{ "id": 4277217, "name": "ERIK T. DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTON CORRIGAN et al., Defendants-Appellees (American Country Insurance Company et al., Defendants)", "name_abbreviation": "Daniels v. Corrigan", "decision_date": "2008-03-31", "docket_number": "No. 1\u201406\u20141256", "first_page": "66", "last_page": "81", "citations": [ { "type": "official", "cite": "382 Ill. App. 3d 66" } ], "court": { "name_abbreviation": "Ill. App. Ct.", "id": 8837, "name": "Illinois Appellate Court" }, "jurisdiction": { "id": 29, "name_long": "Illinois", "name": "Ill." }, "cites_to": [ { "cite": "321 Ill. App. 3d 832", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 132458 ], "year": 2001, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/321/0832-01" ] }, { "cite": "348 Ill. App. 3d 703", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4022252 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "708" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/348/0703-01" ] }, { "cite": "219 Ill. App. 3d 690", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5802406 ], "year": 1991, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "694" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/219/0690-01" ] }, { "cite": "227 Ill. App. 3d 836", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5794314 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "843" }, { "page": "843" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/227/0836-01" ] }, { "cite": "338 Ill. App. 3d 206", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 25380 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "211" }, { "page": "211" }, { "page": "211" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/338/0206-01" ] }, { "cite": "596 F.2d 1322", "category": "reporters:federal", "reporter": "F.2d", "case_ids": [ 503072 ], "year": 1979, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1327" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/f2d/596/1322-01" ] }, { "cite": "15 U.S.C. \u00a71051", "category": "laws:leg_statute", "reporter": "U.S.C.", "year": 2006, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "et seq." } ], "opinion_index": 0 }, { "cite": "286 Ill. App. 3d 797", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1544480 ], "year": 1997, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/286/0797-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 150", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 485728 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "155", "parenthetical": "no agency relationship when defendants \"merely monitor[ed] 'licensing standards' \" set by Department of Children and Family Services regulations" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0150-01" ] }, { "cite": "171 Ill. App. 3d 1000", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3618110 ], "year": 1988, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1003-04", "parenthetical": "where the debtor pledged shares of its common stock to secure bank loans and the note granted the bank the right to sell the stock upon default, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the relationship was anything other than creditor-debtor" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/171/1000-01" ] }, { "cite": "356 Ill. App. 3d 165", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3750095 ], "weight": 2, "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "176" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/356/0165-01" ] }, { "cite": "252 Ill. App. 3d 18", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 2968852 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "25-29" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/252/0018-01" ] }, { "cite": "124 Ill. App. 3d 644", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 3427552 ], "year": 1984, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/124/0644-01" ] }, { "cite": "333 Ill. App. 3d 592", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 486587 ], "year": 2002, "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/333/0592-01" ] }, { "cite": "276 Ill. App. 3d 376", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 927613 ], "weight": 5, "year": 1995, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380" }, { "page": "380-81" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/276/0376-01" ] }, { "cite": "238 Ill. App. 3d 650", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5153789 ], "weight": 4, "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652" }, { "page": "652" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/238/0650-01" ] }, { "cite": "226 Ill. App. 3d 440", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5238357 ], "year": 1992, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "444" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/226/0440-01" ] }, { "cite": "372 Ill. App. 3d 127", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4268810 ], "weight": 5, "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "134" }, { "page": "134" }, { "page": "136" }, { "page": "135" }, { "page": "135", "parenthetical": "mere protection of a trade name does not create an agency relationship" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/372/0127-01" ] }, { "cite": "159 Ill. 2d 519", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 781342 ], "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "523" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/159/0519-01" ] }, { "cite": "68 Ill. 2d 7", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5810154 ], "weight": 7, "year": 1977, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "11" }, { "page": "11-12" }, { "page": "12" }, { "page": "12-13" }, { "page": "12-13" }, { "page": "11" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/68/0007-01" ] }, { "cite": "362 Ill. App. 3d 652", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4260691 ], "year": 2005, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "659" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/362/0652-01" ] }, { "cite": "158 Ill. 2d 391", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 780274 ], "weight": 2, "year": 1994, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "397" }, { "page": "397" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/158/0391-01" ] }, { "cite": "324 Ill. App. 3d 305", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 256344 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "309" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/324/0305-01" ] }, { "cite": "325 Ill. App. 3d 780", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 570735 ], "year": 2001, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "786" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/325/0780-01" ] }, { "cite": "336 Ill. App. 3d 553", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1599258 ], "year": 2003, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "556" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/336/0553-01" ] }, { "cite": "244 Ill. App. 3d 190", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 5102108 ], "year": 1993, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "193" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/244/0190-01" ] }, { "cite": "376 Ill. App. 3d 1006", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 4273615 ], "year": 2007, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1022" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/376/1006-01" ] }, { "cite": "131 Ill. 2d 183", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 5569745 ], "year": 1989, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "195", "parenthetical": "submitting new matter on a motion to reconsider after a motion for summary judgment has been granted \"lies in the discretion of the trial court\"" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/131/0183-01" ] }, { "cite": "335 Ill. App. 3d 834", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 637144 ], "weight": 3, "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" }, { "page": "838" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/335/0834-01" ] }, { "cite": "351 Ill. App. 3d 1135", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1083849 ], "year": 2004, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "1140" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/351/1135-01" ] }, { "cite": "303 Ill. App. 3d 573", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 511312 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "576" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/303/0573-01" ] }, { "cite": "305 Ill. App. 3d 45", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. App. 3d", "case_ids": [ 1208079 ], "year": 1999, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "50" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-app-3d/305/0045-01" ] }, { "cite": "201 Ill. 2d 324", "category": "reporters:state", "reporter": "Ill. 2d", "case_ids": [ 1477035 ], "year": 2002, "pin_cites": [ { "page": "335" } ], "opinion_index": 0, "case_paths": [ "/ill-2d/201/0324-01" ] } ], "analysis": { "cardinality": 1417, "char_count": 38604, "ocr_confidence": 0.844, "pagerank": { "raw": 7.922536408906621e-08, "percentile": 0.4616203492944955 }, "sha256": "cacd25b6f5cc43e971b9a07342003ea481b9cd66de37363dba447fd00ececdee", "simhash": "1:abb66f1e694264f0", "word_count": 6208 }, "last_updated": "2023-07-14T21:27:01.752924+00:00", "provenance": { "date_added": "2019-08-29", "source": "Harvard", "batch": "2018" }, "casebody": { "judges": [], "parties": [ "ERIK T. DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTON CORRIGAN et al., Defendants-Appellees (American Country Insurance Company et al., Defendants)." ], "opinions": [ { "text": "JUSTICE MURPHY\ndelivered the opinion of the court:\nPlaintiff, Erik T. Daniels, was injured when the car he was driving was struck by a Yellow Cab driven by Shahzad Malik and owned by Nana Dada, Inc. Plaintiff filed a negligence suit against Malik, Nana Dada, and its owner, Muhammed Atif. He also filed suit against, inter alia, Patton Corrigan, Yellow Cab Affiliation, YellowOne, YellowTwo, CRA Cab, f/k/a Yellow Cab Company, Transit Capital, and Transit Funding Group. These defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, which the trial court granted, finding that defendants did not control Nana Dada or the operation of the cab at the time of the accident.\nI. BACKGROUND\nOn July 7, 2001, plaintiff was injured in an accident with a taxicab owned by Nana Dada and driven by Malik, who leased the cab from Nana Dada. Nana Dada carried $350,000 of liability coverage, the minimum required by the City of Chicago. Plaintiff filed a complaint alleging negligence under theories of joint venture, vicarious liability, and alter ego. According to the complaint, the City of Chicago amended the Chicago Municipal Code to limit the number of taxicab licenses, or medallions, that a single entity could own to 25% of the outstanding medallions. The complaint further alleged that even though Yellow Cab Company was required to divest itself of a number of medallions as a result of this amendment, it formed a network of corporations that allowed it to maintain control over the medallions it sold, including medallion number 1222, which Nana Dada later purchased.\nDefendants filed a motion for summary judgment; the evidence the parties submitted in support of their respective positions established the following.\nA. Corporate Defendants\nIn 1997, Yellow Cab Company sold its medallions to YellowOne and YellowTwo. It sold the name, colors, and dispatch rights to Yellow Cab Management. In 1999, Yellow Cab Company changed its name to CEA Cab Company. CEA owns a number of vehicles that are leased to Yellow Cab Management and to which a medallion owned by Yel-lowOne or YellowTwo would be affixed.\nA City of Chicago ordinance requires all medallion holders to be affiliated with an affiliation licensed by the City. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014080(b)(7) (amended November 15, 2000). Yellow Cab Affiliation is one of 21 such affiliations. YellowOne and YellowTwo entered into a loan servicing agreement with Yellow Cab Affiliation wherein Yellow Cab Affiliation agreed to collect loan payments owed to YellowTwo or the assignee of the note, which Yellow Cab Affiliation would remit to the lender.\nYellow Cab Management, which was incorporated on December 8, 1997, provided a number of services to Yellow Cab Affiliation, including radio dispatching, cash-collecting services, handling of accounts, preparation of financial documents, and the use of the name and colors. Yellow Cab Management also managed a fleet of cabs with medallions owned by YellowOne or YellowTwo that were affixed to cabs owned or leased by Yellow Cab Management.\nB. Nana Dada\u2019s Purchase\nOn April 6, 2001, YellowTwo entered into a transfer agreement and \u201cMedallion Only Purchase Agreement\u201d with Nana Dada. Atif was the president and sole shareholder of Nana Dada. Nana Dada agreed to pay YellowTwo $64,000 for medallion number 1222. Yellow Cab Management sold Nana Dada the cab to which the medallion was attached for $500.\nYellowTwo financed Nana Dada\u2019s purchase of the medallion and subsequently assigned the note to Transit Funding, while Transit Capital financed $2,313 of ancillary costs. Nana Dada was not required to finance the medallion purchase through YellowTwo but, rather, could have used a third parly that provides medallion financing, such as Eavenswood Bank, Elk Funding, Banco Popular, or Medallion Funding.\nYellowTwo and Transit Capital received a security interest in both the vehicle and the medallion in return for providing Nana Dada with financing. YellowTwo also held a security interest in Nana Dada\u2019s shares of stock. Atif, on behalf of Nana Dada, executed a power of attorney for Transit Capital and YellowTwo. It permits YellowTwo to enforce its rights under the security agreement and pledge agreement if Nana Dada defaults on its payment obligations to YellowTwo. Paragraph 12 of the security agreement provides that the power of attorney that Nana Dada signed is only effective upon default. In addition, paragraphs 5 and 6 of the pledge agreement provide that Yel-lowTwo only has the right to use the stock power option upon a default by Nana Dada.\nThe purchase agreement required Nana Dada to become a member of the Yellow Cab Affiliation for a minimum of three years. Accordingly, Nana Dada entered into a taxicab affiliation agreement with Yellow Cab Affiliation. By joining the Yellow Cab Affiliation, Nana Dada could use Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s colors and dispatching services and receive other benefits. In return, Nana Dada paid a fixed weekly fee. Yellow Cab Affiliation also became the registered agent for Nana Dada. We discuss the terms of the affiliation agreement in more detail below. Nana Dada also purchased insurance in its name from American Country Insurance Company in the amount required by the Chicago ordinance.\nAfter Nana Dada purchased the cab and medallion, Atif began driving the cab. He also leased the cab to Malik for a weekly rental fee set by Atif. Malik was driving the cab when the accident occurred.\nNana Dada, Atif, and Malik were not employed by the Yellow Cab Affiliation. It did not pay any salary to Nana Dada, Atif, or Malik, did not withhold taxes on their behalf, and had no authority to determine the hours that the cab was operated, where it was operated, and which customers were to be picked up. Neither Yellow Cab Affiliation nor the other corporate defendants had the right to share in any profits made through use of the medallion or the cab. The only money paid to Yellow Cab Affiliation by Nana Dada was the weekly affiliation payment in return for the services provided by Yellow Cab Affiliation, which Nana Dada was required to make even if the cab was not used that week. The weekly payments to Yellow Cab Affiliation included affiliation dues, insurance premiums, and loan repayment. This payment was fixed and was not contingent on the profits earned by Nana Dada.\nAs president of Nana Dada, Atif was responsible for storage, maintenance, and repairs, and he alone controlled where he wished to repair and maintain the car. Atif had the cab repaired at Medina Auto, which has no relationship with Yellow Cab Affiliation. He or Malik paid for the gas used during cab operations. Atif s cab was not required to pick up fares identified through the Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s Gandalf dispatch system.\nThe trial court granted defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff\u2019s motion for reconsideration. Plaintiff filed a second motion for reconsideration, which argued for the first time that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 of the Chicago Municipal Code established an agency relationship between Malik and Yellow Cab Affiliation as a matter of law. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014390 (amended November 15, 2000). The trial court entertained the motion but denied it. This appeal followed.\nII. ANALYSIS\nSummary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, and other evidence reveal that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2 \u2014 1005 (West 2004). \u201cAlthough a plaintiff is not required to prove his case at the summary judgment stage, in order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must present a factual basis that would arguably entitle [him] to a judgment.\u201d Robidoux v. Oliphant, 201 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2002). Summary judgment is a drastic means of resolving litigation and should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Bier v. Leanna Lakeside Property Ass\u2019n, 305 Ill. App. 3d 45, 50 (1999). An appellate court\u2019s review of a grant of summary judgment is de novo. Woods v. Pence, 303 Ill. App. 3d 573, 576 (1999).\nA. Agency Relationship Pursuant to Ordinance\nPlaintiff contends that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 of the Chicago Municipal Code made Nana Dada the agent of the Yellow Cab Affiliation \u201cas a matter of law.\u201d Although plaintiff raised this argument for the first time in his second motion for reconsideration, the trial court entertained the argument and denied the motion. Therefore, while plaintiff asserts in his brief that \u201c[t]his is an appeal from an order granting summary judgment,\u201d we find that he is appealing the denial of his second motion to reconsider.\nThe purpose of a motion to reconsider is to bring to the trial court\u2019s attention (1) newly discovered evidence not available at the time of the hearing, (2) changes in the law, or (3) errors in the trial court\u2019s previous application of existing law. Stringer v. Packaging Corp. of America, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1135, 1140 (2004). Plaintiffs second motion to reconsider invoked none of these grounds; instead, it presented the new legal theory that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 of the Chicago Municipal Code created an agency relationship between Nana Dada and the Yellow Cab Affiliation.\nA motion to reconsider based on the submission of new matters, such as new arguments or legal theories not presented during the pendency of the original motion for summary judgment, is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. O\u2019Shield v. Lakeside Bank, 335 Ill. App. 3d 834, 838 (2002). See Delgatto v. Brandon Associates, Ltd., 131 Ill. 2d 183, 195 (1989) (submitting new matter on a motion to reconsider after a motion for summary judgment has been granted \u201clies in the discretion of the trial court\u201d). Such a motion essentially seeks a \u201c \u2018second bite at the apple,\u2019 i.e., requiring the trial court to determine whether it should admit these new matters into evidence and, in turn, reconsider its decision based on them.\u201d O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 838.\nPlaintiffs second motion was improper, as Supreme Court Rule 274 provides, \u201cA party may make only one postjudgment motion directed at a judgment order that is otherwise final.\u201d 210 Ill. 2d R. 274. While defendants contend that plaintiff waived his argument, a trial court has the discretion to address new issues presented for the first time in a motion to reconsider \u201cwhere there is a reasonable explanation for why the additional issues were not raised at the original hearing.\u201d (Emphasis omitted.) Kopley Group V., L.P. v. Sheridan Edgewater Properties, Ltd., 376 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1022 (2007). Throughout the extensive briefing on defendants\u2019 motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs first motion for reconsideration, plaintiff relied on the Chicago Municipal Code but did not cite section 9 \u2014 112\u2014 390. In its second motion for reconsideration, plaintiff argued that he was \u201cadvised\u201d of section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 by a law firm representing him in a similar action against a different cab company. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court erred in denying plaintiffs second motion for reconsideration.\nAlthough the trial court denied the second motion for reconsideration, it also entertained the merits of plaintiffs new argument. The trial court held that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 did not establish an agency relationship. This court has previously held that regardless of whether the new matters are admitted through the motion to reconsider, the standard used to review the trial court\u2019s application of law to the facts presented always remains de novo. O\u2019Shield, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 838.\nSection 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 provides as follows:\n\u201cEvery taxicab shall have the public passenger vehicle license number and the cabman\u2019s name and telephone number painted in *** the center of the main panel of the rear doors *** of the vehicle ***. If the cabman is affiliated or identified with any affiliation, as described in Section 9 \u2014 112\u2014070, the affiliation\u2019s color scheme, trade name or emblem and telephone number shall be substituted and, without being limited thereto, any of these indicia of affiliation shall be sufficient to establish the responsibility of the affiliation in the operation of the taxicab. *** The commissioner may also provide, pursuant to rule, that other information of interest to the public, including, but not limited to, the licensee\u2019s or affiliation\u2019s website or e-mail address and/or the current taximeter rates if fare be permanently and prominently affixed to the outside of the vehicle. No other name, number, emblem, or advertisement of any kind excepting signs required *** by this subchapter, official license emblems or metal plate shall be painted or carried so as to be visible on the outside of any taxicab unless otherwise required by state law.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79\u2014112\u2014390 (amended November 15, 2000).\nPlaintiff relies on the language of the ordinance that the use of \u201cthese indicia shall be sufficient to establish the responsibility of the affiliation in the operation of the taxicab.\u201d Plaintiff argues that since the cab involved in the accident carried the Yellow Cab color scheme and logo and Nana Dada was a member of the affiliation operated by the Yellow Cab Affiliation, the affiliation was, \u201cas a matter of law,\u201d the principal for Nana Dada.\nCourts apply the principles of statutory construction to ordinances. City of Evanston v. O\u2019Leary, 244 Ill. App. 3d 190, 193 (1993). The goal of a court when construing a statute is to ascertain the legislature\u2019s intent, \u201cand the surest indicator *** is the language in the statute.\u201d Department of Public Aid ex rel. Schmid v. Williams, 336 Ill. App. 3d 553, 556 (2003). If the language of an ordinance is clear and unambiguous, the court must interpret it according to its terms without resorting to aids of construction. La Salle National Bank v. City Suites, Inc., 325 Ill. App. 3d 780, 786 (2001). The court may consider the reason and necessity for the statute and the evils it was intended to remedy, and will assume that the legislature did not intend an unjust result. In re Marriage of Beyer, 324 Ill. App. 3d 305, 309 (2001).\nWe agree with the trial court that plaintiff took section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 out of context. \u201c[T]he statute should be evaluated as a whole; each provision should be construed in connection with every other section.\u201d Bonaguro v. County Officers Electoral Board, 158 Ill. 2d 391, 397 (1994).\nThe trial court found the purpose of section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 is to make certain that a particular affiliation is identified in relation to a taxicab so that city requirements are followed and are capable of enforcement. The Code defines \u201caffiliation\u201d as\n\u201can association of public passenger vehicle license holders organized and incorporated for the purpose of providing its members with a Chicago business address, telephone number registered to the affiliation, color scheme where applicable, a trade name or emblem where applicable, a two-way radio dispatch system, insurance and the designation of an authorized registered agent.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014010 (amended November 15, 2000).\nThis definition did not provide that the purpose of taxicab affiliations was to serve as the insurer for affiliates who personally own medallions and operate their cabs. The title of section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390\u2014 \u201cLicense number and driver identification \u2014 Display\u201d\u2014also militates against plaintiff\u2019s interpretation. \u201cInterpreting a statute as a whole means interpreting a specific provision in the context of other parts of the statute, including the heading under which the provision appears.\u201d Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm\u2019n, 362 Ill. App. 3d 652, 659 (2005).\nIn addition, these requirements, which become the \u201cresponsibility\u201d of the affiliation under section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390, are reflected in other sections of the Code. See Chicago Municipal Code \u00a7\u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014230(c) (affiliation cannot dispatch a cab for purposes of providing transportation to a customer unless the vehicle is properly licensed), 9 \u2014 112\u2014 230(e)(1) (affiliation is responsible for ensuring that dispatch equipment is activated and operating at all times when the cab is in service), 9 \u2014 112\u2014215(e) (affiliations have a duty to ensure compliance of affiliated drivers to rules regarding underserved areas) (amended November 15, 2000).\nWe further agree that plaintiff\u2019s interpretation would render other parts of the Code superfluous or meaningless. See Bonaguro, 158 Ill. 2d at 397. For example, section 9 \u2014 112\u2014100 provides that the commissioner may investigate \u201cthe financial ability of the applicant *** to pay all judgments and awards [that] may be rendered for any cause arising out of the operation of a public passenger vehicle during the license period.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014100 (2006). The Code also requires all licensees to \u201cpay each judgment or award for loss or damage in the operation or use of a public passenger vehicle rendered against the licensee.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014240 (2001). Furthermore, \u201clicensees\u201d are required to carry a minimum of public liability and property damage insurance \u201cto secure payment by the licensee, his agents, employees or lessees of any final judgment or settlement *** resulting from any occurrence caused by or arising out of the operation or use of any of the licensee\u2019s public passenger vehicles.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014220 (2006). If affiliations were, as a matter of law, the principals of their affiliates, the City would not need to investigate the financial ability of licensees to pay judgments or make certain that affiliates \u2014 but not the affiliations\u2014 have sufficient insurance. Plaintiffs interpretation of section 9 \u2014 112\u2014 390 would render these sections on the financial responsibility of licensees meaningless.\nPlaintiff, citing Schedler v. Rowley Interstate Transportation Co., 68 Ill. 2d 7 (1977), compares this case to the regulation of the trucking industry. In Schedler, a trucking company and a driver-owner entered into a lease agreement in the form prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. The ICC regulations governing the lease agreement required that the lease provide for \u201c \u2018the exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment, and for the complete assumption of responsibility in respect thereto, by the lessee for the duration of *** [the] lease.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 11. The regulations also placed a duty upon authorized carriers to \u201cremove any legend, showing it as the operating carrier, displayed on such equipment,\u201d before relinquishing possession of the equipment. Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 11-12. When the driver was operating the truck for his own use, he had an accident. The trucking company\u2019s name and permit number had not been removed from the truck or concealed pursuant to ICC regulations. Our supreme court noted that the ICC rules and regulations were designed to help fix financial responsibility for injuries to members of the public. Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 12. The court concluded that \u201cit was the purpose of the regulatory scheme that the carrier-lessee be vicariously responsible to the public for the negligent operation of the leased vehicle without regard to whether at the time in question it was being used in the business of the lessee.\u201d Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 12-13. Accordingly, the court held the trucking company vicariously liable. Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 12-13.\nSchedler is distinguishable. Not only does it involve a different industry with different policy implications, but the regulations in Schedler specifically required that the lease provide for \u201cthe exclusive possession, control, and use of the equipment, and for the complete assumption of responsibility in respect thereto, by the lessee for the duration of*** [the] lease.\u201d Schedler, 68 Ill. 2d at 11. Nana Dada, not the affiliation, had exclusive possession, control, and use of the cab, and at the time of the accident, the cab and medallion were owned by Nana Dada and leased to Malik.\nTherefore, we conclude that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014390 of the Chicago Municipal Code did not make Nana Dada the agent of the Yellow Cab Affiliation \u201cas a matter of law.\u201d\nB. Agency Relationship\nPlaintiff next argues that the corporate defendants exercised sufficient control over Nana Dada at the time the accident occurred to establish an agency relationship. The doctrine of respondeat superior allows an injured party to hold a principal vicariously liable for the conduct of his or her agent. Moy v. County of Cook, 159 Ill. 2d 519, 523 (1994). \u201cWhile the existence of any agency relationship is usually a question of fact, it becomes a question of law when the facts regarding the relationship are undisputed or no liability exists as a matter of law.\u201d Oliveira-Brooks v. Re/Max International, Inc., 372 Ill. App. 3d 127, 134 (2007). \u201cThe burden of proving the existence of an agency relationship and the scope of authority is on the party seeking to charge the alleged principal.\u201d Anderson v. Boy Scouts of America, Inc., 226 Ill. App. 3d 440, 444 (1992).\nThe affiliation agreement provided that \u201c[e]ach party hereto acknowledges that it is an independent contractor and affirms that nothing contained herein shall be construed as creating any employer-employee, principal-agent, or joint venture relationship between the parties.\u201d \u201cNevertheless, the declaration of the parties is not controlling where the conduct of the parties demonstrates the existence of an agency relationship.\u201d Oliveira-Brooks, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 134. In Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 238 Ill. App. 3d 650, 652 (1992), the court held,\n\u201c \u2018No one factor may determine what relationship is between parties in a given case. It may be necessary to consider a number of factors ***, such as the right to control the manner in which the work is done, the method of payment, the right to discharge, the skill required in the work to be done, and who provides the tools, material, or equipment. ***\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Yellow Cab Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d at 652.\n\u201c \u2018Of these factors, the right to control the manner in which the work is done is the most important in determining the relationship.\u2019 [Citation.]\u201d Yellow Cab Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d at 652; Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376, 380 (1995).\nAt the time of the accident, Nana Dada owned the cab, medallion, and meter. From the outset, this factor distinguishes the case at hand from Davila v. Yellow Cab Co., 333 Ill. App. 3d 592 (2002), and other leased-cab cases. See Yellow Cab Co., 238 Ill. App. 3d 650; Yellow Cab Co. v. Industrial Comm\u2019n, 124 Ill. App. 3d 644 (1984). Atif, the president of Nana Dada, set the operating hours for the cab and paid all expenses for the cab, including gas, repairs, insurance, parking tickets, and fines. He was not required to have the cab repaired at a particular repair shop, nor was his cab required to pick up fares identified through the affiliation\u2019s dispatch system. Atif did not have to report the location of the cab while driving, maintain a trip sheet, keep a written record of fares, or report fares collected to any of the Yellow entities. The Yellow Cab Affiliation did not pay any salary to Nana Dada, Atif, or Malik, did not withhold taxes on their behalf, and did not have the right to share in any profits made through use of the medallion or the cab.\nPlaintiff relies on a number of other factors, \u201cvarious contractual restraints\u201d imposed by the affiliation agreement and financing documents, in support of his argument that the Yellow entities exercised control over \u201cevery other aspect of [Nana Dada\u2019s] business.\u201d He argues that the trial court erred when it viewed these factors \u201cin isolation\u201d instead of considering them together.\nFirst, plaintiff argues that the Yellow Cab Affiliation requires its affiliates to obtain approval as a \u201cprerequisite to selling or transferring a medallion to a third party.\u201d According to plaintiff, this decision is at the Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s sole discretion, which means that it \u201ccan deny approval of medallion transfers for its own benefit and can ignore what might be best for the medallion holder, so long as its decision is not arbitrary.\u201d\nContrary to plaintiffs argument, the provisions that plaintiff relies on are conditions precedent that will release the licensee from the affiliation agreement, not \u201cprerequisite approval\u201d for transfers of medallions. Paragraph 10(g) of the agreement provides that the affiliation may terminate the agreement if the licensee transfers the medallion or its rights under the agreement without the written approval of the \u201cAffiliation as to its rights under this agreement.\u201d Similarly, paragraph 11 provides that when the medallion has been transferred in accordance with \u201capplicable law,\u201d the licensee, at the Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s sole discretion, will be released from its obligations under the agreement, as long as the licensee transfers to the buyer its rights under the agreement and the \u201cAffiliation shall have consented in writing to the assignment.\u201d As defendants correctly note, courts have upheld limiting the ability of a party to be released from its contractual obligations. See MXL Industries, Inc. v. Mulder, 252 Ill. App. 3d 18, 25-29 (1993). Furthermore, section 9 \u2014 112\u2014080 requires taxicab affiliations to verify that drivers hired by affiliates are licensed chauffeurs with a record of safe operations. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79\u2014 112 \u2014 080 (amended November 15, 2000).\nPlaintiff argues that Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s right to approve the transfer of a medallion is a significant interference with the right of a private individual to deal with his property. Plaintiff cites Board of Education of Glen Ellyn Community Consolidated School District No. 89 v. Department of Revenue, 356 Ill. App. 3d 165 (2005), which held that a school district did not qualify for a statutory tax exemption because it did not qualify as an \u201cowner\u201d of the property. The school district was not permitted to \u201cassign, encumber, or otherwise alienate its interest in the property,\u201d and its right to make alterations to the property and remove structures was restricted. Glen Ellyn, 356 Ill. App. 3d at 176. Here, Nana Dada owns, rather than leases, the medallion and taxicab.\nPlaintiff argues that the financing agreement governing Nana Dada\u2019s purchase of the medallion also demonstrates defendants\u2019 control because it required Nana Dada to join the affiliation and defined termination of its membership with the affiliation as an \u201cevent of default.\u201d Plaintiff concedes that section 9 \u2014 112\u2014080(b)(7) requires cab owners to join an affiliation (Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014 080(b)(7) (amended November 15, 2000)); however, he contends that requiring medallion owners to join \u201cthis particular organization\u201d rather than \u201csome affiliation\u201d is evidence of defendants\u2019 intent to keep control over the medallions. To the contrary, Nana Dada\u2019s membership in the Yellow Cab Affiliation was security for the lender. Furthermore, the required membership was only for a minimum of three years, a limited period of time intended to ensure that Nana Dada would make loan payments for the initial part of the loan term.\nPlaintiff also relies on the power of attorney that Atif and Nana Dada gave YellowTwo and Transit Funding. This power of attorney, however, was contingent on an \u201cevent of default\u201d and was limited to what was necessary to \u201ceffect the titling, registration, and/or conveyance\u201d of the medallion and cab. In addition, while Atif transferred his shares in Nana Dada to YellowTwo and appointed YellowTwo as his attorney in fact to effect that transfer, neither YellowTwo nor its assignee, Transit Funding, had any rights to the collateral unless Nana Dada was in default on its loan obligations. See generally Northern Trust Co. v. Burlew, 171 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 1003-04 (1988) (where the debtor pledged shares of its common stock to secure bank loans and the note granted the bank the right to sell the stock upon default, there was nothing in the record to suggest that the relationship was anything other than creditor-debtor).\nPlaintiff next argues that defendants controlled Nana Dada\u2019s liability insurance coverage and induced affiliates to keep their coverage at an artificially low level. We disagree. Section 9 \u2014 112\u2014220 of the Code requires licensees to carry a minimum of $350,000 in liability insurance. The affiliation, by facilitating affiliates\u2019 purchase of the minimum amount of insurance required by section 9 \u2014 112\u2014220, was simply complying with this law. See Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79\u2014 112 \u2014 010(a) (amended November 15, 2000) (defining \u201caffiliation\u201d as \u201can association of public passenger vehicle license holders organized and incorporated for the purpose of providing its members with *** insurance\u201d). In addition, the affiliation agreement shows that the affiliation offered additional insurance coverage beyond the $350,000 minimum. See Oliveira-Brooks, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 136.\nWe also disagree with plaintiff\u2019s contention that the affiliation agreement\u2019s requirement that affiliates purchase insurance from American Country or another approved insurer was another element of the affiliation\u2019s control over Nana Dada. Yellow Cab Affiliation agreed to purchase insurance for its fleet, including its affiliates pursuant to the taxicab insurance agreement between Yellow Cab Affiliation and American Country Insurance. However, the affiliation agreement states that the affiliation will provide affiliates with insurance \u201cin an amount of not less than $350,000, *** as written by American Country or any other duly licensed insurance company with an overall rating of \u2018A\u2019 or higher as determined by the most recent edition of Best\u2019s Insurance Reports\u201d or an equivalent indemnification authorized by law. Therefore, the affiliation agreement between Nana Dada and Yellow Cab Affiliation does not require that the insurance be purchased from American Country. Furthermore, Yellow Cab Affiliation was, again, simply acting in conformity with the Code, which requires that insurance be provided by \u201csolvent and responsible insurers\u201d approved by the commissioner. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014220 (2006).\nPlaintiff contends that Yellow Cab Affiliation had a strong incentive to keep affiliates\u2019 insurance coverage low because in the taxicab insurance agreement, American Country agreed to \u201cshare profits\u201d with it over a rolling three-year time period as long as \u201cno loss determination shall exceed $350,000 per occurrence.\u201d In addition, American Country pays a commission to Lower Cross Agency for procuring the policies issued to the Yellow Cab Affiliation. Lower Cross Agency is a nondefendant subsidiary of Lower Cross Corp.; plaintiff argues that Corrigan and his family are the beneficiaries of the entities that receive the fees and commissions. While this evidence may demonstrate a financial motive on the part of the Yellow entities, it does not demonstrate that they actually exercised control over Nana Dada. Furthermore, to the extent that plaintiff relies on an alleged fiduciary relationship between Yellow Cab Affiliation and its affiliates, his argument is waived because he raised it for the first time on appeal and did not cite any authority in his opening brief. 210 Ill. 2d R. 341(h)(7).\nPlaintiff also relies on the affiliation agreement\u2019s requirement that Nana Dada equip its vehicle with radio equipment purchased from Yellow Cab Affiliation and a related equipment acceptance and responsibility agreement\u2019s requirement that it have the equipment repaired at facilities designated by Yellow Cab Affiliation. Plaintiff again concedes that this requirement was simply a means of carrying out the duty established by the Code, which requires affiliations to ensure that radios are operating.\nFinally, plaintiff relies on Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s status as registered agent for Nana Dada. This was done pursuant to section 9 \u2014 112\u2014010, which defines an affiliation as an association of public passenger vehicle license holders organized for the purpose of, inter alia, the \u201cdesignation of an authorized agent.\u201d Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79 \u2014 112\u2014010(a) (amended November 15, 2000).\nIllinois courts have previously refused to find an agency relationship based on defendants\u2019 attempts to comply with or set standards in conformity with a statute. In Knapp v. Hill, 276 Ill. App. 3d 376 (1995), for example, a student in a high school automotive repair class was returning his car to the parking lot at his teacher\u2019s request when another student jumped on the hood and was thrown off. The plaintiff, the injured student\u2019s estate, argued that the first student was an agent for the school because it was responsible for directing the method and manner of removing cars from the shop area. We found, however, that although the school district exercised control over its students, such control alone was insufficient to establish a principal-agent relationship under the circumstances alleged. Knapp, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 380. \u201c[T]he \u2018control\u2019 necessary to support the creation of a principal-agent relationship is the same \u2018control\u2019 implicit in the nature and the undertaking of the education process.\u201d Knapp, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 380. This control was grounded in the nature of the education process, as recognized by the Illinois School Code. Knapp, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 380-81. See also Commerce Bank v. Youth Services of Mid-Illinois, Inc., 333 Ill. App. 3d 150, 155 (2002) (no agency relationship when defendants \u201cmerely monitor[ed] \u2018licensing standards\u2019 \u201d set by Department of Children and Family Services regulations); Hansen v. Caring Professionals, Inc., 286 Ill. App. 3d 797 (1997).\nPlaintiff also relies on the fact that Yellow Cab Affiliation requires its affiliates to submit to inspections and paint their cabs with its color and insignia. Plaintiff acknowledges that Yellow Cab Affiliation\u2019s control of affiliates\u2019 use of the logo and color \u201cwould not alone be sufficient to create a principal-agent relationship\u201d but insist that it \u201cremains a factor to be weighed with the other control factors.\u201d As plaintiff concedes, however, the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. \u00a71051 et seq. (2006)) requires that licensors of trademarks control their use so the public is not deceived and maintaining such control \u201cdoes not automatically saddle the licensor with the responsibilities under state law of a principal for his agent.\u201d Oberlin v. Marlin American Corp., 596 F.2d 1322, 1327 (7th Cir. 1979); Oliveira-Brooks, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 135.\nPlaintiff further cites the affiliation agreement\u2019s requirement that an affiliate not place \u201cany advertising or any other markings on its vehicles\u201d that the affiliation has not approved in \u201cits sole discretion.\u201d Section 9 \u2014 112\u2014300 requires approval by the commissioner before any advertising be displayed on a cab. Chicago Municipal Code \u00a79\u2014 112 \u2014 300 (2006). Not only is the affiliation complying with its obligations under this law, but it has a strong interest in protecting its colors and logo, including any advertising that will be associated with it. Oliveira-Brooks, 372 Ill. App. 3d at 135 (mere protection of a trade name does not create an agency relationship).\nWe conclude that the corporate defendants did not exercise the requisite control over Nana Dada to establish an agency relationship.\nC. Joint Venture\nPlaintiff also argues that the corporate defendants acted as joint venturers because they coordinated their actions to govern the ability of Nana Dada to operate its business. The trial court rejected plaintiffs argument because it found a lack of control by defendants.\nA joint venture is an association of two or more entities to carry out a single, specific purpose for a profit. Kaporovskiy v. Grecian Delight Foods, Inc., 338 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211 (2003). Whether a joint venture exists is a matter of the intention of the alleged joint venturers. Kaporovskiy, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 211. Even in the absence of a formal agreement, the existence of a joint venture may be inferred from circumstances demonstrating that the parties intended to enter into a joint venture. O\u2019Brien v. Cacciatore, 227 Ill. App. 3d 836, 843 (1992). In determining whether the parties intended a joint venture, a court continues the following elements: (1) a community of interest, (2) a proprietary interest in the subject matter, (3) a right to direct and govern the policy, and (4) a sharing in both profits and losses. Kaporovskiy, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 211. \u201cPossibly, the most important criterion of a joint venture is joint control and management of the property used in accomplishing its aims.\u201d Herst v. Chark, 219 Ill. App. 3d 690, 694 (1991). \u201cThe party who contends that a joint venture exists has the burden of proving that the parties intended such a relationship.\u201d Yokel v. Hite, 348 Ill. App. 3d 703, 708 (2004). In the absence of any one of the elements, a joint venture does not exist. O\u2019Brien, 227 Ill. App. 3d at 843.\nPlaintiff admits that the absence of control of Nana Dada by defendants would defeat a claim that defendants acted as joint venturers. As we have already found insufficient control over Nana Dada to establish an agency relationship, we find that it further defeats his joint venture claim. In addition, the authority that plaintiff relies on is readily distinguishable, as plaintiff compares this case to jurisdiction in a parent-subsidiary context instead of analyzing cases relating to joint ventures. See Alderson v. Southern Co., 321 Ill. App. 3d 832 (2001).\nIII. CONCLUSION\nFor the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court\u2019s decisions.\nAffirmed.\nCAMPBELL and O\u2019BRIEN, JJ., concur.\nThe trial court also dismissed the claims against Stamford Capital Group, the Corrigan Trust, American Country Insurance, and Muhammed Atif. Plaintiff has elected not to pursue the dismissal of these claims on appeal. He has also abandoned his alter ego argument.", "type": "majority", "author": "JUSTICE MURPHY" } ], "attorneys": [ "Michael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Stephan D. Blandid, Antonio M. Ro-manucci, Vicki Voukidis Blum, and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.", "Frances P. Kao, Justin L. Heather, and Carmin D. Ballou, all of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flora LLE Robert Comfort and David Macksey, both of Johnson & Bell Ltd., and Michael Resis, of SmithAmundsen LLC, all of Chicago, for appellees." ], "corrections": "", "head_matter": "ERIK T. DANIELS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATTON CORRIGAN et al., Defendants-Appellees (American Country Insurance Company et al., Defendants).\nFirst District (4th Division)\nNo. 1\u201406\u20141256\nOpinion filed March 31, 2008.\nMichael W. Rathsack, of Chicago (Stephan D. Blandid, Antonio M. Ro-manucci, Vicki Voukidis Blum, and Michael W. Rathsack, of counsel), for appellant.\nFrances P. Kao, Justin L. Heather, and Carmin D. Ballou, all of Skadden Arps Slate Meagher & Flora LLE Robert Comfort and David Macksey, both of Johnson & Bell Ltd., and Michael Resis, of SmithAmundsen LLC, all of Chicago, for appellees." }, "file_name": "0066-01", "first_page_order": 84, "last_page_order": 99 }