{ "id": 3627253, "name": "TIMOTHY PHALIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McHENRY COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee", "name_abbreviation": "Phalin v. McHenry County Sheriff's Department", "decision_date": "2008-03-28", "docket_number": "No. 2\u201407\u20140569", "first_page": "185", "last_page": "193", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 185" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "233 Ill. App. 3d 58", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5195124 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "66-67", "parenthetical": "holding that, for purposes of conferring disability benefits on a municipal police officer, the term \"line of duty\" is used less restrictively in the Public Employee Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2004)) than in applicable provisions of the Code" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/233/0058-01" ] }, { "cite": "46 Ill. 2d 238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 2898605 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1970, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "247" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/46/0238-01" ] }, { "cite": "316 Ill. App. 3d 1238", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1096548 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1240-41" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/316/1238-01" ] }, { "cite": "205 Ill. App. 3d 102", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2568022 ], "year": 1990, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "109" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/205/0102-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 189", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25450 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "197" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0189-01" ] }, { "cite": "204 Ill. 2d 392", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 609696 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" }, { "page": "397" }, { "page": "398" }, { "page": "400" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/204/0392-01" ] }, { "cite": "191 Ill. 2d 278", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 229716 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "291" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/191/0278-01" ] }, { "cite": "111 Ill. 2d 229", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3166688 ], "year": 1986, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "240" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/111/0229-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. 2d 307", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3610870 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "311" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/226/0307-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 853, "char_count": 20884, "ocr_confidence": 0.829, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.699805336962679e-08, "percentile": 0.407141304377205 }, "sha256": "03c57538cd0c6726af674a30c44c99548a236e3339d036e5910a06e24aeb35e4", "simhash": "1:d1b59dfa5a2296e0", "word_count": 3379 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:38.608554+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "TIMOTHY PHALIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McHENRY COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BYRNE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Timothy Phalin, filed a two-count complaint in the circuit court of McHenry County against defendant, the McHenry County sheriffs department. Count I sought a declaratory judgment that, pursuant to section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) (820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2004)), defendant was obligated to pay premiums on its health insurance plan for plaintiff and his \u201cqualifying family members.\u201d Count II sought an award of attorney fees pursuant to section 1 of the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2004)). The trial court entered summary judgment for defendant on both counts and plaintiff brought this appeal. We reverse and remand.\nSection 10 of the Act provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201c(a) An employer who employs a full-time law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, or firefighter, who *** suffers a catastrophic injury or is killed in the line of duty shall pay the entire premium of the employer\u2019s health insurance plan for the injured employee, the injured employee\u2019s spouse, and for each dependent child of the injured employee until the child reaches the age of majority or until the end of the calendar year in which the child reaches the age of 25 if the child continues to be dependent for support or the child is a full-time or part-time student and is dependent for support. *** If the injured employee subsequently dies, the employer shall continue to pay the entire health insurance premium for the surviving spouse until remarried and for the dependent children under the conditions established in this Section. ***\n^ ^\n(b) In order for the law enforcement, correctional or correctional probation officer, firefighter, spouse, or dependent children to be eligible for insurance coverage under this Act, the injury or death must have occurred as the result of the officer\u2019s response to fresh pursuit, the officer or firefighter\u2019s response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act.\u201d 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2004).\nIn count I of his complaint, plaintiff alleged that on November 21, 1998, and August 23, 2001, while employed by defendant as a full-time correctional officer, he injured his neck during altercations with inmates of the McHenry County jail. Plaintiff further alleged that in both incidents he was responding to what he reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act, or both. According to the complaint, in November 2001, as a result of one or both of the injuries, plaintiff became unable to perform his duties as a correctional officer. Plaintiffs responses to a request to admit served by defendant indicate that, in addition to the neck injuries suffered in November 1998 and August 2001, plaintiff injured his neck in January 1999 when a chair collapsed, and he injured his back during a training exercise on November 1, 2001. Plaintiff further admitted that, in June 2003, his employment with defendant terminated, and he obtained employment as a financial services associate with an insurance company. Plaintiff received temporary disability benefits from the Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund (IMRF) under section 7 \u2014 146 of the Illinois Pension Code (Code) (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 146 (West 2004)) from November 2002 until at least June 2003. Plaintiff was never awarded total and permanent disability benefits under section 7 \u2014 150 of the Code (40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 150 (West 2004)).\nIn count II, plaintiff alleged that he made a demand in writing to defendant \u201cfor an amount not exceeding the amount actually due and owing to him pursuant to the [Act]\u201d and was therefore statutorily entitled to an award of attorney fees.\nDefendant moved for summary judgment on both counts. In support of its motion, defendant argued that, in the case of a correctional officer, a catastrophic injury is one for which the officer is entitled to receive total and permanent disability benefits from the IMRF pursuant to section 7 \u2014 150 of the Code, which applies to municipal employees who are disabled from engaging in any gainful activity. Defendant argued that plaintiff did not qualify for the section 7 \u2014 150 benefits because, inter alia, he had obtained gainful employment as a financial services associate. Therefore, according to defendant, plaintiff did not suffer a catastrophic injury within the meaning of the Act. Defendant also argued that two of the four injuries plaintiff suffered\u2014 the second and the fourth \u2014 did not meet the criteria of section 10(b) of the Act. With respect to count II, defendant argued that plaintiff failed to satisfy the demand requirement of the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act because his demand letter did not set forth a specific sum.\nSummary judgment is appropriate where \u201cthe pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.\u201d 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005(c) (West 2004). \u201cThe purpose of a summary judgment proceeding is not to try an issue of fact, but rather to determine whether one exists.\u201d Mydlach v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 226 Ill. 2d 307, 311 (2007). Summary judgment should be allowed only \u201cwhen the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.\u201d Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986). The trial court\u2019s ruling on a summary judgment motion is subject to de novo review. Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 191 Ill. 2d 278, 291 (2000).\nEmployers subject to the Act must pay for health insurance coverage for a public safety employee (and his or her spouse and dependent children) when the employee suffers a \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d under the circumstances specified in section 10(b). Defendant suffered four injuries. There is no dispute that the first and third \u2014 which arose from altercations with jail inmates \u2014 meet the criteria of section 10(b). Likewise there is no dispute that the second and fourth injuries do not meet those criteria. The principal issue is whether plaintiff suffered a \u201ccatastrophic\u201d injury.\nIn Krohe v. City of Bloomington, 204 Ill. 2d 392 (2003), our supreme court considered whether a firefighter who had been awarded a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code was also entitled to benefits under the Act. In arguing that he was not, his municipal employer insisted that the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d embraces only injuries that \u201c \u2018severely limit the earning power of the affected employee\u2019 \u201d (Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 395) or render the employee \u201c \u2018incapable of engaging in any gainful employment\u2019 \u201d (emphasis in original) (Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 397). Our supreme court disagreed. Concluding that the term is ambiguous, the court surveyed the legislative debates on the bill proposing the Act. The court cited statements to the effect that the Act was designed to provide continuing health coverage for law enforcement officers and police officers who are disabled in the line of duty and for their families. The Governor vetoed the bill, but the General Assembly voted to override the veto. The Krohe court noted:\n\u201cImmediately prior to the vote [to override the veto], the bill\u2019s sponsor *** delivered the following remarks:\nT\u2019d like to say for the sake of the record what we mean by catastrophically injured. What it means is that it is our intent to define \u201ccatastrophically injured\u201d as a police officer or firefighter who, due to injuries, has been forced to take a line of duty disability\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 398.\nBased on this statement, the Krohe court construed the term \u201ccatastrophic injury\u201d \u201cas synonymous with an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability under section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code.\u201d Krohe, 204 Ill. 2d at 400.\nIn O\u2019Loughlin v. Village of River Forest, 338 Ill. App. 3d 189 (2003), decided eight days after Krohe, the appellate court applied similar reasoning in a case involving a municipal police officer\u2019s right to benefits under the Act. The O\u2019Loughlin court concluded that \u201cthe legislature of Illinois intended for the Act to cover police officers and firefighters who were forced to take a line-of-duty disability.\u201d O\u2019Loughlin, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 197.\nUnder Krohe and O\u2019Loughlin, municipal police officers and firefighters need not establish that they are disabled from engaging in any gainful activity. Section 4 \u2014 110 of the Code provides for a line-of-duty disability pension where a firefighter, \u201cas the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, is found *** to be *** permanently disabled for service in the fire department.\" (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/4 \u2014 110 (West 2004) (applicable to firefighters employed by municipalities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants); see also 40 ILCS 5/6 \u2014 112, 6 \u2014 151 (West 2004) (applicable to firefighters employed by municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants). Section 3 \u2014 114.1 of the Code provides for a line-of-duty disability pension when a municipal police officer, \u201cas the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty, is found to be *** disabled for service in the police department.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 114.1 (West 2004) (applicable to police officers in municipalities with fewer than 500,000 inhabitants); see also 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 115, 5 \u2014 154 (West 2004) (applicable to police officers employed by municipalities with more than 500,000 inhabitants).\nThe problem here, as defendant correctly observes, is that, because plaintiff is neither a municipal police officer nor a municipal firefighter, he is ineligible for line-of-duty disability pension benefits under the particular statutory provisions applicable to the public safety employees in Krohe and O\u2019Loughlin. If a line-of-duty disability pension were available under some other statute, it might stand to reason that, in accordance with the analysis in Krohe and O\u2019Loughlin, that statute would govern eligibility for benefits under the Act. Unfortunately, that is not the case here.\nPlaintiff is a participating employee in the IMRF, which is governed by article 7 of the Code. Defendant argues that section 7 \u2014 150 governs plaintiff\u2019s right to benefits under the Act. Section 7 \u2014 150(a)(1) provides for payment of total and permanent disability benefits to participating employees who are, inter alia, \u201cunable to engage in any gainful activity.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 150(a)(1) (West 2004). However, neither eligibility for nor the amount of benefits under section 7 \u2014 150 depends in any way on whether the employee was disabled in the line of duty. Moreover, the General Assembly has specifically used the term \u201cduty disability\u201d or \u201cline of duty\u201d to describe the pension benefits available to municipal police officers and firefighters in sections 3 \u2014 114.1, 4 \u2014 110, 5 \u2014 154, and 6 \u2014 151 of the Code. 40 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 114.1, 4 \u2014 110, 5 \u2014 154, 6 \u2014 151 (West 2004). Section 7 \u2014 150 uses no such language. Thus section 7 \u2014 150 simply has no bearing on the central inquiry under Krohe: whether a public safety employee suffered an injury resulting in a line-of-duty disability.\nIn the trial court, defendant cited section 367h(3)(a) of the Illinois Insurance Code (215 ILCS 5/367h(3)(a) (West 2004)) in support of its argument that plaintiffs eligibility for benefits under the Act must be determined with reference to article 7 of the Code. Section 367h permits a \u201cdeputy\u201d to continue group health insurance at his own expense during a disability period that \u201cbegins on the day the deputy is removed from [the] sheriffs police department payroll because *** the deputy\u2019s disability is established under Article 7 of the Illinois Pension Code.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/367h(3)(a) (West 2004). Defendant\u2019s reason for invoking this statute is not altogether clear. Apparently, defendant hoped to bolster its argument that article 7 is the applicable pension law for purposes of determining a sheriffs corrections officer\u2019s rights under the Act. However, section 367h does not the fix the basic flaw in defendant\u2019s argument: article 7 does not provide for line-of-duty benefits, so it is not germane to the test set forth in Krohe and O\u2019Loughlin.\nDefendant\u2019s reliance on section 367h is misplaced for the additional reason that, in all likelihood, plaintiff was not a \u201cdeputy\u201d within the meaning of that provision. Section 367h(2) defines \u201cdeputy\u201d as a \u201csheriff\u2019s law enforcement employee.\u201d 215 ILCS 5/367h(2) (West 2004). Subject to exceptions that are not applicable here, \u201csheriffs law enforcement employee\u201d means \u201c[a] county sheriff and all deputies, other than special deputies, employed on a full time basis in the office of the sheriff.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/7 \u2014 109.3(a)(1) (West 2004). Where a county has created a Sheriffs Office Merit Commission, all full-time deputy sheriffs are within the jurisdiction of the Sheriffs Merit System Law (55 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 8001 et seq. (West 2004)). Roche v. County of Lake, 205 Ill. App. 3d 102, 109 (1990). McHenry County has a merit commission for deputies, but since February 16, 1988, jail officers have been excluded from the merit system and have been \u201chired pursuant to a nonmerited system administered by the Sheriff.\u201d Goodwin v. McHenry County Sheriff\u2019s Department Merit Comm\u2019n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 1238, 1240-41 (2000). Because jail officers are not merit system employees, they cannot be deputies and, therefore, are not sheriffs law enforcement employees.\nThere is no merit to defendant\u2019s position that a sheriffs correctional officer must suffer a total and permanent disability to qualify for health insurance coverage under the Act. As seen, it was the intent of the General Assembly that health insurance be maintained for public safety employees who are disabled in the line of duty, whether or not the disability prevents the employee from performing another type of employment. However, because there is no statute providing a line-of-duty disability pension, as such, to a sheriffs correctional officer, we must craft an appropriate test for determining whether a disability was incurred in the line of duty. In our view, the test that applies to municipal police officers is a valuable source of guidance. Like police officers, who are charged with the responsibility to maintain public order and safety within the general population, correctional officers are responsible for maintaining safety within the inmate population of a correctional facility. To be entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension, a police officer\u2019s disability must be connected to an \u201cact of duty,\u201d the essence of which is the existence of a \u201cspecial risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life.\u201d 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 113 (West 2004). A correctional officer\u2019s encounters with potentially violent inmates entail this sort of risk. Thus, we hold that a sheriff\u2019s correctional officer\u2019s disability resulting from altercations with inmates is sustained in the line of duty.\nThe remaining question is one of causation. Plaintiff became unable to perform the work of a correctional officer after injuring his neck and back in four separate incidents. The first and third incidents \u2014 altercations with inmates \u2014 undisputedly satisfy the criteria of section 10(b) of the Act. On the other hand, it is also undisputed that the second incident and the final one do not satisfy those criteria. Plaintiff posits, however, that the Act does not limit benefits to a disability that \u201cstems from a single qualifying injury.\u201d He cites International Harvester Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 46 Ill. 2d 238 (1970), which held that, where a worker is disabled after suffering an occupational injury and a subsequent nonoccupational injury, the worker is entitled to worker\u2019s compensation benefits if \u201cthe existing employment-connected condition is a causative factor in producing either the subsequent injury or the subsequent disability.\u201d International Harvester Co., 46 Ill. 2d at 247. We see no reason why a similar rule of causation should not apply here. Thus, if plaintiff\u2019s \u201cqualifying\u201d injuries \u2014 those suffered as a result of altercations with inmates \u2014 were a causative factor in his disability, they were \u201ccatastrophic\u201d and he should receive benefits under the Act. What role, if any, those injuries played in disabling plaintiff from performing the duties of a correctional officer is a question of fact precluding the entry of summary judgment.\nAccordingly, the trial court erred in entering summary judgment on count I of the complaint. The trial court also entered summary judgment for defendant on count II of the complaint, which is predicated on section 1 of the Attorneys Fees in Wage Actions Act (705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2004)). Section 1 provides, in pertinent part:\n\u201cWhenever [an] *** employee brings an action for wages earned and due and owing according to the terms of the employment, and establishes by the decision of the court or jury that the amount for which he or she has brought the action is justly due and owing, and that a demand was made in writing at least 3 days before the action was brought, for a sum not exceeding the amount so found due and owing, then the court shall allow to the plaintiff a reasonable attorney fee of not less than $10, in addition to the amount found due and owing for wages, to be taxed as costs of the action.\u201d 705 ILCS 225/1 (West 2004).\nThe trial court correctly reasoned that plaintiff could not prevail on count II unless he also prevailed on count I. Thus, because the trial court entered summary judgment on count I, it concluded that defendant was necessarily entitled to summary judgment on count II as well. However, because the entiy of summary judgment on count I was error, the disposition of count II cannot be sustained on this basis.\nIn the trial court, defendant argued that plaintiffs written demand was inadequate because it did not set forth a specific sum. Plaintiffs letter to defendant provided, in pertinent part, as follows:\n\u201cI have incurred $1,569.98 in expenses to pay for health insurance premiums to date, and additional expenses will accrue in the future.\nBy this letter, I am demanding that McHenry County immediately pay any and all health insurance premiums for myself and my qualifying family members pursuant to the [Act],\nThis request is also being made pursuant to the Attorneys Fees in Wage Action Act ***. If the County fails to take immediate action to pay the sum of $5,742.09 for past health insurance premiums and thereafter pay all future premiums as they come due pursuant to the [Act], please be advised that an action seeking a declaratory judgment and for attorney\u2019s fees will be filed in the Circuit Court.\u201d\nDefendant argued that the demand was improper because it set forth two different sums. The argument is meritless. Although plaintiff refers to having incurred $1,569 to pay for health insurance, he makes but one demand in connection with his statutory right to collect attorney fees. Plaintiff specifically sets forth the sum of $5,742.09 as the amount the county must pay to avoid a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment and attorney fees. It is this amount, and this amount alone, that represents plaintiffs demand for purposes of his statutory claim for attorney fees. Accordingly, the entry of summary judgment on count II was error.\nFor the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County and remand for further proceedings.\nReversed and remanded.\nGROMETER and ZENOFF, JJ., concur.\nThe General Assembly has similarly differentiated \u201cline of duty\u201d and \u201cduty disability\u201d benefits from \u201coccupational disability benefits\u201d available to a broad range of state employees. See 40 ILCS 5/14 \u2014 123 (West 2004).\nPlaintiff testified at his deposition that he joined the McHenry County sheriffs office in 1992.\nIn doing so, we are cognizant that the term \u201cline of duty\u201d may have different meanings in different contexts, even as applied to a single category of public safety employee. See Swanson v. Village of Lake in the Hills, 233 Ill. App. 3d 58, 66-67 (1992) (holding that, for purposes of conferring disability benefits on a municipal police officer, the term \u201cline of duty\u201d is used less restrictively in the Public Employee Disability Act (5 ILCS 345/1 (West 2004)) than in applicable provisions of the Code).", "type": "majority", "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE BYRNE" } ], "attorneys": [ "Anthony G. Argeros, of Anthony G. Argeros, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.", "Louis A. Bianchi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Michelle J. Courier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "TIMOTHY PHALIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. McHENRY COUNTY SHERIFF\u2019S DEPARTMENT, Defendant-Appellee.\nSecond District\nNo. 2\u201407\u20140569\nOpinion filed March 28, 2008.\nAnthony G. Argeros, of Anthony G. Argeros, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.\nLouis A. Bianchi, State\u2019s Attorney, of Woodstock (Michelle J. Courier, Assistant State\u2019s Attorney, of counsel), for appellee." }, "file_name": "0185-01", "first_page_order": 201, "last_page_order": 209 }