{
  "id": 3628123,
  "name": "STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMIE ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant",
  "name_abbreviation": "Standard Mutual Insurance v. Rogers",
  "decision_date": "2008-03-20",
  "docket_number": "No. 3\u201407\u20140138",
  "first_page": "196",
  "last_page": "199",
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    "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.",
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    "name": "Illinois Appellate Court"
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  "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:38.608554+00:00",
  "provenance": {
    "date_added": "2019-08-29",
    "source": "Harvard",
    "batch": "2018"
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  "casebody": {
    "judges": [],
    "parties": [
      "STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMIE ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant."
    ],
    "opinions": [
      {
        "text": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThe plaintiff, Standard Mutual Insurance Company, filed a declaratory judgment action, alleging that it had no duty to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the defendant, Jimmie Rogers. Both parties moved for summary judgment, and the circuit court found in favor of the plaintiff. On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it found that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under his insurance policy with the plaintiff. We affirm.\nOn September 28, 2005, the defendant was driving his son to preschool. While stopped at an intersection, an individual on a bicycle rode into the defendant\u2019s vehicle, causing the front passenger-side window to shatter. The defendant sustained an injury to his right eye from the broken glass. The individual on the bicycle was not covered by an insurance policy.\nOn October 24, 2005, the defendant filed an insurance claim with the plaintiff, alleging that he was entitled to compensation for his injuries under the uninsured motorist provision of his policy. In response, the plaintiff filed this declaratory judgment action.\nBoth parties filed motions for summary judgment. On January 26, 2007, the circuit court found that the plaintiff had no duty or obligation to provide uninsured motorist benefits to the defendant because a bicycle did not constitute a motor vehicle, such that the individual on the bicycle was not considered an uninsured motorist. On February 27, 2007, the defendant filed a notice of appeal with the circuit court.\nInitially, we note that the plaintiff suggests that the defendant failed to file a timely notice of appeal and that this court must dismiss the defendant\u2019s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.\nIn relevant part, Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) (210 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)(1)) provides that \u201cthe notice of appeal must be filed with the clerk of the circuit court within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from.\u201d Supreme Court Rule 373 (155 Ill. 2d R. 373) provides that, if a notice of appeal is received after the due date, the time of mailing will be the time of filing. In this case, the defendant filed his notice of appeal on February 27, 2007, which was not within 30 days of the court\u2019s final judgment on January 26, 2007. However, the defendant\u2019s notice of filing indicates that it was mailed on February 21, 2007. This court has inquired with the circuit court of Will County, which confirmed that the defendant mailed the notice of appeal to the circuit court on February 21, 2007. Accordingly, the defendant timely filed his notice of appeal (155 Ill. 2d R. 373), and we have jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant\u2019s argument.\nThe defendant argues that the circuit court erred when it found that he was not entitled to uninsured motorist benefits under his insurance policy with the plaintiff. Specifically, the defendant contends that the public policy considerations behind the uninsured motorist coverage statute weigh in favor of extending coverage in this case, including the general rule that coverage should be construed liberally in favor of the policyholder.\nWe review matters of statutory construction and summary judgment de novo. Hudson v. YMCA of Metropolitan Chicago, LLC, 377 Ill. App. 3d 631, 878 N.E.2d 821 (2007).\nStatutory construction requires the reviewing court to determine and give effect to the legislature\u2019s intent. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). The primary indicator of legislative intent is the statute\u2019s plain language. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229. If the statute\u2019s language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to other methods of statutory construction. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229. However, if the statute\u2019s plain language is ambiguous, we will employ other tools of statutory construction, including the consideration of similar and related enactments. DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229.\nSection 143a(l) of the Illinois Insurance Code provides:\n\u201cNo policy insuring against loss resulting from liability imposed by law for bodily injury or death suffered by any person arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle that is designed for use on public highways and that is either required to be registered in this State or is principally garaged in this State shall be renewed, delivered, or issued for delivery in this State unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto, in limits for bodily injury or death set forth in Section 7 \u2014 203 of the Illinois Vehicle Code for the protection of persons insured thereunder who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles and hit-and-run motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death, resulting therefrom.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 215 ILCS 5/143a(l) (West 2004).\n\u201cMotor vehicle\u201d is not defined in the Illinois Insurance Code. However, \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d is defined in the Illinois Vehicle Code (Vehicle Code) (625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 100 et seq. (West 2004)), a code that is referenced in the Illinois Insurance Code. Thus, we look to the Vehicle Code for assistance in defining \u201cmotor vehicle.\u201d DeLuna, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 857 N.E.2d 229.\nSection 1 \u2014 146 of the Vehicle Code defines \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d as \u201c[ejvery vehicle which is self-propelled and every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except for vehicles moved solely by human power and motorized wheelchairs.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/1\u2014 146 (West 2004). Section 1 \u2014 217 of the Vehicle Code defines \u201cvehicle\u201d as \u201c[ejvery device, in, upon or by which any person or property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway or requiring a certificate of title under Section 3 \u2014 101(d) of this Code, except devices moved by human power, devices used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks and snowmobiles as defined in the Snowmobile Registration and Safety Act.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 217 (West 2004). Furthermore, section 1 \u2014 106 of the Vehicle Code defines \u201cbicycle\u201d as \u201c[ejvery device propelled by human power upon which any person may ride, having two tandem wheels except scooters and similar devices.\u201d 625 ILCS 5/1 \u2014 106 (West 2004). Given these legislative distinctions, it is clear that a \u201cbicycle\u201d cannot be considered a \u201cmotor vehicle\u201d for the purposes of uninsured motor vehicle coverage. We are unpersuaded by the defendant\u2019s public-policy-based argument, and hold that the circuit court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff.\nThe judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.\nAffirmed.\nSCHMIDT and CARTER, JJ., concur.",
        "type": "majority",
        "author": "PRESIDING JUSTICE McDADE"
      }
    ],
    "attorneys": [
      "Danielle Thomas-McCain and Yao O. Dinizulu, LLC, both of Harris, Mitchell & Dinizulu, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.",
      "Robert Marc Chemers, Scott L. Howie, and Richard Siebert, all of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellee."
    ],
    "corrections": "",
    "head_matter": "STANDARD MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JIMMIE ROGERS, Defendant-Appellant.\nThird District\nNo. 3\u201407\u20140138\nOpinion filed March 20, 2008.\nDanielle Thomas-McCain and Yao O. Dinizulu, LLC, both of Harris, Mitchell & Dinizulu, LLC, of Chicago, for appellant.\nRobert Marc Chemers, Scott L. Howie, and Richard Siebert, all of Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtrd., of Chicago, for appellee."
  },
  "file_name": "0196-01",
  "first_page_order": 212,
  "last_page_order": 215
}