{ "id": 3627620, "name": "In re ESTATE OF ERIC CAGE, Deceased (Sherlie Butler, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lahienda Thompson, as Adm'r of the Estate of Eric Cage, Cross-Petitioner-Appellee)", "name_abbreviation": "Butler v. Thompson", "decision_date": "2008-03-14", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20141297", "first_page": "110", "last_page": "115", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 110" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704074 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112" }, { "page": "112", "parenthetical": "reviewing court should avoid a statutory interpretation that renders any term meaningless or superfluous" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 453", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704382 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "460" }, { "page": "460" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0453-01" ] }, { "cite": "207 Ill. 2d 393", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 975004 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "401" }, { "page": "402" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/207/0393-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 461, "char_count": 11587, "ocr_confidence": 0.821, "pagerank": { "raw": 5.207966869300525e-08, "percentile": 0.3275999874896181 }, "sha256": "fe2d9369e746e73c2448ab3d0895bcee7c70ff44cef14db7c76ef92fe1bc580d", "simhash": "1:c98e3d9bde7442a2", "word_count": 1828 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:38.608554+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "In re ESTATE OF ERIC CAGE, Deceased (Sherlie Butler, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lahienda Thompson, as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Eric Cage, Cross-Petitioner-Appellee) ." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPetitioner Sherlie Butler appeals from the circuit court\u2019s order that denied Butler\u2019s petition for letters of administration and granted cross-petitioner Lahienda Thompson\u2019s cross-petition for letters of administration pertaining to the estate of decedent Eric Cage. On appeal, Butler contends that the circuit court erred when the court determined that Thompson, who is the mother and court-appointed guardian of decedent\u2019s children, had a higher statutory preference of appointment as compared to Butler, who is decedent\u2019s sister, under certain provisions of the Probate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)) (the Act). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.\nBACKGROUND\nIn September 2006, decedent died as a result of a vehicle collision involving his vehicle and an unmarked Chicago police department vehicle. Decedent was survived by his three minor children, namely, Eric Cage, Jr., Eriel Cage, and Erin Cage. Thompson is the mother of decedent\u2019s three minor children, but she and decedent were never married.\nOn October 23, 2006, Butler filed a petition for letters of administration, wherein she sought to be appointed independent administrator of decedent\u2019s estate. In that petition, in pertinent part, Butler identified herself as decedent\u2019s sister. Butler also identified decedent\u2019s three minor children as individuals who were entitled to nominate or administer equally or in preference to her. In addition, Butler attached to her petition her affidavit, wherein she attested that Thompson was the mother of decedent\u2019s three minor children and those children lived with Thompson.\nOn October 24, 2006, the circuit court entered an order declaring decedent\u2019s heirship, which declared that decedent\u2019s three minor children were decedent\u2019s only heirs.\nOn October 25, 2006, the circuit court appointed Butler administrator to collect for decedent\u2019s estate.\nOn October 30, 2006, Thompson sent Butler\u2019s attorney a letter indicating that she was objecting to the appointment of Butler as independent administrator of decedent\u2019s estate.\nOn December 19, 2006, the circuit court entered an order appointing Thompson the guardian of her and decedent\u2019s three minor children.\nOn December 20, 2006, the circuit court entered an order granting Thompson leave to file a cross-petition for letters of administration in connection with decedent\u2019s estate.\nThat same day, December 20, 2006, Thompson filed her cross-petition for letters of administration, wherein she sought to be appointed independent administrator of decedent\u2019s estate. In that petition, in pertinent part, Thompson identified herself as guardian of decedent\u2019s three minor children and indicated that no one had a higher statutory preference to become the administrator of decedent\u2019s estate.\nIn January 2007, Butler responded to Thompson\u2019s cross-petition for letters of administration and urged the trial court to deny Thompson\u2019s cross-petition. Butler maintained that Thompson was never married to decedent and was never related to decedent in any way. According to Butler, the plain language of section 9 \u2014 3 of the Act permitted the guardian of a minor, such as Thompson, to \u201conly file letters of administration for the purpose of nominating someone in the order of preference (e.g. a spouse or sibling).\u201d Butler further argued that \u201cthere is no provision in Section 9 \u2014 3 allowing [Thompson], the guardian of a minor, the right to nominate someone outside the preference list, including herself.\u201d\nIn February 2007, Thompson replied and argued that she was qualified to act as an administrator of decedent\u2019s estate and had been appointed guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children. Thompson argued that as their guardian, she had a statutory right and authority to nominate on behalf of those minors. Thompson further argued that decedent\u2019s minor children had a higher statutory preference over Butler, who was decedent\u2019s sister.\nIn March 2007, the circuit court entered an order appointing Thompson independent administrator of decedent\u2019s estate. In particular, the court found that Thompson, as guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children, had preference over Butler, as a sibling of decedent, under section 9 \u2014 3 of the Act. Accordingly, the court found that Thompson had preference over Butler to nominate herself as administrator of decedent\u2019s estate.\nIn April 2007, the circuit court denied Butler\u2019s motion to reconsider.\nThis appeal followed.\nANALYSIS\nOn appeal, Butler contends that the circuit court erred when the court determined, pursuant to section 9 \u2014 3 of the Act (755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006)), that Thompson, as guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children, had a higher statutory preference of appointment as compared to Butler, as decedent\u2019s sibling. Specifically, Butler asserts that under the plain statutory language of the Act decedent\u2019s minor children \u201cnever had the right to nominate on their own\u201d and that \u201cthe only persons on the [statutory] preference list that Lahienda Thompson could nominate are the parents of Eric Cage and his siblings.\u201d\nBecause Butler presents an issue involving statutory construction, we review de novo the circuit court\u2019s interpretation of the applicable provisions of the Act. In re Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d 393, 401 (2003). When we interpret a statute, we must ascertain and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent, which is best indicated by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language itself. Wisniewski v. Kownacki, 221 Ill. 2d 453, 460 (2006).\nWhere the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we must apply it without resorting to other aids of statutory construction. Wisniewski, 221 Ill. 2d at 460. However, a reviewing court must always presume that the legislature did not intend to create absurd, inconvenient, or unjust results. Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d 102, 112 (2006). In addition, we should consider a statute in its entirety and avoid constructions that would render any term or provision meaningless or superfluous. Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112.\nSection 9 \u2014 1 of the Act is entitled \u201cWho may act as administrator\u201d and provides:\n\u201cA person who has attained the age of 18 years, is a resident of the United States, is not of unsound mind, is not an adjudged disabled person as defined in this Act and has not been convicted of a felony, is qualified to act as administrator.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 2006).\nSection 9 \u2014 3 of the Act lists categories of persons entitled to preference in obtaining letters of administration. 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006); Estate of Poole, 207 Ill. 2d at 402, citing 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 1998). In particular, section 9 \u2014 3 identifies 10 specific categories entitled to preference in obtaining letters of administration in sequential order. 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006). In pertinent part, the third category in order of preference is \u201c[t]he children or any person nominated by them.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(c) (West 2006). The sixth category in order of preference is \u201c[t]he brothers and sisters or any person nominated by them.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(f) (West 2006).\nSection 9 \u2014 3 further provides, relevant to this appeal, that the guardian of a person \u201cwho is not qualified to act as administrator solely because of minority *** may nominate on behalf of the minor *** in accordance with the order of preference set forth in this Section.\u201d 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006).\nHere, after carefully interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of sections 9 \u2014 1 and 9 \u2014 3 of the Act, we agree with the circuit court\u2019s conclusion that Thompson, as guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children, has a higher statutory preference in nominating an administrator and obtaining letters of administration when compared to Butler, as decedent\u2019s sibling.\nMost significantly, it is undeniable that section 9 \u2014 3 of the Act explicitly and unambiguously provides that decedent\u2019s children have higher preference in obtaining letters of administration when compared to Butler, who is decedent\u2019s sister. 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3(c), (e) (West 2006). While section 9 \u2014 1 of the Act (755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 2006)) precludes decedent\u2019s minor children from serving as administrators of decedent\u2019s estate solely because of their minority status, those minor children are nonetheless entitled under section 9 \u2014 3 to be represented by their guardian, in this case Thompson, who is indisputably authorized to \u201cnominate [an administrator] on behalf of the minor.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006).\nFurthermore, contrary to Butler\u2019s contentions otherwise, there is nothing in the Act\u2019s provisions that prohibits Thompson from nominating herself as the administrator of decedent\u2019s estate. In fact, section 9 \u2014 1 of the Act, which is entitled \u201cWho may act as administrator,\u201d rather broadly defines an eligible administrator as an individual who (1) is at least 18 years of age; (2) is a resident of the United States; (3) is not of unsound mind; (4) is not an adjudged disabled person; and (5) is not a convicted felon. 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 2006). In the case sub judice, as Butler implicitly concedes by not arguing to the contrary, there is absolutely no evidence that Thompson fails to satisfy the requirements of section 9 \u2014 1.\nUltimately, after carefully interpreting the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language of sections 9 \u2014 1 and 9 \u2014 3 as a whole, we find that Thompson, as guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children, was authorized to nominate herself as administrator of decedent\u2019s estate and had a higher preference to do so than Butler, who is decedent\u2019s sister.\nWe are not persuaded by Butler\u2019s strained interpretation of sections 9 \u2014 1 and 9 \u2014 3 of the Act. First, we acknowledge, as Butler maintains, that decedent\u2019s minor children were ineligible to serve as administrator of decedent\u2019s estate or nominate an administrator because of their minority status. However, we reiterate that the Act clearly provides a mechanism whereby the interests of minor children are to be represented by the guardian of such minor children. See 755 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 3 (West 2006) (providing that a guardian of a person \u201cwho is not qualified to act as administrator solely because of minority *** may nominate on behalf of the minor\u201d). Here, Thompson was the undisputed guardian of decedent\u2019s minor children and was thus empowered under section 9 \u2014 3 to nominate on their behalf.\nSecond, we reject Butler\u2019s assertion that Thompson was limited to nominating only those individuals who were identified in the preference list of section 9 \u2014 3. Specifically, Butler argues that, pursuant to section 9 \u2014 3, Thompson was limited to nominating either decedent\u2019s parents or decedent\u2019s siblings, including Butler. However, Butler\u2019s strict interpretation of section 9 \u2014 3 would render superfluous and meaningless the broad and clear definition of eligible administrators under section 9 \u2014 1 of the Act, which is an unfavorable outcome that we necessarily reject. See, e.g., Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 112 (reviewing court should avoid a statutory interpretation that renders any term meaningless or superfluous).\nCONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.\nAffirmed.\nMcBRIDE, EJ., and McNULTY, J., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Matthew C. Friedman, of Friedman & Bonebrake, EC., of Chicago, for appellant.", "Michael W Rathsack, of Chicago, for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "In re ESTATE OF ERIC CAGE, Deceased (Sherlie Butler, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Lahienda Thompson, as Adm\u2019r of the Estate of Eric Cage, Cross-Petitioner-Appellee) .\nFirst District (6th Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20141297\nOpinion filed March 14, 2008.\nMatthew C. Friedman, of Friedman & Bonebrake, EC., of Chicago, for appellant.\nMichael W Rathsack, of Chicago, for appellee." }, "file_name": "0110-01", "first_page_order": 126, "last_page_order": 131 }