{ "id": 3627347, "name": "ANDREW JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DHR CAMBRIDGE HOMES, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Residential Carpentry, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Jones v. DHR Cambridge Homes, Inc.", "decision_date": "2008-03-04", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201405\u20143526", "first_page": "18", "last_page": "41", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 18" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "861 N.E.2d 664", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "222 Ill. 2d 600", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "854 N.E.2d 758", "category": "reporters:state_regional", "reporter": "N.E.2d", "year": 2006, "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "367 Ill. App. 3d 272", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 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DHR CAMBRIDGE HOMES, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Residential Carpentry, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE HALL\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Andrew Jones, filed a complaint against the defendant, DHR Cambridge Homes, Inc. (Cambridge), seeking damages for personal injuries he sustained while working on a construction site. Cambridge filed a third-party complaint against the plaintiff s employer, Residential Carpentry, Inc. (RCI), seeking contribution pursuant to the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/1 et seq. (2000)). Prior to sending the case to the jury, the trial court granted RCI\u2019s motion for a directed verdict on Cambridge\u2019s contribution claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.\nCambridge appeals, raising the following issues: (1) whether the trial court erred in granting RCI\u2019s motion for a directed verdict; (2) whether the trial court erred in failing to include RCI on the verdict form apportioning damages; (3) whether the trial court erred in failing to include a nonparty on the jury verdict form; (4) whether the trial court erred in barring the use of a surveillance videotape of the plaintiff; (5) whether the trial court erred in barring any testimony that OSHA had failed to issue any citations for walking on sill plates; (6) whether the plaintiff\u2019s counsel\u2019s remarks during closing argument required a new trial; and (7) whether the trial court erred in refusing to give Cambridge\u2019s nonpattern jury instructions. The pertinent evidence is summarized below.\nFor the Plaintiff\nThe plaintiff was employed as a carpenter by RCI. Cambridge, the owner and general contractor, subcontracted with RCI to perform the carpentry work on the Cambridge Walk subdivision it was constructing. The plaintiff described the process of erecting first-floor joists. The sill plates were affixed to the steel beams set in place and braced by the ironworkers. Sometimes the carpenters have to move the steel slightly and rebrace it. There were several houses in the subdivision on which the plaintiff had to restraighten the bracing before the sill plates could be placed. The plaintiff reported the problem to Mr. Zembruzski, the RCI foreman, but the problem did not get resolved.\nOn November 4, 1999, the plaintiff walked out on a wooden sill plate that was mounted on a structural steel beam to take measurements for the layout of the floor joists. The sill plate was approximately eight to nine feet off the ground and was wider than the steel beam. The \u201cbrace,\u201d which the plaintiff had secured the day before, ran perpendicular to the sill plate on which the plaintiff stood and spanned the distance between that sill plate and an adjacent sill plate and beam. In performing his measurement, the plaintiff placed his left foot upon the brace and leaned forward to obtain a measurement. The brace flipped up, causing the plaintiff to fall forward into the basement area.\nAccording to the plaintiff, he was never told he could not walk out on a sill plate on a steel beam. While he was trained not to walk on a brace, he was never told he could not place the weight of his foot on the brace. It was not unusual to put a foot on a brace.\nThe subcontract agreement between Cambridge and RCI provided in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cSafety Precautions and Procedures \u2014 The Subcontractor shall take all reasonable safety precautions with respect to the Work and shall comply with all safety measures required by Contractor and by all applicable laws, ordinances, rules, regulations and orders of any public authority for the safety of persons or property, including but not limited to the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act, as amended from time to time and all regulations relating thereto.\u201d\nAnd:\n\u201cTemporary Facilities and Services \u2014 Subcontractor shall furnish all temporary offices, sheds and tool houses, equipment, power, water, temporary lights, hoistings, scaffolding, ladders, deckings, stagings, runways, and all other facilities required in connection with the Work.\u201d\nThe subcontract agreement also provided that \u201cthe latest edition of the General Conditions of the Contract for Construction, AIA Document A-201\u201d was also made part of the subcontract agreement.\nMark Tuma was the construction superintendent for Cambridge on the project. Cambridge scheduled and sequenced the work of the various trades on the project. It would also inspect the work of the trades for compliance with the subcontracts, which included compliance with Cambridge\u2019s safety manual. It was part of Mr. Tuma\u2019s job to make sure that the trades adhered to the safety manual. Cambridge held weekly meetings to discuss the progress of the work and to address problems, including safety issues. He would inform a trade to fix a problem. Each trade had to provide a safety manual.\nMr. Tuma acknowledged that the subcontract agreement identified Cambridge as the \u201ccontractor,\u201d that RCI was a subcontractor and that the AIA Document A-120 general conditions were made part of the subcontractor agreement. Mr. Tuma was then questioned by the plaintiffs counsel about specific provisions of the general conditions as follows:\n\u201cQ. Section 3.3 of these general conditions are entitled \u2018supervision and construction procedures;\u2019 do you see that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And 3.3.1 reads as follows \u2014 tell me if I\u2019ve read correctly.\n\u2018The contractor shall supervise and direct the work using the contractor\u2019s best skill and attention. The contractor shall be\u2019 keyword here \u2018solely\u2019 \u2014 do you see that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. \u2018Solely responsible for and have control over construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures and for having coordination \u2014 and for coordinating all portions of the work under the contract unless the contract documents give other specific instructions concerning these matters.\u2019 Do you see that? So far I am reading it right?\nA. Yes.\nQ. It goes on to read, \u2018if the contract documents give specific instructions concerning construction means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures, the contractor shall evaluate the job site safety thereof and as except stated below, shall be fully and solely responsible for the job site safety of such means, methods, techniques, sequences or procedures.\u201d\nMr. Turna agreed that was what the general conditions provided.\nMr. Turna was then questioned about article 10 of the general conditions as follows:\n\u201cI\u2019m referring you to specifically to article ten which is entitled \u2018protection of persons and property;\u2019 do you see that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. 10.1, \u2018safety precaution and programs;\u2019 do you see that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. 10.1.1, reads as follows \u2014 tell me if I\u2019m not reading it correctly, please.\n\u2018The contractor shall be responsible for initiating, maintaining and supervising all safely precautions and programs in connection with the performance of the contract.\u2019 Do you see that?\nA. Yes.\nQ. And if you go down to 10.2.1, safety of persons and property, it reads:\n\u2018The contractor shall take reasonable precautions for the safety of and shall provide reasonable protection to prevent damage, injury, or loss to .1, employees on the work,\u2019 correct?\nA. Yes.\u201d\nAccording to Mr. Turna, if he observed an OSHA violation or an unsafe practice on a construction site, he could stop it. OSHA required that residential construction workers have some type of fall protection if they were exposed to a six-foot or greater fall. A \u201ccontrolled access zone\u201d (CAZ) was used to control the environment for particular work. Other than \u201cawareness,\u201d no other fall protection was in place, even though Mr. Turna was aware that the RCI carpenters were working nine feet in the air on the sill plates. Mr. Turna did not think this was dangerous; it was a common practice and utilizing a CAZ complied with OSHA. While there were safer alternatives to walking the sills, he chose not to instruct the trades on how to perform their jobs. He did recall that someone from RCI brought the problems with the steel to his attention. Mr. Turna had no problems with RCI on the project.\nAt the time of the plaintiff\u2019s accident, Randall Jensen was employed by RCI and was the safety coordinator for the project. He described the plaintiff as a very qualified carpenter and not known to take any unnecessary risks. While working on the project, he observed Cambridge supervisors, Mr. Turna and Mark Gagliano, inspecting the work on the site. If the supervisors requested that a trade correct a problem, the trade would do so. Only Cambridge had authority to change specifications. No safety issue was ever raised about working off the sill plates. If Cambridge had directed RCI to stop the practice, it would have done so. While it was safer to use a ladder, the job then took longer. Neither Cambridge nor RCI told the carpenters they could not use ladders. Cambridge\u2019s weekly safety meetings were attended by RCI\u2019s foremen, who would then meet with RCI employees, because it was RCI\u2019s job to educate its employees, not Cambridge\u2019s.\nRichard Lamb was a regional director for Cambridge. At the time of the plaintiffs accident, he was overseeing 14 projects, including the Cambridge Walk project. Mark Turna and Mark Gagliano worked under him as superintendents. Part of the superintendents\u2019 job was to enforce Cambridge\u2019s safety manual. Cambridge\u2019s safety regulations applied to all the subcontractors on the site. If a superintendent observed a safety violation, it was his responsibility to see that it was corrected. At the time of the plaintiffs accident, the superintendents were trained to enforce the OSHA six-foot fall protection rule. While there were no exceptions to the fall protection rule, there were alternative fall protection means, such as creating a CAZ. Mr. Lamb acknowledged that a CAZ did not protect against injuries sustained in falls.\nMr. Lamb acknowledged that Cambridge did not tell its subcontractors how to do their jobs. Safety barriers, railings and the like were the responsibility of the carpentry contractor. Cambridge\u2019s duties were to coordinate the project and make sure that the job was done according to the specifications and that the contractors were in the right place. He never told a carpentry contractor that the employees should not walk on a sill plate. He understood that activity was permitted by OSHA.\nAt the time of the plaintiff\u2019s accident, Jerome Coleman was employed by RCI as a superintendent at the Cambridge Walk project. He was the highest-ranking RCI employee on the site. By entering into a subcontract with Cambridge, RCI was required to conform to Cambridge\u2019s safety program and to follow its rules with regard to safety. Cambridge could and did dictate safety rules with regard to RCI\u2019s work. Mr. Turna could stop RCI\u2019s work if he thought the employee was doing something unsafe. If Cambridge thought that RCI was not doing its work safely, it could remove RCI from the job. Mr. Coleman reviewed the accident report, which noted that the plaintiff had one foot on the brace and which was considered okay. Mr. Coleman did not have a criticism of the plaintiffs actions. Mr. Coleman had taken OSHA classes and attended safety meetings where the OSHA regulations were reviewed. To his knowledge, OSHA did not prohibit walking on sill plates.\nAccording to Mr. Coleman, RCI supplied all of its own equipment in connection with its work for Cambridge. RCI required all its employees to attend its weekly safety meetings. He was unaware of anyone from Cambridge instructing the plaintiff to walk on the sill plates. All of the means and methods of doing the work were the responsibility of RCI, not Cambridge. RCI did not permit new carpenters on heights or dangerous areas initially. If the plaintiff had stepped on a brace that was unsecured or possibly unsecured, he was not following the safety rules.\nPhillip Colleran was a self-employed safety and health consultant, specializing in construction safety. He had worked for OSHA for 17 years and rose to become a senior compliance officer. While working for OSHA, he received training and took courses and seminars on workplace safety. He provides teaching for OSHA and does work for the agency on small projects. He has also written articles on residential construction site safety, including one on fall protection.\nMr. Colleran explained that, as of 1995, OSHA required that residential construction employers provide fall protection for any operation requiring work six feet or higher above the ground. There was a presumption that it was feasible and would not create a greater hazard to implement fall protection systems, such as guardrails, personal fall arrest systems, nets or other types of systems that provide a measure of protection against falls, such as ladders or scaffolds. The employer had the burden of establishing that it was appropriate to implement a fall protection plan which complied with OSHA\u2019s regulations in lieu of implementing one of those systems. Both Cambridge and RCI were subject to OSHA.\nAccording to Mr. Colleran, under OSHA\u2019s regulation, the plaintiff should have been provided fall protection, suited to the job at hand, which, in this case, would have been ladders or sawhorses with planks. The regulations also required inspections. In terms of who was to carry out the inspections, Mr. Colleran stated as follows:\n\u201cI\u2019m talking about RCI, obviously, but I\u2019m also talk [sic] about Cambridge who knew full well that this activity was going on and said it\u2019s a matter of money as to why it wasn\u2019t abated or that it was basically something that was commonplace and accepted at that. And they were in a position certainly with their pursestrings authority to have intervened and said, RCI, you\u2019re imperiling people up here by allowing them to walk these beams. You\u2019ve got to basically stop this, just as they have in their contract. You have to abide by OSHA.\u201d\nMr. Colleran agreed that after the plaintiff, the best line of protection for the plaintiff was his employer.\nMichael Zembruzski was a foreman for RCI at the time of the plaintiffs accident. At the time of trial, he was employed by Cambridge as a superintendent and had the same duties as Mr. Tuma at the time of the plaintiffs accident. These duties included stopping a subcontractor\u2019s work if it was not working in accordance with Cambridge\u2019s safety program. Prior to sending RCI to work on a lot, Mr. Tuma would have been expected to make sure that the lot was ready and safe for RCI, i.e., that the steel was properly erected. After the plaintiff complained to Mr. Zembruzski about the setting of the steel, Mr. Zembruzski took the matter up with Mr. Tuma and understood that the problems were going to be fixed.\nMr. Zembruzski explained that the carpenters laying out the sill plates had no fall protection, other than the CAZ, which only warned of a fall hazard. Neither RCI nor Cambridge provided the plaintiff with training regarding walking on the sill plates. Walking on a sill plate would not have been a violation of RCI\u2019s policies at the time of the accident. The work could have been done from a ladder, but would have been a bit slower. If Mr. Tuma had considered walking on the sill plate to be unsafe, he had the authority to stop the work. Cambridge did not tell RCI how to do its work.\nFor Cambridge\nMark Gagliano was employed by Cambridge and was responsible for the preparation of the contract between Cambridge and RCI. Although the contract specified such things as the quality of wood to be used in construction, it did not provide instructions to the subcontractors as to how to do their work. The contract required RCI to perform its work in compliance with federal, state and local laws and the minimum statutory health and safety requirements. Each trade was responsible for providing its own safety equipment. Cambridge did not supply any scaffolding or ladders or equipment of any sort. If needed, they would be supplied by RCI in this case.\nMr. Gagliano explained that the ALA Document A-201 was not physically included in the contract. It was designed to provide general conditions between the owner and the general contractor. In this case, Cambridge was both the owner and the general contractor. An ambiguity was created because RCI was referred to as the subcontractor. However, the intention was to bind RCI and Cambridge to these general conditions. While he maintained that Cambridge did not really dictate the means and methods of doing the subcontractors\u2019 work, Mr. Gagliano agreed sections 3.3.1 and 10.1.1 of the general conditions provided that Cambridge, as the contractor, was solely responsible for and had control over the means and methods of the work and was responsible for safety in connection with the work. If Cambridge had not wished to undertake these obligations, it could have chosen not to incorporate them into the contract with RCI.\nEugene Holland was Cambridge\u2019s expert witness on construction safety. His work in construction safety predated OSHA. He had taken the 10-hour OSHA course, belonged to the American Society of Safety Engineers and taught courses at the University of Illinois, at Chicago, having to do with materials used in construction. OSHA rules were included in those courses. He had provided consulting services to OSHA on a nonpaid basis. He was familiar with the OSHA regulations pertaining to fall protection.\nAccording to Mr. Holland, it was a custom and practice in the construction industry for workers to walk on sill plates while laying out or measuring the floor joists. Based on his 45 years of experience, he believed that it was a safe practice. While OSHA\u2019s six-foot rule required fall protection, the methods required were not reasonable when applied to walking on sill plates. OSHA regulations recognized that construction involved certain hazards for which there was no complete fall protection. The use of the CAZ allowed for work to be done without the standard fall protection requirements in residential construction.\nMr. Holland explained that OSHA rules required an employee to be responsible for his actions and conduct and required the employer to furnish a working environment free from hazards likely to cause death or serious harm to the employees. In this case, RCI was the plaintiffs employer and had the obligation to provide a safe workplace. The direct employer is responsible for supplying safety equipment. There was no OSHA regulation that would require Cambridge to provide such equipment to someone it is not employing.\nAccording to Mr. Holland, RCI was in direct, operative control over its employees and was responsible for defining the means and methods of performing the work, including the procedures and the safe way of doing them. Whether the measurement was done from a ladder or walking on the sill plate, it was a means or method of performing the work. There was no evidence that Cambridge had the same authority to control the means and methods. Mr. Holland opined that no action on the part of Cambridge had anything to do with the plaintiffs accident. However, he acknowledged that at his deposition he had stated that, had the steel been erected correctly, the accident could have been avoided and that Cambridge should have inspected the lot prior to allowing RCI to work on it.\nAt the close of the evidence, RCI moved for a directed verdict. RCI pointed out that none of the witnesses testified that RCI had done anything wrong. The trial court granted the motion. Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against Cambridge. Following the denial of its posttrial motion, Cambridge filed a timely notice of appeal.\nANALYSIS\nI. Directed Verdict for RCI\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cThe grant or denial of a motion for [a] directed verdict is reviewed de novo.\u201d Kim v. Mercedes-Benz, U.S.A., Inc., 353 Ill. App. 3d 444, 460, 818 N.E.2d 713 (2004). The Kim court recognized that there was contrary authority as to the appropriate standard of review but concluded that de novo review was appropriate \u201cbecause the evidence presented at trial must be considered \u2018 \u201c \u2018[a]new; afresh; a second time.\u2019 \u201d \u2019 \u201d (Emphasis in original.) Kim, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 460, quoting Susnis v. Radfar, 317 Ill. App. 3d 817, 826, 739 N.E.2d 960 (2000), quoting City of Mattoon v. Mentzer, 282 Ill. App. 3d 628, 633, 668 N.E.2d 601 (1996), quoting Black\u2019s Law Dictionary 435 (6th ed. 1990).\n\u201cA directed verdict is appropriate where the plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case.\u201d Kim, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 460. \u201cA directed verdict is granted improperly where \u2018there is any evidence, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, demonstrating a substantial factual dispute, or where the assessment of credibility of the witnesses or the determination regarding conflicting evidence is decisive to the outcome.\u2019 \u201d Kim, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 460, quoting Maple v. Gustafson, 151 Ill. 2d 445, 454, 603 N.E.2d 508 (1992).\nB. Discussion\nIn its third-party complaint, Cambridge alleged that RCI had a duty to exercise reasonable and ordinary care for the safety of the plaintiff and breached its duty to the plaintiff in the following respects:\n\u201c(a) negligently and carelessly failed to properly train and supervise the Plaintiff;\n(b) negligently and carelessly failed to warn the Plaintiff of the dangers of the jobsite;\n(c) negligently and carelessly created an unsafe work environment by the means and methods used in its work;\n(d) negligently and carelessly caused and required the Plaintiff to perform his work from the structural steel support beams of the subject building under conditions which were dangerous and unsafe;\n(e) negligently and carelessly caused and required carpenters to utilize five inch wide steel beams as a temporary support while laying out floor joists;\n(f) negligently and carelessly failed to provide adequate safeguards to prevent Plaintiff from injury while lawfully upon said premises;\n(g) failed to make a reasonable inspection of the premises and the work being done thereon, when it knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care should have known, that said inspection was necessary to prevent injury to the Plaintiff;\n(h) carelessly and negligently coordinated the work in an unsafe and improper manner; and\n(i) required the Plaintiff to work in an unsafe area.\u201d\n\u201cIn any negligence action, plaintiff bears the burden of proving not only a duty and breach of duty but also that the breach of that duty was the proximate cause of plaintiff\u2019s injury.\u201d Taake v. WHGK, Inc., 228 Ill. App. 3d 692, 711, 592 N.E.2d 1159 (1992). \u201cThe plaintiff must present at least some evidence on every element essential to his cause of action [citations], and a directed verdict in favor of the defendant is appropriate where the plaintiff has not established a prima facie case [citation].\u201d Saxton v. Toole, 240 Ill. App. 3d 204, 210, 608 N.E.2d 233 (1992). The above rule applies to a third-party action for contribution. See Victory Memorial Hospital Ass\u2019n v. Schmidt, Garden & Erickson, 158 Ill. App. 3d 931, 934, 511 N.E.2d 953 (1987).\nRCI maintains that Cambridge itself did not present any evidence that RCI was negligent and argues that Cambridge may not rely on the evidence introduced by the plaintiff. A similar argument was rejected in Frisch v. International Harvester Co., 33 Ill. App. 3d 507, 338 N.E.2d 90 (1975). In that case, the plaintiff sued the manufacturer and the seller of a product. The reviewing court held that the elements of strict liability had been shown by competent evidence and that it would be a waste of judicial resources to require the seller, who counterclaimed against the manufacturer, to separately prove the elements of strict liability. Frisch, 33 Ill. App. 3d at 521.\nByrne v. SCM Corp., 182 Ill. App. 3d 523, 538 N.E.2d 796 (1989), is also instmctive. In that case, the plaintiffs filed a products liability case against the manufacturer of paint the husband used as part of his job. The manufacturer filed a third-party complaint for contribution against the husband\u2019s employer. At the close of all the evidence, the trial court directed verdict for the employer on the issue of ventilation. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiffs and against the manufacturer.\nOn appeal, the reviewing court upheld the granting of the directed verdict for the employer. The court noted that \u201cdefendant trial counsel was placed in an awkward position, on one side arguing the ventilation was adequate to combat plaintiffs\u2019 claims and on the other side arguing the issue of adequate ventilation should nevertheless be submitted to the jury in order to keep the contribution action in the case.\u201d Byrne, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 562-63. The court concluded that the manufacturer\u2019s problem was \u201cnot the argument, it [was] the evidence. The product was inherently dangerous. The defect was the inadequacy of the warning. Experts testified that even if the painting was done outdoors, a proper mask must be used. Therefore, although the ventilation was a condition, it was not a contributing cause.\u201d Byrne, 182 Ill. App. 3d at 563. In reaching its conclusion, the reviewing court did not appear to limit itself to the manufacturer\u2019s evidence as opposed to the evidence as a whole.\nSimilarly, in the present case, on one hand, Cambridge argued that walking on the sill plates was not dangerous. On the other hand, it argued that if walking on the sills was dangerous, RCI was responsible or at least partly responsible for the plaintiffs safety. Cambridge introduced evidence establishing RCI\u2019s duty, but relied on the plaintiffs evidence to establish that RCI breached its duty to the plaintiff by allowing him to walk on the sills and that this breach resulted in the plaintiffs injury.\n\u201c[I]n ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, courts must evaluate the relative strength of the nonmovant\u2019s evidence in the context of the entire record at the time the motion is presented.\u201d Williams v. Chicago Osteopathic Health Systems, 274 Ill. App. 3d 1039, 1047, 654 N.E.2d 613 (1995). Since RCI moved for a directed verdict at the close of all the evidence, all the evidence, including that introduced by the plaintiff, must be considered. \u201cIn determining whether the court erred in directing a verdict, it is immaterial upon which side the evidence is introduced. If evidence introduced by either side, with its legitimate and natural inferences tends to establish the claim of the party opposing the motion, the motion should not be allowed.\u201d Bay Island Drainage & Levee District No. 1 v. Nussbaum, 388 Ill. 131, 134, 56 N.E.2d 615 (1944).\nViewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to Cambridge, the nonmoving party, we disagree that a verdict could never stand against RCI. The plaintiff was injured as the result of walking on a sill plate without fall protection. The responsibility for providing the fall protection was disputed at trial. The plaintiff presented evidence that Cambridge was responsible for all of the safety issues. However, Cambridge presented the testimony of Mr. Holland, who opined that RCI was responsible for the means and methods of performing the work on the project and for providing a safe work place for the plaintiff.\nWe conclude that the trial court erred in directing a verdict in favor of RCI, and therefore, this case must be remanded for a new trial. We will address those issues that may arise on retrial of this case.\nII. Verdict Form\nA. Standard of Review\nA trial court\u2019s determination of jury instructions will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion. Hiscott v. Peters, 324 Ill. App. 3d 114, 125, 754 N.E.2d 839 (2001). \u201cAn abuse of discretion occurs when the ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would take the same view.\u201d Check v. Clifford Chrysler-Plymouth of Buffalo Grove, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 3d 150, 157, 794 N.E.2d 829 (2003).\nB. Discussion\nCambridge contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused Cambridge\u2019s verdict form, which included Residential Steel, the steel contractor on the project. Residential Steel was never a party in this case. Nonetheless, Cambridge points out that in the comment to Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. B45.03A (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000) No. B45.03A), the committee recognized that the \u201c[ijnclusion of \u2018nonparties\u2019 within the calculation of fault may be necessary for correct consideration of comparative fault, joint and several liability and contribution.\u201d IPI Civil (2000) No. B45.03A, Comment, at 208. However, Cambridge misinterprets the term \u201cnon-parties.\u201d\nIn the version applicable to this case, section 2 \u2014 1117 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1117 (West 1994)) provided in pertinent part that \u201c[a]ny defendant whose fault, as determined by the trier of fact, is 25% or greater of the total fault attributable to the plaintiff, the defendants sued by the plaintiff, and any third party defendants who could have been sued by the plaintiff, shall be jointly and severally liable for all other damages.\u201d As explained by our supreme court in Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64, 783 N.E.2d 1024 (2002):\n\u201cSection 2 \u2014 1117 does not include in the division of fault \u2018anyone who could have been sued by the plaintiff.\u2019 Rather, it includes \u2018any third-party defendant who could have been sued by the plaintiff.\u2019 In other words, the party must already have been brought into the case by a defendant for that party to be included in the division of fault.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Unzicker, 203 Ill. 2d at 78.\nLikewise, in the present case, in order for Residential Steel to be included on the verdict form, it must have been named as a party by Cambridge. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Cambridge\u2019s jury verdict form.\nIII. Videotape\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cThe admission of a film into evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court [citation], and an abuse of discretion occurs only where no reasonable person would agree with the trial court\u2019s conclusion.\u201d Velarde v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 354 Ill. App. 3d 523, 529, 820 N.E.2d 37 (2004).\nB. Discussion\nCambridge contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to admit into evidence a surveillance videotape of the plaintiff. Prior to trial, the court barred the admission of the videotape because it had been disclosed after the discovery cutoff. During the trial, Cambridge requested reconsideration of the trial court\u2019s ruling. After viewing the videotape, the trial court again denied the admission of the videotape.\n\u201cWhen evidence is excluded, the offer of proof is the key to preserving [the] error.\u201d Kankakee County Board of Review v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 316 Ill. App. 3d 148, 155, 735 N.E.2d 1011 (2000). \u201cThe purpose of the offer of proof is to disclose the nature of the evidence offered to the trial judge and opposing counsel and to the reviewing court in order that it may determine whether the exclusion of evidence was erroneous.\u201d Kankakee County Board of Review, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 155.\nThe plaintiff maintains that in order to be sufficient, the offer of proof in this case should have included the videotape. Compare Kankakee County Board of Review, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 153 (if the offer of proof pertains to a document, the party should be allowed to place the document into the record); People v. Phillips, 186 Ill. App. 3d 668, 679, 542 N.E.2d 814 (1989) (where the document was not made part of the record on appeal, counsel\u2019s statement about the content of the document was insufficient to show that the defendant was prejudiced by the court\u2019s refusal to allow cross-examination of a witness based on the document). The plaintiff concludes that in the absence of the videotape, Cambridge has waived any error with regard to its admissibility. See Schmitz v. Binette, 368 Ill. App. 3d 447, 453, 857 N.E.2d 846 (2006) (failure to make offer of proof will waive a claim that evidence was improperly excluded).\n\u201c \u2018[A]n offer of proof is not required if it is apparent that the trial judge understood the nature of the objection and the character of the evidence sought to be introduced or if the questions themselves and the circumstances surrounding them show the purpose and materiality of the evidence.\u2019 \u201d Schmitz, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 454, quoting Carter v. Azaran, 332 Ill. App. 3d 948, 956, 774 N.E.2d 400 (2002), citing Bafia v. City International Trucks, Inc., 258 Ill. App. 3d 4, 7-8, 629 N.E.2d 666 (1994). An offer of proof is sufficiently specific \u201cif it adequately shows the court what the evidence would be, allowing a court of review to assess the prejudice allegedly inuring from the exclusion.\u201d People v. Wallace, 331 Ill. App. 3d 822, 831, 772 N.E.2d 785 (2002).\nIn the present case, the offer of proof consisted of Cambridge\u2019s counsel\u2019s statement as to the identities of the videographers, the type of equipment they used and their work experience in recording and editing videotapes. Counsel further stated that if called as witnesses, the two videographers would have testified that the videotape was a recording of the plaintiff and his activities on February 10, 2005, and that the videotape accurately portrayed their observations of the plaintiffs activities on that date.\nIn this case, since the trial court actually viewed the videotape, the court was made aware of what the evidence would be. However, \u201c \u2018[t]he offer serves no purpose if it does not demonstrate, both to the [circuit] court and to reviewing courts, the admissibility of the testimony which was foreclosed by the sustained objection.\u2019 \u201d Kim, 353 Ill. App. 3d at 451, quoting People v. Andrews, 146 Ill. 2d 413, 421, 588 N.E.2d 1126 (1992). Since the videotape is not available to this court and the offer of proof does not describe what activities the plaintiff was engaged in and under what circumstances these activities were undertaken, we are unable to determine whether its exclusion was proper.\nA new trial should be ordered \u201c \u2018only when evidence improperly admitted appears to have affected the outcome of the trial.\u2019 \u201d Schmidt v. Ameritech Illinois, 329 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 1040-41, 768 N.E.2d 303 (2002), quoting Tzystuck v. Chicago Transit Authority, 124 Ill. 2d 226, 243, 529 N.E.2d 525 (1988). \u201cIn other words, a new trial is necessary where the exclusion of evidence was the result of \u2018serious and prejudicial errors made at trial.\u2019 \u201d Schmidt, 329 Ill. App. 3d at 1041, quoting Lagestee v. Days Inn Management Co., 303 Ill. App. 3d 935, 942, 709 N.E.2d 270 (1999).\nAccording to the videographers\u2019 surveillance report in the record, the plaintiff was observed doing carpentry work for another employer. However, the plaintiff testified he was able to do carpentry work, even though he was slower now, and hammering, for example, caused him pain. Moreover, Cambridge candidly concedes that it cannot prove the videotape would have altered the outcome of the trial. Therefore, even if the exclusion of the videotape was an abuse of discretion, the exclusion of the videotape would not have required that Cambridge receive a new trial.\nIV Absence of OSHA Violations\nA. Standard of Review\n\u201cAn abuse of discretion standard applies when this court reviews a trial court\u2019s evidentiary rulings.\u201d Chapman v. Hubbard Woods Motors, Inc., 351 Ill. App. 3d 99, 105, 812 N.E.2d 389 (2004).\nB. Discussion\nCambridge agreed with the trial court\u2019s ruling barring any evidence of OSHA violations. However, Cambridge contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it barred any evidence that OSHA had never issued citations for walking on sill plates. Cambridge maintains that such evidence supported Cambridge\u2019s argument that its conduct was reasonable.\nA party may introduce evidence of a lack of prior accidents or incidents when that party establishes a proper foundation. McKenzie v. SK Hand Tool Corp., 272 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 650 N.E.2d 612 (1995). A proper foundation would require evidence \u201cestablishing that such absence took place under conditions substantially similar to those surrounding the accident sued upon.\u201d Parson v. City of Chicago, 117 Ill. App. 3d 383, 388, 453 N.E.2d 770 (1983). In Parson, the court recognized that \u201c \u2018evidence of absence of accidents has less probative value than evidence of previous accidents, and thus is more easily outweighed by the factor that the collateral issue will result in jury confusion. *** Evidence of absence of accidents usually involves generally unreliable negative evidence *** and does not tend directly to prove absence of negligence.\u2019 \u201d Parson, 117 Ill. App. 3d at 388-89, quoting Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 82 Mich. App. 282, 288, 289, 266 N.W.2d 791 (1978).\nCambridge argues that the testimony of Mr. Colleran and Mr. Hoiland laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the evidence that OSHA had not issued violations for allowing a worker to walk on a sill plate. However, Mr. Colleran\u2019s testimony was that he was unaware that OSHA had ever issued a violation in such circumstances. Mr. Holland\u2019s testimony that OSHA had never cited anyone for walking on a sill plate was limited to his own knowledge. This testimony failed to establish that, under the conditions substantially similar to those surrounding the plaintiff\u2019s accident, OSHA would not have issued a citation. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in barring evidence as to the lack of OSHA citations.\nV Non-IPI Instructions\nA. Standard of Review\nWe review a trial court\u2019s determination whether or not to provide a particular jury instruction under the abuse of discretion standard. Webber v. Wight & Co., 368 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1020, 858 N.E.2d 579 (2006). A reviewing court will not disturb the trial court\u2019s determination absent a clear abuse of discretion. Webber, 368 Ill. App. 3d at 1020.\nB. Discussion\nAt trial, Cambridge maintained that the IPI instructions pertaining to construction negligence set forth an inaccurate statement of the law and tendered non-IPI instructions on that issue. The plaintiff objected, and the trial court gave the jury the IPI construction negligence instructions. Accordingly, the jury was instructed as follows:\n\u201cA contractor who entrusts work to a subcontractor can be liable for injuries resulting from the work if the contractor retained some control over the safety of the work and the injuries were proximately caused by the contractor\u2019s failure to exercise that control with ordinary care.\u201d IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.01.\nCambridge\u2019s proposed instruction read as follows:\n\u201cA contractor who entrusts work to a subcontractor can be liable for injuries resulting from the work if the contractor retained some control over the means and methods or operative detail of the subcontractor\u2019s work and the injuries were proximately caused by the contractor\u2019s failure to exercise that control with ordinary care.\u201d\nThe jury was also given IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.02 as follows:\n\u201cA party who retained some control over the safety of the work has a duty to exercise that control with ordinary care.\u201d\nCambridge\u2019s proposed instruction read as follows:\n\u201cA party who retained some control over the means and methods or operative detail of the subcontractor\u2019s work has a duty to exercise that control with ordinary care.\u201d\nThe jury was also given IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.03, which is in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cPlaintiff, Andrew Jones, seeks to recover damages from defendant Cambridge Homes, Inc. In order to recover damages, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:\n1. The defendant retained some control over the safety of the work.\u201d\nCambridge\u2019s proposed instruction read in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cPlaintiff, Andrew Jones seeks to recover damages from defendant DRH Cambridge Homes, Inc. The Plaintiff claims and in order to recover damages, the plaintiff has the burden of proving:\n1. The defendant, DRH Cambridge Homes, Inc., retained some control over the means and methods or operative detail of the work.\u201d\nFinally, the jury was given IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.04 as follows:\n\u201cOne or more persons may have some control over the safety of the work. Which person or persons had some control over the work under the particular facts of this case is for you to decide.\u201d\n\u201c[T]he trial court has the discretion to determine if a particular jury instruction is applicable, supported by evidence in the record, and an accurate statement of the law.\u201d Luye v. Schopper, 348 Ill. App. 3d 767, 773, 809 N.E.2d 156 (2004). \u201cOnce a trial court determines an instruction is to be given, then Supreme Court Rule 239(a) (177 Ill. 2d R. 239(a)) creates a presumption that the Illinois Pattern Instructions (IPI) are to be used.\u201d Luye, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 773. Whether an instruction is an accurate statement of the law is reviewed de novo. Luye, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 773.\nIn its introduction to the construction negligence series of the IPI instructions, the committee reviewed a number of cases on the issue of control of the work and concluded as follows:\n\u201cDue to the lack of consensus among the appellate courts and no Supreme Court cases on this subject since [Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 33 Ill. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965)], the concept of \u2018control\u2019 caused the committee great difficulty. The committee chose to concentrate on the area of \u2018safety\u2019 in these instructions. The committee believed that the overriding consideration throughout all of these cases is the ability of the controlling entity to affect overall job safety. It would appear that the ability to stop unsafe work and not permit it to be resumed until done to the satisfaction of the controlling entity satisfies both the requirement of \u2018control\u2019 and demonstrates that the contractor is \u2018not entirely free to do the work in his own way.\u2019 \u201d IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.00, Committee Comment b, at 226.\nThe committee further observed that the Larson court chose not to define \u201c \u2018having charge of the work,\u2019 \u201d stating it was a \u201c \u2018generic term of broad import.\u2019 [Citation.] Whether the term \u2018control\u2019 will be treated similarly will depend on further judicial interpretation to help guide the committee.\u201d IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.00, Committee Comment b, at 226.\n\u201cThe Illinois Supreme Court has held that pattern instructions are not exempt from challenge.\u201d Luye, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 776. \u201cPattern instructions do not receive advance approval by the Illinois Supreme Court and are only approved or rejected through judicial questioning and consideration.\u201d Luye, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 776.\nCambridge\u2019s argument that the IPI instructions on construction negligence do not accurately state the law is based on this court\u2019s decision in Martens v. MCL Construction Corp., 347 Ill. App. 3d 303, 807 N.E.2d 480 (2004). In that case, we upheld a summary judgment in favor of the general contractor finding that the plaintiff had failed to raise a question of fact as to whether the general contractor had retained control or exercised supervisory or operational control over the subcontractor to be held liable. Martens, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 315.\nIn Martens, the plaintiff, relying on the analysis in Moss v. Rowe Construction Co., 344 Ill. App. 3d 772, 801 N.E.2d 612 (2003), asserted that the central issue was the general contractor\u2019s ability to affect worker safety. Martens, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 318; see Moss, 344 Ill. App. 3d at 777 (\u201cThe issue is not control of the \u2018means and methods\u2019 of performing the task, but rather who contractually and/or physically has the duty to control safety of the project\u201d). We disagreed with Moss, stating as follows:\n\u201cThe central issue is retained control of the independent contractor\u2019s work, whether contractual, supervisory, operational, or some mix thereof. The party who retains control is the logical party upon whom to impose the duty to ensure worker safety.\u201d Martens, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 318.\nSee also Doe v. Big Brothers Big Sisters of America, 359 Ill. App. 3d 684, 695-96, 834 N.E.2d 913 (2005) (reiterating that Martens rejected Moss\u2019s view that the right to control safety alone sufficient to subject a general contractor to liability).\nCambridge maintains that the decision in Martens means that the construction negligence IPI instructions no longer reflect the common law on construction negligence. Therefore, its proposed jury instructions, which incorporated the holding from Martens, should have been given to the jury. We disagree, noting that the Martens court referred to IPI Civil (2005) No. 55.02 without criticism, stating as follows:\n\u201cPenalizing a general contractor\u2019s efforts to promote safety and coordinate a general safety program among various independent contractors at a large jobsite hardly serves to advance the goal of work site safety. A party who retains some control over the safety of the work has a duty to exercise that control with ordinary care. [IPI Civil (Supp. 2003) No. 55.02]. Nevertheless, the existence of a safety program, safety manual or safety director does not constitute retained control per se; the court must still conduct an analysis pursuant to the section 414 retained control exception. [Citation.] We recognize, of course, that if a defendant\u2019s safety program sufficiently affected a contractor\u2019s means and methods of doing its work, then such program could bring the defendant within the ambit of the retained control exception. [Citation.]\u201d Martens, 347 Ill. App. 3d at 318-19.\nIn Martens, the general contractor could make safety recommendations but could not demand that the subcontractor\u2019s employees comply with a safety standard that exceeded the OSHA requirement. In contrast, Cambridge could require compliance with its safety standards and stop the work if RCI\u2019s employees were violating its safety rules. We note that \u201cour courts take a dim view of \u2018culling passages from opinions and incorporating them into instructions.\u2019 \u201d Costa v. Dresser Industries, Inc., 268 Ill. App. 3d 1, 12, 642 N.E.2d 898 (1994), quoting People v. Bush, 157 Ill. 2d 248, 256, 623 N.E.2d 1361 (1993). Moreover, the Martens court\u2019s cite to the pattern instructions on construction negligence does not suggest that the court intended its decision to mean that the pattern instruction no longer reflected an accurate statement of the law.\nWe conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Cambridge\u2019s non-IPI instructions.\nVI. Special Interrogatory\nA. Standard of Review\nA trial court\u2019s denial of a request for a special interrogatory presents a question of law and is reviewed de novo. Hooper v. County of Cook, 366 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 851 N.E.2d 663 (2006); 735 ILCS 5/2\u2014 1108 (West 2004).\nB. Discussion\nThe giving of special interrogatories is governed by section 2 \u2014 1108 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides in pertinent part as follows:\n\u201cUnless the nature of the case requires otherwise, the jury shall render a general verdict. The jury may be required by the court, and must be required on request of any party, to find specially upon any material question or questions of fact submitted to the jury in writing. Special interrogatories shall be tendered, objected to, ruled upon and submitted to the jury as in the case of instructions. *** When the special finding of fact is inconsistent with the general verdict, the former controls the latter and the court may enter judgment accordingly.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1108 (West 2004).\nA trial court has no discretion but to submit to the jury a special interrogatory, requested by a party, as long as it is in the proper form. Northern Trust Co. v. University of Chicago Hospitals & Clinics, 355 Ill. App. 3d 230, 251, 821 N.E.2d 757 (2004). \u201cA special interrogatory is in [the] proper form if (1) it relates to an ultimate issue of fact upon which the rights of the parties depend, and (2) an answer responsive thereto is inconsistent with some general verdict that might be returned.\u201d Northern Trust Co., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 251. \u201cThe required inconsistency arises when the special interrogatory is \u2018 \u201cclearly and absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Northern Trust Co., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 251, quoting Simmons v. Garces, 198 Ill. 2d 541, 556, 612 N.E.2d 85 (2002), quoting Powell v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 243 Ill. App. 3d 577, 581, 612 N.E.2d 85 (1993). \u201cIf a special interrogatory does not cover the issues upon which the jury is called to render a decision and a \u2018 \u201creasonable hypothesis\u201d \u2019 is left unaddressed that would allow the special interrogatory to be construed consistently with the general verdict, the special interrogatory is not \u2018absolutely irreconcilable\u2019 with the general verdict, is improper in form, and thus, may not be submitted to the jury.\u201d Northern Trust Co., 355 Ill. App. 3d at 251, citing Simmons, 198 Ill. 2d at 556, citing Powell, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 581. Finally, a special interrogatory that is repetitive, misleading, confusing, or ambiguous is not in proper form. Blakey v. Gilbane Building Corp., 303 Ill. App. 3d 872, 882, 708 N.E.2d 1187 (1999).\nCambridge tendered the following special interrogatory:\n\u201cDid DRH Cambridge Homes, Inc. retain control over the means and methods or the operative detail of Residential Carpentry, Inc. and/or the plaintiff?\u201d\nIn determining whether a special interrogatory meets the criteria of being in the proper form, the court should consider the language of the special interrogatory within the context of all of the jury instructions. Johnson v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 313 Ill. App. 3d 230, 236, 729 N.E.2d 883 (2000). In this case, the instructions to the jury referred to control over safety while the special interrogatory referred only to control over the work. We agree with the plaintiff that the special interrogatory was confusing and ambiguous when considered in connection with the other instructions given to the jury.\nMore significantly, even if it had answered Cambridge\u2019s special interrogatory negatively, the jury still could have concluded that Cambridge, by virtue of its ability to stop the work if RCI violated Cambridge\u2019s safety rules, retained control of the safety issues, rendering it liable to the plaintiff. Therefore, the special interrogatory was not absolutely irreconcilable with the general verdict. Therefore, the trial court was correct in refusing to submit the special interrogatory to the jury.\nFollowing the issuance of the original disposition in this case, the plaintiff filed a petition for rehearing requesting that this court affirm the damages award in this case and limit the retrial of this case to the issue of liability. The plaintiff argued that the retrial in this case should be limited to liability only since Cambridge did not raise any issue as to damages in its appeal.\nPursuant to Supreme Court Rule 367(d) (210 Ill. 2d R. 367(d)), this court ordered RCI and Cambridge to answer the petition for rehearing. In their responses, both Cambridge and RCI argued that because the trial court granted RCI\u2019s motion for a directed verdict, RCI never had the opportunity to offer jury instructions and to argue the question of damages to the jury. The plaintiff argues that RCI never challenged the damages evidence at trial.\nThis court has held that \u201c[a]n appellate court should limit the issues to be resolved on retrial only where it is plain that any error that has crept into one element of the verdict did not affect the determination of any other issue.\u201d Phillips v. Gannotti, 327 Ill. App. 3d 512, 521, 763 N.E.2d 820 (2002). \u201cA limited retrial should not be granted if it might be prejudicial to either party.\u201d Phillips, 327 Ill. App. 3d at 521; see Glassman v. St. Joseph Hospital, 259 Ill. App. 3d 730, 769, 631 N.E.2d 1186 (1994) (a retrial limited to damages is appropriate only if the questions of liability and damages are so separate and distinct that a retrial only as to damages is not unfair).\nIn Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc., 367 Ill. App. 3d 272, 854 N.E.2d 758 (2006), appeal allowed, 222 Ill. 2d 600, 861 N.E.2d 664 (2006), this court limited the retrial of the case to the issue of liability where the defendant-appellant failed to raise an issue on appeal as to the amount of damages awarded. Likewise, in the present case, Cambridge never argued on appeal that the damages were excessive. However, unlike Ready, this case involves another defendant, RCI, which was an appellee in this appeal.\nAfter considering the parties\u2019 arguments and the authorities cited in support thereof, we conclude that the effect of the reversal of the directed verdict in its favor and a remand for a new trial, if limited to liability, would be to deny RCI its right to argue the damages issue. Therefore, in the interests of fairness and a just result, we direct that the retrial of this case include both liability and damages issues.\nThe directed verdict in favor of RCI is reversed. The cause is remanded for a new trial on both liability and damages, consistent with the views expressed in this opinion.\nReversed and remanded with directions.\nSOUTH and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.\nhereinafter referred to as \u201cOSHA.\u201d\nThe AIA Document A-201 general conditions were contained in the plaintiffs trial exhibit No. 2. However, the exhibit was not made a part of the record on appeal.\nThe record does contain a surveillance report describing the videographers\u2019 observations of the plaintiffs activities, but that was not included in offer of proof.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE HALL" } ], "attorneys": [ "David E Pardys, Linda E. Spring, and David S. Goles, all of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLE of Libertyville, for appellant.", "Gregory T. Henry, of Fraterrigo, Beranek, Feiereisel & Kasbohm, of Chicago, for appellee Residential Carpentry, Inc.", "Kirsten M. Dunne, of Goldberg, Weisman & Cairo, Ltd., for appellee Andrew Jones." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ANDREW JONES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DHR CAMBRIDGE HOMES, INC., Defendant-Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant (Residential Carpentry, Inc., Third-Party Defendant-Appellee).\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201405\u20143526\nOpinion filed March 4, 2008.\nRehearing denied February 27, 2008.\nDavid E Pardys, Linda E. Spring, and David S. Goles, all of Swanson, Martin & Bell, LLE of Libertyville, for appellant.\nGregory T. Henry, of Fraterrigo, Beranek, Feiereisel & Kasbohm, of Chicago, for appellee Residential Carpentry, Inc.\nKirsten M. Dunne, of Goldberg, Weisman & Cairo, Ltd., for appellee Andrew Jones." }, "file_name": "0018-01", "first_page_order": 34, "last_page_order": 57 }