{ "id": 3627509, "name": "GEORGE ROSARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees", "name_abbreviation": "Rosario v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund", "decision_date": "2008-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201407\u20142190", "first_page": "776", "last_page": "782", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "381 Ill. App. 3d 776" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "198 Ill. 2d 380", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 29956 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "395" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/198/0380-01" ] }, { "cite": "221 Ill. 2d 130", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5704268 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "143" }, { "page": "143" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/221/0130-01" ] }, { "cite": "216 Ill. 2d 455", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 3828104 ], "weight": 4, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "471" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" }, { "page": "472" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/216/0455-01" ] }, { "cite": "315 Ill. App. 3d 1176", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 980740 ], "year": 2000, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1179" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/315/1176-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 605, "char_count": 13545, "ocr_confidence": 0.838, "pagerank": { "raw": 6.884805146940624e-08, "percentile": 0.41872750110141554 }, "sha256": "d01c46239a77d047ace3c98d8ac0d9eb1d9cab098fd0923d10a3cea8c1bbd042", "simhash": "1:dba029945096c4fd", "word_count": 2273 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T18:23:38.608554+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "GEORGE ROSARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE SOUTH\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nThis appeal arises from an order of the circuit court of Cook County denying plaintiffs motion for summary judgment and upholding defendant\u2019s decision to deny plaintiffs petition for credit for prior service under the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/1\u2014 101.1 et seq. (West 2006)).\nThe uncontested facts are as follows: On March 4, 1985, plaintiff, George Rosario, was appointed to the Chicago police department. Prior to his employment as a Chicago police officer, he was employed with the Cook County sheriffs police department as a police officer and a correctional officer with the Cook County department of corrections for a period of nine years from September 1, 1976, to March 10, 1985. On April 18, 2006, he filed a written request with the Retirement Board of the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund City of Chicago (Board) to transfer his nine years of prior service with the Cook County sheriffs office to the Policemen\u2019s Annuity and Benefit Fund. The letter to the Board stated in pertinent part:\n\u201cPlease be advised that I have been employed with the Chicago Police Department for 22 years and prior to that I was employed with the Cook county Sheriffs Department for 9 years. I have dedicated my career to law enforcement and I believe that I have been an exemplary police officer.\nTherefore, I am requesting that the time I served with the Cook County Sheriffs Department be transferred to the Chicago Police Department. This will enable me to receive 75% of my pension as opposed to 55% with my current tenure.\u201d\nIn support of his request, plaintiff submitted a letter from the Board dated April 24, 1992, to another City of Chicago police officer who is not involved in this case. That other police officer referred to in the letter had also held the positions of Cook County sheriffs police officer and Cook County sheriffs correctional officer and, like plaintiff, filed a request to pay into the City of Chicago\u2019s annuity fund for the periods prior to his appointment with the city, which request was granted.\nOn June 29, 2006, plaintiff appeared before the Board with his supporting documentation. When asked why he was presenting the letter of the other police officer, plaintiff responded that the Board had made a favorable ruling in that case wherein that other police officer was similarly situated. In response, the presiding officer on behalf of the Board stated:\n\u201c[T]he Board hears all of these cases as an individual case. The Board, as you probably know, changes from time to time\\over the years with elections, and the Board in reviewing the matters and in reviewing your matter makes its own decisions based upon what it believes the law is and how it interprets the law. So while it\u2019s informative, the information that you\u2019ve given to us, it may or may not be binding insofar as the sitting board is concerned.\u201d\nPlaintiff then brought to the Board\u2019s attention that it had granted these requests in at least two other instances, and referred to those officers by name. He then went on to say:\n\u201cI mean, there\u2019s a lot of other people that have done it. What I\u2019m trying to do is not something new or obsolete. It\u2019s been done. I\u2019ve known a bunch of people since \u201990 that have done it.\u201d\nIn response, the Board\u2019s counsel stated:\n\u201cWell, I\u2019ll tell you this. I don\u2019t know the names, but I know there have been some that haven\u2019t been approved also.\u201d\nPlaintiff stated that he was \u201cwell aware\u201d of those whose requests had not been approved. The Board\u2019s counsel then went on to state:\n\u201cSo as I said before, the problem \u2014 well, it\u2019s not a problem. The situation is that new boards can read something and may not interpret it the same way a prior Board interprets it. That\u2019s just the way it is.\nSo it\u2019s really going to be a Board decision, and they\u2019ll let you know.\u201d\nThe Board then recessed into executive session, after which it conducted proceedings in an open session. Plaintiffs request was put to a vote with the result that four members voted in favor of denying it and four members voted in favor of granting it. Inasmuch as there was a tie, the request \u201cdied,\u201d and on September 26, 2006, the Board sent a letter by certified mail to plaintiff stating that after considering his testimony at the Board meeting and the documents he presented in support of his request, it was determined that such request was not \u201cprovided for in the Pension Code,\u201d and plaintiff\u2019s application for prior service credit was denied.\nPlaintiff filed a three-count petition for administrative review in the circuit court of Cook County. Count I (waiver) alleged the Board had on a prior occasion ruled that an identical application by another applicant for credit from the Cook County sheriffs police department and Cook County department of corrections satisfied the requirements of the Pension Code, and that, therefore, the Board\u2019s decision to deny plaintiffs petition was barred by its prior waiver of the provisions of the Pension Code in the prior case. Count II (estoppel) alleged the Board was estopped from denying plaintiffs claim on the grounds that \u201cit was not provided for in the Pension Code\u201d because it had previously held in the earlier case that such a claim was provided for in the Pension Code. Count III (error of law and against manifest weight) alleged that the Board\u2019s decision was erroneous at law and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.\nOn April 27, 2007, plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the Board had waived any objection to his petition based upon its prior findings with the petition of the other officer. On August 2, 2007, the trial court denied the motion and upheld the Board\u2019s decision to deny the petition, stating:\n\u201c(A) That the Board was not barred by \u2018collateral estoppel\u2019 from finding that the petition for prior service credit was not provided for in the Pension Code.\n(B) That the Board was not bound by principles of stare decisis that the petition for prior service credit was provided for in the Pension Code.\n(C) That the Board was not \u2018clearly erroneous\u2019 when it determined that Plaintiff\u2019s request for prior service credit was not provided for in the Pension Code.\u201d\nOn appeal, plaintiff has raised the following issues for our review: (1) whether the Retirement Board\u2019s interpretation of the Pension Code was clearly erroneous, (2) and whether the principles of collateral estoppel bar the Board from ruling that plaintiffs other service was not included by the Pension Code where it had previously ruled in another factually similar case that such prior service was included.\nIn reviewing a final decision under the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 101 et seq. (West 2006)), this court reviews the administrative agency\u2019s decision and not the circuit court\u2019s determination. Armour Pharmaceutical Co. v. Department of Revenue, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1176, 1179 (2000). The Administrative Review Law provides that judicial review of an administrative agency decision shall extend to all questions of law and fact presented by the entire record before the court. 735 ILCS 5/3 \u2014 110 (West 2006). The standard of review that determines the degree of deference given to the agency\u2019s decision turns on whether the issue presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact. Comprehensive Community Solutions, Inc. v. Rockford School District No. 205, 216 Ill. 2d 455, 471 (2005). A mixed question of law and fact asks the legal effect of a given set of facts. Comprehensive Community Solutions, 216 Ill. 2d at 472. \u201cThat is, in resolving a mixed question of law and fact, a reviewing court must determine whether established facts satisfy applicable legal rules.\u201d Comprehensive Community Solutions, 216 Ill. 2d at 472. \u201cAn agency\u2019s conclusion on a mixed question of law and fact is reviewed for clear error.\u201d Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 143 (2006). \u201cSuch review is significantly deferential to an agency\u2019s experience in construing and applying the statutes that it administers.\u201d Elementary School District 159, 221 Ill. 2d at 143. \u201cThus, \u2018when the decision of an administrative agency presents a mixed question of law and fact, the agency decision will be deemed \u201cclearly erroneous\u201d only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is \u201cleft with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.\u201d \u2019 \u201d Comprehensive Community Solutions, 216 Ill. 2d at 472, quoting AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 395 (2001). Both sides agree that this case involves a mixed question of law and fact and that, therefore, the clearly erroneous standard of review should apply.\nThe applicable statute is section 5 \u2014 214 of the Pension Code, which states in pertinent part:\n\u201cCredit for other service. Any participant in this fund (other than a member of the fire department of the city) who has rendered service as a member of the police department of the city for a period of 3 years or more is entitled to credit for the various purposes of this Article for service rendered prior to becoming a member or subsequent thereto for the following periods:\n(a) While on leave of absence from the police department assigned or detailed to investigative, protective, security or police work for the park district of the city, the department of the Port of Chicago or the sanitary district in which the city is located.\n***\n(c) While performing safety or investigative work for the county in which such city is principally located or for the State of Illinois or for the federal government, on leave of absence from the department of police, or while performing investigative work for the department as a civilian employee of the department.\n* * *\nConcurrently with such contributions, the city shall contribute the amounts provided by this Article. No credit shall be allowed for any period of time for which contributions by the policeman have not been paid. The period of service rendered by such policeman prior to the date he became a member of the police department of the city or while detailed, assigned or on leave of absence and employed in any of the departments set forth hereinabove in this Section for which such policeman has contributed to this fund shall be credited to him as service for all the purposes of this Article ***.\u201d (Emphasis added.) 40 ILCS 5/5 \u2014 214 (West 2006).\nPlaintiff maintains that under subparagraph (c) the intended beneficiaries fall into two categories, to wit, those persons working for the county and those persons working for the state \u201cwhile on leave of absence\u201d from the city police department. In other words, plaintiff argues that the phrase \u201con leave of absence from the department of police\u201d refers only to those persons who perform safety or investigative work for the State of Illinois or the federal government. In support of his position, plaintiff cites the third sentence of the third paragraph of section 5 \u2014 214, which refers to \u201c[t]he period of service rendered by such policeman prior to the date he became a member of the department of the city.\u201d That paragraph mandates that the period of service rendered by such policeman prior to the date he became a member of the department \u201cshall be credited to him as service for all purposes of this Article.\u201d\nThe Board responds that the disputed language refers only to those persons who are on leave of absence from the department of police and not to those individuals who held safety or investigative positions for the county prior to the date they became members of the department.\nOur reading of the statute differs from that of the Board. While it could be argued that subparagraph (c) is ambiguous and can be read according to either the plaintiffs interpretation or the Board\u2019s, such ambiguity is dispelled, we believe, by the next to the last paragraph of section 5 \u2014 214, which appears to draw a distinction between those police officers who have rendered service prior to the time they became employed as policemen with the city police department and those who are either \u201cdetailed, assigned, or on leave of absence\u201d from the State of Illinois or the federal government. In other words, we read the phrase \u201con leave of absence from the department of police\u201d as modifying \u201cthe State of Illinois\u201d or \u201cthe federal government,\u201d and that the period of service rendered by any other policeman, such as plaintiff, who has contributed to the retirement fund shall be credited to him or her as service for the purposes of the Pension Code.\nTherefore, we hold that the clear language of the statute mandates that plaintiff is entitled to credit for the service he rendered as a Cook County sheriffs police officer and correctional officer for the Cook County department of corrections prior to his employment with the city department of police. Based upon our decision, we need not address plaintiffs second issue.\nAccordingly, the judgment of the circuit court is reversed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this ruling.\nReversed and remanded.\nHALL and KARNEZIS, JJ., concur.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE SOUTH" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael Buckley Bolan, of Chicago, for appellant.", "David R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "GEORGE ROSARIO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN\u2019S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO et al., Defendants-Appellees.\nFirst District (2nd Division)\nNo. 1\u201407\u20142190\nOpinion filed March 31, 2008.\nRehearing denied April 28, 2008.\nMichael Buckley Bolan, of Chicago, for appellant.\nDavid R. Kugler, of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0776-01", "first_page_order": 792, "last_page_order": 798 }