{ "id": 4276051, "name": "LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant; LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "Benjamin v. McKinnon", "decision_date": "2008-02-26", "docket_number": "Nos. 4-07-0079, 4-07-0080 cons.", "first_page": "1013", "last_page": "1025", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "379 Ill. App. 3d 1013" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "726 N.E.2d 175", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "179" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "311 Ill. App. 3d 971", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 415385 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "976" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/311/0971-01" ] }, { "cite": "732 N.E.2d 1129", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1134" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980737 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "244" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "693 N.E.2d 358", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "372" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "181 Ill. 2d 460", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 821410 ], "year": 1998, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "487" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/181/0460-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.W.3d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8331069 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/213/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "noting the defendant was \"related by marriage\" to his mother-in-law" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493847 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93", "parenthetical": "noting the defendant was \"related by marriage\" to his mother-in-law" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0087-01" ] }, { "cite": "821 N.E.2d 698", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "704" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "354 Ill. App. 3d 506", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3215142 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "512" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/354/0506-01" ] }, { "cite": "843 N.E.2d 292", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "296" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "218 Ill. 2d 148", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5735959 ], "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "154" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/218/0148-01" ] }, { "cite": "728 N.E.2d 1234", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1236" }, { "page": "1236", "parenthetical": "applying the exception to an expired order of protection" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "313 Ill. App. 3d 286", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 186508 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "288" }, { "page": "288" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/313/0286-01" ] }, { "cite": "345 N.E.2d 493", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "495" } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "63 Ill. 2d 128", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5426498 ], "year": 1976, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "133" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/63/0128-01" ] }, { "cite": "818 N.E.2d 824", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "826", "parenthetical": "\"We cannot read words into a statute that are not there\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "353 Ill. App. 3d 415", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3365104 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "417", "parenthetical": "\"We cannot read words into a statute that are not there\"" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/353/0415-01" ] }, { "cite": "213 S.W.3d 159", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "S.W.3d", "case_ids": [ 8331069 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" }, { "page": "160" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/sw3d/213/0159-01" ] }, { "cite": "473 N.E.2d 548", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "553", "parenthetical": "noting the defendant was \"related by marriage\" to his mother-in-law" } ], "opinion_index": 1 }, { "cite": "130 Ill. App. 3d 87", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3493847 ], "year": 1984, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "93" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/130/0087-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1162, "char_count": 30527, "ocr_confidence": 0.759, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.527646540942415e-08, "percentile": 0.3471310489530471 }, "sha256": "4039b0c4e1ced22c69bbd12d810df6290b6236b7dd8d2411c3c7b94cac137d24", "simhash": "1:5e2b94c627c288d4", "word_count": 5001 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:50:11.340315+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nIn separate April 5, 2006, petitions, plaintiff, Lonna Benjamin, sought orders of protection against defendant Terry McKinnon and defendant Jeremy McKinnon, Terry\u2019s son. That same day, the trial court granted ex parte emergency orders of protection against both defendants. In June 2006, plaintiff filed amended order-of-protection petitions. After a September 2006 hearing on the amended petitions, the court granted plaintiff an order of protection for one year against Jeremy but denied her one against Terry. Jeremy filed a motion to reconsider, and Terry filed a motion for sanctions under Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137). After a January 2007 hearing, the court denied both motions.\nDefendants appeal, asserting (1) the order of protection against Jeremy should be vacated because Jeremy does not fall under the definition of \u201cfamily or household member\u201d and (2) the trial court erred by denying Terry\u2019s Rule 137 motion. We affirm.\nI. BACKGROUND\nPlaintiff sought an order of protection against Jeremy and Terry based on a verbal skirmish that took place at her residence in the early morning hours of April 1, 2006. In her order-of-protection petitions, plaintiff marked \u201cother related by blood or marriage\u201d as her relationship to Jeremy and Terry. The trial court granted plaintiff emergency orders of protection against defendants. In May 2006, Terry filed a motion to dismiss, asserting, inter alia, that he was not related by blood or marriage to plaintiff. He noted one of his children had been married to one of plaintiffs children but that the couple divorced in October 2005. After a June 2006 hearing, the court denied Terry\u2019s motion. (A transcript of that hearing is not included in the record on appeal.)\nOn September 6, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on the petition for plenary orders of protection. Lonna testified on her own behalf. She stated that at approximately 2 a.m. on April 1, 2006, she was watching television when she heard a vehicle \u201ccome barreling down the street.\u201d She looked out the window and saw the vehicle stopped for approximately a minute at a stop sign. She said the pickup truck she saw looked to her like Jeremy\u2019s. She then heard the truck \u201crev just like someone laid on the gas pedal, just revved up.\u201d Lonna estimated her house to be about 40 to 50 feet from the stop sign. Lonna stated that the truck drove past the stop sign, stopped, and then Jeremy got out of the vehicle.\nLonna went outside to the front porch. Lonna testified, \u201c[Jeremy] was yelling and screaming that \u2014 saying [\u2018]that pussy mother \u2014 send that pussy motherfucker out so I can beat his ass.[\u2019] \u201d Lonna testified she knew Jeremy to be referring to her son Lucas because Lucas and Jeremy \u201chave had history.\u201d Lonna stated that she asked Jeremy to leave the property and that he responded that he \u201c \u2018would kill all you mother fuckers.\u2019 \u201d She again told Jeremy to leave the property. Jeremy did not leave, and Lonna and Jeremy \u201cargued back and forth.\u201d\nEventually, Jeremy exited the yard and moved to the side of the street. Lonna testified, \u201c[Jeremy] was calling me all kinds of filthy names.\u201d She stated that Jeremy referred to her as a \u201cbitch\u201d and a \u201cwhore.\u201d She said, \u201c[Jeremy] grabbed his private parts and said, [\u2018]I can touch you in places you\u2019ve never been touched before. [\u2019] \u201d\nLonna testified that it was then that she noticed her husband Larry, her sons Lucas and Logan, and Logan\u2019s girlfriend Billy Jo Surratt, were all outside on the porch. Lonna stated that Jeremy was trying to get Lucas to come down to the street. She said Jeremy threatened to kill Lucas and the whole family. She stated that she had reason to be fearful of Jeremy because her grandchildren were inside the house and because \u201canybody that would come to someone\u2019s house at that hour of the morning I think that they would act on their words.\u201d\nApproximately three to five minutes after Jeremy arrived, his father Terry also arrived at the Benjamins\u2019 house. Lonna testified that Terry \u201cjokingly\u201d tried to get Jeremy back in his truck. As Terry was driving off, Lonna stated that he pointed to her son Logan and said \u201csomething to the effect of [\u2018Jthat\u2019s right, you better leave, slugger, [\u2019] or something like that.\u201d She testified that Terry pointed his finger at Logan and said, \u201c [\u2018][Y]ou better watch your ass, boy, or you\u2019ll get some of it too.[\u2019] \u201d\nLonna testified that she feared Terry because she knew that he had been convicted for stabbing his own nephew. She said the actions of both Jeremy and Terry made her extremely upset. She said Jeremy appeared to be under the influence of alcohol that night. She said Jeremy was \u201cextremely loud\u201d and that he had slurred speech. She also observed that he was staggering. She testified that he appeared to be drunk \u201cor impaired in some way.\u201d\nLonna\u2019s husband, Larry, also testified that he observed the events that night as Lonna described and that Jeremy\u2019s behavior caused him to be extremely upset. He testified, \u201cYou know, anytime someone threatens to kill my whole family, yes, it\u2019s upsetting.\u201d Larry testified that he could not recall exactly what Lucas was saying in response to Jeremy; however, Larry recalled Lucas indicating that if Jeremy came into their yard he would beat him up.\nOn cross-examination, Larry testified that there was \u201cbad blood\u201d between the two families. When asked whether the bad blood was caused by criminal activity, namely Lucas\u2019s home invasions, Larry responded that \u201c[a] lot of that has to do with [Jeremy] threatening my family.\u201d Larry testified that Lucas had been arrested because of complaints made by Terry\u2019s daughter and Jeremy\u2019s sister (and Lucas\u2019s former wife), Tara. Larry could not recall whether Lucas had been arrested for home invasion. Larry denied that Lucas had a reputation for being a troublemaker. On the night in question, Larry stated that his youngest son, Logan, told Terry that he \u201cbetter go on down the street,\u201d which elicited Terry\u2019s response, \u201c [\u2018][Y]ou better watch your ass boy. You\u2019re going to get some of it too.[\u2019] \u201d\nBilly Jo Surratt testified that she was Logan\u2019s girlfriend and living in the Benjamins\u2019 house at the time. She also observed the events that night around 2 a.m. outside the Benjamins\u2019 house. She testified she heard Jeremy tell Lonna he was going to kill her whole family. She also heard Jeremy call Lonna a \u201cbitch\u201d and a \u201cwhore.\u201d After Terry arrived, Billy Jo testified she went back inside the house and did not observe anything further. On cross-examination, Billy Jo testified that she initially went outside to the porch because she heard an engine \u201crevving\u201d outside. She testified that she only heard what Jeremy said while the argument ensued outside on the porch and could not recall what anyone else said.\nAt the conclusion of plaintiffs evidence, defense counsel made a motion for a directed judgment asserting plaintiff had failed to establish a family relationship between the parties. Plaintiffs attorney responded they had already litigated the matter on Terry\u2019s motion to dismiss. The trial court noted the issue of a family relationship had already been brought before the court and denied the motion for a directed judgment.\nLonna was called as an adverse witness by Jeremy and Terry. She testified that Lucas had pending court cases involving Class X felonies. The victim in those cases was her son Lucas\u2019s ex-wife Tara, Jeremy\u2019s sister and Terry\u2019s daughter. Lonna testified that Lucas\u2019s felony charges were pending when she filed the petition.\nWhen asked whether she had any family relationship with Terry at all, Lonna answered, \u201cI don\u2019t know how to answer that.\u201d She also testified that she was not Jeremy\u2019s mother-in-law.\nTerry testified that when he arrived at the Benjamins\u2019 that night, he did not observe anyone threaten anyone else. He stated Jeremy did not punch anyone and he did not go onto the Benjamins\u2019 property. He said that he observed Jeremy in the street arguing with Lucas. Terry testified that Lucas\u2019s actions were \u201c[l]ike Jeremy\u2019s. They were just a word battle is all it was.\u201d Terry did not observe Jeremy grab his crotch. Terry testified Lucas got his dog, which \u201clooked like some kind of a lab maybe, golden lab, pretty good size dog.\u201d He said he did not know whether Lucas had the dog by a chain or the collar, but he was trying to \u201csic\u201d the dog on Jeremy but the dog would not do it. Terry said eventually he got Jeremy in his truck and went back to his truck to leave. At this point, Terry testified the McKinnons were calling him \u201c fjfat ass, queer, and baldy.f] \u201d He could not recall exactly who was saying these things to him. Terry stated that he laughed at them while he was walking back to his truck because they were calling him these names. Terry denied that he threatened Logan while he was leaving.\nOn cross-examination, Terry testified that it was Cindy McKinnon, his ex-wife, who called him that night and told him to go to the Benjamins\u2019 house to get Jeremy. Terry testified he went to the Benjamins\u2019 house because he did not want to see Jeremy get in trouble. Terry testified that he had not been drinking that night and that he does not drink. He testified that he did have a conviction in Calhoun County for aggravated battery.\nJeremy testified that earlier in the evening he had been at the Palace, a bar in Calhoun County. He stated that he saw Lucas at the bar with Jeremy\u2019s sister and Lucas\u2019s ex-wife, Tara, although Tara had been issued an order of protection preventing Lucas from being near her. The trial court took judicial notice of this order. Jeremy said that he and Lucas \u201chad words\u201d at the bar. Jeremy testified that he asked Lucas to leave the bar, but Lucas refused. Jeremy said he left the bar with his cousin Greg, and when they returned to the bar, Lucas and Tara were gone.\nJeremy testified, \u201cI got upset, and that\u2019s why I went into Pleasant Hill [(where the Benjamins lived)] and done what I done.\u201d Jeremy stated that he went first to his sister Tara\u2019s house to look for her. When he did not find her at home, he went to the Benjamins\u2019 house to search for Tara. Jeremy denied that he was barreling down the road or revving his engine when he approached the Benjamins\u2019 house. He stated that he stopped his car because Lucas came running out into the yard and saying, \u201c \u2018[B]ring it on, little pussy, come on, come on.\u2019 \u201d Jeremy testified that Lucas \u201ckept going, [\u2018]bang, you\u2019re dead, bang, you\u2019re dead.[\u2019] \u201d Jeremy said that he got scared, turned around and started to return to his truck, and Lucas called him \u201ca pussy.\u201d Jeremy stated that he went to the edge of the Benjamins\u2019 property but that he never set foot in their yard. Jeremy testified that his father, Terry, eventually showed up and quietly asked him to get into his truck. Jeremy said he went to Terry\u2019s truck and Terry said, \u201c \u2018[C]ome on, let\u2019s go home.\u2019 \u201d\nJeremy stated that Lucas brought his dog outside and kept laughing as he told the dog to \u201csick [sic] him, boy, sick [sic] him.\u201d Jeremy testified that he was not related to Lonna, Luke, or Larry.\nOn cross-examination, Jeremy said Terry had to persuade him to leave the Benjamins\u2019 property. He said he was very angry and not ready to leave. Jeremy said that he was begging Lucas to come out for a fight. Jeremy said, \u201cI\u2019m going to tell you why I was beggin [sic] him to come out to the road. When you show up at somebody\u2019s house walking toward them and they act like they\u2019ve got a gun, [\u2018]bank [sic] your dead, bank [sic] your dead,[\u2019] wouldn\u2019t that upset you?\u201d He said, \u201cWhen I started walking back, I didn\u2019t know what was going to happen. When you have a guy calling you names, [\u2018]pussy, faggot,[\u2019] whatever was said, it does flare the temper a bit.\u201d\nOn redirect examination, Jeremy testified that he did not originally go to Lucas\u2019s house looking for a fistfight but instead wanted to see if his sister Tara was safe. During the hearing, no evidence or testimony was presented by either party as to where Tara was located after she left the bar that evening.\nDuring closing arguments, defense counsel again contended no family relationship existed among the parties.\nThe trial court issued a plenary order of protection against Jeremy and denied the order against Terry. The court disagreed with defendants, finding a sufficient relationship existed for the issuance of an order of protection based on the fact Jeremy was the brother and Terry was the father of plaintiffs son\u2019s ex-wife, Tara. The court stated:\n\u201cCertainly ex-relationships are as protected as existing relationships, at least according to the language of the Order of Protection Act. This certainly seems to me to be a case where that relationship should apply and where an order of protection should enter if there were sufficient factual bases to support it.\u201d\nThe court concluded the evidence was sufficient to grant an order of protection for one year against Jeremy only, as Terry\u2019s actions were reasonable under the circumstances. The court issued a written order of protection against Jeremy effective until 9 a.m. on August 31, 2007.\nOn September 22, 2006, Jeremy filed a motion to reconsider the trial court\u2019s order, again asserting no family relationship existed. Also on September 22, 2007, Terry filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137, asserting, inter alia, plaintiff filed her petition for an order of protection knowing she had no family relationship with him. 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. After a joint January 2007 hearing, the trial court denied both of the motions. Jeremy (No. 4 \u2014 07\u20140080) and Terry (No. 4 \u2014 07\u20140079) appealed, and we consolidated the appeals.\nII. ANALYSIS\nA. Lack of Appellee Brief\nPlaintiff has not filed a brief on appeal. A reviewing court is not compelled to serve as an advocate for the appellee and is not required to search the record for the purpose of sustaining the trial court\u2019s judgment. However, if the record is simple and the claimed errors are such that the reviewing court can easily decide them without the aid of an appellee\u2019s brief, that court should decide the merits of the appeal. On the other hand, \u201cif the appellant\u2019s brief demonstrates prima facie reversible error and the contentions [in] the brief find support in the record,\u201d the trial court\u2019s judgment may be reversed. First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133, 345 N.E.2d 493, 495 (1976).\nB. Order of Protection\nSince the order of protection against Jeremy expired on its own terms on August 31, 2007, we must begin by addressing whether the doctrine of mootness applies to Jeremy\u2019s challenge to the order. An issue raised on appeal becomes moot when the issue no longer exists due to events occurring after the filing of appeal that make it impossible for the appellate court to grant effective relief. Lutz v. Lutz, 313 Ill. App. 3d 286, 288, 728 N.E.2d 1234, 1236 (2000). Even assuming the order of protection\u2019s expiration rendered Jeremy\u2019s issue formally moot, we find his issue reviewable under the public-interest exception to the mootness doctrine. See Lutz, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 288, 728 N.E.2d at 1236 (applying the exception to an expired order of protection).\nJeremy asserts the order of protection entered against him should be vacated because he is not \u201ca family or household member\u201d of plaintiff. Jeremy\u2019s issue is a matter of statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law; and thus our review is de novo. People v. Palmer, 218 Ill. 2d 148, 154, 843 N.E.2d 292, 296 (2006).\nIn interpreting statutes, courts seek to ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. A court begins by examining the statute\u2019s language. The words are given their plain and commonly understood meanings as viewed, not in isolation, but in light of the statute\u2019s other relevant provisions. When a statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, it will be given effect without resort to statutory-construction tools. State Board of Elections v. Shelden, 354 Ill. App. 3d 506, 512, 821 N.E.2d 698, 704 (2004). This case involves the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 (Domestic Violence Act) (750 ILCS 60/ 101 through 401 (West 2006)), which contains a provision regarding construction (750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2006)). The Domestic Violence Act, by its very language, was intended to be applied broadly. The Domestic Violence Act states that it \u201cshall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes,\u201d which the legislature then lists. 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2006). The first purpose of the Domestic Violence Act is as follows:\n\u201c(1) Recognize domestic violence as a serious crime against the individual and society which produces family disharmony in thousands of Illinois families, promotes a pattern of escalating violence which frequently culminates in intra[ ]family homicide, and creates an emotional atmosphere that is not conducive to healthy childhood development!.]\u201d 750 ILCS 60/102(1) (West 2006).\nIf the trial court finds the plaintiff \u201chas been abused by a family or household member,\u201d then the Domestic Violence Act provides that \u201can order of protection prohibiting that abuse, neglect, or exploitation shall issue.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/214(a) (West 2006). Section 103(6) of the Domestic Violence Act (750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006)) defines \u201c \u2018[flamily or household members\u2019 \u201d as including the following:\n\u201cspouses, former spouses, parents, children, stepchildren[,] and other persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage, persons who share or formerly shared a common dwelling, persons who have or allegedly have a child in common, persons who share or allegedly share a blood relationship through a child, persons who have or have had a dating or engagement relationship, persons with disabilities and their personal assistants, and caregivers as defined in paragraph (3) of subsection (b) of [s]ection 12 \u2014 21 of the Criminal Code of 1961 [(720 ILCS 5/12 \u2014 21(b)(3) (West 2006))].\u201d (Emphases added.) 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006).\nThe specific statutory language at issue in this case is the language \u201cother persons related by blood or by present or prior marriage.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006). In the present case, Lonna\u2019s son, Lucas, was formerly married to Jeremy\u2019s sister, Tara. Jeremy is, therefore, clearly Lucas\u2019s former brother-in-law. Jeremy is then Lonna\u2019s former daughter-in-law\u2019s brother. Terry\u2019s relationship to Lonna is Lonna\u2019s son\u2019s former father-in-law.\nJeremy and Terry argue that these relationships were not intended to be included in the language of the Domestic Violence Act. They argue that \u201crelated by marriage\u201d is commonly understood to mean one\u2019s \u201cin-laws,\u201d such as father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law. See Gary-Wheaton Bank v. Meyer, 130 Ill. App. 3d 87, 93, 473 N.E.2d 548, 553 (1984) (noting the defendant was \u201crelated by marriage\u201d to his mother-in-law).\n\u201cRelated by marriage\u201d is synonymous with \u201crelated by affinity.\u201d See, e.g., Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 1050 (11th ed. 2003) (\u201crelative *** a person connected with another by blood or affinity\u201d). There are degrees of affinity. \u201cDirect affinity\u201d is \u201c[t]he relationship of a spouse to the other spouse\u2019s blood relatives,\u201d such as \u201ca wife and her husband\u2019s brother.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 63 (8th ed. 2004). \u201cCollateral affinity\u201d is \u201c[t]he relationship of a spouse\u2019s relatives to the other spouse\u2019s blood relatives,\u201d such as a \u201cwife\u2019s brother and her husband\u2019s sister.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 63 (8th ed. 2004).\nThe relationship between Lonna and Jeremy and Lonna and Terry is not fortuitous. These parties were relatives by virtue of Lucas and Tara\u2019s prior marriage. Therefore, Jeremy and Terry were Lonna\u2019s relatives by collateral affinity.\nPratt v. Lasley, 213 S.W.3d 159, 160 (Mo. App. 2007), supports this statutory interpretation. In Pratt, the court concluded that two men who were married to sisters were related by secondary affinity such that one could obtain an order of protection against the other. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160. No direct affinity existed in that case. The defendant argued that while he was related by marriage to his wife\u2019s sister, he was not related by marriage to her sister\u2019s husband. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160. Nevertheless, \u201ccollateral affinity\u201d existed, and the court, quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary, held that an order of protection was properly granted. Applying that logic to the present case, any of Lucas\u2019s siblings could have obtained an order of protection against any of Tara\u2019s blood relatives, including her father, Terry, and her brother Jeremy. Lucas\u2019s mother should be allowed to do so also, as the same degree of relationship is present.\nSuch a liberal interpretation of \u201cpersons related by prior marriage\u201d is supported by section 102 of the Domestic Violence Act, which states, \u201cThis Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/102 (West 2006). One of those stated purposes is to prevent escalating intrafamily violence. Certainly, the present case commenced as a result of escalating intrafamily violence that included not only the formerly married couple, Lucas and Tara, but also their siblings and parents. Based on this stated purpose of the Domestic Violence Act, the relationship between Jeremy, Terry, and Lonna, which resulted from the marriage of their immediate family members, is precisely one type of relationship the Domestic Violence Act was intended to address.\nBecause the Domestic Violence Act provides for a liberal construction of the term \u201cfamily member,\u201d courts should recognize brothers and parents of two formerly married people as included in the term \u201cfamily member\u201d or \u201cpersons related by *** prior marriage.\u201d Moreover, as applied in this case, inclusion of siblings and parents of formerly married spouses as \u201cfamily members\u201d promotes the Domestic Violence Act\u2019s stated purpose of eliminating intrafamily violence. Therefore, we affirm the order of protection entered against him.\nC. Rule 137 Sanctions\nTerry contends the trial court erred by denying his Rule 137 motion for sanctions because plaintiff falsely pleaded a family relationship existed between them when one did not.\nThe decision whether to impose sanctions under Rule 137 rests within the trial court\u2019s sound discretion, and a reviewing court will not overturn that decision unless the trial court has abused that discretion. Dowd & Dowd, Ltd. v. Gleason, 181 Ill. 2d 460, 487, 693 N.E.2d 358, 372 (1998). A trial court abuses its discretion when no reasonable person could take the view it adopted. Technology Innovation Center, Inc. v. Advanced Multiuser Technologies Corp., 315 Ill. App. 3d 238, 244, 732 N.E.2d 1129, 1134 (2000).\nThis court has held Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) sanctions may he granted under the following circumstances:\n\u201c(1) if either party files a pleading or motion that to the best of the attorney\u2019s \u2018knowledge, information, and belief\u2019 is not \u2018well grounded in fact\u2019 and is not \u2018warranted by existing law or a good-faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law,\u2019 or (2) if the pleading or motion is interposed to \u2018harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.\u2019 \u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Miller v. Bizzell, 311 Ill. App. 3d 971, 976, 726 N.E.2d 175, 179 (2000), quoting 155 Ill. 2d R. 137.\nWe disagree with Terry that he and plaintiff were not family members related by a prior marriage. Therefore, plaintiffs argument was not only a good-faith interpretation of the Domestic Violence Act as demonstrated by the trial court\u2019s concurrence with her interpretation but also a successful one. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Terry\u2019s Rule 137 motion.\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court\u2019s judgments.\nNo. 4 \u2014 07\u20140079, Affirmed.\nNo. 4 \u2014 07\u20140080, Affirmed.\nCOOK, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MYERSCOUGH" }, { "text": "JUSTICE TURNER,\nspecially concurring in part and dissenting in part:\nWhile I concur in the majority\u2019s conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Terry\u2019s Rule 137 motion (No. 4 \u2014 07\u2014 0079), I respectfully dissent from its affirmation of the trial court\u2019s order of protection against Jeremy (No. 4 \u2014 07\u20140080).\nI fully appreciate the majority\u2019s desire to uphold one of the Domestic Violence Act\u2019s stated purposes \u201cto prevent escalating intra[ ]family violence.\u201d Nonetheless, there must be some set parameters to determine when and if people are related by marriage.\nAs defendants note, \u201crelated by marriage\u201d is commonly understood to mean one\u2019s \u201cin-laws,\u201d such as father-in-law, mother-in-law, sister-in-law, brother-in-law, son-in-law, and daughter-in-law. See Gary-Wheaton Bank, 130 Ill. App. 3d at 93, 473 N.E.2d at 553 (noting the defendant was \u201crelated by marriage\u201d to his mother-in-law). The term \u201cin-law\u201d is defined as \u201ca relative by marriage.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 802 (8th ed. 2004); Merriam-Webster\u2019s Collegiate Dictionary 644 (11th ed. 2003). Thus, the language of the statute is almost identical to the definition of \u201cin-law.\u201d Clearly, Jeremy is Lucas\u2019s former brother-in-law, but none of the aforementioned \u201cin-law\u201d terms would apply to Lonna\u2019s relationship to Jeremy. Similarly, Terry is Lucas\u2019s former father-in-law, but again none of the aforementioned terms would apply to Lonna\u2019s relationship to Terry. I agree with defendants, no commonly understood term describes the relationship between a parent and his or her child\u2019s in-laws. Additionally, a parent\u2019s child\u2019s in-laws are not commonly understood to be the parent\u2019s relations by marriage, just the child\u2019s. Thus, I conclude Lonna\u2019s relationship to Jeremy and Terry does not fall under the plain and ordinary meaning of \u201crelated by *** prior marriage.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006).\nThe majority reaches the opposite result, finding Jeremy and Terry were Lonna\u2019s \u201crelatives by collateral affinity.\u201d The majority\u2019s analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, the statute does not use the term \u201crelatives by collateral affinity,\u201d and it is not this court\u2019s function to insert terminology into the statute the legislature did not see fit to include. See In re Minor Child Alexis Stella, 353 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417, 818 N.E.2d 824, 826 (2004) (\u201cWe cannot read words into a statute that are not there\u201d). The crux of this case is the plain and ordinary meaning of \u201crelated by *** prior marriage.\u201d 750 ILCS 60/103(6) (West 2006).\nSecond, although I question the majority\u2019s conclusion \u201c \u2018related by affinity\u2019 \u201d is synonymous with \u201c \u2018related by marriage,\u2019 \u201d even if it is true, \u201caffinity\u201d is usually described as the relationship that the majority refers to as \u201cdirect affinity\u201d (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1021). Black\u2019s Law Dictionary defines \u201caffinity\u201d as \u201c[t]he relation that one spouse has to the blood relatives of the other spouse; relationship by marriage.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 63 (8th ed. 2004). Moreover, Black\u2019s Law Dictionary provides the following definition for \u201crelative by affinity\u201d: \u201cA person is a relative by affinity (1) to any blood or adopted relative of his or her spouse, and (2) to any spouse of his or her blood and adopted relatives.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 1315 (8th ed. 2004). While Lucas\u2019s prior relationship to Terry and Jeremy would fall under the aforementioned definitions of affinity and direct affinity, Lonna\u2019s relationship to defendants as Lucas\u2019s mother clearly does not.\nThird, even if we look to degrees of affinity, the majority fails to expressly note the term \u201csecondary affinity.\u201d \u201cSecondary affinity\u201d is \u201c[t]he relationship of a spouse to the other spouse\u2019s marital relatives,\u201d such as \u201ca wife and her husband\u2019s sister-in-law.\u201d Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 63-64 (8th ed. 2004). Contrary to the majority\u2019s suggestion (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1021-22), \u201csecondary affinity\u201d is its own term separate from the term \u201ccollateral affinity.\u201d Moreover, on the facts of this case, secondary affinity would describe Lucas\u2019s relationship to the spouses of Tara\u2019s siblings and Tara\u2019s relationship to the spouses of Lucas\u2019s siblings, not the relationship between Lucas\u2019s siblings and Tara\u2019s blood relatives as implied by the majority (see 379 Ill. App. 3d at 1022).\nLast, I disagree the Pratt case supports the majority\u2019s interpretation of the statute. While the Pratt court noted the parties in that case were related by secondary affinity, it mentioned that term in rejecting the defendant\u2019s assertion \u201crelated by marriage\u201d should be limited to relatives by blood or direct affinity based on the definition of the term \u201cof kin.\u201d See Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160, 160 n.2. In actually interpreting the statute, the Pratt court looked to the plain and ordinary meaning of \u201crelated by marriage\u201d and found that term included one\u2019s brother-in-law. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160. Then citing the definition of \u201cbrother-in-law,\u201d the Pratt court found the defendant and the plaintiff, who were married to sisters, were brothers-in-law and therefore their relationship fell under the order-of-protection statute. Pratt, 213 S.W.3d at 160, citing Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 194 (6th ed. 1990); Webster\u2019s Third New International Dictionary 284 (1993). Thus, the Pratt court did not look to such terms as direct, secondary, and collateral affinity in interpreting \u201crelated by marriage,\u201d but rather looked to the commonly understood meaning of the term. Moreover, even if it is proper to consider degrees of affinity in interpreting \u201crelated by marriage,\u201d the Pratt case still does not support the majority\u2019s conclusion because it involved secondary affinity, not the more distant collateral affinity at issue in this case.\nAs previously indicated, I agree with the majority\u2019s conclusion the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Terry\u2019s Rule 137 motion. While I agree with Terry that he and Lonna were not family members related by a prior marriage since they were not \u201cin-laws,\u201d Lonna\u2019s argument was a good-faith interpretation of the Domestic Violence Act as demonstrated by the trial court\u2019s ruling and by the majority position taken today.", "type": "concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part", "author": "JUSTICE TURNER," } ], "attorneys": [ "Jesse R. Gilsdorf, of Mt. Sterling, for appellants.", "No brief filed for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. TERRY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant.\u2014LONNA BENJAMIN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JEREMY McKINNON, Defendant-Appellant.\nFourth District\nNos. 4\u201407\u20140079, 4\u201407\u20140080 cons.\nOpinion filed February 26, 2008.\nRehearing denied April 11, 2008.\nTURNER, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.\nJesse R. Gilsdorf, of Mt. Sterling, for appellants.\nNo brief filed for appellee." }, "file_name": "1013-01", "first_page_order": 1029, "last_page_order": 1041 }