{ "id": 3627204, "name": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL C. CEJA, Defendant-Appellant", "name_abbreviation": "People v. Ceja", "decision_date": "2008-03-25", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20140293", "first_page": "178", "last_page": "185", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 178" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "191 Ill. App. 3d 364", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2511113 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "366" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/191/0364-01" ] }, { "cite": "317 Ill. App. 3d 905", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1025927 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "907" }, { "page": "908" }, { "page": "907" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/317/0905-01" ] }, { "cite": "363 Ill. App. 3d 668", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765959 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "672-73" }, { "page": "673" }, { "page": "672" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0668-01" ] }, { "cite": "224 Ill. 2d 115", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3607201 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" }, { "page": "130" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/224/0115-01" ] }, { "cite": "187 Ill. 2d 448", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1131034 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "451" }, { "page": "451" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/187/0448-01" ] }, { "cite": "177 Ill. 2d 53", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 317113 ], "year": 1997, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "101" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/177/0053-01" ] }, { "cite": "312 Ill. 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App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5765959 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "672-73" }, { "page": "773" } ], "opinion_index": 1, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/363/0668-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 711, "char_count": 17386, "ocr_confidence": 0.826, "pagerank": { "raw": 4.03580807328026e-08, "percentile": 0.10420086267577762 }, "sha256": "51e841ad24651b93ed837a5aa02195db99f38a3985cd7e6a42ce3069b4b94a27", "simhash": "1:fb69367b334897d5", "word_count": 2856 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:38.608554+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL C. CEJA, Defendant-Appellant." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE GROMETER\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis case is before us on defendant Raul C. Ceja\u2019s motion for summary remand. Defendant contends that the trial court improperly dismissed his petition under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 1 et seq. (West 2006)). We agree, and, for the reasons that follow, we vacate and remand.\nA summary of the proceedings up until this point in the litigation would be helpful in understanding our disposition of this appeal. Hence, we set forth the following. After a jury trial in 1999, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9 \u2014 1 (West 1998)). On April 17, 1999, he was sentenced to death. Defendant appealed to the supreme court; that appeal was not resolved until April 2003. Meanwhile, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition in August 2001. Also, Governor George Ryan commuted defendant\u2019s sentence to natural life in prison in January 2003. After seeking and receiving several continuances, defendant, through counsel, filed an amended postconviction petition on November 30, 2006. The trial court dismissed the petition as frivolous and patently without merit on February 21, 2007.\nDefendant appeals the trial court\u2019s decision. He reasons that since this was a capital case at the time the initial postconviction petition was filed, there was never a period during which the summary dismissal provision of the Act applied. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 2006). Further, even if the case is deemed to be a noncapital case due to the commutation of his sentence, the petition had already been pending for more than 90 days at the time the court dismissed it. Dispositive of defendant\u2019s argument is whether the filing of the amended petition triggered a new 90-day period during which the court could summarily dismiss his petition. We hold that it did not.\nBefore turning to the substance of defendant\u2019s contentions, we will address the State\u2019s argument that defendant waived any objection to the trial court summarily dismissing his petition. Specifically, the State invokes the invited-error doctrine. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 187 Ill. App. 3d 999, 1007 (1989). It points out that defendant caused the lengthy delay in this case by seeking a myriad of continuances before amending his petition. But for these continuances, the State reasons, the trial court would have had an opportunity to dismiss the petition summarily. The State\u2019s waiver argument breaks down, however, because, as we explain in more detail below, when defendant filed his original petition, this was a capital case. Therefore, the petition was never subject to summary dismissal. Any delay caused by defendant did not cause the trial court to lose an opportunity to dismiss the petition.\nHence, the question before us is whether the trial court had the authority to dismiss defendant\u2019s amended petition. The Act establishes a three-stage procedure for adjudicating postconviction petitions. People v. Cummings, 375 Ill. App. 3d 513, 516 (2007). In the first stage, \u201cthe circuit court determines whether defendant\u2019s allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional violation that would necessitate relief, and the court may summarily dismiss a petition upon finding that it is frivolous or patently without merit.\u201d Cummings, 375 Ill. App. 3d at 516; see also 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a)(2) (West 2006). In a noncapital case, if the petition is not dismissed in the first stage, the court may appoint counsel for an indigent defendant, counsel may amend the petition, and the State may move to dismiss the petition. People v. Rish, 344 Ill. App. 3d 1105, 1110 (2003). In the third stage, the court conducts an evidentiary hearing and considers the merits of the petition. People v. Starks, 365 Ill. App. 3d 592, 598 (2006). In a capital case, there is no provision for a stage-one dismissal of a petition as frivolous or patently without merit. See 725 ILCS 5/122\u2014 2.1(a)(1) (West 2006). In essence, since there is no stage one in a capital case, the petition is automatically docketed for further proceedings. See 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a), (b) (West 2006). Because this was a capital case when defendant first sought postconviction relief, there was never a time when defendant\u2019s petition could have been dismissed summarily by the trial court. This straightforward application of the provisions of the Act normally would be enough to resolve this appeal.\nThe State, however, raises an additional argument we must consider. It contends that the subsequent commutation of defendant\u2019s sentence coupled with the filing of an amended petition created a new window in which the case could be summarily dismissed. A number of cases touch upon this issue. The First District case of People v. Smith, 312 Ill. App. 3d 219 (2000), shares a number of similarities with this case, but also has one important difference. In Smith, the defendant filed a postconviction petition while under a sentence of death. Subsequently, the Illinois Supreme Court, on direct appeal, vacated the defendant\u2019s death sentence. People v. Smith, 177 Ill. 2d 53, 101 (1997). The trial court then summarily dismissed the defendant\u2019s postconviction petition. The petition was dismissed more than 90 days after it was filed. The State argued that when the supreme court vacated the defendant\u2019s sentence of death, it restored the trial court\u2019s power to summarily dismiss the petition and created a new 90-day period in which the petition could be dismissed. The Smith court rejected this argument, explaining that \u201cIllinois case law provides that the statutory time limit of 90 days is mandatory [citation] and begins to run upon the \u2018filing and docketing of each petition\u2019 [citation]. There are no exceptions to this rule.\u201d Smith, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 223. It then held that \u201cany action taken by the trial court pursuant to section 122 \u2014 2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act must be taken \u2018[w]ithin 90 days after the filing and docketing of each petition.\u2019 \u201d Smith, 312 Ill. App. 3d at 224, quoting 725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1(a) (West 1996).\nSmith teaches us that the mere fact that defendant\u2019s death sentence was commuted did not create a new 90-day period in which the trial court could dismiss defendant\u2019s petition. However, Smith differs from this case in that it did not involve an amended petition. Thus, we must consider whether the filing of the amended petition here somehow leads to a different result.\nIt is true that filing an amended petition during stage one of post-conviction proceedings causes a new 90-day period to run from the time of the filing. In People v. Watson, 187 Ill. 2d 448, 451 (1999), our supreme court held, \u201cwhen a defendant who has filed an original post-conviction petition subsequently files an amended petition, the 90-day period in which the court must examine the defendant\u2019s petition and enter an order thereon is to be calculated from the filing of the amended petition.\u201d The Watson court was concerned with what it termed the \u201cunreasonableness\u201d of the defendant\u2019s position:\n\u201cAfter requesting and receiving leave to amend his original petition, defendant mailed the amended petition on the eighty-eighth day of the original period. Under defendant\u2019s suggestion, the circuit court would then have had only two days to consider the merits of the amended petition. Such a truncated time frame to consider the petition would be both inadequate and unfair. Such a rule could work only to the detriment of all, including both defendants and prosecutors.\u201d Watson, 187 Ill. 2d at 451.\nWatson\u2019s holding would seem to support the State\u2019s position.\nHowever, in People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 130 (2007), the court qualified Watson, explaining that \u201cin Watson the amended petition was filed before the initial 90-day period expired.\u201d It continued, \u201cIn other words, during the initial 90-day period, the petition was replaced by a new petition, and the 90-day period began anew.\u201d Harris, 224 Ill. 2d at 130. The court then noted, \u201c[t]here is no provision in the Act allowing the trial court to delay the beginning of the 90-day period when a petition is pending before it.\u201d Harris, 224 Ill. 2d at 130. Therefore, the rule set forth in Watson, that the filing of an amended petition causes a new 90-day period to run, applies only while postconviction proceedings are still in the first stage.\nIndeed, in People v. Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d 668, 672 (2006), the Fifth District discussed Watson and concluded, \u201cWe do not believe that Watson stands for the proposition that any time an amended petition is filed, the 90-day time period for summary dismissal starts anew.\u201d (Emphasis in original.) Rather, the court stated, \u201c[W]e believe that once counsel has been appointed, any dismissal of the petition should be by adversary process, based on a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecutor, and not done sua sponte and summarily by the circuit court.\u201d Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 673. We find the court\u2019s reasons for taking this position persuasive.\nThe Volkmar court based its decision upon the purposes behind the procedures set forth in section 122 \u2014 2.1 of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122 \u2014 2.1 (West 1996)). It first explained the purpose behind the summary dismissal provision, which is to \u201cdeter the filing of frivolous pro se petitions and save both the court and the prosecutor from having to expend time and resources on them.\u201d Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73. Once proceedings pass to the second stage \u2014 when counsel is appointed \u2014 there is no need for such frivolity review, in that \u201c[i]t must be assumed that counsel, who by signing a pleading certifies pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137) that it is well-grounded in fact and in law and is not interposed for an improper purpose, will not file a frivolous or patently unmeritorious petition.\u201d Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 673. Also, counsel, unlike a layperson, is bound by Rule 3.3 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, which provides that \u201c[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous.\u201d 134 Ill. 2d R. 3.3. Furthermore, the Volkmar court also noted that allowing a new 90-day period in which a petition could be dismissed would entail a potential consequence that the legislature likely did not intend: \u201cTo allow the summary dismissal of a petition that has been amended by counsel might deter counsel from making any amendment, for fear that it would make the petition vulnerable to a sua sponte summary dismissal by the circuit court.\u201d Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 672.\nIn sum, we agree with the Volkmar court. The presence of counsel once a defendant gets beyond that first stage of postconviction proceedings obviates the need for judicial review for frivolity. Hence, there is no reason to revive the period in which the petition could be summarily dismissed. The State points out that, in this case, counsel was appointed because of the death sentence. We do not see the relevance of the reason for the appointment. Counsel is always bound by Supreme Court Rule 137 (155 Ill. 2d R. 137), and that is a sufficient safeguard against the filing of a frivolous or patently meritless petition.\nThe State points briefly to People v. Lara, 317 Ill. App. 3d 905, 907 (2000), in support of its position. Lara, however, did not involve a summary dismissal of a postconviction petition. Lara, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 908. Nevertheless, it did restate the rule from Watson: \u201cA summary dismissal entered more than 90 days after the petition was filed is void, unless the defendant requested leave to amend within the period for the trial court\u2019s first-stage review.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Lara, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 907. Hence, Lara does not help the State.\nFinally, the State asserts that \u201cthere would be no practical value to remanding this cause to the trial court for further proceedings, as the trial court would likely then dismiss the petition upon a motion by the People.\u201d In essence, this is a harmless-error argument; however, the State cites no authority indicating that the error committed by the trial court in this case is amenable to a harmless-error analysis. Accordingly, this contention is waived. People v. Acevedo, 191 Ill. App. 3d 364, 366 (1989).\nBefore closing, we emphasize that the foregoing discussion is not intended to supplant any of the bright-line rules set forth in the Act. In accordance with the Act\u2019s provisions, a trial court may dismiss a petition as frivolous or patently without merit during stage one and not thereafter, regardless of whether counsel is involved in the case. Though it is typically the case that counsel is not involved during stage-one proceedings and is involved thereafter, the rule remains as it has always been stated in the Act. We intended only to examine the State\u2019s argument regarding revival of a 90-day summary dismissal period in the context of the policies that the mechanics of the Act serve.\nAccordingly, we grant defendant\u2019s motion for summary remand. We vacate the order dismissing defendant\u2019s postconviction petition and remand this cause for further proceedings.\nVacated and remanded.\nCALLUM, J., concurs.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE GROMETER" }, { "text": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY,\nspecially concurring:\nI write separately because I disagree with the majority\u2019s decision to adopt the flawed reasoning expressed in Volkmar. As the majority notes, Volkmar states that postconviction petitions should not be summarily dismissed at the second stage because, once a petition has reached the second stage and counsel has been appointed, frivolity review would be redundant with the mandate from Rule 137 that counsel certify that filed pleadings are well grounded in fact and law. 381 Ill. App. 3d at 182-83; see Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 672-73. Thus, according to Volkmar, \u201conce counsel has been appointed, any dismissal of the petition should be by adversary process, *** not done sua sponte and summarily by the circuit court.\u201d (Emphasis added.) Volkmar, 363 Ill. App. 3d at 773. This is wrong. Contrary to the reasoning in Volkmar, the circuit court\u2019s power to dismiss a postconviction petition summarily does not hinge on the question of whether counsel has been appointed; it hinges on the status of the petition. Quite simply, a petition in the first stage of postconviction proceedings may be dismissed summarily; a petition that has advanced past the first stage may not be dismissed summarily.\nVolkmar\u2019s erroneous reliance on the presence of counsel suggests at least two results that contravene the Act. First, under Volkmar, a petition filed by retained counsel at the first stage could not be dismissed summarily at the first stage, because the petition would bear the certification of counsel pursuant to Rule 137. Second, if a defendant were to elect to proceed pro se after his petition survived first-stage review, Volkmar would allow the trial court to dismiss his petition summarily at either stage two or stage three, because the petition would lack the certification of counsel pursuant to Rule 137.\nThe basis for Volkmar\u2019s reasoning is that, once counsel has been retained or appointed, the certification requirements of Rule 137 apply, and a court will thereby have the necessary assurance that a petition is not frivolous. However, Rule 137 does not govern only attorneys. It provides that \u201c[a] party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading ***. *** The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that *** [the pleading] is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 155 Ill. 2d R. 137. Thus, Rule 137 does not supply any basis to distinguish pro se petitions from those filed with the assistance of counsel, and Volkmar\u2019s reliance on it is misplaced.\nThe majority deems Volkmar\u2019s reasoning \u201cpersuasive\u201d (381 Ill. App. 3d at 182), declares that it \u201cagree[s] with the Volkmar court\u201d (381 Ill. App. 3d at 183), and echoes the sentiment from Volkmar that \u201c[t]he presence of counsel once a defendant gets beyond [the] first stage *** obviates the need for judicial review for frivolity\u201d (381 Ill. App. 3d at 183). The majority follows these endorsements of Volkmar with the hollow assurance that its discussion \u201cis not intended to supplant any of the bright-line rules set forth in the Act\u201d and the incongruous (albeit correct) explanation that \u201ca trial court may dismiss a petition as frivolous or patently without merit during stage one and not thereafter, regardless of whether counsel is involved in the case.\u201d 381 Ill. App. 3d at 183. These statements, which appear as an afterthought in the penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion, fall flat in light of the majority\u2019s actual reasoning.\nIn my view, the majority should rely on the Act, not Volkmar, to reach the result that defendant\u2019s petition should be remanded for second-stage postconviction proceedings.", "type": "concurrence", "author": "JUSTICE O\u2019MALLEY," } ], "attorneys": [ "Thomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.", "Joseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL C. CEJA, Defendant-Appellant.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140293\nOpinion filed March 25, 2008.\nO\u2019MALLEY, J., specially concurring.\nThomas A. Lilien, of State Appellate Defender\u2019s Office, of Elgin, for appellant.\nJoseph E. Birkett, State\u2019s Attorney, of Wheaton (Lawrence M. Bauer and Diane L. Campbell, both of State\u2019s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor\u2019s Office, of counsel), for the People." }, "file_name": "0178-01", "first_page_order": 194, "last_page_order": 201 }