of the offense.\u201d Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1144-45. The appellate court stated \u201cthere is a difference between being under age 18 and being significantly under age 18.\u201d Thurmond, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 1144.\nJust as a trial court may consider whether a sexual assault victim was particularly young, a trial court may also consider whether a victim was particularly senior. In the case at bar, the trial court did not err when it considered that the victim was 15 years above the age required in the statute. The victim in the case at bar was 75 or 76 years old at the time of the offense, and the age required for aggravated sexual assault was only 60. 720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 14(a)(5) (West 2000).\nThird, the defendant claims that the sentencing court failed to consider mitigating factors, such as defendant\u2019s lack of a lengthy criminal record, his associate\u2019s degree, his work history and his honorable discharge from the military. Defense counsel stated most of these facts at sentencing, and the trial judge acknowledged that he had \u201c[r]eviewed the background\u201d and that \u201cthere are many things that go into sentencing.\u201d\n\u201c[Tjhere is no mandatory requirement that the trial judge recite all\u201d the mitigating and aggravating factors \u201cbefore imposing sentence.\u201d Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 802. \u201cIt is presumed that the trial judge considered all of the factors unless the record indicates to the contrary.\u201d Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 802. We can find no evidence of \u201can abuse of discretion\u201d in the sentencing record. Jackson, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 800.\nCorrection of Mittimus\nBoth the State and the defense agree that the mittimus must be corrected. The \u201cOrder of Commitment and Sentence\u201d states that the defendant was \u201cadjudged guilty of the offense(s) enumerated below\u201d and then lists three separate offenses: (1) \u201cAGG. CRIM SEX ASSAULT/FELONY\u201d; (2) \u201cAGG. CRIM SEX ASLT/VICTIM>60\u201d; and (3) \u201cFORGERY/ISSUE/DELIVER DOCUMENT.\u201d\nAt sentencing, the trial court merged count IX, aggravated criminal sexual assault based on the victim\u2019s age, with count VII, aggravated criminal sexual assault predicated on its commission during a residential burglary. However, the jury had acquitted defendant of residential burglary.\nThe jury found defendant guilty of, and the trial court entered judgment and sentenced defendant on, one count of aggravated criminal sexual assault and on one count of forgery. Accordingly, the order must be corrected to eliminate \u201cAGG. CRIM SEX ASSAULT/ FELONY.\u201d \u201cPursuant to Supreme Court Rule 615 (134 Ill. 2d R. 615), a reviewing court on appeal may correct the mittimus at any time, without remanding the cause to the trial court.\u201d People v. Jones, 371 Ill. App. 3d 303, 310 (2007).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, the defendant\u2019s conviction and sentence are affirmed, and the mittimus is corrected.\nAffirmed.\nCAHILL, EJ., and WOLFSON, J., concur.\nRaymond Doherty was a sergeant at the time of trial and a detective at the time of the investigation.\nAt trial, the following exchange occurred. Defense counsel asked: \u201cDr. Lahti, when you interviewed Ms. Cartman, what did she say had been done to her?\u201d The defense counsel stated: \u201cObjection.\u201d The court responded: \u201cOverruled.\u201d The doctor answered: \u201cShe said she was tied and raped.\u201d\nDefendant does not claim that the particular statement at issue, that the victim was \u201ctied and raped,\u201d was not pertinent to the victim\u2019s diagnosis and treatment. Instead, defendant claims that the entire examination was for evidentiary rather than diagnostic purposes.\nIn Crawford, the United States Supreme Court stated that \u201cthe term \u2018interrogation\u2019 \u201d was to be used \u201cin its colloquial, rather than any technical legal[ ]sense.\u201d Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4, 158 L. Ed. 2d at 194 n.4, 124 S. Ct. at 1365 n.4; West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 35 (\u201caccording to Crawford, the term \u2018interrogation\u2019 is to be viewed in a colloquial, rather than a technical, sense\u201d).\nThe Davis Court stated: \u201cIf 911 operators are not themselves law enforcement officers, they may at least be agents of law enforcement when they conduct interrogations of 911 callers. For purposes of this opinion (and without deciding the point), we consider their acts to be acts of the police.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 238 n.2, 126 S. Ct. at 2274 n.2.\nOur opinion \u201cin no way impugned\u201d the police officer\u2019s action in bringing the victim to the doctor. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243 n.6, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6. Unlike other constitutional clauses such as the Fourth Amendment\u2019s guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure, the confrontation clause \u201cin no way governs police conduct.\u201d Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243 n.6, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6. The Confrontation Clause regulates \u201cthe trial use of\u2019 properly obtained statements. (Emphasis omitted.) Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 n.6, 165 L. Ed. 2d at 243 n.6, 126 S. Ct. at 2279 n.6.\nThe court in West held that while a sexual assault victim\u2019s statements about the nature of her assault to a police officer were testimonial, her subsequent, similar statements to an emergency room doctor were not. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 37.\nIn West, the appellate court held that the victim\u2019s statements to the doctor about the nature of the attack were nontestimonial and thus admissible under the sixth amendment, whereas the victim\u2019s statements to the doctor about the identity of the perpetrator were testimonial and thus not admissible. West, 355 Ill. App. 3d at 37. As noted above, the Illinois Supreme Court in Stechly held inadmissible the victim\u2019s statements about both the identity of the perpetrator and the nature of the sexual abuse. Stechly, 225 Ill. 2d at 252, 256. The supreme court did not draw the same distinction between identity and nature of the assault that the appellate court did.\nThe semen found on the victim\u2019s housecoat is not evidence of penetration. It is consistent with the defendant\u2019s statement that he placed his penis on the victim\u2019s thigh and did not penetrate. In fact, it could be argued that the presence of semen on the housecoat and not on the vaginal or anal swabs is evidence of a lack of penetration.\nThe defendant was not charged with criminal sexual abuse, which would have required only sexual conduct and not penetration (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 15 (West 2000)). \u201cSexual conduct\u201d includes \u201cany transfer or transmission of semen by the accused upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim\u201d (720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 12(e) (West 2000)).\nThe defendant\u2019s statement that he placed his penis on the victim\u2019s thigh was not evidence of \u201cpenetration\u201d as defined in the statute. The statute requires either intrusion or a certain type of contact. First, placing his penis on the victim\u2019s thigh was not an intrusion into her \u201csex organ\u201d or anus, as the statute requires. Second, the act did not qualify as a \u201ccontact\u201d either. To be a \u201ccontact,\u201d his penis would have to come in contact with \u201can object, the sex organ, mouth or anus\u201d of the victim. Her thigh is not an object or sex organ, so it does not fall within the plain language of the statute. Later in the same sentence, the legislators used the words \u201cany part of the body,\u201d but they chose not to use it here.\nThe defendant\u2019s statement by itself was, without a doubt, sufficient evidence for a jury to find the defendant guilty of penetration. People v. McIntosh, 305 Ill. App. 3d 462, 467-68 (1999) (victim\u2019s statement was sufficient to prove sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt). However, the question on this appeal is not whether the defendant\u2019s statement was sufficient evidence, but whether it was such overwhelming evidence that admission of the victim\u2019s statement was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that it was.\nAt the suppression hearing, the assistant State\u2019s Attorney asked the defedant: \u201cI take it then that you don\u2019t remember giving all of the details that are contained in this 6 page statement? You don\u2019t remember telling the state\u2019s attorney that information?\u201d The defendant responded: \u201cI recollect.\u201d\nThe indictment alleged two counts of forgery: forgery by knowingly altering a document, in violation of section 17 \u2014 3(a)(1) (720 ILCS 5/17\u2014 3(a)(1) (West 2000)); and forgery by knowingly delivering a document, in violation of section 17 \u2014 3(a)(2) (720 ILCS 5/17 \u2014 3(a)(2) (West 2000)). In the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury on only the latter type of forgery, forgery by delivery.\nThe jury charge also stated that the jury had to find that \u201cthe defendant knowingly issued or delivered a check which he knew had been made or altered so that it appeared to have been made by another.\u201d\nIt is curious that, in a case such as this where the crime was perpetuated by duress and threat of force, neither the indictment nor the jury instructions charged the third clause: \u201cby authority of one who did not give such authority.\u201d 720 ILCS 5/17 \u2014 3(a)(1) (West 2000).\nAt sentencing, the defendant disputed having committed the aggravated battery but admitted the conviction. Defendant claimed that he pled guilty in 1993 in order to \u201c[g]et it over with, they came to me with the battery charge and I took.\u201d\nThe defendant also cited People v. Conover, 84 Ill. 2d 400 (1981), and People v. Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d 86 (1989). Conover and Ferguson involved the question of whether the aggravating factor permitted the sentencing court to impose \u201can extended-term sentence\u201d (Ferguson, 132 Ill. 2d at 95) or \u201ca more severe penalty\u201d (Conover, 84 Ill. 2d at 405) for the offense than the legislature had authorized for the offense. These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar because the trial court in the case at bar sentenced the defendant within the statutory maximum for the offense.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael J. Pelletier and Lisa Southerland, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Richard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon-Malavia, Tasha Marie Kelly, and Shannan McFadden, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CHARLES SPICER, Defendant-Appellant.\nFirst District (1st Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20143358\nOpinion filed December 10, 2007.\nModified on denial of rehearing February 25, 2008.\nMichael J. Pelletier and Lisa Southerland, both of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRichard A. Devine, State\u2019s Attorney, of Chicago (James E. Fitzgerald, Veronica Calderon-Malavia, Tasha Marie Kelly, and Shannan McFadden, Assistant State\u2019s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0441-01", "first_page_order": 457, "last_page_order": 485 }